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ABSTRACT 
The early chapters are concerned with the fundamental 
policy issues associated with the demand for money function 
and those monetary features of the post-CCC 1970's which 
present problems for the determination of valid structural 
demand relationships. 
Alternative macro-demand for money models are outlined 
in Chapter 3; models which recognize the potential 
significance of both domestic and international speculation. 
After reviewing the work of other researchers my own 
empirical findings are reported in Chapters 5-9 inclusive. 
Various definitions of money were considered, including Mi 
and LM3, and it was found that simple partial adjustment 
models performed reasonably well. Simultaneity was not found 
to be important for either Ml or ZM3 and there was no 
empirical evidence to suggest that either domestic or 
international speculative influences were especially strong. 
Most of the estimated equations were plausible although small 
and weakly-determined price elasticities were found for both 
time deposits and personal sector money-holdings. Inflation 
expectations were only found to have a significant direct 
influence on Ml. The best estimated relationships passed the 
structural stability tests and provided reasonable ex-post 
forecasts for 1979. 
Work on the company sector included two special features: 
firstlys the estimation of a simple portfolio model of liquid 
asset demand and secondly, an examination of the money-holding 
behaviour of those large companies which participate in the 
(ii) 
DOI survey of company liquidity. 
The major conclusion reached is that the various 
demand for money functions, including the policy-relevant 
ZM3 definition, have been reasonably stable in the post- 
CCC 1970's with the CCC reforms only temporarily de- 
stabilising the functions. Certainly, there is no reaý 
evidence to suggest that monetarism cannot achieve its long- 
term objective of low and steady inflation because of any 
serious instability of the demand for money function. 
(iii) 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the necessary conditions for the success of monetary 
policy in achieving medium-term control over the level of 
aggregate demand, in particular the rate of inflation, is 
that a stable demand for money function can be identified. 
The empirical work embodied in this thesis is addressed to 
this particular issue and focuses on the post-Competition 
and Credit Control period, 1972-1979. 
Many studies of the demand for money have been made 
and the existing body of empirical work for the UK economy 
(work which considers at least some of the post-CCC era) 
is reported in Chapter 4. Prior to the introduction of 
Competition and Credit Control in September 1971 there was 
a wide measure of agreement amongst researchers that both 
narrow and broad money demand functions were stable. This 
finding of stability allied to the failure of existing 
demand management policies (founded on Keynesian beliefs) 
to achieve their objectives gave rise to a growing respect 
for monetarism. As a result the CCC reforms involved a 
limited move away from interest rate control towards control 
of the money supply. Further moves in this direction came 
with the introduction of flexible exchange rates in 1972, 
which made independent long-run control of the money supply 
possiblep and the announcement of money supply targets for 
LM3 from 1976 onwards. Finally, under the 1979-elected 
Conservative government, the UK monetary authorities show 
some inclination to move closer to a system of monetary base 
control, although there is some concern as to the possible 
consequences to money market behaviour. 
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In Chapter 1 the basic developments in demand for 
money theory are considered along with the essential policy 
issues in aggregate demand management. The aim here is 
merely to establish the importance of money demand behaviour 
with respect to the choice between alternative policy 
instruments for controlling the level of aggregate demand 
and to show that the success of monetary policy depends on 
a stable demand for money function. At the end of the 
chapter there is a brief summary of UK demand for money 
studies covering the pre-CCC period which produced a picture 
of stability. 
Unfortunately at the very time monetarism was gaining 
respect there came some disturbing evidence that both the Ml 
and M3 demand functions, estimated over pre-CCC years, could 
not make sense of the early post-CCC period. Studies by 
Hacche and Artis and Lewis, which are reported in Chapter 4, 
both pointed towards a definite picture of instability for 
the M3 demand function. Since these studies of the early 
post-CCC erap additional work using more recent data has also 
suggested instability for M3 although the picture for Ml is 
less clear. The relevant studies are reported in Chapter 4 
and while many investigations have been made most have focused 
on Ml rather than the policy-relevant M3 definition. Further- 
more, none of the reported broad money studies employing 
recent data have investigated the money demand behaviour of 
the personal and company sectors separately. 
Since instability of the demand for money function is 
certainly damning for monetarism (quite apart from the 
question of whether the money supply can be controlled 
sufficiently closely) 
it is important to carefully consider 
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the monetary reforms and developments of the 1970's to 
see, in particular, how these might have influenced demand 
for money behaviour. It might be the case that the simple 
demand functions that performed so well in the pre-CCC era 
need to be revised in the light of these reforms and 
developments. For example the new competitive environment 
in which the banks operated after the introduction of 
Competition and Credit Control meant that it became important 
to additionally include an own-rate on money variable in the 
demand for broad money function. It could of course be 
that the demand for money functions were only temporarily 
de-stabilised by the banking reforms of 1971, or that the 
functions shifted systematically before settling down again. 
Indeed, it might bev as Artis and Lewis suggested (see 
Chapter 4)p that the economy was off the demand for money 
curve during the years of rapid money stock growth - i. e. 
1972 and 1973! 
chapter 3 covers the modelling aspects of the 
macroeconomic demand for money iunction. After dealing with 
the question of variable selection for five different demand 
for money equations (Ml, LM3, Time deposits (TD), Personal 
sector holdings of M3 deposits (MP) and Company sector 
holdings of M3 deposits (MC)), the specification of variables 
and functional form are considered. As far as model dynamics 
are concerned a variety of popular fixed lag models, including 
partial adjustment, are described as well as flexible lag 
models based on polynomial distributed lag structures. 
Finally, estimation problems in the context of both single 
equation and simultaneous models are discussed with a view to 
the selection of optimal estimators in the empirical worX. 
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Chapter 4 consists of a survey of the existing 
empirical evidence on UK demand for money functions in the 
post-CCC 1970's. The broad aim was to present a compre- 
hensive, but certainly not exhaustive, survey specifically 
focusing on those monetary reforms and developments, 
discussed in Chapter 2, which are likely to have had an 
influence on the public's demand for money behaviour. In 
covering the post-CCC studies in this way it has been 
possible to identify areas which have either not been 
adequately covered, or even dealt with at all. In 
particular, it was possible to identify a need for further 
work,, both in terms of model specification revisions and an 
updating of the data. 
The major gaps and shortcomings in the reported 
studies were identified as follows: - 
Despite the fact that the broad money stock could 
no longer be regarded as demand-determined after 
the CCC reforms, none of the reported studies 
were explicitly set in a simultaneous model frame- 
work. In my own work simple simultaneous models 
are estimated for both Ml and ZM3 in addition to 
single equation specifications: the results are 
reported in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. 
(2) In many of the studies price homogeneity (either in 
the short-run or the long-run) has been assumed 
without any prior attempt to test whether this is 
a legitimate restriction by freely estimating the 
price and income elasticities. Since wrong estimates 
of these elasticities cculd result in money supply 
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growth policies which are either too 'tight, or 
too 'easy' it is important to try and establish 
their separate values. Although the lack of 
independent variation in the real income and price 
data made it difficult to determine the separate 
elasticities in the 1960's there has been much 
greater independent variation in the 19701s. In 
my own work the price and income elasticities have 
been freely determined and for comparison purposes 
I have also included specifications which impose 
the price restriction. 
(3) Few studies have specifically considered the asset 
or speculative demand for money. In Chapter 6 an 
extrapolative/regressive expectations hypothesis 
is considered for the return on government bonds and 
is tested for &M3 and private sector time deposits. 
This particular hypothesis was selected in the light 
of the behaviour of the bond rate during the post- 
CCC 1970's. 
(4) Only two of the reported studies specifically included 
an exchange rate variable in the demand for money 
function. In my own work I have considered the 
influence of exchange rate expectations for three 
definitions of money: LM3, private sector time 
deposits (TD) and company holdings of M3 deposits (MC). 
(5) The modelling of inflation expectations is inadequate 
in those studies which do include an inflation variable 
in the demand for money specification. Many studies 
do not include an inflation variable at all claiming 
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that the influence of inflation on the demand for 
money is largely taken up by movements in nominal 
interest rates. Chapter 7 is devoted to an investi- 
gation of the influence of inflation expectations on 
the demand for money in which two models of inflation 
expectations are specifically considered: adaptive 
expectations and extrapolative/regressive expectations. 
(6) There is a clear need for an updating of the work on 
the sectoral demand for money, particularly as the money 
demand behaviour of the personal and company sectors is 
likely to be quite different. In Chapter 8 the demand 
for money behaviour of the personal sector is investi- 
gated over the post-CCC 1970's and a similar exercise 
is conducted for the company sector in Chapter 9. 
(7) Most of the reported studies have used fixed lag 
dynamic models without providing any empirical evidence 
to show that the dynamic specifications employed are 
valid. There is a clear need for more work in the 
context of flexible lag models. Evidence from both 
fixed and flexible lag models was considered for M1 and 
the sectoral demand for broad money in my own work. 
Furthermore, the validity of the fixed lag model 
dynamics for models such as partial adjustment was 
specifically tested for each of the estimated equations. 
Transforming relationships to remove serial correlation 
in the residuals was only done in cases where a test 
statistic (x 
2) 
showed the auto-regressive restriction 
to be valid. 
10 
(8) From the introduction of CCC to the end of the 1970's 
there is just enough sample information with which-to 
estimate demand for money functions using only post- 
CCC data. Indeed, this is necessary before drawing 
any real conclusions about the stability of either the 
narrow or broad money functions in the post-CCC era. 
Accordingly, although some of my empirical work covers 
the data period 1964-1979 the vast majority of the 
reported results are based on equations estimated over 
the period 1972-1979. 
Work on the company sector, reported in Chapter 9, 
includes some special features such as the estimation of a 
disaggregated liquid asset demand model. The main aim, here, 
was to establish the strength of substitution between the 
various assets held and how a change in the pattern of interest 
rates might influence the composition of the company sector's 
asset portfolio. Another special feature is the investigation 
of the demand for money behaviour of large companies based on 
data from the Department of Industry's survey of company 
liquidity. The basic aims here are to determine whether the 
money-holding behaviour of large companies differs significantly 
from that of small companies and whether there is a significant 
difference between the money-holding behaviour of manufacturing 
as opposed to non-manufacturing companies, 
In the last chapter, in the context of a simple dynamic 
IS/LM model, it is considered whether the behaviour of the 
demand for &M3 function had provided the most serious difficul- 
ties for demand-management policies, or whether in fact the 
money supply or aggregate expenditure functions were more 
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troublesome in the post-CCC 1970's. The policy-relevant 
reduced form fiscal and money multipliers are derived from 
the structural model and the relationships between the 
structural parameters in these multiplier terms are carefully 
considered. The impact on the value of either multiplier 
resulting from any given disturbance to one or more of. the 
structural coefficients in the demand for money equation can 
readily be measured. 
After considering the formal policy issues and 
implications in the context of an IS/LM model the remainder 
of the chapter concentrates on the demand for money. A 
summary of the best single equation results is reported and 
verdicts concerning the stability of the various demand 
functions are reached. Ex-post forecasts for Ml, EM3 and 
time deposits (TD) are extended to cover. the first five 
quarters of the 1980's, a period in which there were 
disturbances to financial markets caused by changes in the 
techniques of monetary control and the sudden absence of 
exchange controls. 
Finally, policy conclusions based on the major findings 
are drawn. In this particular context the implications of 
recent work by Artis and Currie which suggests that exchange 
rate targeting might be preferable to money supply targeting 
are briefly considered. If interest rate controls are not 
considered to be an acceptable policy measure than a finding 
of instability in the demand for broad money function would 
lend itself to a policy of exchange rate targeting, 
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CHAPTER 1 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
1.1 Basic theory on the demand for mone 
Developments in demand for money theory can be traced from 
the work of the classical economists* in the early 20th 
century. 
Irving Fisher's Quantity Theory of Money (48 
although simply an identity as it stands can be interpreted, 
after making suitable important assumptionsp ** as a theory 
of the demand for money. A re-arrangement of the equation 
MV = Py leads to the following equation: 
.1 py = 2; y v 
Furthermore, since in equilibrium desired money-holdings 
equals actual money-holdings, which, of course, equals the 
stock of money in existence, we have a simple proposition 
about the demand for money: 
(2) 
Since V was regarded by the early quantity theorists as 
essentially fixed in the short-run, determined by technical 
factors associated with the structure of the economy which 
Fisher (1911)p Pigou (1917), Marshall (1923). 
These assumptions concern the nature of the relationship 
between final market transactions, Y in equation (1), and 
all transactions. only if Y varies in direct proportion 
with T will Vy be constant in the short-run assuming, of 
course that YT is. For this to be true merger and take- 
over activities, and the degree of vertical integration 
in the economy must be slow to change. 
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were likely to change slowly and predictablyt this amounted 
to assuming a direct proportionality between the stock of 
money held and the level of money national income. 
An alternative approach was the 'Cambridge Equation, , 
developed by Cambridge economists such as Marshall ( 87) and 
Pigou (111). Formally, the Cambridge Equation is identical 
with the income version of Fisher's equationp outlined above, 
and can be written as: 
(3)'4 MD = KPy where K=2; in the Fisher equation v 
However, while income was seen as the most important 
determinant of the demand for money, the view was taken that 
other variables, such as the rate of interest, might also 
have an important influence. So, unlike Fisher, they did 
not assume a direct proportionality between money-holdings 
and national income. However, there was little serious 
attempt to examine the dependence of K on other variables. 
Perhaps (3) A should be re-expressed as follows to clearly 
differentiate it from the Fisher equation: 
)B mD= K(r)Py 
These basic classical models were developed further 
by Friedman ( 51 ) and Keynes ( 74 ), respectively. 
Friedman stated that the quantity theory of money 
should be interpreted as a theory of the demand for money in 
a generalised portfolio framework; he applied basic consumer 
theory, postulating that individuals would arrange their 
portfolios so as to maximise utility. Essentiallys money 
was seen as a substitute for a wide range of assets including 
14 
human wealth. 
Friedman's demand for money function represents the 
Modern Quantity Theory of Money and can be expressed as 
f ollows: 
MDf (W R0R 13 RE 
pE h u) P. 
where, 
W Wealth 
RO Returns on capital-certain financial assets 
RB Expected returns on gilts 
RE Expected returns'on equities 
ýE Expected inflation 
h= The ratio of non-human to human wealth 
u= Tastes 
Price level 
The expected rate of inflation is included since it 
represents the cost of holding money in terms of physical 
goods: as the rate of inflation rises so people would be 
expected to substitute goods for money in their portfolios. 
Since human wealth can only be substituted to a very 
limited extent for other assets, there is a case for 
distinguishing between human and non-human wealth in the 
demand function: this is done by including the ratio of 
non-human to human wealth. 
Friedman actually makes use of permanent income, Yp, 
for empirical work since direct estimates of wealth are 
Human wealth is defined as the discounted value of 
the expected stream of earned income. 
Defined as a weighted average of current and past 
incomes. 
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unavailable. Further empirical simplifications include: 
(a) Ignoring expected capital gains or losses 
since no measure of these are available. 
(b) Dropping the rate of inflation since 
developed economies have rarely experienced 
conditions of rapidly accelerating inflation 
and movements in interest rates capture the 
influence of inflation to some extento in 
any case. 
(c) Dropping the ratio of non-human to human 
wealth. 
(d) Retaining only one rate of interest to 
represent the return on alternative financial 
assets for sound statistical reasons. 
This leaves us with the following simplified demand 
for money function: 
(5) M f(Y R u) Y permanent income TP0P 
since money is regarded as a substitute for a wide 
range of alternative assets, a change in the rate of interest 
on a particular substitute asset should lead to substitution 
from all others, to varying extents, so that the interest 
elasticity of the demand for money is not expected to be 
particularly great. Furthermore, and rather importantly for 
policy purposeso the demand for money is considered by 
The problem of multicollinearity due to interest rates 
varying closely together, so that the separate influence 
of each cannot be easily estimated. 
The demand for money is assumed to be linearly homogeneous 
in prices: there is no dispute between monetarists and 
Keynesians on this point. 
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Friedman, and other monetarists, to be a stable function 
of the few variables included in equation (5) above 
The Keynesian approach to the demand for money is 
developed from the Cambridge Equation. It defines motives 
for holding money and specifically focuses on the role of 
variables other than income in explaining the demand for 
money: in the 'Cambridge terminology' it represents an 
attempt to explain Kp which is recognized as a variable 
parameter in that equationp and one that might be importantly 
related to the Rate of Interest. 
The three motives for holding money are the transactions, 
precautionary and speculative motives: Keynes' essential 
contribution to demand for money theory was based on the 
speculative motive. While the transactions and precautionary 
money-holdings were considered to be a function of current 
income, speculative holdings depended on the expected returns 
from holding capital uncertain assets, such as bonds: these 
expected returns could be expressed as some function of the 
rate of interest on long-term bonds. 
In its simplest form the Keynesian demand for money 
function can be written as follows: 
mD=L1 (Y) +L2 (RB) 
where Y= nominal income 
RB= rate of interest on bonds 
In developing his theory on the speculative demand for 
money, Keynes made use of the concept of the normal rate of 
interest* and held that speculation about bond prices was 
Defined as that rate of interest to which individuals, on 
average# expected the ruling market rate to return to. 
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based on the relationship between the ruling market rate 
and the normal rate. Quite simply, if the market rate of 
interest on bonds was above the normal rate, then, on 
average, the public would expect the rate of interest to 
fall, and hence the price of bonds to rise. The chance to 
make capital gains from bond-holding would cause individuals 
to move out of money and into bonds. The converse holds, 
so that when the rate of interest is below the normal rate, 
individuals will tend to move out of bonds and into money 
in order to avoid capital losses. It was also suggested 
that at some low rate of interest no-one would wish to hold 
bonds. since a rise in interest rates was universally expected, 
and thus capital losses on bonds. So, at this interest rate 
floor, the public were willing to hold any amount of money 
thus rendering monetary policy impotent. -Since attempts to 
boost the American and. UK economies in the 1930's by 
increasing the money supply failed to lift these countries 
out of depression, this liquidity trap hypothesis appeared 
to be respectable. However, the hypothesis has very little 
relevance to the post-war UK economy which has mainly been 
troubled by inflation and has not experienced demand- 
deficient unemployment. 
The important question of the stability of the demand 
for money function hinged critically on the market's views 
regarding the normal rate of interest. Since these could 
change unpredictably then so could the demand for speculative 
I 
money balances: in fact there is evidence from the Radcliffe 
Report of 1959 (113)* that the demand for money function was 
Radcliffe Committeep 1959, paragraph 391. 
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considered to be highly unstable, and this supported 
Keynesian rather than monetarist policies. Besides the 
question of the stability of the function, another point 
of dispute between Keynesians and monetarists concerns the 
interest elasticity of demand for money: Keynesians 
believe the rate on long-term government bonds is the most 
relevant ratef and that the demand for money is fairly 
interest-elasticp whereas monetarists maintain that the 
short-term rate of interest is relevant, and that the value 
of the interest-elasticity is fairly small. The policy 
significance of such beliefs and the empirical evidence 
on them will be considered in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
Criticism of the Keynesian theory is particularly 
directed towards two aspects of the speculative demand for 
money. The first concerns the money-bonds choice, where it 
is argued that money should really be regarded as a close 
substitute for short-term capital-certain assets - e. g. 
local authority deposits - and that to suggest that people 
will either hold money or bonds is unrealistic since it 
ignores these more obvious avenues of substitution. - 
Howeverp this criticism was easily countered by Leijonhufvud 
( 84) who suggested that Keynes had in mind the substitution 
between a variety of short-term assets which were capital 
certaino and longer-term financial assets, such as government 
bonds# which were subject to capital riskp when discussing 
the money-bonds choice. 
The second aspect concerns the 'all-money' or 
, all-bonds' holdings of individuals which fails to square 
with the diversified portfolios held 
in practice. The 
. 
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'General Theory' is rather vague concerning expectations 
about bond prices, but Keynes has generally been interpreted 
to have assumed that each individual held his expectations 
with certainty2 so that if any particular individual expects 
to make a gain from bond holdingp then there is no incentive 
for him to hold any speculative money balances and vice-versa. 
Tobin (131) attempted to deal with this particular 
criticism by arguing that liquidity preference must essentially 
be based on uncertainty in the mind of each investor concerning 
future rates of interest. He used indifference curve analysis 
to suggest that individuals attempt to maximise utility from 
their asset-holdings according to their relative tastes for 
risk., and expected return on bonds. 
* Some individuals will 
be risk-lovers and will go for maximum risk which means they 
will hold all bondsp but most will be risk-averters seeking 
higher expected returns for additional risk; typically risk- 
averters will hold a diversified portfolio. Although Tobin 
uses the two-asset framework, money and bonds, for simplicity, 
the theory holds for the In asset' case. 
Finally, brief mention must be made of the criticisms 
regarding the separability of the money demand function into 
, transactions demand, regarded as technologically determined, 
and the asset demand, being treated as a matter of choice. ' 
Reconciling the diverse motives into a consistent single 
theory is most commonly attempted by rationalising a non-zero 
It is assumed in the Tobin model that a fall in 
the price of bonds is just as likely as a rise in 
the price of bonds, so that the expected return 
from holding bonds equals the rate of interest. 
(2) Perhaps the variability of bond prices could be 
used as a measure of risk. 
** Johnson ( 68 ) p. 92. 
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interest elasticity of transaction balances. Baumol ( 17) 
and Tobin (130) obtain results which make transaction 
balances vary inversely 'viith the rate of interest. From 
Baumol's inventory-theoretic model* an income elasticity 
of -ý0.5 and an interest elasticity of -0.5 can be formally 
derived. However# these values depend on some questionable 
assumptions underlying'the model which when relaxed 
irýtroduce greater flexibility with a range of possible 
values for the elasticities. The assumptions are as follows: 
(1) A known and steady stream of expenditures 
which have to be paid for in cash. 
(2) The cash is obtained by withdrawals from 
interest-bearing assets or directly in 
the form of income. In either case the 
larger the volume of cash balances held, 
the greater is the interest return which 
is sacrificed. 
Baumol argues that there are costs involved in making 
portfolio changes for transactions purposes: such costs 
will include brokers' feesq time and nuisance costs and 
administrative costs. In his model Baumol refers to these 
costs, collectively, as Triokerage costs. Such costs will 
not be important if wealth tends to be held in the form 
of non-interest bearing money. However, this involves the 
sacrifice of interest which is available on other assets. 
Clearly, brokerage costs must be balanced against interest 
forgone on cash balances. 
The following expression for transactions demand is 
derived from his model: 
M= 
I_E_ 
T 
r 
b= brokerage costs per cash withdrawal 
T= value of transactions over period 
r= rate of interest 
This result suggests strong economies of scale in the 
holdings of cash balances. 
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A fixed brokerage cost is incurred per 
transfer between cash and earning assets. 
Further developments to the transactions demand 
approach include the work of Orr (930108) and Miller (93)* 
who consider the consequences of relaxing assumption (1) 
above, while retaining the other assumptions in Baumol's 
model. In the face of uncertainty over the timing of pay- 
ments, which is a more realistic assumptiono the authors 
demonstrate that the demand for money is related to the 
variance of transactions rather than the level of trans- 
actions. Thiss in turnp means that there will be a range of 
possible values which the income and interest elasticities 
may take. 
Another assumption in the Baumol model which can be 
challenged is that of the fixed brokerage costs. Indeed, 
as Brunner and Meltzer (22) point out, if there is a variable 
component in the brokerage costs then the 'square-root' 
formula no longer holds. 
Perhaps the most damning criticism of transactions 
demand models concerns the neglect of certain institutional 
features of the monetary system - e. g. the availability of 
overdraft and credit facilities, and the imposition of bank 
charges when average current account holdings fall below a 
certain specified level in any given charges period. This, in 
turn, means that such models are likely to be of limited 
practical use. In the US Sprenkle (123,124) found that the 
percentage of the actual cash balances held by large firms 
that could be explained by the simple Baumol model was only 
in the region of 2L24/.! Another study by Aronson (7) showed 
A good account of this work can be found in Goodhart (56) 
p. 25-28. 
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that the state and local governments in the U. S. appear to 
hold larger money balances than the Baumol model suggests. 
In addition to the developments and criticisms 
outlined abovep it must be remembered that the theory applies 
at the micro-level and that potentially serious aggregation 
problems limit its usefulness at the macro-level. 
1.2 The demand for money and monetary policy 
This can be considered in an IS/LM framework, * in which the 
IS curve represents points of equilibrium between investment 
and savings, and the LM curve points of equilibrium between 
the money supply and the demand for money, at different 
levels of national income: the IS curve represents 
equilibrium in the goods markett whereas the LM curve 
represents equilibrium in the money market. This Hicksian 
framework was developed at a time when demand-deficient 
unemployment was the pressing issue, so that inflation was 
not a problem. With the assumptions of downwardly inflexible 
prices and a cushion of unemployed resources which could 
easily be brought into production, changes in money national 
income were equivalent to changes in real national income. 
Essentiallyp then, the variables in this model are all in 
real terms. 
Despite the usefulness of the IS/LM approach in 
illustrating key policy issues it does have its shortcomings. 
Brunner and Meltzer (23 ) suggest three major deficiencies. 
" 
The IS/LM framework represents the Neo-Keynesian Theory 
of the Rate of Interest and was originally developed by 
Hicks ( 66 ) and elaborated on by Hansen ( 61 
Ibid p. 951-952. 
23 
Firstlys that variables of interest are either omitted 
or combined - e. g. bonds and real capital are treated as 
a single asset and there is only one relative price, the 
rate of interest. Secondly, that none of the models based 
on the approach have been able to provide a reliable 
explanation of prices2 output and interest rates. 
Finallys they point to the fact that the standard macro- 
theory has not been extended or modified to incorporate 
some of the main developments in monetary theory. One such 
development is the work on portfolio balance by Tobin (132) 
which introduces relative prices into the analysis of 
asset demand. Another specific weakness of the standard 
IS/LM approach is that it ignores the labour market; only 
the goods and money markets are considered. 
However, since the IS/LM approach*has been widely 
used by economists and because it brings out the essential 
policy issues concerning the demand for money in a clear 
and simple way, it is clearly a useful tool despite the 
aforementioned shortcomings. 
Now, under ceteris paribus assumptions the greater 
(1) the interest elasticity of demand for money, then the 
greater the elasticity of the LM curve, and (2) the 
greater the income elasticity of demand for money, the 
more inelastic the LM curve will be. Since there is a 
dispute between Keynesians and Monetarists regarding the 
interest-elasticity of demand for money it is useful to 
focus on just this aspect, in an IS neutral caseq in order 
to highlight the implications for monetary policy. 
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FIGURE 1 
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R, 
K R2 
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yK yM 22 
Initial rate of interest 
R2 New rate of interest 
y1 Original level of na 
y2 New level of nationa 
M Monetarist Position 
= Original level of national income 
= New level of national income 
= Monetarist position 
K= Keynesian position, 
The above diagram clearly shows that for a given 
increase in the supply of money, the level of national 
income will rise further and the interest rate fall further, 
when the demand for money is relatively interest-inelastic 
- i. e. on the LMM curves. The level of national income 
rises from Y to YM, while the interest rate falls from R 2 
to RM. The alternative Keynesian position involves a smaller 2 
fall in the rate of interest to RK and most significantly 2 
a smaller increase in output to yK 2' 
So. under ceteris paribus assumptions, monetary policy 
has a weaker influence on national output the greater the 
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interest elasticity of the demand for money. This helps 
to explain the Keynesian emphasis on fiscal rather than 
monetary policy to influence the level of national output. 
However, if the money-income multiplier is relatively 
low because the demand for money is interest-elasticq all 
that is necessary to achieve the target level of national 
income is a larger increase in the money supply; providing 
the value of the multiplier is known and remains stable over 
time, then the target can be hit. In the context of the 
above diagram this simply means pushing the IM 
K 
curve 
further to the right. Only in the liquidity trap situation 
would such a policy be futile, so providing the interest- 
elasticity is less than perfectly elastic, monetary policy 
can still be successfully used to achieve the policy goal. 
on the question of the stability of the demand for 
money function, monetarists believe it to be relatively 
stable whereas Keynesians, on grounds of the speculative 
demand, believe it is relatively unstable. Keynesians also 
believe that the IS curve can shift unpredictablyq although 
the instability is much less serious than for the LM curve, 
while monetarists believe that the IS curve is relatively 
stablep but less so than the LM curve. To clearly focus on 
the stability, or otherwise, of the demand for money function, 
it is assumed that the IS curve is relatively stable. 
Figure 2 below shows that instability of the demand for 
money function, which causes the LM curve to shift either to 
the right or left, can lead to serious fluctuations in the 
level of national income, without any change in the money 
supply. LM 1 and LM 2 represent shifts away 
from the desired 
position and are associated with levels of national 
income, 
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Y1 and Y2 , respectively, which fail to coincide with the 
target level Y*. 
FIGURE 2 LM 1 
R1 
R2 
Y* y 
In view of this, Keynesians claim that attempts to 
control the level of aggregate demand by manipulating the 
money stock are pointless and that a policy which aims to 
control interest rates is more appropriate. In the context 
of the above example, an interest rate policy involves 
increasing the stock of money when the demand for money 
increases shifting the LM curve back to LMl, and reducing 
the stock of money when the demand for money suddenly falls 
shifting the LM curve to LM2* In this way interest rates 
can be kept at, or near, the target level R* and fluctuations 
around the target level of incomep Y*p minimised. 
so, in a dynamic contextp monetarists emphasise the 
importance of controlling the growth of the money stock to 
achieve the target growth of national income, because they 
believe that the demand for money function is essentially 
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stablep whereas Keynesians emphasise interest. rate control 
since they believe the function to be inherently unstable. 
1.3 The demand for money and fiscal polic 
To highlight the importance of the demand for money with 
respect to fiscal policyp the interest-elastic and interest- 
inelastic D-M cases are considered in the context of 'neutral 
IS curves'. 
In Figure 3, belowp there is assumed to be an increase 
in government spending which shifts the IS curve from IS to 
IS, * It can readily be seen that the steeper LM curveg 
associated with the monetarist belief that the interest 
elasticity of demand for money is lowp results in an equili- 
brium change which involves only a small increase in output, 
from Y to YM and a relatively large rise in the interest rate, 1 
from R to RM In contrast, the Keynesian case leads to a 11 
more significant increase in output and a smaller rise in 
FIGURE 3 
Rm 1 
RK I 
R 
yK 
* Neutral in the sense of slope, not position. 
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interest rates; income rises from Y to YK and the interest 1 
K 
rate rises from R to Rl. 
Quite clearly, a greater increase in government 
spending combined with the acceptance of interest rates 
higher than RM will be necessary if the economy is on the 
steeper LM curve, LM 
M 
and the target level of national 
K income coincides with Yl, 
Fiscal'policy is seen to have a stronger influence on 
output when the demand for money is interest elastic; hence, 
Keynesians tend to advocate fiscal policy for manipulating 
the level of aggregate demand. 
It should be clearly pointed out that the above case 
represents 'pure fiscal policylp where the increased govern- 
ment spending is entirely financed from non-bank sources - 
i. e. the money is raised from the sale of securities* to the 
non-bank private sector. Government spending financed by 
loans from the banking system should, properly speaking, be 
viewed as a fiscal/monetary hybrid policy. In the context 
of Figure 3 above both the IS and LM curves shift to the 
right. This implies that it is clearly dangerous to assume 
that a close relationship between the PSBR and monetary 
growtht on the &M3 definition, can be taken as showing that 
fiscal targets are broadly consistent with money supply 
targets, as do Pepper and Wood (1976) (109). Before the mid- 
1970's increases in government borrowing were commonly 
financed by the banks, which simply meant that money supply 
increases were financing larger budget deficits. Does this 
represent monetary policy, fiscal policy, or both? 
Proceeds from the sale of public sector assets and the 
surpluses made by public corporations represent 
additional'sources of funds. 
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The relationship between the PSBR, interest rates 
and the money supply is now seen as a crucial but somewhat 
controversial issue i. n aggregate demand management policy. 
Chapter 6 in the House of Commons Report on Monetary Policy, 
1980-81, (133) outlines the views of the Treasury and 
economists of different persuasion, such as Laidler, K. aldor 
and Minford on this issue. The Treasury view is that in the 
fight against inflation the PSBR must be consistent with 
low money growth in order to avoid continually rising rates 
of interest on government debt (a view which is not supported 
by any evidence from a sophisticated structural model of the 
economy). This implies either government spending cuts and/ 
or tax increases when the target growth rates for ZM3 are 
reduced. Such fiscal contraction with the economy already 
in recession can only lead to further falls in output and 
rising unemployment. However, in these circumstances the 
, built-in fiscal stabilisers' cause the PSBR to rise and 
following the 'Treasury view, either higher interest rates 
must be accepted, or further cuts in government spending 
madep if the monetary targets set for ZM3 are to be strictly 
observed. Further fiscal restraint will set up a vicious 
circle in which output continues to fall and unemployment 
rises! A more flexible approach to monetary targets such 
as that followed by the West German Bundesbank might well 
be in order. 
Finally, comment must be made regarding fiscal policy 
and the stability of the demand for money function. As 
Keynesians believe that the function is inherently unstable, 
it follows that Keynesian monetary policies involve interest 
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rate &ontrols, with changes in the supply of money being 
made according to discerned changes in the demand for money. 
so, a combination of fiscal and monetary policy is clearly 
necessary if national income targets are to be achieved. 
1.4 Government economic policy in qeneral and the demand 
for money 
If monetary policy is to be a successful form of macro- 
demand management then both the IS and LM functions must be 
relatively stable. Although monetarists regard the 
consumption function as being less stable than the demand 
for money function (Friedman (53 ) p. 8), they still believe 
it to be fairly stable. To stress the importance of this 
consider the following extracts from Laidler ( 78) and 
Nobay (107). 
"It is obvious ...... that if the value 
of the money multiplier is to remain 
stable over time, then so must the para- 
meters of both the demand for money 
function and the aRgregate expenditure 
function. " 
LAIDLER (1978) 
(2) "A necessary and sufficient condition for 
a stable money multiplier is the existence 
both of a stable demand for money function 
and a stable expenditure function. " 
NOBAY (1972) 
The truth of such statements can be demonstrated by reference 
to the IS/LM diagram overleaf: 
31 1 
TM 
Rl 
R0 
R* 
is 
1 
y 
Providing the parameters of the expenditure and money 
functions are actually known, and both are stable, then the 
economy will move from Yo to the policy target level Y* 
following an increase in the money supply which shifts the 
LM curve out to LMl, However, instability which takes the 
government by surprise, could result in a shift of the IS 
curve either backwards to IS 2 or forwards to IS 11 In the 
first case there is no change in the level of national income, 
which remains at Yo, and in the second case Y rises well 
beyond the target level of Y* to Y19 Quite clearly, any 
serious instability in the IS function could lead to the 
failure of monetary policy to achieve its goals despite the 
existence of a highly stable demand for money function. 
Evidence of serious instability in the consumption 
function emerged for many OECD countries in the mid-1970's. 
As Table 1.1 overleaf indicates, there were sharp rises in 
the personal savings ratio during the period 1973-1975, (and 
again in 1978 and 1979) in the U. K. 
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TABLE 1.1 
Personal Savinqs Ratio 1970-1979 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
Savings 9.3 7.6 9.7 11.7 13.5 12.7 11.8 10.5 12.4 13.8 Ratio 
The high savings ratios in 1974 and 1975 went against 
received theory (Friedman ( 52 ) and Morgan Grenf ell ( 98 )). 
Despite high rates of inflation and a deep recession in 1975 
the savings ratio was significantly higher than it had been 
in the early 1970's. This surprising rise in the savings 
ratio is equivalent to the IS curve shifting to the left, as 
indicated in Figure 4 above. 
However, even if the parameters in an equilibrium 
IS/LM model are stable, this does not guarantee the efficiency 
of monetary policy. There is the important question of 
possible stochastic shocks in short-run models, which can 
critically influence both the pattern and speed of adjustment 
to equilibrium: if monetary policy is to be used for fine- 
tuning purposes then this will be important. Indeed, since 
the lag structures involved in both the expenditure and money 
functions are likely to be complex, anyway, there must be a 
great deal of uncertainty regarding short-run adjustment. 
The important question of lag structures is explored further 
in Chapter 10. 
Even assuming all this is in order there are still the 
familiar problems of information lags, policy reaction and 
policy implementation lags, as well as information weaknesses 
and inaccuracies. Since these problems are common to each of 
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the alternative macro-policies they will not be discussed 
further here, except to say that there are relatively long 
lags, at least 18 months, before changes in the money supply 
feed through to prices. 
That the basic IS/LM model excludes the labour market 
has already been remarked upon. Ignoring the labour market 
when conducting economic policy can clearly frustrate the 
achievement of policy targets: for example, the essentially 
monetarist policies of the 1979 elected Conservative 
Government were not combined with an incomes policy for private 
sector workers. A monetary squeeze in the face of wage 
resistance has led to serious unemployment and a fall in 
output. In the short-run at least, such a fall in output 
can mean persistently high inflation despite tight monetary 
and fiscal policies. There is clearly feedback relevance as 
far as the demand for money is concerned. Firstly, unless 
the separate real. income and price elasticities are well- 
established, a change in the balance between the relative 
variation in the two variables, may lead to empirical results 
which suggest that the demand for money function is unstable, 
when in fact it is stable! Clearly, the typical assumption 
that the demand for money is linearly homogeneous with respect 
to prices is a dangerous one, especially for the LM3 
definition of the money stock, as my empirical results in 
Chapter 6 clearly suggest. Secondly, if inflation expect- 
ations significantly influence private sector wage demands, 
and assuming the absence of money illusion in the labour 
market they must where jobs are not threatened, then the 
longer it takes for inflation to slow-down, so changes in 
either output or income velocitYP or 
both, must persist. The 
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question of whether the rate of inflation is a significant 
determinant of the demand for money is taken up in Chapter 
7. Clearly, if it is, its exclusion from the demand for 
money function may again lead to false conclusions about the 
stability of the function, and/or, the values of the 
parameters. Even if inflation is not directly influential 
it may well be that the parameters of the demand for money 
function themselves vary with the rate of inflation, so that 
unless the parameters are endogenised in some way, the 
empirical work will give misleading information about the 
demand for money. 
As yet, nothing specific has been said about the policy 
significance of the alternative money supply definitions, 
and whether the money supply, itself, can be controlled 
fairly closely. This is the subject of the next section, 
and quite clearly if it can not be controlled then the stability 
of the demand for money function has no policy significance. 
1.5 Alternative definitions of mo 
siqnificance 
and their 
The official definitions of money are Ml, ZM3 and M3: Ml 
consists of notes and coin in circulation and sterling sight 
deposits held by the private sector; f. M3 equals Ml + private 
sector sterling time deposits, and public sector sterling 
deposits; M3 equals ZM3 + U. K. residents' foreign currency 
deposits. It should be noted that a small, but growingt 
proportion of M1 deposits are interest-bearing. 
The U. K. 
monetary authorities have treated the &M3 
definition as the 
policy-relevant aggregate since 1976: this was preferred 
to the M3 definition since firstly, a large proportion of 
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U. K. residents, foreign currency deposits consist of the 
working balances of multi-national companies which have 
little connection with the monetary situation within the 
U. K., and secondlyo exchange rate fluctuations will cause 
the sterling value of these foreign currency deposits to 
fluctuate quite sharply. 
The authorities have tended to give more weight to 
the &M3 definition than M1 since the latter is essentially 
demand-determined with frequent shifting of funds into and 
out of current accounts as interest rates change. 
Although the ZM3 definition of the money supply 
certainly has its weaknesses* it happens to be the policy- 
relevant variable for the U. K. economy. Monetary targets 
have been defined in terms of SM3 since 1976 and increasing 
importance has been attached to them since this date: 
initially the target annual rate of growth was set at 9-13% 
before being changed to 8-12% for the fiscal year 1978/79, 
and then to 7-11% by the new Conservative Government in June 
1979. 
These relatively broad target ranges reflect the 
difficulty of controlling the money supply very precisely, 
but the ability of the monetary authorities to keep the 
growth of ZM3 within the target range can be taken as a fair 
degree of control. In fact, during May 1978 the Bank of 
one weakness concerns the rather arbitrary exclusion of 
sterling deposits held by non-residents, while another 
concerns the influence of a balance of payments dis- 
equilibrium on the money supply figures (see Dennis 
( 36 ) p. 16f ). 
The government's medium-term financial strategy (MTFS) 
for the period 1980/81-1983/84 set out ranges for the 
growth of LM3 declining by 1% each year from 7-11% in 
1980/81 to 4-80/o in 1983/84. These targets were to be 
strictly adhered to (but see following footnote). 
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Englahd published figures showing that the growth of ZM3 
was 16'-elo over the financial year 1977/78; over 3 percentage 
points above the top end of the target range for that year! 
Again, in 1979 the growth of ZM3 was excessive., but only 
just outside the top end of the target range. This evidence 
could be interpreted as suggesting that even exercising 
a reasonably close control over the money stock is a difficult 
matterv or alternatively, that the political will to control 
it closely, despite stated intentions, was lacking! 
It is clearly possible that even when ZM3 can be kept 
within its target growth range, the technique of control 
used may interfere with its policy significance. Suppose 
that under one regime of monetary controls, a stable money- 
income multiplier can be identified (which will mean that a 
stable demand for money function exists) and then a new 
technique of control, such as the 'corset' in December 
1973, is introduced. It is clearly possible that the method 
of control used may lead to distortions in financial 
markets which cause instability in the demand for money 
function and hence loosen, or destroy, the ultimate policy 
significance of controlling the growth of ZM3. The influence 
of competition and credit control and the supplementary 
deposit scheme on ZM3 is considered in some detail in 
Chapter 2. 
This possible sensitivity of the policy significance 
of SM3 to changes in the techniques of monetary control and 
financial market conditions, raises the important question 
of whether a wider definition of money, including liquid 
assets such as Building Society deposits, ought to be 
S/ 
considered. 
* Perhaps an empirical search for a bundle of 
liquid assets which is most stably related to national 
income is called for? 
one empirical approach to determining the appropriate 
definition of money has been suggested by Laumas ( 81). 
He used a regression approach in which changes in the 
national income,, LY, are firstly regressed on a narrow 
definition of money excluding interest-bearing depositso 
A M. Subsequent regressions are then run with an additional 
variable, interest-bearing liquid assets, included. AS 
represents changes in this variable, and its definition is 
gradually broadened to include a wider range of short-term 
assets. The regression equation takes the following form: 
LY =A+b1LM+b2 Jýý' S+ U' 
b2/b, then represents the Imoneyness' of the additional 
short-term assets included in the equation: essentially, 
it is the contribution of additional assets introduced 
towards the explanation of variations in national income 
which is under consideration. 
However, while this constitutes an interesting approach 
to the problem, the results obtained do depend critically on 
the form of the model used and on the accuracy of its 
The distortion to the growth of LM3 caused by the 
reintermediation of funds following the removal of the 
corset in June 1980 prompted the introduction of wider 
measures of liquidity; PSLl and PSL2 (private sector 
liquidity). In these circumstances no attempt was made 
by the authorities to keep LM3 within its target growth 
range (it actually grew by about 20% in 1980) . However, 
once the distorting effects of the removal of the corset 
had worked through it was intended that the most important 
single monetary target variable should be ZM3 with other 
measures of liquidity serving as important indicators of 
the underlying monetary conditions. 
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specification. Alsol the function should remain stable 
regardless of changes in both techniques of monetary 
control and in the institutional structure of financial 
markets. Finally, even if these conditions were satisfied 
for a particular monetary aggregate, M*, then the monetary 
authorities would need to exercise control over the new 
aggregate: effective controls would now have to be applied 
to a wider range of financial institutionsp which may 
easily encourage new avenues of substitution between 
financial assets, and possibly the introduction of new ones. 
Such changes might easily disturb the velocity of the 
monetary aggregate, M*. 
Another approach to the problem of selecting the 
appropriate definition of money is based on the substitution 
criterion: for examplep if the substitution between demand 
and time deposits is significantly lower than that between 
time deposits and other liquid assets, then money should be 
defined narrowly. For the U. K. economy, Mills and Wood (1977) 
(94 ) found no evidence to suggest that 9, M3 and the 
liabilities of non-bank financial intermediaries are close 
substitutes. So, on the substitution criterion the latter 
should not be included in the definition of money, if these 
findings are to be accepted. If the chosen definition, on 
this criterionp is to be useful for policy purposes, then 
manipulation of the growth of the relevant aggregate must 
be 
seen to have an important influence on the growth of national 
income - 
To quote Laidler ( 76 )*, 
* P. 515 
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"As far as the definition of money is concerned 
the most important issue has been the identif- 
ication and measurement of a stable aggregate 
demand for money function ...... A more stable demand function is precisely one that permits 
the consequences of shifting the money supply 
to be more accurately predicted. " 
Perhaps, in the light of the discussion above, we should add 
that, ideally, such stability should hold quite independently 
of the techniques of monetary control employedp and that the 
defined aggregate is actually capable of being controlled! 
1.6 Empirical findinqs in the UK prior to Competition 
and Credit Control: support for monetarism 
A summary of the empirical results for the UK is given in 
Table 1.2. Typically, the official definitions of the money 
stockp Ml and M3, have been used to represent the dependent 
variable, but various series have been used to represent the 
income and interest rate variables; for example, Laidler 
and Parkin (80) used the Treasury bill rate to represent the 
short-term rate of interest, whereas Hacche and Price (59, 
112) used the rate on local authority deposits, and. 
Hamburger (60) used the 3 month euro-dollar rate. Some of 
the studies are concerned with the long-run demand for money 
(71,77) while most are concerned with the short-run demand 
for money, and employ quarterly data. Those results in Table 
1.2 for which no estimate of the price elasticity is given 
are based on specifications which used nominal rather than 
real income as the constraint variable. Most of the short-run 
studies have employed relatively stralghtforward dynamic 
specifications which are simply 
imposed rather than deter- 
mined by the data 
itself: partial adjustment and adaptive 
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expectations (see Chapter 3) are commonly assumed. 
Price (112), who looks at persons' and companies' holdings 
of M3 separately, is an exception, however. He used a 
flexible lag approach* and obtained significantly different 
estimates of income and price elasticities from most of the 
other empiricists; the income elasticity was well over 2 
for both sectors, while the work of others suggests it is 
less than 1 for both Ml and M3. As for price nearly all 
empiricists have simply imposed an elasticity of 1.0, because 
this is what theory suggests it ought to be. In contrast, 
Price freely estimates this elasticity for both the personal 
and company sectors obtaining values which are less than 
unity; 0.90 and 0.41, respectively. Coghlan in a later 
study (27 ) also uses a flexible lag model, results from 
which suggest very low long-run price elasticities for data 
periods 1964(1)-70(4) and 1964(l)-71(4); 0.36 and 0.52, 
respectively. For Ml, these seem unreasonably low although 
the results do appear to be sensitive to sample size, 
judging from his results covering longer periods. 
As far as estimates of the interest elasticity are 
concerned these vary considerably from one study to another 
depending on whether a short-term or long-term interest rate 
is used, and whether Ml or M3 is the dependent variable. The 
important point to note is that almost every study reveals 
that the interest rate is an important explanatory variable 
having a statistically significant negative coefficients 
as theory suggests it should have. This means that the 
extreme monetarist and Keynesian stances are decisively 
* Flexible lag models are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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rejected, and that the only remaining policy issue concerns 
the stability of the function itself. 
The empirical results strongly suggested that the 
demand for money function was stable in the 'Pre-Competition 
and Credit Control era', and this finding was certainly one 
of the reasons for the swing towards monetarism in the U. K. 
in the early 19701s. In connection with the stability of 
the Ml function it should be noted that later work by Rowan 
and Miller (1979) ( 92 )9 and Laumas (1978) ( 82 ) who used 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques', agreed with the 
earlier empirical findings; Laumas also confirmed the 
stability of the broader aggregates M3. My own work* also 
supported the stability conclusion for both Mi and M3*, 
* 
However$ despite the general findings for stability, 
Coghlan (27 ) feels that caution ought to be exercised. As 
is evident from Table 1.2, taken from Coghlan's paper, there 
is a great deal of variation in these results, so that we 
cannot be very confident about the true values of the 
parameters. Secondly, estimates of the parameters are not 
always well-determined, partly because the sample periods 
tend to be short, and partly because of the common trending 
in the data. Thirdly, it is likely that the fixed lag 
structures, which in the case of the commonly applied partial 
adjustment hypothesis constrains the lag paths on each of 
the explanatory variables to be the same, represents a mis- 
specification of the dynamics. 
Ml results are reported in Chapter 5 and M3 results in 
Chapter 6. 
For the purposes of estimating equations over the data 
period 19641-19794P &M3, rather than M3. was used to 
represent broad money in the pre-CCC era. 
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. While Coghlan agrees that the instability suggested 
by the Radcliffe Committee (113) was not present, he 
emphasises that there is still a large gap between this 
and the conclusion that the demand for money function is 
stable! 
However, despite Coghlan's views it is probably true 
to say that by 1971 there was widespread agreement that 
both the Ml and M3 demand functions were essentially stablef 
and any areas of doubt were essentially concerned with the 
question of whether the function was stable enough for 
monetary fine-tuning policies. Certainly monetarism. had 
now become respectable! 
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TABLE 1.2 
Demand for money in the United Kinqdom: summary of results 
Author Data Money Interest Interest Income Income Price 
rate clasticitylal variable clasticity[a) 
Kavanagh and Annual: 1880-1961 Broad Long -0.31 (-0.22)[b) GNP 1.149 - Walters 1926-1961 Broad Long -0.50 (-0.25)[b] GNP - 
Crouch Quarterly: 1954-1965 LCB Bank Long -0.50 GNP 1.08 - Deposits (total) 
Fisher Quarterly: 1955(l)- Narrow Short -0.11 PDI 0.686 - 1967(2) Broad Short - PDI 0.742 - Narrow Long -0.30 PDI 0.686 - Broad Long - PDl 0.74-1 - 
Goodhart and Quarterly: 1955(3)- Narrow Short -1.05 GDP 1.25 - Crockett 1969(3)/1963(2)- Narrow Long -0.80 GDP 1.09 - 1969(3) Broad Short -0-091-0.21[c] GDP 0.77/1.50[c) - Broad Long -0.35/-0.51[c) GDP 1.09/1.89[c] - 
Laidler and Quarterly: 1 955(3)- Broad Short -0.009 GDP 0.69 1* 
Parkin 1967(4) (perm. ) 
Laidler Annual: M-1965 Broad Long -0.570 GDP 0.795 to 
1900-1913 Broad Long -0.268 1.241 10 1920-1938 Broad Long -0.448 GPD 0.793 1* 1946-1965 Broad Long -0.739 GDP 0.684 1. 
Price Quarterly: 1964(l) Broad Short - 1970(4): Persons Broad Long -0.30 GDP 2.29 0.90 Quarterly: 1964(l) Broad Short -0.36 1970(4): Companies Broad Long - GDP 2.77 0.41 
Racche Quarterly: 1963(4)- Narrow Short -0.091 TEE 0.391 Is 1971(3) Long -0.184 Broad Short -0.091 TEE 0.450 10 
Long - Persons Broad Short - PDI 0.927 1* Long -0.069 
Companies Broad Short -0.067 TEE 0.511 Is 
Long -0.197 
Quarterly; 1 963(4)- Narrow Short -0.062 TEE 0.697 to 1972(4) Long -0.206 Broad Short - TEE I* Long 
Persons Broad Short - PDI 1.081 1* Long -0.110 
companies Broad Short -0.044 TEE 2.206 Is 
Long -0.696 
Quarterly: 1 963(4)- Broad Short -0.248 TEE O. "s Is 
1972(4) Long - Own rate 0.537 
Companies Broad Short - TEE 1.003 Is 
Long -0.345 
Own rate 0.568 
Artis and Quarterly: 
Lewis[d) 1963(2ý4970(4) Narrow Long -0.26 GDP 0.77 
1963(2)-1971(4) Narrow Long -0.39 GDP 0.95 1963(2)-1973(l) Narrow Long -0.66 GDP 1.24 
11963(2ý4970(4) Broad Long -0.47 GDP 1.42 1963(2)-1971(4) Broad Long -0.52 GDP 1.49 1963(2ý4973(11) Broad Long -3.00 GDP . 
4.27 
Hamburger Quarterly: 1 963(2) Narrow Shortfel - 1.20(f) GDP 0.672 1971(l) Longjej -1.071fj 
Key 
A long-run unitary price elasticity imposed. 
GNP - Gross national product 
PDI - Personal disposable income 
TFE - Total final expenditure 
(a] These are the long-run elasticities. 
1b) From the same equation estimated in first differences. 
[c) Results for money on a broad definition for both M2 and M3 respectively, 
(d] Here only the results of the standard approach are summarised, and not the attempts to provide an improved specification. 
[C) In this case the short rate is the three-month curo-dollar rate, and the long rate is the dividcnd-price ratio on ordinary shares. 
if) These are not the interest elasticity, but the elasticity times oneplus the rate of interest divided by the rateof interest. 
SOURCE: 'A transactions demand for money' R. T. Coghlan. 
in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, March 1978. 
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CHAPTER 
MONETARY REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1970'S 
AND THEIR LIKELY IMPACT ON THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
2.0 Introductory remarks 
The introduction of Competition and Credit Control in the 
UK in 19719 together with the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1972 and the rapid 
acceleration of inflation after 1973 represented important 
market changes which may well have contributed to the 
apparent failure of relatively simple demand for money 
functions to make sense of the 19701s; functions which had 
appeared to be relatively stable prior to 1971. 
Other problems included breaks in the official money 
stock series, a switch of policy emphasis from M3 to LM3 
in 1976, and a growing interest-bearing component in the Ml 
definition of the money supply. 
2.1 Competition and credit control 
In September 1971 major reforms were made in the UK banking 
system aimed at widening and unifying the controls on bank 
lending# and at the same time promoting competition both 
between individual banks, and between banks and other 
financial institutions. These reforms included the 
definition of a new multiple reserve assets base which 
applied to all banks# the abandonment of the clearing banks- 
interest rate cartel and the lifting of quantitative ceilings 
on bank lending, and a move away from the policy of interest 
rate control in the gilt-edged market. For full details of 
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these reforms the 1971 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletins 
should be consulted ( 13 ). 
2.1.1 The competitive phase of competition and credit 
control 
It could be argued that the period September 1971-November 
1972 was the true competitive phase: -the rapid expansion 
of bank lending which occurred during the first year was 
no doubt prompted by the monetary authorities' wish to create 
conditions for a recovery from the sharp recession in 1971 
which was due to a weakening of demand, including a fall in 
exports. It took the sterling crisis of June 1972 to halt 
the expansive stance of monetary policy, and in August 1972 
the Bank of England exercised its right to give qualitative 
guidance on bank lending by asking banks to make credit less 
easily available for property companies and other financial 
institutions, and to give priority to manufacturing industry. 
The initial rapid expansion of the money supply was 
prompted by several factors. Firstly, the banks were now 
required to hold a minimum ratio of reserve assets to 
eligible liabilities of 1212%; an arrangement which replaced 
the former liquidity ratio of 28%. This left the London 
clearing banks with massive free reserves to be used for 
expanding lending. Secondly, the abandonment of the interest 
rate cartel and the abolition of quantitative controls on 
bank advances released a substantial pent-up demand by banks 
for interest-bearing deposits; as a result interest rates 
on these rose quickly and banks began to attract new 
deposits. The real growth was. in the volume of wholesale 
deposits and this was prompted by the marketing of a new 
asset by the banks, certificates of deposit. They did attract 
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retail deposits away from the building societies, amongst 
other competitors, but because of the politically sensitive 
mortgage rate the commercial banks were asked not to pay 
interest of more than 9"2/o on deposits of less than Z10,000. 
As Table 2.1 clearly shows this constrained the banks 
during the period 1973-74, while no such constraint applied 
in the CD market until the introduction of the Supplementary 
Special Deposits scheme in December 1973. 
Now the relevance of this new era of competition to 
the demand for money lies in the rate of interest which 
banks offer on time deposits. Before Competition and Credit 
Control the clearing banks' interest rate cartel and 
quantitative controls placed on bank advances which were 
almost continuously in force from 1965 to 1971 (and 
periodically from the 1950's to 1965), meant that interest 
rates offered on these deposits tended to be rather low 
varying directly with Bank Rate which was relatively sticky 
during the 19601s. This, in turn, meant that it was not 
especially important to include an own-rate on money variable 
in the demand for money function prior to Competition and 
Credit Control. However, once the controls had been relaxed 
the differential between the own-rate and the rates on 
substitute assets had to be formally accounted for in the 
demand for money function, and accordingly Hacche (59 ) and 
Artis and Lewis (11 ) specified demand for broad money 
functions which included on own-rate on money variablev 
when investigating the behaviour of M3 in the early 19701s. 
* 
* See Chapter 4 for specification details 
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TABLE 2.1 
Own-Rates on Retail and Wholesale Money Deposits 
1971(l)-1974(l) 
R7 OR R CD R7 OR R CD 
1971 1 5 7.44 1973 1 7-: 4 9.81 
2 4 6.31 2 64 8.12 
3 3 5.19 3 9,1, 2 13.34 
4 2 -1-2 4.69 4 9,1, 2 15.88 
1972 1 2, -2 4.88 1974 1 9'12' 15.69 
2 4 7.75 
3 5ý1 5 7.56 
4 5% 9.00 
R7= Rate on 17 day deposits' of LCB's OR 
R CD Rate on 
3 month certificates of deposit 
SOURCE: Financial Statistics 
2.1.2 Round-tripping and distortions to the money stock 
figures 
Following the introduction of ccc in September 1971 there 
were two years of rapid money supply growth; M3 grew by 
27% between the end of 1971 and the end of 1972p and by 
approximately the same amount over the following year. 
As was emphasised in the previous section the considerably 
improved competitive position of the banks can go some way 
towards accounting for these high growth ratesp but the 
'merry-go-round, (Artis and associates (8)p. 54) has 
undoubtedly made a significant contribution as well. 
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The 'merry-go-round' or 'round-tripping' resulted 
from the fact that some interest rates remained relatively 
sticky while others, such as the CD rates were allowed to 
vary. according to market forces. It was the existence of 
administered rates alongside market-determined rates that 
made extensive arbitrage activities possible. These 
activities largely took place in 1972 and 1973, the years 
immediately following the introduction of CCC, and were 
mainly conducted by large companies, investment institutions 
and local authorities who would borrow from the commercial 
banks on overdraft and re-lend the acquired funds in the 
parallel money markets. This was made possible because 
the market-determined rates rose very sharply while the 
interest rates on bank advances were kept down, so that the 
rates on advances were often well below the ruling rates 
in the parallel money markets. 
For example, companies had a clear profit incentive 
to borrow as much as they could from the banks, frequently 
via large overdraftso and to iývest the proceeds in the 
high interest-yielding certificates of deposit. Since 
CDs are a component of M3 this arbitrage swells the money 
supply figures. 
Attempts to measure the distorting effect of round- 
tripping on ZM3 reveal a wide range of answers: while some 
estimates have suggested that M3 was swollen by 200% of its 
end-1972 level in 1973, other estimates suggest figures 
closer to 2% (ibid p. 59). Although estimates closer to the 
lower end of the range are more generally accepted, these 
still represent a significant distortion. 
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The relevance of these extensive interest arbitrage 
activities to the demand for money lies in the fact that 
for empirical work the actual money stock figures must be 
used to represent the unobservable demand. The new 
monetary policies which promoted competition appear to have 
led to a situation in which there is an excess of money 
supply over desired demand for money, which contradicts the 
logic of the simple partial adjustment hypothesis* of the 
demand for money. With an interest-rate policys and the 
money supply accommodating, it is possible to regard the 
money stock as demand-determined so that the partial adjust- 
ment model is a fair approximation to reality. Howevert 
with the money supply changing independently of demand and 
the government more amenable to monetarist policies, 
exercising a degree of control over M3, it is possible to 
regard the money stock as an exogenous variable, which would 
imply that conventional specifications of the demand for M3 
function represent mis-specifications for at least the 
immediate post-CCC period. 
2.1.3 Reforms in the gilt-edged market 
Prior to Competition and Credit Control the Bank of England 
actively supported the gilt-edged market by taking up unsold 
government debt and generally intervening in the market. 
Thiss of course, was consistent with a policy of interest 
rate control and meant that the government could cover 
growing budget deficits relatively cheaply by 
increasing 
the money supply. When CCc was introduced it was decided 
to restrict the extent of the Bank of England's operations 
* For details on this hypothesis see Chapter 3. 
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in the gilt-edged market and the Bank correspondingly 
announced that it would no longer automatically be 
prepared to take-up government debtf except in the case 
of stocks with one year or less before reaching maturity 
(BEQB 1971). * This freeing of the gilt-edged market 
implied a limited movement away from interest rate control 
towards control of the money supply: while long-term 
interest rates were allowed to fluctuate more freely the 
government still maintained control over short-term interest 
rates and thus a multiple reserve assets base was preferred 
to a simple cash base. 
One reason for the support of the gilt-edged market 
before CCC was the belief of the authorities that the 
market was dominated by extrapolative expectations, so that 
a fall in the price of bonds would create expectations of 
a further fall and thus would reduce rather than increase 
the demand for bonds. Fears regarding this possibility 
were expressed in the year following the introduction of 
CCC but as Professor Morgan (97 p. 19) pointed out econo- 
metric work both within and outside the Bank of England 
suggested that if this perverse behaviour existed at all 
then it was essentially a short-lived phenomenon. 
As far as the demand for money is concerned this 
policy of allowing long-term interest rates to fluctuate 
more freely, while still maintaining close control over 
short-term interest rates raises several problems. Firstly, 
the relationship between short and long rates is unlikely 
to be as close and predictable as it was in the pre-CCC era 
Paragraph 13 - CCC: Text of a consultative document 
issued on 14 May 1971 as a basis for discussion with 
banks and finance houses. 
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and this makes the choice of interest rate variable(s) in 
the demand for money function a more important consider- 
ation: the term-structure of interest rates becomes more 
significant. Clearlyo if the demand for money is sensitive 
to long-term interest rates and only an administered short- 
rate is included in the function, then this represents an 
important mis-specification. 
Another problem concerns the speculatives or assets 
demand for money. If we are to accept a Keynesian 
specification of the demand for money function, then an 
attempt must be made to deal with the concept of the normal 
rate of interest. Under a regime of general interest rate 
controls prompted by Keynesian beliefs concerning the 
stability of the speculative demand for money, rates will 
not be permitted to vary too much and the authorities will 
strongly signal their intentions regarding changes in 
interest rates on bonds. However, with the freeing of the 
gilt-edged market, long-term interest rates will vary more 
widely and in the short-run, at leastv the relationship 
between the ruling market rate on long-term bonds, and the 
normal rates could easily become unstable. Indeed, this 
is one factor which could have contributed to the apparent 
instability of the demand for money function in the early 
1970's. The speculative demand for money has always been 
an awkward empirical problem, but it is one which becomes 
more important to consider when relatively simple trans- 
actions demand for money models fail to make sense of the 
data. 
A final point concerning the freeing of the gilt- 
edged market relates to the change in stance of monetary 
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policy. Can it be regarded as a switch away from interest 
rate control towards control of the money supply? Although 
it meant that the money supply would not be passively 
increased to finance larger budget deficits and that long- 
term interest rates would be allowed to fluctuate more 
freely, this does not amount to asserting that the money 
stock should be regarded as an exogenous variable. True 
monetarist policies would have meant the establishment of 
a simple cash base rather than the multiple reserve assets 
base which was introduced: while it was the intention of 
the authorities to allow long-term interest rates to 
fluctuate more freely, they clearly intended to maintain 
control over the movement of short-term interest rates. 
Indeedy it was explicitly recognized that the combination 
of a multiple reserve assets base, with a minimum reserve 
requirement of 1212% and special deposits, designed to mop 
up excess liquidity in the banking system, was not suited 
to achieving any tight control over money supply growth. 
For such tight control to be possiblep the reserve base 
would have to be completely exogenous, and the only 
component of the multiple reserve base which could be 
regarded as such is bank balances held at the Bank of 
England. 
A move towards monetary base control occurred in August 
1981 with the abolition of the reserve assets ratio and 
the establishment of a 12-/. cash ratio which was to be 
observed by all banks and licensed deposit takers with 
eligible liabilities amounting to L10M or more. This 
new cash ratio arrangement replaced the old Vf/o ratio 
which had only applied to the London clearing banks. 
For details of the new arrangements see 'Monetary 
control-provisions' in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
September 1981. 
53 
The relevance of this with respect to the demand 
for money is that single equation models of M3 cannot be 
regarded as appropriate reduced-form specifications. 
Since the money supply (M3) was no longer passively 
adjusted to changes in the demand for money it was no 
longer possible to simply interpret money stock movements 
as reflecting demand changes. The likelihood is that 
movements in this series reflect a combination of supply 
and demand influences so that an identification problem 
arises. This problem requires the separate specification 
of a money supply function. 
* With equilibrium in the money- 
market restored by interest rate movements following a 
disturbancep the interest rate variable entering both the 
demand and supply functions for money has to be treated as 
an endogenous regressor. This, in turn, -means that these 
functions would have to be estimated simultaneously in 
order to obtain satisfactory estimates of the demand for 
money parameters. 
The narrow money stock could still be regarded as 
essentially demand-determined since the monetary authorities 
have not attempted to control its growth; indeed, it is 
doubtful whether they could do so if they wished to, since 
substitution from deposit into current accounts and vice- 
versa would not be easily amenable to policy control. 
See Chapter 3: Simultaneous Money Models, and 
Identif ication. 
** See Chapter 3: Simultaneous Equation Bias. 
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2.1.4 'The corset': its impact on bank demand for 
interest-bearing eligible liabilities 
As mentioned above during the competitive phase of CCC 
rates of interest on the time deposits of banks had 
increased very sharply* following the relaxation of the 
ceilings formerly imposed on bank advances. In particular, 
the rate on certificates of deposit had increased sharply. 
However, the rapid expansion of the money supply, as 
measured by M3, prompted a speculative run on sterling at 
the end of June 1972 which gathered momentum very quickly 
and necessitated support for sterling prior to the floating 
of the currency. Thisp together with the sharp fall in 
unemployment and the recovery of industrial production 
during 1972, clearly indicated the need for monetary 
restraint. 
After further rapid expansion of the money supply in 
1973 the government introduced the Supplementary Special 
Deposit scheme (the corset) as a new technique of monetary 
control. The broad aim of the scheme was to achieve 
monetary restraint without putting an upward pressure on 
interest rates. The basic idea was to limit the growth of 
banks' interest-bearing eligible liabilities. This was 
achieved in the following way: banks whose liabilities 
grew faster than a certain stated rate, initially 8To over 
6 months, were required to deposit a proportion of the 
excess in a non-interest bearing account at the Bank of 
England. This proportion increased sharply, up to a maximum 
of 500/. v as the excess growth 
increased. The scheme was 
introduced in December 1973, and then suspended in February 
See Table 2.1p Section 2.1.1. 
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1975. It was subsequently re-introduced and suspended 
on two occasions culminating in its termination as a 
technique of control in June 1980. 
* 
The introduction of the 'corset' could be taken as 
marking the end of the expansionary phase of Competition 
and Credit Control. By making it decidedly unprofitable- 
for banks to exceed the defined rates of growth for ibelso 
this represented a return to restrictions on bank business. 
Although the restrictions were placed on bank deposits 
rather than directly on bank advances, the growth of bank 
lending was successfully restrained. 
As Table 2.2 overleaf revealsp the rate of interest 
on certificates of deposit tended to fall sharply with the 
imposition of the 'corset' and to pick-up in 'corset-off' 
periods. 
The last imposition of the corset provides an 
exception with the CD rate rising throughout the 'corset-on, 
period. Howeverp a sudden increase in the rate of inflation, 
prompted by a sharp rise in oil prices and the collapse of 
the Labour government's incomes policy at the end of 1978, 
and the use of MLR as the main technique of monetary control, 
can account for this upward trend in the CD rate. 
So. ý with banks bidding less actively for interest- 
bearing deposits during 'corset-on' periods the rate of 
interest on certificates of deposit, and other interest- 
bearing bank depositsy tended to fall. When the scheme is 
relaxed then banks tend to bid more aggressively for 
ibels 
thus driving the CD rate up. This, in turn, means that an 
* Full details of the scheme can be found in BEQB ( 13 ). 
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TABLE 2.2 
The CD Rate 1972(l)- 1979(4) 
CD CD 
1972 1 4.9 1976 1 8.5 
2 7.8 2 11.3 
3 7.6 3 12.6 
4 9 @ 14.1 
1973 1 9.8 1977(D 9.6 
2 8.1 7.8 
3 13.3 5.7 
0 15.9 4 6.4 
1974G) 15.7 1978 1 6.8 
@) 13.5 2 10.0 
@ 11.9 G 9.6 
12.7 (@ 12.4 
1975 9.9 1979(D 12.1 
2 9.7 13.9 
3 10.7 14.0 
4 11.1 @ 16.8 
'corset-on, quarters 
own-rate on money variable must be included in the demand 
for M3 equation, along with relevant rates of interest on 
alternative financial assets. Furthermore, the relevant 
substitute asset rate will need to be an administered rate, 
or possibly a long-term market-determined rate, since short- 
term market rates such as the rate on local authority 
temporary debt, are almost perfectly correlated with the 
CD rate. 
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Another point concerning the introduction of the 
Supplementary Deposit scheme relates to the interest- 
arbitrage activities of companies in 1972 and 1973. The 
scheme helped to put an end to these since the high CD rates, 
which had prompted the round-tripping came down sharply. 
Alsop as Artis and associates (8 )* point out, interest 
rates on bank advances were more closely tied to market 
ratest such as the rate on CD's after 1973. So. after the 
introduction of the 'corset, the distortions to the M3 money- 
stock figures caused by round-tripping were largely eliminated. 
Before the 'corset' many financial markets, and 
particularly the money marketo may have experienced persis- 
tent disequilibrium conditions from the end of 1971. Indeedo 
Artis and Lewis (11 ) argued that there was an excess of 
money supply over demand and that during the years 1972 and 
1973, when banks competed strongly for deposits with other 
financial institutionso the economy was off the demand for 
money curve. If this argument is accepted then it clearly 
makes sense of the poor tracking performance of equations 
estimated from pre-CCC data: a worsening underprediction 
of the M3 money'stock over the immediate post-CCC period 
would clearly be expected. However, from 1974 onwards with 
competition dampenedv such disequilibrium should be 
eliminatedo and instability of the function arising from 
the ccC reforms largely eliminated. After 1973 the major 
problems for the demand for money models were high and 
variable inflation rates and the behaviour of the exchange 
rate; it is to these problems that I now turn. 
* 62. 
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2.2 High and variable inflation rates 
As Chapter 7 is devoted to a consideration of the influence 
of inflation on the demand for money, I will confine my 
comments to explaining why, and in what particular ways, 
the rate of inflation may cause problems. 
The reason for the direct inclusion of the inflation 
rate in the money demand function at the theoretical level 
has already been mentioned (Chapter 1-1.1 p. 14). Whether 
it has been empirically significant is mainly the province 
of Chapter 7; all I will say here is that it is quite 
possible that movements in nominal interest rates pick-up 
at least some of the influence of inflation on the demand 
for money making the direct entry of the variable a somewhat 
questionable empirical proposition. 
Before 1970 inflation was relatively low and showed 
much less variation than it has during the decade 1970-80. * 
It seems probable then that inflation expectations were 
rather low and steady during the 1960's and, as such, did 
not significantly influence the market behaviour of economic 
agents. 
It is important to distinguish between the effect of 
actual inflations as opposed to the effect of inflation 
expectations on the money-holding decisions of the public. 
Since a dominant influence on expectations regarding future 
rates of inflation is likely to be the actual inflation 
experience of the recent past, the effects of the two are 
obviously inter-related. Suppose, that over a period of 
time inflation has a relatively flat profiles as it had in 
* See C"hapter 
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the 19601s, anticipated inflation could be expected to 
coincide with actual inflation, showing very little 
variation. As such it would not account for any 
significant variation in the public's demand for money; 
in effectv the variable is a constant over the period 
concerned. However, actual inflation over the period 
will influence the demand for nominal money balances 
which, ignoring lags, will keep pace with the rate of 
inflation under the usual assumption that demand is 
linearly homogeneous with respect to price: in theory it 
seems reasonable to assume that the public are primarily 
concerned with the real value of their money-holdings. 
So. under these conditions, inflation expectations is a 
redundant variable in the money demand function and the 
long-run price elasticity of nominal money balances is 
expected to be unity. 
Now, if we turn to the inflation experience of the 
1970's, which has been rather volatile, we might expect 
firstlyp inflation expectations to vary significantly 
through the period and secondly, for some large discrepancies 
to occur between anticipated and realised inflation rates. 
The first half of the 1970's was marked by rapidly rising 
inflation, which reached a peak of approximately 25% by 
mid-1975. If we just consider this period and make the 
unrealistic assumption that actual inflation was perfectly 
anticipated, then there is no reason to suppose that 
inflation expectations will influence any real variables. 
However, with inflation expectations being correctly revised 
upwards, the cost of holding non-interest bearing money in 
terms of physical assets will be seen to be increasing 
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sharpiy. Sop if this avenue of substitution between money 
and goods is at all significant, real balances would fall 
back as prices increased. Now, if a standard money-demand 
function was specified in which no inflation rate appeared, 
either because 'old habits die hard', or because a direct 
transmission from money to goods was incorrectly denied, 
then the estimated elasticities would be subject to mis- 
specification bias; in particular, the measured long-run 
price elasticity could fall significantly short of unity! 
However, in a correctly specified function with the rate of 
inflation included amongst the explanatory variables we 
would still expect the price elasticity to be unity. 
* 
In practice# inflation expectations are unlikely to 
coincide with actual inflation, when the latter varies 
significantly over time: the period 1970-75 saw inflation 
increasep with a sharp acceleration after 1973. Since the 
extent of unanticipated inflation is going to have an 
important influence on the movement of future prices, real 
income and interest ratess as výell as a direct influence on 
real money-holdings, It becomes important to model inflation 
expectations. This is a difficult task, especially so 
given the plausible assumption that the formation of 
expectations is likely to become a more sophisticated 
process as society becomes more accustomed to high and 
variable inflation rates. , 
Approaches to modelling inflation expectations include 
the relatively simple adaptive-expectations and extrapolative/ 
It is, of course, clearly possible that other important 
variables - e. g. the exchange rate - still need to be 
included before sound parameter estimates are obtained. 
Also, in this particular case, inflation should enter the 
equation with a lead of one period. 
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regressive schemes (described in detail in Chapter 7), 
survey techniques (134,26) and rational expectations 
(105,117,118). This last approach involves the use of 
all readily-available information concerning inflation 
and is considerably more sophisticated than either of 
the first two schemes mentioned which postulate that 
inflation expectations are solely determined by reference 
to inflation experience in the past. For examples when 
the Labour government introduced an incomes policy in 
1975 and combined this with tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, 
* in the 'fight against inflation'. it provided 
a clear signal that inflation would soon start falling. 
In fact, between mid-1975 and the end of 1978, when there 
was a return to free collective bargaining, inflation fell 
from around 25% to just under 10%. A rational expectations 
model would incorporate this policy information and other 
relevant factors such as planned increases in oil prices. 
The survey approach is costly and requires compre- 
hensive information from a large sample of households and 
firms if it is to throw any useful light on the formation 
of inflation expectations. 
The point of particular importance is that whichever 
model we use to capture the influence of inflation expect- 
ations, it is rather unlikely that the estimated series for 
the variable will coincide with the actual unobservable 
expectations. As a result we cannot be confident that we 
are correctly estimating the true influence of anticipated 
inflation on the demand for money; if we are not then the 
Monetary targets for LM3 and the PSBR were introduced in 
1976 and this was combined with public expenditure cuts. 
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estimated coefficients on the other variables will be 
suspect as well. 
Suppose we were to deny the existence of any 
significant substitution between money-holdings and real 
assets, and to assume that transactions motives dominate 
the demand for money. As shown by Baumol (17)p Tobin 
(130) and others* this is consistent with a demand for 
money function which includes both an income and an 
interest rate variable. If the latter is measured by an 
administered, or a relatively sticky ratep then it is 
possible that the rate of inflation, itself, would be a 
better proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money. 
However, a much more important point concerns the indirect 
influences of inflation on the demand for money. Firstly, 
as inflation becomes more variable, so it will become more 
important to break-down changes in nominal income into 
price and real income components. In practice, recognition 
of the fact that the demand for money will only fully adjust 
to any disturbances after a lag means that whether the 
dependent variable is expressed in real or nominal terms 
both price and real income must appear as explanatory 
variables. Only if the response of money-holdings to changes 
in price and real income was the same both in time and 
magnitude could nominalincome be successfully used as an 
explanatory variable. If it was incorrectly used 
in these 
circumstances then the parameter associated with 
it would 
be sensitive to changes in the data period. Multi- 
collinearity problems, aside, there 
is no real difficulty 
* See Chapter 12 Section 1.1. 
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in obtaining the separate influences of price and real 
income on the demand for moneyp in cases where there is 
no important discrepancy between anticipated and actual 
inflation. Howeverv in the 1970's some important 
discrepancies are likely to have occurredj as argued above, 
and these will influence the growth of real income and 
interest rates, as well as future price movements. These 
discrepancies are also likely to influence the values of 
the parameters, themselves. For example, assume that the 
adaptive-expectations scheme correctly describes anticipated 
inflation over a period in which inflation rises sharply, 
before falling back. At first inflation would be under- 
anticipatedp with the error becoming progressively worse. 
With the public basing money-holding decisions on expected 
price levels, the measured response of the demand for money 
to changes in actual prices would fall; more specificallyp 
the elasticity of demand for money with respect to actual 
prices would fall as we moved forward in time. During the 
subsequent period offalling inflation2 inflation would be 
progressively over-anticipated, and the measured price- 
elasticity of demand for money would tend to rise. 
Furthermorep since errors between actual and expected 
prices will also influence the assessments of real income 
the same arguments can bd applied to this variable. 
If we accept that the speculative demand for money is 
important then the rate(s) of interest on long-term 
government bonds must be included in the demand for money 
function. Now rates of interest tend to move in the same 
direction as inflation, so if inflation is expected to rise 
then people will expect the interest rates on bonds to rise 
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and will therefore wish to sell bonds. If inflation is 
expected to show a strong trend rise, then it is likely 
that extrapolative expectations will be formed in the 
bond market, with the public wishing to hold more money 
as the interest rate rises. When inflation falls sharplyo 
then interest rates will be expected to fall, and the 
public will be induced to buy bonds because of the expected 
capital gains. For example, over the period 1976-1978s in 
which there was a trend fall in the rate of inflation$ the 
company sector increased its holdings of government securities 
significantly. 
* So it appears that companies purchased bonds 
on speculative grounds anticipating a trend rise in govern- 
ment bond prices. This response has been prompted by the 
behaviour of inflation, itself. If we add to this the 
reasonable assumption that speculators are much more uncertain 
about the future course of bond prices when inflation is high 
and variable, then the relationship between the normal rate 
of interest and the market rate is clearly undermined. Hence, 
inflation during the 1970's may well have caused instability 
in the speculative demand for money. 
Inflation may also cause a problem with respect to its 
influence on the exchange rate and the balance of payments. 
If the rate of inflation rises significantly above the rates 
experienced in the rest of the world then this should put 
downward pressure on the exchange rate, under ceteris 
paribus assumptions. Inflation-induced movements 
in the 
exchange rate will lead to capital flows across exchanges, 
and possibly the substitution of domestic currency for 
foreign monetary assets. So, failure to include the exchange 
* See Table 9.3. Financial Statistics. - 
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rate in the function may also result in mis-specification 
bias. However* open economy problems for the demand for 
money are really a separate issue; one that is taken up 
in the following section. 
Finally, even if the rate of inflation has not 
significantly disturbed the long-run income, price and. 
interest elasticities of money demand, it remains possible 
that adjustment lag paths are influenced by inflation so 
that short-run elasticities and the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium vary significantly over the chosen data period. 
2.3 Exchanqe rates and the balance of payments 
When the importance of international trade for the UK 
economy* is taken into account and suitable open-economy 
assumptions made, then the exchange rate I; egime determines 
whether an independent monetary policy is possible. 
Fleming (49), Mundell (100,101) and Swoboda (126,127) have 
each contributed to the theory of the effectiveness of both 
monetary and fiscal policy in an open economy. The main 
conclusion to be drawn from their work is that an independent 
monetary policy cannot, in the long-run, be operated by a 
small country under fixed exchange rates. Providing 
international capital flows are sensitive to interest rate 
differentials, which in the absence of controls on capital 
movements is a reasonable assumption, then Mundell 
(100,101) 
concludes that for a small open economy like the UK, 
fiscal 
policy should be used to achieve 
internal objectives and 
monetary policy to achieve external objectives 
if the 
At the end of the 1970's around 25% of all expenditure was 
on-imports and about 25% of domestic output was exported. 
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exchange rate is fixed. In the absence of devaluation or 
revaluation the monetary authorities must stand prepared 
to buy or sell sterling in order to support the exchange 
rate. This is most easily explained by reference to the 
'Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments' which has 
been mainly developed by Mundell (103) and Johnson (69 
Following this approach a change in the domestic money 
supply can be broken down into two major components as 
shown below: 
AM = AD + LR 
AD = domestic credit expansion 
AR = change in foreign exchange 
reserves 
Suppose that the domestic money supply is growing in line 
with the world money supply, with the domestic inflation 
rate equal to the world inflation rate and foreign interest 
rates equal to domestic interest rates. Under these 
conditions the balance of payments on current and capital 
account will be in, equilibrium and there is no excess supply 
ofo or demand for, money. 
Now an attempt by the UK monetary authorities to 
pursue an independent monetary policy, by increasing or 
reducing the growth of the domestic money supply will in the 
long-run lead to compensating changes in exchange reserves 
which leave the growth of the money supply unaltered. For 
example, if the growth of the money supply was greater in 
the UK than it was in the rest of the world, then this would 
result in an excess supply of money in the UK which will be 
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used to finance the purchase of foreign goods and 
securities, thus depleting foreign exchange reserves. 
So,, under fixed exchange rates an increase in 
domestic credit expansion, which results in the domestic 
money stock growing faster. than the world money supply,, will 
be offset by a fall in exchange reserves. In contrast, if 
a freely floating exchange rate is used, the adjustment is 
via the exchange rate with the level of exchange reserves 
essentially unaltered. Consequently an independent monetary 
policy can only be successfully pursued, in the long-run, 
with flexible exchange rates. 
* 
A good description of domestic monetary policy 
implications under both fixed and flexible exchange rates 
is given in Dennis ( 36 ) Both small-country and large- 
country cases are considered. 
So, for an independent monetary policy to be 
successfully operated (via a money supply target) in the 
case of a small, open economy like the UK, two important 
A money supply target is assumed here. The case for an 
exchange rate target has recently been considered by 
Artis and Currie (9). They compared the advantages 
of exchange rate versus monetary targets in achieving a 
price stability objective but were unable to come to 
any firm conclusion. The basis of the case for an 
exchange rate target is given in the following extract 
from Artis and Lewis (12 ) p. 53: 
'If the ties between exchange rate variations and 
consequent changes in prices and wages'are close 
and the speed of transmission is fast, a policy 
of exchange rate targeting ..... could be more 
effective as an anti-inflationary device than a 
monetary target. ' 
Austria, Belgium and Sweden have renounced monetary 
targets for an exchange rate commitment. 
** Chapter 8# p. 212-218. 
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necessary conditions must be satisfied: firstly, a flexible 
exchange rate regime must be in force, and secondlyp the 
demand for money function must be stable. 
* 
In the post-war periodo prior to 1971, stable money 
demand functions for both Ml and M3 were found by most 
empiricists, but a fixed exchange rate system was in force. 
This means that independent control of the money supply is 
not really feasible in the long-run which is damaging to 
monetarist policy prescriptions. The recognition of this 
fact, coupled with the world liquidity crisis and the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
in 19712 led to the introduction of flexible exchange rates 
in 1972. 
Now this was really a managed float since the Bank of 
England intervened to support sterling$ or to cap the 
exchange rate on various occasions during the 1970's. 
** 
Despite this the UK was better able to pursue an independent 
monetary policy than it had been under fixed exchange rates. 
Two particularly troublesome years for exchange rate movements 
and the balance of payments were 1976 and 1977: following 
very high rates of domestic inflation in 1974 and 1975 the 
exchange rate fell sharply in 1976 with speculative pressure 
sharpening the fall; in 1977, following Bank of England 
These do not constitute a sufficient condition for the 
success of monetary policy. 
For example, following a rapid fall in the Ll$ exchange 
rate in Autumn 1976, when Z fell to a record low of 
, 
Z1.57 in Octobers support by the monetary authorities 
led to a strong recovery to $1.7055 by the end of the 
year. A sharp recovery during 1977 led to the 
authorities intervening to cap the exchange rate. 
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support for the pounds and the introduction of monetary 
targets in 1976, there was a sharp appreciation of sterling, 
again strengthened by speculative pressure. The serious 
decline of sterling in 1976 was accompanied by large out- 
flows of short-term capital and a serious deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments; this massive 
drain in reserves led to an application to the IMF for 
$3.9b. standby credit, However., following the exchange rate 
recovery in 1977 there was a considerable turn-a-round in 
balance of payments fortunes accompanied by large increases 
in exchange reserves. 
According to theory a move to flexible rates should be 
accompanied by smaller fluctuations in exchange reserves: 
These wide fluctuations in both exchange rates and foreign 
reserves were, no doubtp considerably influenced by extra- 
polative exchange rate expectations. 
Despite the qualifications made aboves the authorities 
have had the ability to independently influence the long-run 
growth of the money supply under flexible exchange rates. 
This means that if a stable money demand relationship can be 
established then monetary policy can be used to control the 
policy target variables, such as inflation, in the long-run. 
Since instability of both the money supply and demand 
functions is evident in the very short-run, fine-tuning 
policies are discredited. 
Conclusions concerning the stability of the money 
demand function may well be upset by a change of exchange 
rate regime: the introduction of flexible exchange rates 
means that movements in exchange rates and, more particularly, 
expected changes in the exchange rate may prove to be 
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important determinantsof the demand for money in the 1970's. 
other important international variables might include short- 
term foreign interest rates and the prices of British goods 
relative to foreign substitutes. A generalised portfolio 
approach to the demand for money would specify each of these 
international variables in the function in addition to the 
important domestic variables. In practice, since 
substitution between money and financial assets is likely 
to be stronger than between mpney and goods, it may only be 
necessary to include the exchange rate and a representative 
foreign short-term interest rate. In contrast to this 
approach a transactions view of the demand for money may be 
heldt which could well be appropriate for the Ml definition 
of moneyp in which speculation and expectations probably 
have no role in determining money demand: in this case, 
it would only be necessary to include an income variable 
and a representative short-term interest rate. 
Indeedp if the latter approach yields a stable demand 
for money function for both M1 and M3 over the period 1972- 
1980, then this suggests that international variables have 
not been important determinants of the demand for money 
during this period. Furthermore, it suggests that domestic 
monetary policy can be successfully used for demand- 
management purposes. 
Boughton (20 ) and Arango and Nadiri( 3) have 
attempted to test the significance of international variables 
in the money demand function. 
* They both considered several 
For details of their empirical results see Chapter 4. 
71 
OECD countries., including the UKy and Boughton examined 
the evidence for the data period 1960-1977, while Arango 
and Nadiri examined the period 1960-1975; both used 
quarterly data. The former considered both narrow and 
broad definitions of money, while the latter only invest- 
igated narrow money defined as cash and demand deposits. 
The conclusions from these studies are highly contra- 
dictory. Boughton claims that international variables have 
not significantly influenced the demand for money function 
in the 1970's, while the latter conclude that they have! 
In fact the conclusions reached by Arango and Nadiri 
are surprising in view of the fact that they considered a 
narrow definition of money: substitution between foreign 
assets and domestic assets is likely to involve switching 
between interest-bearing money and short-term foreign assetsp 
aýd not between non-interest bearing money and foreign 
assets; the motives for holding M1 are likely to be mainly 
transactions-based. 
In contrast, Boughton suggests that simple stable 
demand functions hold$ in general, for both narrow and broad 
definitions of money. The important exceptions are narrow 
moneys in the case of the US# and broad money in the case of 
the UK: instability in both cases can be entirely explained 
by domestic factors; for the UK it appears to be strongly 
associated with the monetary reforms introduced by Competition 
and Credit Control. 
Boughton also reports that Hamburger's (60) demand 
functions which included the uncovered eurodollar rate as 
the most appropriate opportunity cost variables breaks-down 
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when Lta from the 1970's is used, which suggests that 
either the covered rate has become appropriatet or that 
foreign short-term interest rates have not been important 
determinants of the UK demand for money in the 19701s! 
Although Boughton's arguments are persuasive the 
issue is far from settled. It may well be that his results 
have depended on exchange controls operated in the 19701s. 
For the UK economy exchange controls have been in force for 
most of the decade. In fact it was not until October 1979 
that the Chancellor finally announced the immediate removal 
of all remaining exchange controlso including those on the 
buying and retaining of foreign currency, outward portfolio 
investment, and sterling lending to non-residents. The 
relaxation of controls on the outward flow of capital might 
be expected to 'open the economy more effectively' so that 
for a fair test of the significance of foreign interest 
rates and exchange rate movements in the demand for money 
function, data for 1980 and 1981 must be considered. If a 
simple transactions demand specificationp which includes 
only domestic variables, performs well in these years, then 
this affords quite strong evidence that international 
variables have only a minor role to play in explaining the 
demand f or money. 
in conclusion, thenp the introduction of flexible 
exchange rates in 1972 made it possible for the authorities 
to pursue an independent monetary policy. Although there 
is some controversy regarding the appropriate specification 
of the demand for money function and 
its stability* it does 
A stable demand for money function being a necessary 
condition for the success of monetary policy. 
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appear that a relatively simple formulationo including only 
domestic variables$ performs quite satisfactorily in the 
1970's if the Ml definition of money is used. Furthermore, 
Boughton's work does suggest that the apparent instability 
of the M3 money demand function can largely be explained by 
the monetary reforms introduced by Competition and Credit 
Control. Finally, the relaxation of exchange controls in 
1979 may yet show that international variables are more 
than just potentially significant determinants of money 
demand; especially in the case of broadly-defined money. 
2.4 Other problems 
Several breaks have occurred in the official money stock 
figures in the 19701s; at the end of the first quarter in 
1972 and 19730 mid-May 1975 and at the end of the fourth 
quarter in 1975. This presents some problems for empirical 
analysis particularly as the breaks in the Ml series, in 
mid-May 1975, and the M3 series at the end of the first 
quarter in 1972, are particularly serious. 
* Since the Bank 
of England present the money supply figures adjusted for 
breaks in addition to the official series it is possible to 
use both these series in empirical work and to note how 
sensitive the parameter estimates are to the breaks. Another 
approach would be to insert a dummy variable in the equation 
taking the value unity from the quarter in which a major 
break occursp and zero before this data; if the dummy 
variable is significant then it shows that the break 
in the 
official series has an 
important influence on the results. 
For details of these breaks see Financial Statistics 
explanatory handbookv April 1979# p-74. 
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Perhaps a more important problem concerns the shift 
of policy emphasis from M3 to tM3 in 1976; although 
monetary targets have been defined in terms of &M3 since 
this date, LM3 was not the policy-relevant variable before 
1976. For reasons of data consistency, howeverv either M3 
or LM3 should be used throughout. Since the predictive 
ability of the demand function-outside the data period is 
of interesto ZM3 seems the better choice. 
A problem also occurs with Ml since a small, but 
growing, proportion of sight deposits yield interest: the 
interest-bearing component is shown separately from 1975(2) 
onwardsp but no split is available before this date. 
* At 
the end of 1975 interest-bearing sight deposits accounted 
for almost 11% of Ml, and this figure grew to approximately 
14"2% by the end of 1978, and has continued to grow since. 
Because of the fact that this proportion is relatively small 
and that no split was available before 1975(2), Ml is 
generally treated as entirely non-interest bearing in the 
empirical work. Gradually it is becoming less reasonable 
to ignore the growing interest-bearing component. 
The growth of the use of credit cards, particularly 
with the introduction of Access cards in 1972, might be 
expected to increase the velocity of circulation of money; 
the level of balances held to satisfy both transactions and 
precautionary needs is likely tofall in most cases. A 
partial offset to this, and an effective brake on accelerating 
velocity would be a combination of higher bank charges and 
the requirement by banks that customers should hold higher 
The interest-bearing component of Ml was insignificant 
before 1971. 
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average-holdings of current account deposits over the 
charges period in order to avoid incurring bank charges. 
In practice a gentle, but persistent rise in the income 
velocity of circulation of money might be expected to occur 
as a result of the growing use of credit cards. If this 
is the case, then it should not be a de-stabilising 
influence on the money demand function. 
Another possible problem concerns the influence on 
the demand for money which a change of emphasis in the 
techniques of monetary control might exert. For example, 
from 1973(4) onwards the 'corset' was an important technique 
of monetary control on an 'off and on' basis, whereas it was 
subordinated to MLR in 1979. 
* With the 'corset' applied to 
banks a dis-intermediation of bank funds might be expected, 
as companies shift into alternative short-term financial 
assets; it is clearly possible that the control over ZM3 
is of cosmetic significance only since an offsetting fall 
in the demand for money could occur. Similarly, when the 
, corset' is relaxed a re-intermediation of bank funds occurs 
which swells the money stock figures but also leads to a 
fall in velocity. The demand for broad money may be 
destabilised to some extent by all this, particularly as 
the 'corset' arrangements have been varied with each re- 
introduction of the scheme. In contrast, an increase in 
MLR which is designed to reduce the rate of growth of the 
money stock could be'accompanied by a reinforcing fall 
in 
velocityv as the banks attract deposits away from the 
building societies. This, in-fact, did occur in 1979 
The corset' was finally abandoned as an instrument of 
monetary control in June 1980. 
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following sharp increases in MLR taking the rate from 10% 
at the end of the third quarter of 1978 to 17% by the end 
of 1979. While the rate of interest on interest-bearing 
bank deposits rose in sympathy with MLRO the administered 
building society deposit rate did not. Consequently, the 
differential between the two rates moved decidedly in 
favour of the banks. 
Certain exogenous shocks, particularly the quadrupling 
of oil prices in 1974 and more sharp rises in 1979, might 
have influenced the demand for money. 
The rapid development of North Sea oil in the late 
19701sq particularly in 1978 and 1979, encouraged a 
substantial inflow of foreign capital which persisted despite 
the rapid increase in inflation during 1979. * With a 
managed floating exchange rate there would, in the absence 
of North Sea oil, be a tendency for both the exchange rate 
and the level of foreign reserves to fall back when domestic 
inflation is greater than world inflation. However, a 
substantial increase in exchange reserves coupled with a 
sharp rise in the exchange rate occurred alongside the 
accelerating domestic inflation. Thus an increased demand 
for interest-bearing money is to be expected at a time when 
real income is sluggish, and expected inflation ought to be 
rising! Ignoring international factors under such unusual 
conditions might well lead to erroneous conclusions regarding 
the stability of the demand for money function! 
This increase in inflation was mainly due to substantial 
increases in oil prices and an important switch from 
direct to indirect taxes in the June budget. 
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It is clear from the above discussion that the 
1970's provide a very searching test of the adequacy of 
the relatively simple demand for money models which 
performed well in the previous decade. If it is possible 
to obtain sensible and significant estimates of the money 
demand parameters from recent data, together with good 
forecasts for the post-sample period, for both M1 and ZM3. 
then this will provide the strongest support for the 
inherent stability of the demand for money function. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODELS OF MONEY DEMAND 
3.1 The selection of variables 
In the empirical work both narrow and broad definitions of 
money are considered. The policy-relevant definition of 
money for the UK economy is a broad measure, ZM3, which can 
be broken down into its component parts as described in 
Chapter 1 (1.5). In this way groups of similar money 
deposits - e. g. non-interest bearing sight deposits - can 
be separately examined: this is clearly useful since LM3 
involves the aggregation of several different money 
components which may be influenced by different variables. 
Wider definitions of 'money' could be considered 
such as PSLl and PSL2 which include close substitutes for 
interest-bearing money. 
Another approach is to consider the demand for money 
by the different sectors of the economy. At the most general 
level this involves the money-holding behaviour of the private 
and public sectors. Private sector money-holdings can be 
broken down further into (1) Personal sector money-holdings; 
(2) Industrial and commercial companies' money-holdings# and 
(3) other financial institutions' money-holdings. It is 
likely that the money-holding behaviour of these various 
sectors does differ; in particular, the demand for money 
behaviour of the personal and company sectors, which between 
PSL Private sector liquidity. 
PSL1 LM3 (private sector) + money market instruments 
certificates of tax deposit. 
PSL2 PSL1 + savings deposits and securities (e. g. 
deposits with building societies). 
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them hold well over 80% of M3, is likely to be quite 
different. 
So, recognition of the fact that LM3 represents 
both an over-aggregation of deposits and of deposit-holders, 
means that an analysis of broad money by both type of 
deposit and type of deposit-holder is in order. 
However, data limitations prevent a complete and 
consistent analysis of ZM3 in this way. 
* In particular, the 
sectoral analysis of money demand will not be consistent with 
the analysis by type of deposit, since the former is only 
available for M3, not ZM3, during the first half of the 
1970's. My own empirical work covers Ml, private sector 
time deposits, ZM3 and bank deposits held by both the personal 
and company sectors. For the company sector alone, the 
definition of money is widened to include other liquid assets, 
such as local authority temporary debt. 
What guidance does theory give as to the variables 
which are likely to have a significant influence on the 
demand for money? At the most general level, income and 
interest rates are seen to be the chief determinants by 
Keynesians, while monetarists would argue that wealth or 
permanent income should replace current income in the demand 
for money function. Baumol, Tobin and others developed 
transactions demand models**in which money-holdings are seen 
to depend on both income and the short-term rate of interest: 
For example, no information is available from official 
sources on the personal and company sectors' holdings of 
MI. and their holdings of ZM3t as opposed to M3, are only 
available from 1975 onwards. 
Also, the split between interest-bearing and non 
interest-bearing private sector sterling sight deposits is 
only available from 1975 onwards. 
**See Chapter 1,, Section 1.1. 
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such models seem suitable for Ml but not for broader 
definitions such as ZM3, where the speculative, or asset, 
demand for money is likely to be important. Tobin (131) 
developed a theory of the asset demand for money* in which 
money-holdings depend on wealthp the constraint variable, 
the expected rates of return on money substitutesp such as 
government bonds, the riskiness of these assets, and 
individual attitudes towards risk. The typical attitude 
was assumed to be risk-aversionp so that a higher expected 
return was necessary if the public were to be persuaded to 
hold more of a risky asset. 
Friedman's Modern Quantity Theory (51 )* best 
summarises monetarist thinking on the demand for money in 
which a portfolio approach is taken. However, since short- 
term financial assets are likely to be the closest substitutes 
for money, it is the rates on these which are seen to be 
most relevant. The possibility of substitution between 
money and goods is recognized, and so the expected rate of 
inflation might also be a significant explanatory variable. 
The constraint variable is wealth or permanent income. 
Most studies of the demand for money have assumed a 
'closed economy', whereas the UK is very much an 'open 
economy'. So$ for broad definitions of money and those other 
definitions including interest-bearing deposits, rates of 
interest on foreign substitute assets and expected changes 
in the exchange rate are likely to be important explanatory 
variables. 
See Chapter 1, Section 1.1. 
See Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
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In practice, income rather than wealth has been 
used in UK demand for money studies since we have no compre- 
hensive information on the latter. 
We are now in a position to consider those variables 
which are likely to be important determinants of the demand 
for money, with money variously defined: 
Ml 
Transactions motives are likely to dominate, and 
since well over 801/o of Ml bears no interest at all there 
is no need to include an own-rate on money. It is unlikely 
that foreign interest rates or exchange rates have any 
significant influence on the demand for Ml. Following the 
portfolio approach to money demand it is possible that 
inflation expectations have some influence, although this 
may be adequately taken up by the interest rate variable. 
2. Private sector time deposits (TD) 
A speculative motive might well be important, and 
although these deposits might still be held to satisfy a 
transactions motivep a portfolio model with wealth as 
the constraint variable could be in order. International 
variables such as exchange rates and foreign interest rates 
should be influential and an own-rate on money should now 
be included. 
3. SM3 
The variables mentioned in 1. and 2. above should be 
included. Transactions and speculative motives should both 
be important. 
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4. Personal sector holdinqs of M3 (MP) 
Transactions motives for holding money are likely 
to be more important than speculative motives and therefore 
short-term interest rates preferable to long-term interest 
rates. An own-rate on money variable should be included 
along with the short-term rate on a substitute asset. 
5. Company sector holdinqs of M3 (MC) 
Both transactions and asset motives are likely to 
be important, and therefore company sector income and wealth 
variables should enter the model. Both short-term and long- 
term interest rates on substitute assets should be included 
in the equation along with a suitable own-rate variable. 
Foreign interest rates and changes in the exchange rate should 
both be influential. 
We can now write out equations in loose functional 
form for each of the above money definitions: 
(1) Mi f1YPRs ýE 
(2) TD f2 WYPR TD Rs 
JJR 
LR 
192 )EX 
(3) £M3 f3 WYPR m3 Rs 
(gl)RL R F(92 
)EX ýE 
(4) MP f4 YPW RMp Rs PE 
(5) MC f5WYP RMC RS(gl)R LR F(92 
)EX 
Where, 
y= Income 
W= Wealth 
P= Price 
pE = Inflation expectations 
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RS= Short-term interest rate 
(g, )R L=A function of the long- term interest rate 
RF Foreign interest rate 
R TD RM3 RMp 
RMC Own-rates on money 
(92 )EX A function of the exchange 
rate 
It is now necessary to consider which income and interest 
rate variables should be selected for each of the above 
money demand equations. The exchange rate variable is 
assumed to be best represented by *the sterling effective 
exchange rate', and the foreign rate of interest by the 
'Euro-dollar rate'. 
For Ml, TD and EM3 one of the national income measures 
will be appropriate. Are there any grounds for preferring 
one measure of national income to another? 
The choice is between TFE, GNPMp, GNP FC GDPMp and 
GDP FC measures of net national and 
domestic products are 
not considered since estimates of capital depreciation are 
subject to considerable error. On a transactions demand basis 
it can be argued that measures at market prices are more 
appropriate than those at factor cost. Furthermore, 
uncertainty regarding IPD payments and receipts (the amounts 
are often substantially revised for past years in the 
national income accounts) makes GDP or TFE a better measure 
than GNP. 
So, either GDP at market prices or TFE appear to be 
the most appropriate choices for the income variable. Perhaps 
the former variable is the better choice since holdings of 
sterling deposits will be influenced by switches of demand 
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from domestically produced goods to imports. Since 
importers will now need more foreign currency and less 
sterling to finance the increased purchase of imports, the 
demand for Ml and ZM3 should fall. However, the immediate 
impact of the switch from home-produced goods to imports 
will leave TFE unchanged# so that the fall in demand for 
money is not related to a change in this variable. GDP at 
market prices will fall backq however, following the rise 
in imports. If imports grew at the same rate as TFE then 
the choice between the two variables would not be important: 
in factp import penetration of UK markets has increased 
significantly since the early 1970's and during the second 
half of the decade the ratio of TFE to GDPMp, variables 
measured at constant pricest rose from 1.274 in 1976(l) to 
1.296 by 1979(l). 
So, the appropriate income variable for the Ml. TD and 
ZM3 definitions of money appears to be GDP at constant market 
prices. The appropriate price variable would then be the 
GDP deflator. 
For personal sector money-holdings, personal 
disposable income and the associated deflator can be taken 
as the appropriate income and price variables, respectively. 
The drawback with this measure is that although it is 
suitable for households it is not satisfactory for the 
unincorporated businesses which are included in the sector. 
For the company sector the selection of a suitable 
constraint variable for money-holdings is something of a 
problem. Ideally# perhaps, a measure of the total asset- 
holdings of companies would be best; but such a measure is 
not available from published sources# and would in any case 
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be subject to considerable errors because of inconsistencies 
in the valuation of assets by companies. From 'Financial 
Statistics' it is only possible to obtain comprehensive 
information on company-holdings of liquid assets; a port- 
folio of assets dominated by money-holdings and probably too 
narrow a measure to serve as an explanatory variable. 
For industrial companies the index of industrial 
production might be an appropriate choice, although there 
is no reason to suppose that the money-holdings of commercial 
companies should be related to this variable. 
Perhaps a measure of national output could be chosen, 
such as GDP at factor cost, but this is really too broad a 
measure since it includes the personal, public and financial 
sectors' contribution to output in addition to that of the 
company sector. One advantage of the GDP measure over the 
index of industrial production is that there is no problem 
over choosing a price variable for the former; the GDP 
deflator can be used. 
A variable which could be used in a company sector 
demand for money equation is the 'total capital funds of 
industrial and commercial companies'. This series is given 
in Table 9.2 of 'Financial Statisticst. Although this measure 
is narrow in the sense that it does not cover the demand for 
money for transactions purposes (a measure of total company 
sales receipts might be appropriate), it does at least 
relate solely to industrial and commercial companies. 
The selection of appropriate short-term interest rates 
is a difficult task for the Ml, TD and ZM3 definitions of 
money. This is because sectoral splits are not available for 
the first two definitions, and are only available for LM3 from 
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1975 onwards. For this reason it is necessary to try 
alternative short rates such as the rates on local authority 
temporary debt and building society deposits. In fact, 
although rates of interest on short-term financial assets 
should be more relevant than rates on long-term assetsp since 
the former are closer substitutes for money, it is possible 
that rates on longer-term financial assets, such as government 
bonds will perform best. This is because since the introduction 
of competition and credit control the monetary authorities 
have continued to exercise control over short-term interest 
rates, but have allowed long-term rates to vary more freely. 
So, despite the fact that they are capital risky assets the 
rates of interest on short-term and long-term government 
bonds might also be tried. 
Since most of the published domestic short-term 
interest rates have been manipulated by the monetary author- 
ities to some extent, it may also be worth trying the Euro- 
dollar rate which will better-reflect market forces. The 
covered rate should be more relevant following the introduction 
of flexible exchange rates in 1972, but both this rate and 
the uncovered rate could be tried. 
For the personal and company sectors the most relevant 
short-term interest rates can be selected from information on 
selected liquid assets. 
" Since multicollinearity problems 
prevent the inclusion of more than one or two rates at the 
estimation stagep some possible methods of selecting these 
rates need to be, considered. I will deal with three possible 
approaches. 
See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3. 
For the personal sector see Table 10.3 and for the company 
sector see Table 9.3, in 'Financial Statistics,. 
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One approach would be to select an asset on the 
basis of the following criteria: 
1. The significance of the asset in the portfolio. 
2. The variation in the size of the asset-holdings 
over the relevant data period. 
So, that asset which dominates the portfolio in both size 
and variation of holdings should be selected; the rate of 
interest on this asset will then be the appropriate 
opportunity cost variable. 
Acceptance of these criteria would result in the 
selection of the building society deposit rate for the 
personal sector, and either the government bond rate or the 
rate on local authority temporary debt for the company 
sector. The latter sector is more problematical since the 
relative importance of the alternative assets has varied 
during the 1970's, and other liquid assets such as market 
treasury bills and tax instruments might have been chosen. 
Although holdings of bills were trivial until 1975, they 
started to grow rapidly after this date. After June 1976 
they dropped back in level, but remained significant in 
size until mid-1978. The level of holdings fell quite 
sharply after this date. Despite this, it must be noted 
that since unidentified holdings by other sectors are 
included in the figures, we cannot determine what the 
company sector holdings alone actually are. So, 
in view 
of this plus the fact that the level of holdings 
is 
relatively low# the rate of interest on market treasury 
bills will not be retained at the empirical stage. 
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. Tax instruments have only been significant in the 
company sector portfolio from Autumn 1977 onwards, when 
company-holdings grew sharply. A particularly sharp 
increase in holdings occurred between 1978(4) and 1979(1). 
Although they have not been significant for most of the 
decade, it might well be useful to include the rate on 
certificates of tax deposit from 1977(3) onwards. 
A second approach to the problem of selecting a 
suitable opportunity-cost variable is to use a weighted 
average of the rates on the relevant substitute assets. 
Suppose there are five assets which are considered to be 
substitutes for money in the asset portfolio and that the 
total value of these assets held by companies is given by 
the following expression: 
5 
ai where ai Value of the 
holdin s of 
the itg asset. 
Let ri = the rates of interest on the five assets. 
Thenp 
5 
ar 
r* The weighted average rate 
5 of interest on the five 
ai assets. 
One advantage of this approach over the first, is 
that it will successfully capture the influence of a change 
in portfolio composition. 
The simplest approach would be to take the highest 
rate of interest in each period from the various alternative 
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substitute asset ratesp and use the resulting series to 
represent the opportunity cost variable. Although this 
method is less satisfactory than the approaches discussed 
above, its virtue lies in the speed and ease with which the 
series can be constructed. 
If all three approaches are used for a particular 
period and the constructed rates give similar results for 
both personal and company sector money demandp then this 
suggests that the third approach will be optimal when a 
subsequent data period is being considered. 
As far as an own-rate on money variable is concerned 
either a weighted average of the rates on the component 
deposits of the relevant definition of money can be taken 
(constructed as described above) or the rate of interest on 
a particular component of money, which is thought to be 
representative for the aggregate measure. For examplep 
Artis and Lewis (11 ) used the former method when investig- 
ating M3 in the post-CCC era, while Hacche ( 59 ) used the 
CD rate for both M3 and company sector holdings of M3. 
Incomplete information on the different rates applying to 
the various time deposits suggests that the latter method is 
not necessarily inferior. If a particular rate of 
interest 
is used then the CD rate should be appropriate for private 
sector time deposits, ZM3 and company sector 
holdings of M3. 
For the personal sector's demand for money the rate on seven 
day bank deposits will be appropriate. 
As far as capital risky assets are concerned and the 
speculative demand for moneyv the rates of 
interest on 
medium or long-dated government securities should be appropriate. 
iiowever, since there is no reliable maturity break-down of 
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these by sector-holding, all we can do is to select a 
particular government bond and use this. Previous research- 
ers have tended to use the 212% consol rate to represent the 
long-term bond rate. 
A final point concerning interest rates is that 
post-tax rather than pre-tax rates really represent the 
true opportunity cost of holding money. 
* However, it is a 
major undertaking to construct such rates and information 
gaps certainly present problems. 
Finally, inflation expectations may have a role to 
play in explaining the demand for money, for each of the 
money definitions mentioned. However, since Chapter 7 is 
devoted to the influence of inflation on the demand for 
moneys the problem of variable selection is best taken-up 
there. 
3.2 Functional form and the specification of variables 
Demand for money theory gives no real indication of an 
appropriate functional form for the model. In view of this 
I will confine my attention to linear models, which have 
been commonly used in empirical work, for each definition 
of money - i. e. untransformed linear and log-linear models. 
1. Untransformed linear model 
M* =A+b1Y+ b2 P+b3R 
2. Loq-linear model 
M* =*AY 
bl pb2 R b3 U. 
or, 
Log M* = Log A+b1 Log Y+b2 Log P+ 
b3 Log R+ Log u. 
Grice and Bennett (18 ) used post-tax rates in their study 
of the demand for LM3, but to my knowledge all other UK 
researchers have used pre-tax rates. 
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It is assumed above, for convenience, that only transactions 
motives govern decisions to hold money; an assumption 
suitable for the Ml definition of money at least. 
Model 1 states that, 
JM* 
=b 
qM* 
b 
IM* 
=b subject to random lay 1ý -p 2 ýR 3 
errors 
- i. e. changes in desired money balances depend only on the 
size of change in incomep price and the rate of interest, 
respectively, and not on the levels of these variables. 
In Model 2 the coefficients b1 b2 and b3 represent 
the income, price and interest rate elasticities, 
respectively, of the demand for money. The model restricts 
these elasticities to be invariant with respect to the levels 
of the variables; this is probably a reasonable assumption 
with respect to the income and price variables, but is open 
to question if interest rates are specified in percentage 
orm. 
Suppose the rate of interest stood at 5% in period 1 
and rose to 100% in period 2. If the demand for money had an 
interest elasticity of -0.3 then this 100% rise in the level 
of the rate would lead to a fall of 300/. in desired money- 
holdings. However, if the rate of interest stood at 101/o it 
would take a rise of 10 percentage points for the demand for 
money to fall by the same percentage as before. This does 
not seem entirely reasonable, although 
in a short-run demand 
for money model which is to be estimated over a period 
in 
which interest rates do not vary a great dealp 
this particular 
specification of the variable would 
be in order. 
A popular alternative specification of the interest 
rate variablep used in the Bank of England demand for money 
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studies, 
* is shown in the demand for money equation below: 
Log M=A+b1 Log Y+ b2 Log P+b3 Log(l+R) 
This particular specification states that the interest- 
elasticity of money demand increases with the level of the 
rate.. as the following example makes clear: 
Log MD=b1 Log Y+b2 Log(l+R 
Assume Y= nominal income which remains at the constant 
level L55026 (then Log Y= 10). Now consider what happens 
to the demand for money as the interest rate rises from 00/. 
to 20% in intervals of 5 percentage points, with b2 assumed 
to equal -2.0 and b1 unity. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
D Locr M 10 -2.0(Loa 1.0) 10 
Log MD= 10 -2.0(Log 1.05) = 
Log lp = 10 -2.0(Log 1.10) = 
Log MD= 10 -2.0(Log 1.15) = 
Log MD= 10 -2.0(Log 1.20) = 
= 22026 
9.90242 = 19979(-9.3%) 
9.80938 = 18204(-8.9%) 
9.72048 = 16655(-8.5To) 
9.63536 = 15296(-8.2%) 
Although the percentage change in money demand falls 
as the level of interest risesp the interest-elasticity 
of the demand for money rises since the percentage change 
in the rate of interest falls at a considerably faster 
rate (please see Table overleaf): 
* See Price ( 112) and Hacche ( 59 ). 
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Interest rate % change in % change in Elasticity 
range demand for the rate of 
money interest 
0- 5% -9.3 00 0 
5- 100/. -8.9 100 -0.089 
10 - 15% -8.5 50 -0.170 
15 - 20o/, -8.2 33.3 -0.246 
The table clearly shows that the negative interest 
elasticity increases with the level of the rate. 
In the log-linear function an a priori restriction 
is often imposed on the value of the price-elasticity: it 
is assumed that money-holders wish to preserve the real 
value of their money-holdings so that in the absence of 
money-illusion, the coefficient on price phould be unity. 
* 
if this is the case then the demand for money function can 
be re-written as follows: 
Log MD = Log A+b Log Y *+ b Log R+u. p13 
While such an assumption seems plausible it may well 
be rejected empirically. One reason why this could occur 
might simply stem from the fact that the income constraint 
variable used# and hence the price deflatort is not entirely 
appropriate: with the over-aggregation of data problems in 
macro-demand for money relationships it is easy to see how 
the problem could arise. Another reason is based on the 
relationship between final market transactions, or national 
Adjustment lags, which are taken up in the next section, 
are ignored here. 
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incomes and the total value of all transactions: if over 
time, the relationship changes significantly then a national 
income measure Would not be an appropriate explanatory 
variable for the transactions demand for money. Yet another 
reason might be that the actual values of the income and 
price variables are not strictly relevant and that expected 
values for these should appear in the function. The 
modelling of expectations for these variables is considered, 
along with hypotheses of dynamic adjustment, in the following 
section. 
The specification of variables to successfully capture 
the influence of both international variables and speculation 
on the demand for money is a formidable problem. In Section 
3.1 above it was decided that (1) Some function of the long- 
term bond rate, 
* (gl) RL, would be used to measure the B 
variation in money demand due to domestic speculation, and 
that (2) A function of the exchange rate, (92) EX, would be 
used to measure the influence of international speculation. 
What guidance does theory give as to the appropriate 
specifications of these functions? 
One approach to the speculative demand for money is 
the mean-variance analysis of portfolio choice which stems 
from the work of Tobin (131). 
*** According to this analysis 
an appropriate measure of changes in the riskiness of bonds 
is the expected variance of returnsp and the portfolio 
allocation as between money and bonds will be influenced both 
by the relative expected rates of return and by the relative 
The rate on 21fl. consols. 
The sterling effective exchange rate. 
***See Chapter 1, Section 1.1 p, 19 for a brief discussion 
of his work. 
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riskiness of bonds. Artis and Lewis ( 11 p. 151) measured 
the riskiness of bonds using the standard deviation of 
the logarithmic lst differences of the consol yield (a 
36-month moving average of prior values being taken as an 
appropriate expression of the dependence of expectations 
on past experience). The consol yield was used to measure 
the expected return on bonds; a procedure which implies 
that the expected capital gain is zero, regardless of either 
the level or recent behaviour of the interest rate. This 
procedure yields the following demand for money model: 
bY+bP+bRL+bq 123B4 
In which, 
RL= The consol yield. B 
q= The riskiness of bonds. 
As it stands such a procedure has several weaknesses. 
Firstly, although it is possible that the expected capital 
gain is independent of the current level of interestv it is 
still likely to be a function of rates in the recent past 
- i. e. if rates are showing a trend rise then for a while 
at least investors would typically anticipate this trend to 
continue and thus would expect to make capital losses. In 
shortp we need a theory explaining the formation of expect- 
ations with respect to capital gains. Ideally, we require 
a theory such as rational expectations, which will take full 
account of all the available information: for examplep 
during the period of rapidly rising inflation, 1973-1975, 
long-term interest rates showed a trend rise; this trend was 
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halted and briefly reversed in 1977 following the govern- 
ment's strong anti-inflation measures in 1976 which 
included the formal introduction of monetary targets. 
A second weakness of this procedure concerns the use 
of the standard deviation to measure the riskiness of bonds: 
such a measure cannot adequately discriminate between cases 
where there is either a trend rise or fall in long-term 
interest rates, as opposed to variation around a particular 
rate. Since speculative behaviour will critically depend 
on the nature of the variation, the standard deviation alone 
does not provide us with sufficient risk information. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the spread and 
pattern of rates between short-term and long-term financial 
assets is likely to have an important influence on money- 
holding decisions. Even if only one class of capital risky 
assets is investigated such as government bonds, there are 
still short, mdium and long-dated securities to be considered. 
So, if a portfolio approach is adopted when studying the 
demand for money then it becomes necessary to look at the 
term structure of interest rates rather than a single rate 
on a particular alternative financial asset. 
Theories of the term structure of interest rates 
include the Expectations Theory, the Liquidity or Risk-premium 
Theory and the Market Segmentation Theory. 
* Modigliani and 
sutch (96 ) developed a Preferred Habitat Theory which blends 
elements from each of these three theories. The Habitat 
model implies that the spread between the long rate and 
the 
short rate should depend mainly on the expected change 
in 
A description of each can be found in Surrey (125) 
p. 157. 
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the long rate. It also suggests 
influenced by the supply of long 
by primary borrowers relative to 
of primary lenders, to an extent 
risk aversionp transaction costs 
effective arbitrage operations. 
The Habitat model can be 
follows: 
that this spread can be 
and short-term securities 
the corresponding demand 
reflecting prevailing 
and facilities for 
expressed. formally as 
E RLrs-B, &RE + Ft 
where, 
RL Long-term rate 
rS Short-term rate 
ARE Expected change in L the long-rate 
Ft The-net effect of 
relative supply factors 
(which can be + or -) 
The expected capital gain is taken as proportional to the 
expected fall in the long rate - i. e. B LR 
E 
L' 
For the purposes of empirical work to test the theory 
an expression for the expected capital gain, LR 
E, 
must be L 
formally derived. * Frank de Leeuw ( 35) developed a model 
which allowed for both extrapolative and regressive elements 
in expectations, and this gave the following equation for 
expected capital gain: 
Models of expectations for income and inflation are 
considered in the following section, and Chapter 7, 
respectively. 
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Em RE =A+:: ýý bi RL -b RL 
i=i t-i t 
where,, 
M 
bi RL is a distributed lag on the i=l t-l long-term rate of interest. 
So., in order to take account of-the speculative 
demand for money, following the Preferred Habitat Model, 
it is necessary to in clude a distributed lag on the long- 
term rate of interest in the demand for money function; one 
that reflects a suitable expectations formation hypothesis. 
The function can be expressed as follows: 
mD=A+bY+bP+bRL tIt2t3 
Variations on this theme can be tried. For example, 
a distributed lag of the lst differences in the bond rate 
could be entered along with the current rate as follows: 
MP =L 'r - tA+b1Yt+b2Pt+b3RB , t. b 4. AN i=o ,I 
Since a fall in the level of the long-term bond rate should 
lead to a fall in the demand for money, if the fall is 
expected to continuet and vice-versap the expected sign on 
b is positive. If RL remains unchanged over a period, or 4B 
varies around a particular 'normal rate', with. frequent 
changes of sign, then the distributed lag term will not have 
much impact on money demand: this is clearly appropriate since 
it is just this situation in which expected capital gains 
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from holding bonds are likely to be zero. 
It has been assumed that the exchange rate variable 
is best represented by the 'sterling effective exchange 
ratelp and that the expected rate is a function of the 
actual exchange rate - (92 )EX. One procedure for measuring 
the expected exchange rate would be to incorporate a. 
distributed lag of the sterling effective exchange rate 
into the demand for money function as shown below: 
M=A+bY+bP+bRL+bRL+b EX +u 23B3iB 
t-i 
fZ- 4i t-i 1=1 i=O 
Where EX = the sterling effective exchange rate. 
The choice of polynomial degree, and hence the lag path, 
should reflect the expectations hypothesis maintained, 
although the optimum solution is simply to vary both the 
polynomial degree and lag length until the best empirical 
results are obtained. The drawback to this solution is 
that while it might be optimum for the data period under 
consideration, it may provide us with poor forecasts because 
of changes in the factors which influence expectations. 
A theory of exchange rate expectations will therefore be 
needed. 
An alternative approach is based on interest rate 
parity models, where work by Aliber (I Dornbusch ( 40 
and McKinnon ( 88) has been influential. This approach 
treats exchange rates as be ing primarily determined in asset 
markets in the short-run, with exchange rate expectations 
depending on movements in the forward exchange rate relative 
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to thc% spot rate. Laidler (79) points out that since 
the relationship between the spot and forward rate is 
determined by specialist foreign exchange dealers under 
flexible rates, it will serve as a good short-term measure 
of the expected change in the exchange rate for other 
agents. These agents can conveniently use this relation- 
ship to calculate their own 'rational' expectation about 
the time path of the exchange rate. Assuming that the 
forward rate correctly reflects the future spot rate 
(i. e. the spot rate in three months' time) then we have 
perfect foresight which can be expressed as follows: 
jýýEX 
E EX t+l 
Where, 
EX E= Expected exchange rate 
We are now in a position to specify our demand for 
money modelsp for each definiti6n of money, indicating 
both the functional forms and the actual explanatory 
variables (see Section 3.1 above) which are likely to 
perform best. 
Arango and Nadir ,i 
(3) used this approach for exchange 
rate expectations: for precise details of variable 
specification see Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
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t 
1. Ml =a0+b1y GDPMp +b2 PGDP 
MP 
+b3Rs+u1 
2. TD =b+cY Rt +cR 01 GDP MP 
+ C2 PGDP 
MP 
+ C3 S4 CD 
+cR+cRL+iRL EX 5 EU 6B c6 B+c7 
N 
+ -2 5' c7i EX t-i + u2 i=O 
ZM3 c+dY+d+d+d Rt 01 GDPMP 2 PGDPMP 3 RCD 4S 
LmL +d5 REU +d6RB+d 6i RB t-i 
N 
+d 7i EXt_i +u3 
1=0 
4. MP =d+e PDI +eP+eR7+eR+u 012 PDI 3 OR 4 BU 4 
5. MC =e0+f1 YGDP 
FC 
+ f2 PGDP 
FC 
+ f3 R CD +f4 RLA 
or R 
+fR+fRL+m, fRLB 5 EU 6B6iB t-i 
N 
+<f 7i EX t-i + U5 i=O 
Notes 
The functional form is either untransformed linear or 
log-linear. 
2. Since Chapter 7 is devoted to the influence of inflation 
expectations, this variable is omitted from the above 
specifications. 
3. ýt indicates that alternative interest rates should be 
tried since many domestic short-term rates have been 
subject to control during the 1970's. 
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4. Since there are no reliable measures of wealth for 
the UK economy, a wealth variable is excluded from 
the models. 
5. A weighted average of the relevant own-rates on 
money could be used for TD, 9M3 and MC in place of 
the CD rate. 
For variable definitions see data appendix. (Note - 
for convenience the income and price subscripts are 
dropped when presenting the empirical results in 
Chapters 5-10) . 
As they stand these are equilibrium models of the 
demand for money - i. e. the effect of a change in any of 
the explanatory variables on the demand for money is assumed 
to work through completely within a single period. Since 
the empirical work is concerned with short-run quarterly 
demand for money models it is necessary to take account of 
lags in adjustment because it is extremely unlikely, except 
perhaps for the company sector, that adjustment would be 
completed within a quarter. There are several competing 
hypotheses concerning the dynamics of money demand adjustment 
and these are described in the following section. 
3.3 Model dynamics 
Two classes of distributed lag models are considered in this 
section: fixed and flexible lags. Several alternative 
hypotheses have been advanced to account for the lag 
structure and these include partial adjustment, adaptive- 
expectations and the permanent income hypothesis. Despite 
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the very different assumptions of these models they each 
result in very similar final estimating equations; a fact 
which makes it difficult to discriminate between them 
empirically. Although the flexible lag model has no real 
theoretical underpinning, it does not arbitrarily impose 
any particular lag structure from the outset; the data 
itself is allowed to determine both the pattern and length 
of adjustment following changes in the values of the 
explanatory variables. 
Each class of model can now be considered in turn. 
For convenience it is assumed that a transactions demand 
model is appropriate. 
3.3.1 fixed laq models 
1. Partial adjustment 
In this model money-holders are assumed to have a desired 
level of money demand to which they adjust their actual 
holdings gradually-following a change in income, prices or 
interest rates. The reasons for partial adjustment typically 
include ignorance, inertia and the costs of change. The 
model can be set out formally as follows: 
M* =A+bY+b2P+b3R 
m _M (M* -M +u t t-1 t t-1 t 
Where M* Desired money-holdings. 
Substituting for M* in Equation 2 we get; 
3. Mt-mt_l = 
)\A 
+ 
Xb 
1y+ 
Xb 
2p+ 
Xb 
3R 
- 
ýMt-l 
+ ut 
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Bringing Mt_l over to the other side of the 
equation we obtain the final estimating 
equation: 
4. Mt XA + Xb 1Y+ 
Xb 
2P+ 
Xb 
3R 
(1- X)mt-l +Ut 
If we focus on equations 1,2 and 4 we see that the 
coefficients bi represent the long-run coefficients, 
X bi 
the short-run coefficients, and that 
X 
represents the 
speed at which Mt adjusts to the desired level, M*. It 
can readily be seen that if 
X=1 
then desired money- 
holdings equal actual money-holdings (equation 2 above) 
indicating that adjustment to a change is completed within 
a single period. In equation 4 the coefficient on M t-1 
will now be zero, while the coefficients on income, price 
and the rate of interest will now be the long-run values of 
bl, b2 and b3, respectively - i. e. we have an equilibrium 
model. 
It is to be expectedv however, in a short-run 
quarterly model of the demand for money that adjustment 
will not be fully completed within a single period - i. e. 
X<1. 
One of the model requirements is that should not 
be less than 0. for if this is the case the model 
collapses with the coefficient on Mt_l 
If the above set of equations are derived from a 
log-linear specification, as opposed to an untransformed 
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linear model, 
* then the parameters of the model can be 
interpreted as elasticities: 
Income Price Interest 
Elasticity Elasticity Rate Elasticity 
Short-run Xb 
\b 
2 
Xb 
3 
Long-run bb2b3 
The proportion of adjustment of money-holdings 
to their desired level completed within a single 
period. 
The partial adjustment model has been commonly used 
in empirical work and certainly represents a conveniently 
simple specification based on quite plausible assumptions. 
However, it has two important weaknesses. Firstly, it 
constrains both the speed of adjustment and the lag paths 
of the demand for money to be the same regardless of the 
initial source of disturbance: it seems rather unlikely 
that the speed and pattern of adjustment following a change 
in prices would coincide with that for interest ratesl** 
A second criticism concerns the basic assumption that actual 
money-holdings only adjust upwards towards higher desired 
levels: if the monetary authorities were to use open market 
operations in order to increase the money supply# then 
The log-linear specification does have certain econometric 
advantages; in particular the problem of heteroscedasticity, 
which destroys the BLUE properties of the OLS estimator, is 
considerably reduced. 
This implicit assumption of the model can be tested by using 
a flexible lag model which allows the data to determine the 
lag structure. 
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initially the public would find itself holding an increase 
in cash which is in excess of the desired level; in 
subsequent periods they would then reduce cash-holdings 
towards the desired level. The real problem here is one of 
identification since money demand cannot be directly 
observed. Money stock figures are used to represent demando 
and these represent the outcome of both supply and demand 
forces. The problem can be overcome by specifyi*ng a simult- 
aneous model of the money market, with both a money supply 
and money demand function specified. This certainly seems 
appropriate for the policy-relevant LM3 definition of money. 
2. Adaptive-expectations and permanent income 
Cagan ( 25 ) and Friedman ( 51 ) developed these hypotheses 
which have been commonly applied in empirical work on the 
demand for money. Typically, the hypotheses have been 
applied to the income variable only, since short-run 
homogeneity of money demand with respect to the actual price 
level has been commonly assumed in the empirical work. (The 
issue of homogeneity in prices is considered further in an 
Appendix to this Chapter). Such an assumption has led to the 
specification of both the dependent and lagged dependent 
variables in real terms. 
Permanent income is really a proxy measure for wealth 
in the demand for money function, and is defined as a 
distributed lag of current and past incomes as follows: 
CPO 
yp 8(1-e), yt-i 0 i=O 
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In this form permanent income is simply a weighted average 
of current and all past incomes, with the weights declining 
geometrically and reflecting the assumption that incomes in 
the recent past are more important than those which are 
further removed from the current time period. 
The adaptive-expectations model leads to an identical 
expression for YE or expected income, and therefore a final 
estimating equation for the demand for money which is 
identical to that for the permanent income case. It states 
that people will adjust their income expectations by a 
proportion of the discrepancy between actual income in the 
current period and the income expected for that period (the 
expectation being formed in the previous period, t-1). With 
the scheme just applying to income our demand for money model 
can be set out formally as follows: 
1. 
2. 
A+bYE+bP+bR 1t2t3t 
yE= E) (Y - t-1 t 
From equation 2 above, 
yE= ey + (1-e)y 
E 
tt t-1 
Let (1-9) =g then., 
(1-gD)Y E= E)y tt 
0<ej. 
D= delay or lag 
operator 
Therefore: yy t- (1-gD) t 
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Substituting for YE in equation 1 above ve get: t 
mDA+b, 
E) 
Y+bP+bR t (1-gD) t2t3t 
Multiplying equation 3 throughout by (1-gD) ve get, 
MD(1-9D) = A(1-9D) +b16yt+b2 (1-gD) Pt 
b3 (1-9D) Rt+ut (1-9D) 
And since g= (1-8), 
mD (1-E))M = 8A +b8Y+bPb t t-1 1t2t 2(1-6) pt-1 
b3Rt-b 3(1-6) R t-1 + ut - (1-e) ut-1 
Bringing M t-1 over to the R. h. s. of equation we obtain the 
final estimating equation: 
mD= E)A +b E) Y+bP-b2 (1-e) P+bR tIt2t t-1 '3 t 
-b3 (1-8) R t-1 + (1-e) mt-1 + ut - (1-e) ut-1 
Assuming a log-linear specification we can interpret the 
coefficients as elasticities. The long-run price and interest 
rate elasticities, b2 and b3p respectivelyp are available 
directly from the equationp while the coefficient on income, 
b16 represents the short-run income elasticity: the long- 
run income elasticity b1 is obtained by dividing b19 by 9v 
an estimate of which is given by 1- coefficient on M t-1 - 
i. e. 3. - (i-e) = e. 
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The assumption of adaptive-expectations might have 
been applied to any of the variables in the model, or 
perhaps even to each of them. However, it should be pointed 
out that-its application to either the price or interest 
variables during the 1970's would probably be quite 
inappropriate since both variables have shown strong trend 
movements over the period. Furthermore, variation in the 
income variable is not particularly strong compared with 
previous periods, and it is likely that expected income 
would not have seriously diverged from actual income 
especially in the second half of the decade. 
It could still be that expected values of one or more 
of the explanatory variables should appear in the demand for 
money function, but that expectations need to be modelled in 
a different way. For the 1970's an extrapolative/regressive 
model might be in order. Alternatively, a flexible lag 
approach could be used. 
Before turning to flexible lag models it should be 
recognized that lags in the demand for money could well be 
accounted for by a combination of the hypotheses outlined 
above - e. g. partial adjustment combined with adaptive- 
expectations., Such a model which formally combines these 
two hypotheses is detailed below: 
A+bYE+bP+bR+u 1t2t3t 
Such a model is outlined for inflation expectations in 
Chapter 7. 
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Partial M -M =X (M* -M )+vo< Adjustment t t-l t t-l t 
Adaptive- 
-yE_y 
E_ 
= 8(y -y 
E_ 
Expectations tt1tt1 
This model reduces to af inal estimating equation as 
f ollows: 
mt =C0+c1yt+c2 pt +C3p t-1 +c4Rt+c5R t-1 
Cm t-1 +c7m t-2 + et 
wheref 
c0= AA 
c1= bl\ E) 
c2= b2X 
-b2\ (1-E)) 
*4 b3\ 
*5 -b 3X (1-E)) 
c (2-e-A) 6 
c7 
ý) 
et A composite 
error term 
Unlike the partial adjustment model both the adaptive- 
expectations and combined models imply serial correlation 
in the error terms of the estimating equation. In the 
adaptive-expectations scheme the error term is u t-(1-6)ut-.,. 
Let vt=U t-(l-e)ut-l 
Then v t-1 =U t-l- (i-e)u t-2 
Since both Vt and Vt_l depend on ut_l it follows that they 
are correlated to some extent. It is therefore necessary 
to allow for serial correlation when estimating the model. 
ill 
It should also be noted that while the partial 
adjustment model is exactly identified, both the adaptive- 
expectations and combined models are over-identified since 
the number of coefficients to be estimated exceeds the 
number of structural parameters. Thus while the partial 
adjustment model yields unique estimates of the structural 
parameters the other models do not. 
3.3.2 Flexible laq models 
The main trouble with the fixed lag, models is that the lag 
structure is simply imposed from the outset without any 
preliminary investigation of the data. The models considered 
above yielded lag structures with geometrically declining 
coefficients - i. e. current period values of the explanatory 
variables have more influence on the demand for money than 
all previous period values. However, it may well be that 
there is a lag before money-holders react at all to changes 
in income, price or rates of interest. If this is the case 
then the imposition of a rigid lag structure with geometric- 
ally declining weights will obviously be an invalid 
procedure. It is clearly useful to let the data itself 
inform us about the pattern of adjustment and a flexible 
finite lag model allows this. 
The model can be expressed as follows: 
L 
Mt =A+ýbiY t-i +ý Ci P t-i + . 
4ý; diR t-i + ut i=O i=O i=0 
where MO N and L denote the lag lengths on the income, price 
and interest rate variables. 
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Now free estimation of such a model is not really 
feasible owing to (1) the serious multicollinearity problems 
which would arise and (2) the loss of a large number of 
degrees of freedom; an especially important problem when 
dealing with relatively small samples of data. 
Use of the polynomial distributed lag technique (PDL), 
applying the Almon scheme (2), reduces the multicollinearity 
problem significantly and is not so wasteful of degrees of 
freedom since a polynomial of fairly low degree can be used. 
At the same time it does not impose an inflexible lag 
structure on the model as do the partial adjustment and 
adaptive-expectations schemes. 
The PDL technique is based on Weierstrass' theorem* 
which states that a function continuous in a closed interval 
can be approximated over the entire interval by a polynomial 
of suitable degree which differs from the function by*less 
than any given positive quantity at every point of the 
interval. 
Although the theorem gives no indication of the degree 
of polynomial required for a given level of accuracy it is 
hoped that a polynomial of reasonably low degree will*give 
good results. 
In the first instance economic theory should give some 
guidance to the shape of the lag paths, and thus to the 
appropriate choice of polynomial degree for each of the 
explanatory variables. Working on the crude assumption that 
the chosen polynomial degree should be one greater than the 
most of the mathematics dictionaries include some reference 
to Weierstrass' approximation theorem - e. g. Mathematics 
Dictionary - G. James and R. C. James (p. 412 of the 4th 
edition, 1976). 
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number of turning-points expected in the lag path, it would 
seem that the lag reaction of money-holdings to changes in 
income, prices and interest rates can be adequately captured 
by polynomials of low degree. 
Some possible laq paths and the appropriate choice 
of polynomial deqree 
1 
B. 1 
xtx t-1 x t-2 x t-3` x t-i 
3 
5 
2 
4 
6 
4 
tx t-1 x t-2*****'*Xt-i 
xtx t-1 x t-2"*"*' t-i 
xtx t-1 x t-20 90000ex t-i 
xtx t-1 x t-2*""**Xt-i 
xtx t-1 x t-2*'*'***Xt-i 
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It would appear that polynomial degrees of 1-3 are likely 
to adequately cover all the feasible lag paths. If the 
chosen PD proves unsatisfactory when the equations are 
estimatedv then the data for the period concerned rejects 
the theory, and a different PD should be tried. In the 
final analysis the data determines the lag path and 
providing theory does not positively reject the outcome 
we can accept the sample results. 
In addition to selecting the appropriate polynomial 
degree the effective lag length for each explanatory variable 
has to be chosen. Once again, theory should help in the 
first instance plus evidence from existing empirical work. 
The important point is that the optimum PD and lag length 
specification are determined empirically. 
Polynomials and the Almon scheme 
Although orthogonal polynomials are used in my empirical 
work, as they have an important computational advantage 
(explained below)v a simple scheme using Almon weights 
most clearly demonstrates the nature of polynomial distributed 
lag estimation. 
The simple Almon scheme 
f(Z) a0+a1Z+a2z2+ *e*99esee + aj Zj 
a 
i=0 
Wherep Z' A combination of X 
ai Polynomial weights 
j Polynomial degree 
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The precise nature of the polynomial variables, Zi 0 
depends on the construction of the variables implicit in 
the simple Almon scheme and the lag length specified. 
Degree of Polynomial Variables Polynomial 
1Z=X t-1 + 2X t-2 + 3X t-3**'*"+ sx t-s 
z2=X t-1 +22x t-2 +32x t-3* ***+ S2 x t-s 
iX t-1 +21x t-2 +31x t-3"** + si x t-s 
The above table shows that for the lst degree variable, Zp 
each of the coefficients on Xi are raised to the power 
for the 2nd degree variable, z2, they are raised to the 
power 21 and for the ith degree variable, Z1, they are 
raised to the power i. The number of lagged Xi appearing 
in Z depends on the lag length specified; S in this case. 
Suppose the basic equation to be estimated is, 
yt=A+b0 xt +b1x t-1 + b2 x t-2 oeses +bsX t-s +ut 
The coefficients bk are given by the values of f(Z) at the 
points Z=0,1,2 ....... S. 
ai 
i=o 
bk Coefficient on Xi 
j Degree of polynomial 
ai = Polynomial coefficients in f(z) 
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Making the substitution b. = f(K) the model becomes, 
ai K )x t-k +ut i=O 
constructing new variables: 
xs'K1x it -! --! 
K 
t-k k=O 
So., the equation to be estimated is as follows: 
3 
yt=:: ýý ai Xit + ut 
i=o 
Andp 
b0=a0 b1= a0 + a1+a 2 + ai 
b2 = a0 + 2a 1+ 4a 2 + 
23a i 
bs= a0 + Sa 1+ 
2 s a2 + S3a 
EXAMPLE: Let polynomial degree =2 and lag length = 4. 
Then, 
f (Z) =a0Z0+a1 Z' +a2Z2 
Zxt+x t-1 +x t-2 +x t-3 +x t-4 
Z1x t-1 + 
2X 
t-2 + 3x t-3 + 
4X t-4 
Z2x t-1 + 4X t-2 + 9x t-3 + 16X t-4 
Therefore, 
Yt =A+a0xt+ (a 0+a1+a2 
)X 
t-1 
+ (a 0+ 2a 1+ 4a 2)Xt-2 + 
(ao + 3a, + 9a2) Xt-3 
+ (a 0+ 4a 1+ 16a 2)Xt-4 + ut 
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Where., 
b0 
a0+a1+a2= 
a0+ 2a 1+ 4a 2=b2 
Orthoqonal polynomials* 
a0+ 3a 1+ 9a 2=b3 
a0+ 4a 1+ 16a 2=b4 
The basic polynomial regression: 
012n Yt = bo Zt +b1 zt + b2Zt oooooo+ bn Zt + et 
Where Z comprises some combination of X t-i 
The advantage of using orthogonal polynomials is that they 
minimise multicollinearity problems between the Zs in the 
basic equation shown above. These problems can be serious 
when simple polynomials are used - e. g. the simple Almon 
scheme. Orthogonal polynomials have a computational 
advantage only - i. e. as long as the computational problem 
is avoided then the choice of polynomials will make no 
difference at all as the different polynomials would yield 
the same lag weights. 
So, using orthogonal polynomials makes the Z' as 
independent as possible. This is useful since each parameter 
estimated gives reasonably independent' information about 
the weighting function, and it is possible to evaluate the 
significance of including different Zi variables. In fact t 
if the original X series was a stationary random series then 
See 'Polynomial Approximation of Distributed Lag Structures' 
- S. Robinson. Discussion Paper No. 1, LSEq June 1970, 
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using orthogonal polynomials would ensure that the 
expected correlations between the Zi variables would be t 
zero. In such a case each of the bi would give completely 
independent information about the shape of the lag path 
corresponding to the degree of the chosen polynomial. If 
the bi become larger as i increases, then this would suggest 
that the lag path cannot be well approximated by a poly- 
nomial. 
Even if the Xs are serially correlated and thus the 
zi are not independentp the use of orthogonal polynomials t 
will still yield benefits. By running a series of multiple 
regressions, stepping in an additional Zi for each new t 
regression, a set of approximating polynomials of degree 0 
to n are obtained. One can then examine ý2 and the t- 
statistics on the estimated bi, to see if additional 
variables improve the explanatory power of the equation. 
Thus we have a reliable empirical basis for choosing the 
polynomial degree; and if theoretical expectation squares 
with the empirical evidence then this implies that we can be 
confident about the lag path. 
Some details on the orthoqonal polynomials 
There exists a set of orthogonal polynomials which have the 
properties thatp for integer values of t. 
-: 
ý-Pi(t') 
00 
t=l 
n 
pi(t) p (t) =0 for all 
t=l i 
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These polynomials have the following form, 
p0 (t) =1 
p1(t) = 
and the general recursion formula: 
pM=p M-p M-r 
(n -r pM 
r+l 1r -4(4r 2 -1) 
r-1 
Where, 
r= Degree of polynomial 
Pr (t) = Polynomial of degree r in t 
n+l t2 
In the recursion formula t is measured from its mean. 
Therefore t= t-E. 
3.4 Estimation problems 
In dynamic single equation models of the demand for money 
the main problems include multicollinearity, errors in 
variablesp serial correlation and stochastic regressors. 
Howeverv for broad definitions of money such as ZM3 it may 
well be that simultaneity is an important problem with some 
of the regressors in the demand for money equation being 
endogenous. Two important problems for simultaneous models 
are identification and simultaneous equation bias. In 
addition to these there is the problem of across equation 
autocorrelation, as well as within equation autocorrelation, 
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and the treatment of lagged endogenous regressors in the 
face of significant autocorrelation. 
Each of these problems will be dealt with in turn 
focusing firstly on those which arise in the context of a 
single equation model, and then on the problems specifically 
associated with a simultaneous model. 
3.4.1 Sinqle equation problems 
Suppose it is believed that transactions motives are the 
main influence on demand for money behaviour, and that we 
are concerned with a short-run, quarterly model where 
adjustment is not completed within a single period. The 
model can be expressed as follows: 
Mtb1yt+b2pt+b3Rt+xm t-1 +ut 
It is further assumed that movements in the money stock 
reflect demand changes - i. e. the SuPply of money is demand- 
determined, and that each of t4e explanatory variables are 
exogenous. 
One problem which will arise at the estimation stage 
is that of multicollinearity: during the 1960's, in 
particulars there was a common trending in the data, and 
insufficient independent variation in the variables to 
determine a strong relationship. The reason for this was 
the strong positive correlation between income and prices. 
* 
Now the greater the correlation between income and 
prices, the larger will be the variances of the estimated 
Even in the 1970's when there was a good deal more 
independent variation in prices, the correlation 
between price and the lagged money stock was strong. 
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coefficients, b1 and b2 This can be shown most 
conveniently by assuming that both b3 and 
X 
are zero so 
that equationý(l) collapses to a case in which there are 
just the two explanatory variables; income and price. 
Then, 
A 
Variance of b 
2 
uu 
jy2 (1-r 2 
2 
Variance of b2 = (% 
ip 2 (1-r 2 
(Where r= correlation between Y and P). 
Now if prices and income were perfectly correlated then 
r2 =1 and the denominators of the above expressions would be 
zero. It follows that the variances would be infinitely 
great,. but in this case no estimates of the bi could even 
be obtained. More generally, the greater the correlation 
between P and Y then the smaller the denominator of the 
expression must be in relation to the numerator, and hence 
the larger will be the variances of the estimators b1 and 
A 
b2* This, in turn, will result in wide confidence intervals 
for both b1 and b 2' and a strong tendency to accept the null 
hypothesis that the true coefficients are zero. 
It must be stressed that multicollinearity is not a 
problem of the method of estimation, but a problem of the 
data itself. It is often quite serious when dealing with 
time-series data. 
ways of overcoming or easing multicollinearity problems 
include placing theoretical restrictions, where appropriate, 
122 
on the values of certain parameters - e. g. it has often 
been assumed in empirical work that the demand for money 
is linearly homogeneous with respect to the price level. 
Another way around the problem, when it is caused by common 
trending in the datap is to take lst differences of the 
variables before estimation. However, since this procedure 
may well lead to serial correlation problems, where none 
existed in the first place, it is not to be strongly 
recommended. A third way to handle the problem is to apply 
principal component analysisp* although in this case it is 
difficult to interpret the results. 
In practice, we must live with the multicollinearity 
problem: as long as the t-test shows the estimated regression 
coefficients to be significant at some prior chosen 
significance level, then the coefficient estimates can be 
accepted. 
A second. problem which might arise is that of errors 
in variables. This concerns the possibility of measurement 
error in the independent variables; P, Y and R. One source 
of error is information weakness. For example, figures in 
the national income accounts are subject to a small degree 
of uncertainty, and current and back-year figures may be 
revised in subsequent data periods. Howeverg this is 
probably not a serious problem since economic agents often 
act on the basis of reported information, whether it is 
incorrect or not. 
** Errors in variables will be much more 
This analysis is fully explained in Dutta ( 43 ) Ch. 8. 
But to the extent that the errors arise in the aggreg- 
ation of data it could be argued that since individuals 
often pay attention to known micro variables the problem 
still exists. 
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important if it is believed that expected rather than 
actual values of the explanatory variables are relevant 
to money-holding behaviour. If expectations models, such 
as adaptive or extrapolative-regressive expectations, are 
relevant then the application of OLS will yield coefficient 
estimates which are both biased and inconsistent. In such 
cases alternative estimators such as instrumental variables 
or maximum likelihood are required. 
* 
Perhaps the most important problem is that'of serial 
correlation in the residuals. One of the necessary conditions 
for the BLUE property of OLS is that the error terms are 
serially independent -E ut ut_i = 0. If this condition is 
broken then ut depends on u t-1 and the estimated variances 
of both the coefficients and the residuals will be misleading 
so that nothing much can be said about the significance of 
the coefficients and no hypothesis tests can be constructed. 
It should be stressed that serial correlation by itself - 
i. e. in equations without lagged dependents appearing as 
regressors, and only non-stochastic variables - does not 
lead to biased and inconsistent OLS parameter estimates. 
simple adjustments can be made for serial correlation, which 
is measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic; 
** for sample 
sizes where n> 30 an efficient estimate of p is given by 
the formula 1- '-2d(where d= D-W statistic), and although 
the same procedure can be followed for smaller samples it is 
important to test for serial correlation again after trans- 
forming the original relationship. 
Johnston (70 ) p-281-291 gives a good account of the 
errors in variables problem; especially p. 281 and 
p. 283. 
J. Durbin and G. S. Watson ( 42 
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In our dynamic demand for money model, see equation 
(1) above, we have an additional problem since the lagged 
dependent variable,, M t-12 is included in the set of 
explanatory variables. This violates another important 
necessary condition for OLS estimators to be BLUE - i. e. 
the explanatory variables, Xi, should be independent of ui 
for all i; they should be non-stochastic. The condition 
is violated since the lagged money stock, Mt_lp clearly 
depends on u t-19 
Now in the absence of serial correlation the only 
problem resulting from this violation of the independence 
condition would be one of bias in small samples - i. e. 
n< 30. However, OLS would still yield, asymptotically 
unbiased and consistent estimates; attractive properties 
of any estimator. 
If both problems exist together then it immediately 
follows that M t-1 
is correlated with ut, since M t-1 and 
ut are each correlated with u t-1, In this situation the 
OLS estimator will be both biased and inconsistent. Further- 
more, the D-W statistic will now be an inappropriate measure 
of serial correlation; 
* in cases of positive autocorrelation 
the D-W statistic will be biased towards 2.0 and may well 
suggest that the problem does not existp when in fact it 
does. 
It is important to obtain a consistent estimate of p 
before transforming the variables to eliminate the serial 
correlation problem. Although there are several alternative 
In -these circumstances the appropriate test-statistic 
is given by Durbin (41 ). Durbin's h-statistic is 
explained in Johnston ( 70 ) p. 313. 
125 
methods for doing this, I will focus only on the method 
used in the GIVE programme 
* 
since this was used for much 
of my empirical work. 
Before outlining the method of estimation for 
dynamic single equation models with serially correlated 
error terms it is important to consider how the serial 
correlation might have arisen; in some cases blindly 
transforming the variables in order to eliminate the 
problem might be quite inappropriate. 
Suppose the problem arose simply because the 
structural form of the model is incorrect. Perhaps an- 
important explanatory variable has been omitted from the 
modelo or it could be that. the dynamics have been specified 
incorrectly. Worse still, it may be that a non-linear 
rather than a linear specification is appropriate. Each 
of these three cases are possible for our postulated demand 
for money relationship; consider for example the naive lag 
structure postulated by the popular partial adjustment 
hypothesiso or the possibility that a variable to take 
account of a speculative component of money demand needs to 
be specified. The appropriate action in these cases is to 
revise the basic model and not to simply transform the 
existing relationship. 
However, if the serial correlation problem arises 
because of certain data shocks - e. g. the disturbance to 
money markets caused by Competition and Credit Control which 
was essentially temporary - then unless the disturbance can 
be adequately picked-up by the inclusion of dummy variables, 
* Hendry and Srba ( 65 ). 
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it may be necessary to transform the relationship in order 
to eliminate the problem. Perhaps a better solution still 
would be to omit those observations which are atypical, 
although we are then faced with the problem of small data 
samples. Another source of naturally occurring serial 
correlation in the data itself, may be due to seasonal 
variation in the variables which cannot be adequately 
accounted for by the usual seasonal adjustment methods. 
In demand for money relationships the problem of residual 
seasonal variation is a likely occurrence since (1) the 
method used by the CSO to adjust income data is not the 
same as the one used by the Bank of England to adjust the 
money stock figures, (2) interest rates are not seasonally 
adjusted and (3) the Bank of England adjust the money stock 
figures for reasons other than just seasonal variation. 
In these cases where serial correlation problems 
arise in the data itself, then transformation to eliminate 
them is an appropriate procedure. However, if serial 
correlation arises because themodel has been incorrectly. 
specified then the correct response is to adapt the model 
itself and not to simply eliminate the problem via transform- 
ation. 
The GIVE programme allows us to estimate p. the 
serial correlation coefficient, efficiently 
in the context 
of a dynamic single equation autoregressive model. It also 
enables us to decide whether any serial correlation 
in the 
residuals is due to mis-specified dynamics in the model. 
An outline of the GIVE procedure is given overleaf. 
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A description of the GIVE procedure 
Firstly, we can write our autoregressive model of the 
demand for money as follows: 
(1) mt=A+b1yt+b2pt+b3Rt+ 
xm 
t-1 +ut 
ut=p Ut_l +et 
Ee =0 Ee 
2=2 Ee e=0. tet t-1 
Equation (1) sets out the structural form of the model 
and equation (2) postulates lst order serial correlation 
in the error term. 
Now, three different representations of this single 
model are possible: the structural form as in (1) above, 
the restricted transformation function (RTF) and the 
unrestricted transformation function (URTF). 
The RTF is obtained as follows: 
From (1) and (2) above we obtain the following expression, 
p Mt-1 = P(A +b1y t-1 +b2 pt-1 +b3R t-1 
xm 
t-2 +u t-1) 
Subtracting (3) from (1) gives the RTF. 
RTF: Mt = A(l-p) +b1 Yt - pbl Yt_l + b2Ft - 
pb 2p t-1 +b3Rt- pb 3R t-1 + 
(p +x) mt-l 
- PX Mt-2 + et. 
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Which can be re-arrangpd and alternatively expressed as 
f ollows: 
Mt - pMt_l = A(l-p) + bl(Yt-pYt_, ) +b 2(pt-ppt-l) 
b3 (Rt-pR t-1 
)+ ý(Mt-l-PN-2 )+ et. 
Finallys we have the URTF which is simply fhe unrestricted 
form of equation (4) above: 
URTF - Mt =b0+c1yt+C2y t-1 +C3pt+c4p t-1 
Rt+C6R t-1 +C7m t-1 +C8m t-2 + Vto 
GIVE estimates all three representations and applies test- 
statistics, such as the )(2_statistic, to see which is the 
valid specification. 
Whereas the structural form and the URTF can be 
estimated bY OLS, the RTF with its non-linear restrictions 
must be estimated by ALS (autoregressive least squares). 
The procedure is as follows: 
eý is calculated for a grid of values of p from 1 
-0.92 to + 0.98 in steps of 0.10. This search 
procedure provides a check for multiple minima 
and helps ensure that the iteration commences close 
to the global minimum. 
(2) For the iteration a variant of Gauss-Seidel is then 
2 
used until successive results for: 
ýe 
i converge. 
See Hendry (63 ) p. 562-563 for details on the relevant 
test statistics. 
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This procedure gives us a consistent estimate for p and 
for each of the structural parameters of the model providing 
there is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals 
of the RTF. 
If p is significantly different from zero and if there 
is no significant difference between the sum of squared 
residuals from the RTF and the URTF, then the non-linear 
restrictions between the parameters in the RTF are shown to 
hold. 
If there is a significant difference between the 
residuals then the RTF should be rejected in favour of the 
URTF. In this case we would recognize that the structural 
form of the model has been incorrectly specified, * and that 
simply transforming the relationship to take account of 1 st 
order serial correlation is an inappropriate procedure. 
A 
Finally, if p is not significantly different from 
zero and the correlogram (or autocorrelation function) 
indicates random residuals in the structural form, then 
providing an F-test shows that the additional lagged 
regressors entering the URTF do not add significantly to 
the explanation of variation in the dependent variable, this 
indicates that the basic structure is sound and can be 
estimated efficiently by OLS. 
3.4.2 Problems in a simultaneous model 
For LM3p the broad money aggregate, it has already been 
argued that a simultaneous model may well be appropriate, so 
simple IS/LM models are considered in the empirical work in 
It might be that a higher order of serial correlation is 
present, but if the hypothesis of a random correlogram 
can be strongly accepted then this points to an error in 
the dynamic specification of the SP. 
130 
addition to single equation models. 
Hendry (63 ), Hendry and Srba ( 65 ) and Fair ( 45 
comprehensively cover the estimation of simultaneous/ 
models and the selection of optimal estimators. The last- 
named author specifically deals with models containing 
lagged endogenous variables and first order serially 
correlated errors. 
A brief treatment of the problems is given here with 
the emphasis placed on the appropriate choice of estimator. 
Consider the following simple IS/LM model in which 
all variables are expressed in nominal terms, and the price 
elasticity of demand for money is assumed to equal the 
income elasticity. 
LM3 Da+bY+bR+bR+X ZM3 D t01t2Bt3 CD t -1 
(2) ZM3S =b+cH+cR+c MLR +8 ZM3S +v t01t2Bt3tt 
(3) yt =c0 +-d 1At+d2RBt+ 
LY-1 
+et 
Three endogenous variables - ZM3v Y) R B* 
(4) u t = pi + U/ Ut-, t Eu 
/=0 
t 
(5) v t ý P2 + V/ Vt-l t Ev/ =0 t 
(6) e t= P3 et_l + e/ t Ee 
/=0 
t 
/2 2 Eu t 0--U/ Eut ut_l =0 
Ev12 =2 EV / V/- =0 t Cýv tt1 
Ee 12 = ()ý2 1 Ee 
1 e/_ = C) tt1 
(All variables are defined in the data appendix). 
The dynamics of the system are assumed to reflect a 
general partial adjustment hypothesis, and the errors are 
assumed to be subject to lst order serial correlation. 
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The problem is to select an estimator which will 
give us consistent estimates of the parameters of the 
demand for money equation - i. e. the equation of special 
interest. 
Before estimation of the model we must check to see 
that the model is identified, since if it is under- 
. 
identified there will be at least one equation in the system 
for which we will not be able to derive consistent parameter 
estimates: it is essential that the demand for money 
equation is identified otherwise we will not be able to 
obtain estimates of the various elasticities (assuming a 
log-linear specification*). 
A sufficient condition for the identification of an 
equation in a simultaneous model is that both the Order and 
Rank conditions are satisfied. 
** The Orqer condition can 
be stated as follows: 
In a model of M simultaneous equationst in order for 
an equation to be identifiedo the number of predetermined 
variables (exogenous and lagged endogenous) excluded from 
the equation must not be less than the number of endogenous 
regressors in the equation of interest. 
In the model outlined above there are two endogenous 
regressors in the demand for money equation., Y and RB, and 
there are four pre-determined variables, H MLR A Y_l, which 
Strictly speaking, a log-linear version of this model 
is an ad hoc specification since equation (3) above, 
the is equation, involves the aggregation of several 
different expenditure terms and the addition of logs 
of variables will not satisfy the national income 
identity. 
The Rank condition is explained in Appendix B. 
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are excluded from this equation. 
* Thus equation (1) is 
said to be over-identified since the number of excluded 
pre-determined variables exceeds the number of endogenous 
regressors. (The money supply and income equations are 
also over-identified). So,, providing the Rank condition 
is satisfied, as is likely to be the case, each equation 
of the model is identified and estimation can proceed. 
There is an estimation problemp however, because 
of the presence of endogenous regressors in each of the 
equations. OLS estimates of the parameters of the demand 
for money function ignore the simultaneity in the model 
and are thus subject to simultaneous equation bias. If 
the feed-back relationships postulated by the system are 
strong then the OLS estimator will be seriously biased. 
The problem arises because the endogenous regressors Yt 
and Rt are both correlated with ut in equation (i). clearly, 
then, an alternative estimator must. be found. If the 
equation was exactly identified then Indirect Least Squares" 
could be used. However, in over-identified models unique 
parameter estimates cannot be obtained by applying this 
method. Insteadp 2SLS must be used which gives identical 
results to ILS in exactly-identified equations and yields 
unique parameter estimates in over-identified models. 
2SLS copes with the simultaneity problem by the 
following procedure: 
Strictly speaking both the number of endogenous and exo- 
genous variables should be greater in the presence of 
serial correlation. Lagged exogenous variables will now 
be additional instruments and lagged endogenous must be 
treated as current endogenous. This does not alter the 
finding of over-identification. 
See Johnston ( 70 ) p. 344-346. 
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The two endogenous regressors in the demand for 
money equation, Yt and RB, are each regressed 
on the pre-determined variables in the systems 
AA 
so that Yt and RB are obtained. Since these 
variables will simply be linear functions of 
just the exogenous variables in the systems which 
are non-stochastic and uncorrelated with ut by 
assumptions it follows that both Yt and RB are 
uncorrelated with ut, 
Therefore; 
(2) Yt and RB should be replaced by the instrumental 
tAA 
variables# Yt. and R Bt 
in the demand for money 
function, before estimation. 
This procedure will yield consistent estimates of 
the parameters of the demand for money function providing 
correction has been made for within-equation serial correl- 
ation, and providing there is no auto-correlation across 
equations - i. e. ut correlated with vt and et, If across- 
equation auto-correlation of residuals is significant then 
single equation techniques, such as 2SLS, will not be 
optimal. Systems methods such as 3SLS or preferably FIML 
should be used since the problem of across equation auto- 
correlation of residuals can be handled as well as the usual 
problem of within equation serial correlation. The LSE 
programme ARFIML* (auto-regressive full information maximum 
likelihood) provides estimates of both types of residual 
auto-correlation occurring in estimated simultaneous equations. 
* The ARFIML programme was written by D. Hendry and F. Srba. 
134 
Howeverp since FIML parameter estimates are highly 
sensitive to model specification whereas 2SLS estimates 
are not, the practical choice in the face of uncertainty 
is the 2SLS estimator. 
Finally, it should be stressed that feedback relation- 
ships in a dynamic quarterly model will often be weak. In 
fact, the shorter the time period considered the more likely 
we are to have a definite ordering of events with just one- 
way causality and no feedback within the period. If 
contemporaneous feedback is weak then the OLS estimator will 
tend to give similar results to the 2SLS estimator, and since 
it is computationally less expensive, it ought to be preferred. 
In practice large econometric models using, quarterly data 
tend to be estimated by OLS - e. g. the Treasury and National 
Institute forecasting models. 
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CHAPTER 3 
APPENDIX A 
The homoqeneity of the demand for money with respect to 
the level of prices 
Models of the demand for money have frequently been 
specified and estimated in a form which imposes linear 
homogeneity in prices for nominal money-holdings. However# 
this is really an assumption which needs to be tested by the 
data itself, and accordingly no prior restrictions were placed 
on the price coefficient in the demand for money models 
specified in the main text of this chapter. 
For a log-linear specification of the simple partial 
adjustment model, two cases will now be considered in which 
prior restrictions have been placed on the value of the price- 
elasticity. 
Short-run homoq eneity in prices 
M* = (A yb 1R 
b2 )p or 
al 
= Ayb 1R 
b2 
p 
Let M* 
al and M 
MT 
p 
(2) m M*) U. MM1 
(3) M M* 
xmU. 
Then substituting for M* in (3) we get, 
AX YXbl R 
Xb2 
M_1A 1 
Hacche ( 59 ) and Boughton ( 20 ) are examples of researchers 
who constrained the price-elasticity of demand for money 
to be unity. 
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This equation is linear in the logarithms of the variables 
and can be re-expressed as: - 
Log MX Log A+ Xb 1 Log Y+ 
Xb 
2 Log R+ (1-ý) Log M-1 
+L og u. 
2. 
(1) 
Lonq-run homoqeneity in prices 
M* =AYb1R 
b2 
p 
(2) m M* )XV M-1 M-1 
(3) M= M*XM'T-\ v 
or AY 
bl R 
b2 
i7 
0< \1 
Substituting for M* in (3) we get, 
M A\ yXb 1RX b2 pX Ml-\v 
-1 
P 
Since Pý can be expressed as we have, 
PX 
Aý' YX bl RX b2 (Mil) 1-X 
p 
Log 
11 
= 
XLog A+ Xb 1 Log Y+ 
Xb Log R+ (14) Log (M-1) p2p 
+ Log v. 
Note that the difference in variable specification, 
due to the different price assumptionsp lies solely in the 
lagged money term: when short-run homogeneity is assumed 
the lagged real money stock enters as an explanatory variable, 
but with long-run homogeneity it is the lagged nominal stock 
deflated by current prices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
APPENDIX B 
The Rank condition for Identification 
Consider the following simultaneous model: 
(1) MD =a0+b1Y+b2P+b3R+b4 M-1 
mCC, 3U+C4 P-1 
ad1ms+d2A+d3 MLR +d4U+d5 Y-1 
R=a3+e1ms+e2Y+e3P+e4 PSBR +e5 MLR 
e 
MD = F, s=M 
(All variables are defined in the data appendix). 
For convenience the error terms are omitted. 
This specification of the model is, clearly subject to 
uncertainty and it is quite possible that one or more of the 
pre-determined variables in the system are not influential 
in practice - e. g. MLR and U may both be redundant explanatory 
variables. Now by the Order condition each of the equations 
in the system are over-identifiedp but this condition could 
easily be upset if some of the pre-determined variables are 
redundant. High multicollinearity between some of the pre- 
determined variables could also upset the order condition. 
A sufficient condition for Identification is given as 
ollows: 
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An equation is identified if the Rank of the 
matrix of coefficients on variables excluded 
from the equation of interest equals n-1 in 
a simultaneous equations system with a total 
of n equations. 
The Rank of a matrix is the largest square matrix that 
can be formed from it with a_non-zero determinant: a 
singular matrix is one with a zero determinant and cannot 
be inverted. If the largest matrix with a non-zero deter- 
minant is 3x3 then its rank is 3. 
Now we can apply the Rank condition to the demand 
for money equation in the above model - i. e. equation (1). 
Three endogenous regressors are included in the 
equation, and excluding the identity, there are four 
equations in the system. 
For identification we need to form a matrix of Rank 
n-l - i. e. 3 in this case. 
From the eight pre-deterinined variables in the 
systemp which do not enter equation (1), any three can be 
considered and the appropriate matrix of coefficients formed. 
Suppose we take, W, U and PSBR as the pre-determined 
variables for rank inspection. If the determinant of the 
matrix of coefficients associated with these variables in 
equations (2)-(4) is non-zero then the demand for money 
equation is identified. 
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wu PSBR 
c2 C3 0 Eqn (2) 
A0d40 Eqn (3) 
00e4 Eqn (4) 
Matrix of coefficients 
on variables excluded 
from demand for money 
equation. 
tAl =24e4)-c3 (0) +0=c2 (d 4e 4) 
Providing WO U and PSBR are independent of one another 
and that each of these are significant explanatory 
variables in the system, as hypothesised, then c2d4e4 
must be non-zero, and the demand for money equation 
identified. 
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CHAPTER 
A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
4.0 Introductory remarks 
The major demand for money problems in the 1970's have-been 
outlined in Chapter 2. This survey focuses on these problems 
and encompasses a wide range of single equation specifications 
which include both fixed and flexible lag models (for model 
details see Chapter 3). 
Although the main focus of attention is on the Ml and 
ZM3 definitions of money, the work of Hacche (59 ), amongst 
others, who examines both personal and company-holdings of 
M3 separately, is also considered. 
Issues concerning the appropriate specification of the 
interest rate variable(s), and the homogeneity of money demand 
with respect to price are also considered. 
only the study of Arango and Nadiri (3) attempts to 
deal with the simultaneity problem, and none of the reported 
work is based on specified simultaneous models. While this 
may well be in order for the Ml definition of moneyo there is 
considerable doubt regarding the appropriateness of the 
single equation work on M3. Although my concern is with the 
UK economy, I should point out that some empirical studies 
of the demand for money in other countries have been based on 
simultaneous models. 
For example, Frowen and Arestis (4) for W. Germany and 
Teigen (128) for the United States. 
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The fundamental issue is whether a stable demand for 
money function* can be identified for the UK economy in the 
1970's. 
4.1 The apparent breakdown'of demand for monev functions 
in the early 1970's 
Two major studies which pointed to the instability of functions 
which had performed well in the pre-CCC erav were those of 
Hacche ( 59 ) and Artis and Lewis (11) . 
Hacche applied a log-linear partial adjustment model 
to the Ml. M3, MC (company-holdings of M3) and MP (person's 
holdings of M3) definitions of money. The estimation period 
was 1963(4)-1971(3) and the forecasting performances of the 
equations were examined for the quarters 1971(4)-1974(1) 
inclusive. The results are given in Table 1.2, Chapter 1, 
p. 43; the long rate of interest is represented by the 2ý-2% 
consol yield and the short rate by the 3 month local authority 
deposit rate. The long-run price elasticity was constrained 
to equal unity and the interest-rate was specified in the form 
log (1+r) so that the interest rate elasticity varied positively 
with the level of interest (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). The 
models were actually estimated in lst difference form after 
carrying out transformations for Ist order serial correlation. 
This procedure has been criticised by Courakis (30 ) and 
Hendry and Mizon (64 ) for its essentially arbitrary nature. 
As far as the forecasting performance of these pre-CCC 
estimated equations was concerned, Ml was reasonably satisfact- 
ory, and MP performed well up to 1973p but increasingly under- 
predicted after this date. In contrast the M3 and Mc forecasts 
Especially for the policy-relevant ZM3 definition of money. 
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were particularly bad with the error patterns being similar; 
for M3 there was significant under-prediction in eight out 
of the ten quartersp-and for MC it was nine out of the ten 
quarters. 
In the light of these results Hacche investigated M3 
and MC further: the estimation period was extended to cover 
1963(4)-1972(4)* and an own-rate of interest on money 
variable was included in both cases from 1971(4) onwards to 
take account of the new competitive environment which banks 
now operated in. The rate on three month certificates of 
deposit was used to represent the own-rate on money variable 
and this entered both equations significantly. For the 
forecast period 1973(l)-1974(l) inclusive, the forecasts 
were considerably improved for both M3 and MC: both over- 
prediction and under-prediction errors now occurred. The 
long-run own-rate interest elasticity was greater than 0.5 
in each case, but other parameters in the function changed 
significantly; in particularp the speed of adjustment was 
lower" than before, and the long-run income elasticity was 
higher. 
Hacche warns that these new equations which include the 
CD rate may be picking-up essentially transitional influences, 
especially as a tax loop-holep which made CD's attractivet 
was blocked by measures in the 1973 budget. However, against 
this we have the fact that the 'corset, was used as an 
important technique of monetary control during the period 
1974-1979, and this has had a considerable influence on the 
behaviour of the own-rate on money. 
The first five quarters of the CCC era. 
Hacche does not reveal how much lower. 
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Hacche has focused entirely on the market disturbances 
stemming from Competition and Credit Control in attempting 
to explain the breakdown of the simple broad money equation 
which had performed well prior to 1972. His work might be 
criticised, for ignoring, the fact that the UK is an open 
economy andp in particular, for failing to consider the 
serious disturbances in foreign exchange markets which led 
to the floating of sterling in 1972. He could also be 
criticised for using a model which essentially only recognizes 
transactions motives for money-holding; it is clearly possible 
that the change of policy in the gilt-edged market might have 
de-stabilised the demand for money (see Chapter 2). A third 
criticism relates to the restriction imposed on the long-run 
price elasticity; whether the price elasticity is unity, or 
otherwise, should be decided by the data and not simply imposed 
because it is a theoretical expectation. Price (112) found 
that the long-run price elasticity for MP was 0.90, and for 
MC was 0.41 over the data period 1964(l)-1970(4). In another 
Bank of England study, Coghlan (27 ) reported a long-run price 
elasticity of 0.75 for Ml over the data period 1964(l)-1976(4). 
it may be significant that both Coghlan and Price used 
flexible lag models. 
In common with Hacchep Artis and Lewis (11 ) find that 
the simple demand for money functions which performed well 
prior to Competition and Credit Control become unstable after 
1971; in fact they found that both Ml and M3 are under- 
predicted after 1971(3). They go on to explain 
(ibid p. 153) 
that both functions still break-down after the additional 
inclusion of an own-rate on money variable, and a variable to 
capture the variability of bond prices. 
The significance of 
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these variables has already been discussed (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1). 
Whereas Hacche used the CD rate to represent the 
own-rate in the M3 equations Artis and Lewis use a weighted 
average of the various interest rates on interest-bearing 
money deposits. 
* 
is calculated as 
deviation of the 
consols. 
While Haci 
The variability of bond prices measure 
a 36-month moving average of the standard 
log 1 st differences of the yield on 2! -2-/. 
=he claimed that broad money equations were 
considerably improved by the inclusion of an own-rate, 
Artis and Lewis still found the broad money function to be 
essentially unstable. Howeverv this difference in findings 
might depend on several factors: 
(1) Despite the fact that a log-linear partial adjustment 
model was used by both there were some important 
differences'in variable specification. For example, 
Artis and Lewis used nominal GDP for the income 
variable whereas Hacche used real TFE and constrained 
the long-run price-elasticity (measured by the TFE 
deflator) to unity. Using nominal GDP involves the 
implicit assumption that the income elasticity is the 
same as the price elasticity, and although variation 
in nominal income has been dominated by price move- 
ments in the 19701sp this seems a rather strong 
assumption! Also, Artis and Lewis entered the own- 
rate in differential form using the consol rate as the 
The weights used reflect the significance of each money 
component of M3. Where the actual interest rates relevant 
to a particular deposit are not Knowny the rate on some 
other similar deposit is used as a proxy measure. 
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alternative asset yield, whereas Hacche entered 
the interest rates separately and used the rate on 
3-month local authority deposits for the alternative 
asset yield. 
(2) Hacche estimated his relationship with the variables 
expressed in log first differences, whereas Artis 
and Lewis specified a log levels relationship. 
(3) No attempt to measure speculative influences on the 
demand for money was made by Hacche, whereas Artis 
and Lewis included the variability of bond prices. 
If the findings of Artis and Lewis are to be accepted then 
further experimentation with functional specification is 
in order in an attempt to identify a relationship which can 
make sense of the early post-CCC era. 
Artis and Lewis suggest that the money stock, rather 
than the rate of interest, might perhaps be regarded as the 
predominantly exogenous variable after the introduction of 
Competition and Credit Control*9 and such a claim does receive 
some support from the change in policy in the gilt-edged 
market. They argue that a preferable specification would 
be one in which the interest rate is the dependent variable, 
with the money stock entered as one of the explanatory 
variables. 
A view which is consistent with the idea that the demand 
for money was adjusting to supply changes rather than 
the reverse case of a demand-determined money supply. 
This is explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.3). The 
change from fixed to flexible exchange rates provides 
additional support (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). 
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Before outlining this somewhat unconventional 
approach to the estimation of demand for money relationships 
it should be pointed out that Artis and Lewis, in common 
with most demand for money researchers, have ignored the 
possible influence of international factors such as exchange 
rate changes. 
The general form of the estimated equations is as 
follows: 
R=B0+B1Y+B2M+B3 R_ 1+u Log-linear 
Three definitions of money were investigated; Ml, M3 and 
M3 less certificates of deposit. The partial adjustment 
model (applied to interest rates) provpd as good as any and 
excluded variables such as bond price variability and 
inflation expectations had been found to ýe comparatively 
unimportant explanatory variables in the preliminary empirical 
work. For Ml the dependent variable was the consol rate 
while for both M3 and M3 
A (M3-CDs) the dependent was specified 
as the differential between the consol rate and the own-rate 
on money, R*. 
I will focus on the results for M3. For a full listing 
of the results refer to p. 172 for Ml and p. 174 for M3 (ibid). 
Equations for the pre-CCC era and a data period 
extended to cover the first six quarters of CCC, are shown 
overleaf. 
They have, in effect, used a closed-economy model and 
with the introduction of flexible exchange rates 
in 1972 
and the foreign currency market disturbances before this 
date.. it may be inappropriate. 
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(1) ' 1963(2)-1970( 
R2 DW 
R* = -1.085 +1 242 YCUp -1.017 M3 + 0.623 R*_, 0822 1.73 (1.3) H. 8 ) GD (1.5) (4.2) 
1963(2)-1973(l) 
R* = -1.038 + le 44 Y 
Cu 
-1.029 M3 + 0.652 R*_, *904 1.90 (1.9) (3.9) GDP (3.7) (6.0) 
The coefficients are very similar for the two data 
periods which indicates that the relationship identified for 
the pre-CCC era remains stable when six additional ICCC 
observations' are added to the sample. The long-run income 
and interest elasticities of the demand for money derived 
from equation (2) are 1.21 and -0.34P respectively. It is 
noticeable that the coefficients are considerably better- 
determined in equation (2) and this is only to be expected 
given that the exogeneity of money claim can only have any 
validity after the introduction of Competition and Credit 
control. 
Despite the fact that the instability suggested by 
conventional money demand equations is not evident in these 
interest rate models there are several points which can be 
made arguing against treating the money supply as an exogenous 
variable. 
Firstly, Mehra (89 )* provides evidence from exogeneity 
tests to suggest that when nominal values are usedp as in the 
study of Artis and Lewisp single equation techniques are 
invalid for each of the specifications, so that there is 
nothing to be gained by specifying the rate of interest as the 
p. 227. 
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dependent variable as opposed to the money stock. The clear 
implication from this is that a simultaneous model is in 
order. 
Another point concerns the fact that the monetary 
authorities have continued to control short-term interest 
rates after CCC, and in practice the money supply has been 
controlled by interest rate manipulation. 
Finally, since only six observations were available 
to reflect post-CCC experience it would surely be more 
correct to treat the money stock as essentially demand- 
determined since prior to 1971 a policy of interest-rate 
control was often practised. In fact, some early empirical 
work conducted in my own research, for the data period 
1972(1)-1978(4), suggested that the 'Artis and Lewis, interest 
rate specifications are not appropriate for the post-ccc 
1970's. The estimated equations were poorly determined and 
in some cases the coefficients were not in accordance with 
a priori beliefs. Another piece of evidence which suggests 
that the money stock should be treated as endogenous is 
that monetary targets for M3 were not formally introduced 
until 1976, and even then the money supply was allowed to 
fluctuate within a reasonably wide growth band - e. g. 8-12T. 
sometimes growing at an excessive rate. Indeed, by the end 
of the 1970's there was considerable doubt concerning the 
ability Of the authorities to control money supply growth at 
all closely! 
In conclusion, despite their results# it would appear 
that the treatment of the money stock as a more exogenous 
variable than the rate of interestp even 
in a data period 
which entirely consists of post-CCC observations, 
is certainly 
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open to question. In practice it may well be necessary to 
specify a simultaneous model of the money market, in which 
the supply of moneyp the demand for money and the rate of 
interest are all endogenous variables. 
The model used by both Hacche and Artis and Lewis 
was a partial adjustment model which constrains the adjust- 
ment paths and lag lengths to be the same regardless of 
whether the initial disturbance is due to changing prices, 
incomes or interest rates (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1). 
Price (112), Coghlan, ( 27 ) and Hamburger ( 60 ) use flexible 
models, but only the latter two researchers. included post-CCC 
observations in their data samples. Hamburger's stability 
tests for Ml (the only definition of money he considers) 
reveal that the function is unstable after 1971(4): in fact 
only four post-CCC observations are used so that the tests 
are not especially revealing. However, his findings represent 
limited evidence to suggest that Competition and Credit 
Control has undermined the stability of the Ml function. 
While this was also the finding of Artis and Lewis (11 ), 
Hacche found that the demand for Ml was essentially stable 
in the early post-CCC period. It should be pointed out, 
howevery that Hamburger uses the uncovered euro-dollar rate 
to represent the interest rate variable, whereas Hacche used 
a domestic rate of interest. 
coghlan (27 ) disputes the claim that a stable demand 
function for M1 had been identified before CCC; he points 
to the lack of independent variation in the data during the 
1960's which caused serious multicollinearity problems and 
weakly-determined coefficients. 
* This may have concealed 
Ibid p. 51. 
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the true demand for M1'relationship when the data was 
limited to the 1960's and early 19701s! 
4.2 The evidence from more recent empirical work 
Coghlan ( 27 ), Rowan and Miller ( 92 ), Laumas ( 82 ) and 
Smith (122) have each included data for several years of 
post-CCC experience, and this extra information throws more 
light on the stability issue. A recent study of the demand 
for LM3 by Grice and Bennett (18 ) shows that a measure of 
financial wealth is preferable to income in the function, 
and uses post-tax rather than pre-tax rates of interest. 
Coghlan's study considers the behaviour of Mi over 
the data period 1964(l)-1975(4) and examines the equation's 
forecasting performance over the quarters 1976(l)-1977(3) 
inclusive. He assumes that the demand for Ml is dominated 
by transactions motives and as such only income, price and 
the rate of interest enter as explanatory variables. A 
flexible lag model is used and variables are expressed in 
natural logarithms. The best forecasting performance was 
achieved using first differences of the data and accordingly 
the results from this specification are shown below: 
AMJ = 0.309 ATFE + 0.408 ATFE_, +(0.228 LTFE -2 (2.5) (3.4) 2.0) 
+ 1.073ä P_ 1 -0 8911ýP-2 + 0.589AP- 3 (4.1) (3: 2) (1.9) 
- 0.048AR -0 012ýR_, -0 070AR -2 (2.9) (0: 7) (4: 1) 
-2 R . 652 DW = 1.96 
p Price-deflator of TFE 
R Local authority 3 month rate 
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Long-run elasticities: TFE = 0.945 P=0.77 R= -0.13 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors 1976(l)-1977(3) 
1976 1977 
1 -2 3423 
0.2 -0.5 0.8 1.2 2.5 0.9 
The forecasting performance of this equation is quite 
good although only one quarter out of seven gives a negative 
error. 
The results suggest that the lagged adjustment process 
is different for the various explanatory variables and is 
relatively rapid: approximately six months following a change 
in income, nine months for price changes, and a rather 
uncertain lag for interest rates. 
When these results were compared with those from data 
periods ending in earlier years a picture of stability emerged 
with the estimated long-run elasticities being similar. 
Two important qualifications need to be made with 
respect to the results. Firstly, the intercept has been 
dropped and this proved necessary to obtain good results; 
however, it is only a strictly valid procedure if the estimated 
constant term is both small and insignificant. Secondly, the 
interest rate results are not well-determined, and the estimated 
long-run interest-elasticity is sensitive to whether the 
function is specified in levels of the data or in ist difference 
orm. 
Finally, although Coghlan claims that the flexible 
model equations perform substantially better than the simple 
Forecast-Actua YActual X 100- 
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distributed lag modelsq it must be remembered that this 
has only been shown to be the case for the Ml definition 
of money. Furthermore, since Ml is not really amenable to 
policy control, and is not in any case the policy-relevant 
monetary aggregate for the UK, the stability or otherwise 
of this function is not a crucial issue for monetary p9licy. 
LM3 is the policy-relevant definition, since targets have 
been set for its growth, and accordingly it is the stability 
of demand for this particular aggregate which especially 
needs to be investigated. Coghlan only considers the demand 
for Ml. 
Rowan and Miller use a log-linear partial adjustment 
model and just investigate the demand for Ml. The interest 
rate variable employed is the three-month euro-dollar rate, 
which is expressed as log (1+r) to allow the interest 
elasticity to vary with the level of the rate. For the income 
and price variables they use TFE and the TFE deflator, 
respectively. Both TFE and Ml are seasonally adjusted. 
It is argued that the real rate of interest, as measured 
by the nominal rate - expected rate of inflation, should be 
more relevant than the nominal rate but empirical results 
indicate that the real rate performs badly. Howeverv the bad 
performance is not perhaps too surprising in the light of 
White's comments (137). 
* He points out that since a rise in 
nominal rates of interest and anticipated 
inflation are both 
expected to impart negative influences to money demand 
it is 
clearly possible that the demand for money could fall while 
the real rate of interest remains unchanged. 
* 595. 
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The authors also use an expected prices series as 
an alternative to actual prices. They find that expected 
prices generally out-perform actual prices so that their 
preferred demand for money equations include the former 
rather than the latter. 
The direct influence of the expected rate of inflation 
was tested but it was not found to have a significant 
influence on the demand for Ml. However, this may simply 
reflect the fact that inflation was relatively low and did 
not show a great deal of variation during much of the sample 
period; even with the largest sample of data running from 
1963(2)-1977(2), inflation is only likely to have had any 
significant influence over the last third of the period. It 
may also be true that the series used by Rowan and Edwardes 
(44 ) does not measure expected inflation correctly; this 
criticism, of course, applies to any attempt made to measure 
expected values. 
The preferred model can be expressed as follows: 
bY+b (1+rt) +bE 1t23p 
mmp t-1 x (M*t - Mt-l) 
pE t-1 
The variables have been defined above and are expressed in 
natural logs. *= desired and E= expected. The second term 
included in equation (2) measures an adjustment to errors in 
forecasting the value of the price level. 
Regressions run over several periods between 1963(2)- 
For details of this series see Rowan and Edwardes ( 44 
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1970(3) and 1963(2)-1977(2), suggested that a unitary 
loný-run price-elasticity was not in order and that the 
adjustment to errors in forecasting prices became important 
from 1973 onwards. 
Rowan and Miller attempt to define and isolate the 
cCC period empirically by running regressions which either 
exclude ICCC observations' or involve the insertion of a 
dummy variable into the equation to capture its separate 
influence. Defining various CCC periods, with the widest 
definition being 1971(2)-1975(2) inclusive, the empirically 
preferred definition is 1971(4)-1973(4). This seems a very 
reasonable definition since the first quarter immediately 
follows the formal introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control while at the end of the 1973(4) quarter the 
Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme was introducedp and. 
round-tripping ceased to be important. It shouldp however, 
be remembered that the main impact of CCC was on the 
corporate sector's holdings of M3 rather than on Mi. 
From their empirical results the-authors conclude 
that a fairly stable and simple demand for Mi function appears 
to exist from 1963-1976 provided either a dummy variable is 
entered for CCC observations, or, alternatively, the CCC 
observations are omitted from the sample. They find that the 
income, price and interest rate elasticities are approximately 
0.6,0.7 and -0.1, respectively. Two possible reasons are 
suggested for the price elasticity falling significantly short 
of unity. Firstly# the increasing use of credit cards which 
See Chapter 2p Section 2.1.2, for an explanation of round- 
tripping. 
(92 ) p. 37-42. 
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reduces the need to hold transactions balances, and 
secondly, increased business integration which means that 
the volume of transactions, and hence money held, falls for 
given levels of nominal income. 
One criticism of this work concerns the income and 
price variables. Since expected prices are preferred to 
actual prices it seems to me that expected income, rather 
than actual incomep should be included in the function. 
Thisq of courseq may well change the results; for example, 
the expected price elasticity might be closer to unity. 
This examination of the stability of Ml over the 
period 1963-1976 has thrown-up some interesting results, 
but a similar exercise for the more problematical, but policy- 
relevant, ZM3 needs to be carried out. 
Laumas ( 82 ) using a varying parameter technique* 
investigates the stability of both the Ml and M3 demand 
functions over the sample periods 1964(l)-1971(3), the pre- 
ccC era, and 1971(4)-1976(4), the post-CCC era. He concludes 
that despite a major shift in the money demand relationships 
stable demand functions can be identified for both Ml and M3, 
using either short or long interest rates. 
Two criticisms of his work are firstly, he does not 
specify an own-rate on money interest variable for the post- 
CCC era, and secondly, he used a model specification which 
constrains the short-run price elasticity of money demand to 
equal unity. 
Smith (122) considers the demand for five different 
definitions of money over the period 1924-1977. The 
estimated relationships proved rather unstable when different 
See Cooley and Prescott (29 ) for details of this technique. 
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sub-periods were considereds although it must be said that 
the use, of nominal incomep which constrains the price and 
income elasticities to be the same, may have contributed to 
this finding. 
The equations of interest, are those that cover the 
period 1963-1977 for which the long-run income and interest- 
rate elasticities are shown below: 
mi M2 M3 M4 M5 
y . 78 . 72 1.70A 1.04'& + 
R -. 21 -. 07& -. 92 . 064 + 
S. E. % 2.1 1.9 2.8 2.1 + 
Ml,, M3 Official definitions of money 
M2 Ml + 17-day time deposits' 
M4 M2 + building society, and TSB and 
National Savings Bank deposits 
M5 M3 + (M4-M2) 
Y GDP at current prices 
R For Ml the yield on 2ýfl. consols. 
For other definitions R is the 
difference between the consol 
yield and the own-rate on money 
S. E. % Standard error of equation expressed 
as a percentage 
Insignificant at the 5% level 
+ No sensible estimates could be 
obtained 
only the Ml equation is well-determined with both the 
income and interest rate coefficients significant at the 5% 
level. 
Computed as a weighted average of rates on interest- 
bearing money deposits. 
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An important qualification to the above results is 
that they are based on annual rather than quarterly datap 
which means that a very small sample of only 15 observations 
has been used. 
A study investigating ZM3, in the context of a single 
equation model, has been carried out by Grice and Bennett 
(18 ). Their main contribution involves the use of a 
financial wealth series in the demand function. Most 
researchers use income rather than wealth because there are 
no reliable wealth statistics for the UK. However, with 
assistance from the Central Statistical Office, the Inland 
Revenue and the Bank of England, engaged in the construction 
of national balance sheets, the authors found it possible to 
construct a series for financial wealth. Reid (114) and 
Pettigrew (110) describe the work involved in constructing 
these balance sheets. 
Another important aspect of their work concerns the 
treatment of interest rates. They use post-tax rates since 
these are the relevant opportunity costs of holding money for 
persons and companies, alike. Since higher-rate tax-payers 
pay more tax at the margin than basic rate tax-payersp the 
returns they receive from identical investments will be 
smaller. Companies paying corporation tax will pay a 
considerably higher rate than individuals paying tax at the 
basic rate. Clearly, it is the after-tax rate of interest 
which measures the true cost of holding non-interest bearing 
money. However, the construction of post-tax interest rates 
is a difficult and time-consuming task; difficult because 
much relevant information will not be readily available. 
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Although the authors do consider other monetary 
aggregates, including Ml, they focus mainly on ZM3. They 
start with a general specification capable of embracing 
alternative theories of the demand for money and work 
towards a specific formulation via a process of elimination 
of redundant variables, setting coefficients equal and* 
differencing where the results from the general specification 
suggested this to be appropriate. Tests were applied to see 
how specific the formulations should be. 
* 
The M3 equations are estimated over the data period 
1963(l)-1978(4). Those expressed in nominal terms implicitly 
assume that the price elasticity is identical to that on real 
wealth, but there is no good reason to assume this to be the 
case, especially as the implied long-run price elasticity is 
significantly lower than unity. Homogeneity of degree one 
in prices is imposed in subsequent estimation, but this is 
an assumption that should be formally tested. The authors 
make a vague reference to making allowance for the 
possibility of the demand for money not being homogeneous 
in prices in either the short-run or the long-run. However, 
this is a hypothesis which should be carefully tested and in 
the general specification it should be an open-ended issue. 
The failure to test for homogeneity at the outset suggests 
that the authors' general to specific approach in estimation 
does not start from a general enough position. Rather than 
simply using nominal wealth in the initial set of equationso 
real wealth and prices should appear as separate arguments. 
For example, log-likelihood ratio tests. 
( 18 ) p. 35. 
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4.3 The influence of international variables on the 
demand for money 
A general reference to the work of Boughton and Arango and 
Nadiri was made in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3). It is of 
interest to look at their results more closely. 
Boughton (20 ) considers both Mi and M3 for the data 
periods 1963(l)-1973(4) and 1963(l)-1977(3), and what 
distinguishes his work from that of most other researchers 
is that he formally recognizes the potential influence of 
international variables such as the exchange rate. However, 
his empirical work suggests that exchange rate changes are 
not important in determining money demand on either the Ml 
or M3 definitions. Accordingly, the variable is dropped from 
the estimating equation, although it appears in the original 
model specification. 
The results 
1. mi 
(1) 1963(l)-1973(4) 
mi = . 749 + 0.145 Y-0 043RLA - 0*181 + 0.869 Ml_l (1.4) (4.6) (ý-9) (3.1) (2.1*) 
p= -0.608 DW = 1.83 (4.4) 
_1_963(l)-1977(3) 
mi = 0779 + 0.116 Y-0 045 R LA- 
0.105 ý+0.912 Ml_, 
(1.9) (5.5) (ý. 5) (4.3) (3.6*) 
p= -0.682 DW = 1.93 
(7.0) 
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2. M3 
(1) 1963(l)-1973(4) 
M3 = -1.025 + 0.112 Y-0.067 RL - 0.176 + 1.073 M3_1 
, 
(2.6) (1.2) (2.4) (3.2) (1.5*) 
No serial correlation DW = 2.00 
1963(l)-1977(3) 
M3 = -1.157 + 0.197 Y-0.100 RL +0 046 RLA - 0.218 
(4.2) (3.0) (5.8) (5.9) 
+ 1.063 M3_1 
(2.1*) 
No serial correlation DW = 1.91 
Notes 
A partial adjustment model was specified with the 
variables expressed in logarithms. 
2. money and income are expressed in real terms; GDP 
is used for the income measure. 
3. The model specification constrains the short-run 
price elasticity of demand to be unity. 
4. RL Rate on 20-year government debentures. 
RLA Rate of interest on 3-month local authority 
deposits. 
5. * t-statistic indicates number of standard errors 
between coefficient value and unity. 
6. P is represented by log (pt/pt-1). 
7. Full details of the elasticities for both time periods 
and both definitions of money can be found in Tables 
20 5ý 7 and 9 (ibid p. 41,43,45 and 49). 
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It can be seen from the results that the M3 partial 
adjustment models collapse since the coefficients on the 
lagged dependent variables exceed unity in both sample 
periods. Furthermore# while the Mi equation remains stable 
over the longer data period, the M3 equation does not. 
Boughton concludes that while the demand for Ml has been 
fairly stable during the 19701s, the demand for M3 has become 
unstable. He attributes this instability to the changes 
introduced by Competition and Credit Control and subsequent 
banking reforms, and points to a finding of stability in the 
demand for broad money functions in other OECD countries* to 
support the claim that the behaviour of exchange rates and 
foreign interest rates has not. destabilised M3. 
In another paper by Boughton (21 )** he defines his 
cri'teria for stability of a function and in his empirical 
work makes use of the following tests: a direct comparison 
of parameter estimates from full sample and truncated sample 
results; ex-post forecasting performance of equations; and 
evidence on structural stability as provided by the Chow 
F-test. 
one criticism of Boughton's work concerns the 
specification of the demand for money in real terms with the 
implied restriction of short-run homogeneity in prices. Quite 
clearly such an assumption should be tested by the data 
itself and not merely imposed from the outset, Another 
criticism relates to the evident failure to include an own- 
rate on money variable in the M3 equation for the data period 
1963(1)-1973(4), as shown by Table 8 (p. 48)(20 ). 
For example, Canadag United States and France. 
P. 582. 
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A final comment on Boughton's work concerns the 
significance of inflation as an explanatory variable; in 
each of the equations reported above inflation was highly 
significant and entered with the expected negative sign. 
Arango and Nadiri (3) only examined the Ml 
definition of money, but, in contrast to Boughton, claimed 
that international variables have been important determinants 
of money-holdings. The estimation period was 1960(l)-1975(4) 
and, unlike most reported work, allowance was made for possible 
simultaneous equation bias* as well as lst order serial 
correlation in the residuals. The model was specified in 
log-linear form and the dynamics described by the partial 
adjustment hypothesis. In common with Boughton the money and 
income variables were deflatedo and short-run homogeneity in 
prices is implicit in the specification of the model. 
The estimated equation is shown below: 
Ml = -0.018 +0 152 Yp-0 028 iD -0 020 if + 0.026 EX 
(0.1) (ý. 5) (i. 9) 
H. 8) (0.5) 
-0.452+L -0.124++ýE + 0.799 Ml_l 
(2.0) (2.5) (17.3) 
p=0.407 R2= . 911 DW = 1.97 
+ ist order distributed lag over six quarters. 
++ same over three quarters. 
Definition of -variables 
Yp Permanent income, based on real GNP 
iD Call money rate 
if Average of short-term interest rates of Canada, 
Germany and US. 
A 2SLs estimator is used and details of the instruments 
employed are given on p. 74 (ibid). This procedure would 
seem to be more in order for the M3 definition of money. 
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Domestic rate of inflation based on the 
wholesale price index. 
EX Premium or discount in foreign market exchange. 
L% change in EX. 
Endogenous variables - Ml, iD, EX, 
L. 
EX is measured as follows: 
EX (EXF -1) x 400* EX s 
EX F 3-month forward exchange rate in Z per US )ý. 
EX S= Spot exchange rate 
in Z per US $. 
ý is measured as follows: 
((P t/ P t-1) 
4_ 1) x 100 
Pt Wholesale prices. 
This gives quarterly figures at equivalent 
annual rates. 
Table 2 (ibid p. 78) gives full details of the short and 
long-run elasticities. 
F-tests are used by the authors to show that this 
particular specification of the demand for Mi function is 
stable. Since both exchange rate changes and foreign 
interest rates enter significantly at the 10% level (the 
former variable is just significant at the 5% level) it 
would appear on the basis of these results that stability 
of the function depends on their inclusionp and that these 
variables are important determinants of Mi. 
For annual conversion from quarterly information in 
order to be consistent with interest rate measures. 
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Since substitution between time deposits and foreign 
assets should be considerably stronger than substitution 
between the latter and non-interest bearing money, this 
result seems a bit surprising! It seems particularly 
surprising in the light of Boughton's empirical finding that 
even the demand for M3 was not significantly influenced by 
- international variables! It is a pity that the authors did 
not attempt to carry out a similar exercise for M3. 
A final comment on these results is that inflation 
expectations are seen to be a significant determinant of Ml 
and enter the equation with a correctly signed coefficient. 
This finding is in agreement with Boughton's results. 
4.4 The sectoral demand for mone 
Price (112) and Hacche (59 ) investigated. both the personal 
and company sectors' demand for money. While the former was 
concerned with the pre-CCC data period only, Hacche included 
several quarters of post-CCC experience in his sample. 
Hacche's results are shown below: 
Personal sector results - 1963(4)-1972(4) 
mp 4.287 +0 326 Yt+0.301 Pt -0.475 (1+rt_, ) + 0.699 MP 6.9) (1.4) (6.7) 
p2 = 0.79 p= -0.6 
y= Real personal disposable income. 
p= PDI deflator. 
r= Yield on V2-/. consolidated stock. 
* Long-run price elasticity constrained to equal unity. 
165 
Note all variables are in natural logarithms. For details 
of model specification and estimation see above, Section 
4.1. 
The long-run income elasticity equals 1.10 approx- 
imately, and the long-run interest elasticity equals -0.11 
(evaluated at the mean) . 
The satisfactory forecasting performance of this 
equation has been commented on earlier in the chapter. 
Company sector results - 1963(4)-1972(4) 
MC = -9.303 + 0.449 Y+0.447 Pt -2-197 (1+r t) (1.7) t (2.0) (2.0) 
3.156 (1+rl) + 0.553 MC_ 
(3.4) t (3.8) 
-2 R 0.69 p= -0.4 
Real total final expenditure 
P= TFE deflator 
r= Yield on 2ý2-/. consolidated stock 
Interest rate on 3-month'sterling certificates 
of deposit from 1971(4) onwards; zero before 
this date. 
Note'- all variables are in natural logarithms. For details 
of model specification and estimation see above, Section 4.1. 
Long-run Elasticities 
yr r/ 
1.00 -0.345 0.568 
Long-run price elasticity constrained to equal unity. 
166 
With the inclusion of an own-rate on money variable, 
represented by the CD rate, the forecasting performance 
of the equation is considerably improved compared with the 
specification which fails to include an own-rate variable. 
An interesting feature of these results is the 
considerably faster speed of adjustment by companies and 
the much greater sensitivity of company money-holdings to 
changes in interest rates: the long-run interest elasticity 
of MC is around three times greater than that'for MP. Such 
results are in accordance with expectation'since companies 
hold large balances in comparison with households, and stand 
to sacrifice relatively large sums of money if they do not 
adjust their portfolios reasonably quickly following a change 
in interest yields and differentials. The brokerage costs 
involved in making portfolio changes are likely to be trivial 
compared with the sizes of the returns to be made. 
There is some difficulty with the choice of appropriate 
constraint variables for both personal and company sector 
money-holdings. Although personal disposable income is 
appropriate for households, which hold the bulk of personal 
sector money, it is not appropriate for unincorporated 
businesses. For the company sector there is no readily 
available choice which is entirely satisfactory: suitable 
measures of wealth are not yet available, while 
income 
measures such as GDP and TFE are at best likely to 
be rather 
loosely related to the money-holdings of companies. While 
Hacche used TFE as the constraint variable in his company 
sector equation, Price used GDP at factor cost, and 
the index 
of industrial production as an alternative measure. 
In fact, 
despite the fact that the latter measure is not relevant for 
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commercial companies,. it out-performs GDP in Price's 
empirical work. The price variable used in association 
with the index of industrial production is the wholesale 
prices series for manufactured products. 
Although these two variables gave more plausible 
results than GDP FIC and 
its associated deflator, the 
coefficients were not particularly well-determined and 
proved sensitive to choice of data period. As can be seen 
from Hacche's results, reported above, the coefficient on 
TFE is not very well determined; the t-statistic of 1.7 
indicates that it is not significantly different from zero 
at the 5% significance level. 
So, there is empirical evidence from the work of both 
Hacche and Price which suggests that company money-holdings 
are not importantly related to GDP, TFE or the index of 
industrial production. This points to the inappropriateness 
of such variables for the role of constraint variable in the 
company sector demand for money equation. 
other studies which focus on aspects of the company 
sector's demand for money include those of Saving (119) and 
Hunter (67 ) while Wilbratte (138) deals with both sectors. 
White (136) and Parkin, Barrett and Gray (16 )* have conducted 
work relating to the personal sector's demand for money. 
Most of the empirical work is based on the US economy and 
considers data periods which end in the early 19701s. 
Wilbratte concludes from his research that US household 
demand for money (various definitions) tends to be stable over 
money is one of several financial assets considered by the 
authors, and an asset portfolio approach is used. For 
details of the theory behind this approach see Chapter 9, 
Section 9.1.2. 
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the data period 1952(l)-1971(2), whereas a stable money 
demand for business firms can only be found for relatively 
broad definitions of money. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
Since data for the entire decade, 1970-1980, is now available 
there is a need to update much of the work reported above: 
only Grice and Bennett (18 ). Boughton (20 ), and Rowan and 
Miller (92 ) consider data periods including post-1976 data 
when estimating their equations. 
* The work reported by Hacche 
on the sectoral demand for money was largely based on pre-CCC 
data. It has now become possible to estimate demand for money 
equations which just include post-CCC observations - i. e. 
enough observations are available. 
Most of the reported work has considered the Ml 
definition of money only and besides Hacche (59 ) and 
Artis and Lewis (11 ), who were concerned with the immediate 
post-CCC experience, only LaUmas ( 82 ), Boughton ( 20 ) and 
Grice and Bennett (18 ) investigated M3. Each of these 
studies were based on single equation models, but it seems 
probable that simultaneous models are more appropriate. There 
is a clear need to specify and estimate simultaneous models, 
or to at least allow for the presence of endogenous regressors, 
when estimating broad money functions. It may emerge that 
the simultaneity problem is not particularly serious in a 
quarterly model, but in order to determine this the parameters 
of the demand for money function should be estimated by 
alternative estimators. 
" 
For quarterly models of money demand. 
In addition to OLS at least 2SLS should be used. 
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Only Coghlan ( 27 )., Hamburger ( 60 ) and Grice and 
Bennett (18 ) used flexible lag structures, whereas the 
other researchers mentioned have used fixed lag models; 
typically partial adjustment. In the absence of any firm 
theoretical guidance on lag structures the best procedure 
is probably to estimate both types of model for the 
different money definitions. 
Only the studies of Boughton (20 ), Arango and 
Nadiri (3) and Hamburger (60 ) specifically allowed for 
the influence of international variables, such as the 
exchange rate and foreign interest rates, although there 
was disagreement concerning the significance of these 
variables during the 1960's and 1970's. Clearly, there is 
need for more work which formally recognizes that the UK is 
an open-economy. 
Some researchers have included a measure of inflation 
expectations in the demand for money function, but there is 
no general agreement on either the role or significance of 
this variable. Chapter 7 of my work is completely devoted to 
the influence of this variable on both Ml and time deposits 
(TD). 
Many researchers have imposed constraints on either 
the short-run or long-run price elasticity of money demand, 
but it is better to let the data determine the elasticity. 
The greater independent variation in the price and real 
income variables during the 1970's should reduce multi- 
collinearity problems so that these variables can be 
separately entered. Specification problems regarding the 
interest rate can best be resolved empirically; whether a 
constant interest-rate elasticity 
is in order can be decided 
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on the basis of regression results from equations in which 
the interest rate variable is specified in alternative ways. 
Although it is recognized that wealth is more 
appropriate than income as a constraint variable in the 
demand for broad money function, there are no really reliable 
wealth measures available for the UK economy. Thus income 
measures are almost always used in practice. 
* Which income 
measure is most relevant is largely a matter for the data to 
decide, so thatalternative series should be tried. 
The choice of interest rate variable(s) is also 
problematical. A variety of rates have been used in the 
empirical work reported above, but for Ml and ZM3 different 
rates should be tried and the 'best' equation selected in each 
case; if the results are not particularly sensitive to choice 
of interest variable then the issue is not an important one 
for the data period in question. For the sectoral demand for 
money equations it is possible to select the most appropriate 
rates by examining both the personal and company sectors, 
liquid asset portfolios over the relevant data period: the 
rates on non-money assets which are both important in the 
overall portfolio and show variation in size of holdings, are 
clearly candidates for inclusion in the respective functions. 
Finally, since the work of Hacche (59 ) points to the 
instability of M3 being mainly due to the behaviour of company 
money-holdings, it is clearly of interest to look at this 
sector more closely. In the penultimate chapter of my work 
I consider evidence on the money-holding behaviour of (1) 
To my knowledge the only UK study of M3 which uses a 
wealth measure for the constraint variable is that of 
Grice and Bennett ( 18 ). 
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all iridustrial and commercial companies and (2) large 
industrial and commercial companies, to see if the latter 
group's behaviour is different from that of the average 
company. In additions the company sector's demand for 
wider aggregates, including total holdings of selected 
liquid assets, is investigated. This should help to 
explain the portfolio behaviour of companies and establish 
the strength of substitution between money and each of the 
non-money financial assets which are typically held. 
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CHAPTER 5 
. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON Ml 
5.0 Introductory remarks 
Evidence from both autoregressive and flexible finite lag 
models is considered. 
It is assumed that transactions motives dominate the 
money-holding behaviour of the public, so that income, prices 
and short-term rates of interest are considered to be the 
most important explanatory variables. 
GDP at market prices is the preferred income variable. 
Equations were estimated using TFE, but in every case better 
results were obtained using the former variable; the 
equations were generally better-determined with the GDP 
coefficients having higher t-ratios. 
Since multi. collinearity problems rule out the inclusion 
of several interest rate variables in the empirical model, and 
theory offers little guidance as to which rates are most 
relevant, different interest rates are tried. Furthermore, 
although short-rates should be more relevant than long-ratest 
the latter have been subject to less control over the period. 
it is therefore possible that long-rates serve as better 
proxies for the relevant short-term rates than do published 
domestic short-rates such as the Treasury bill and local 
authority rates. 
The main focus of attention is on the post-CCC era, 
defined as 1972(l)-1979(4), and the aim is to establish the 
properties of the Ml demand function and whether it is 
173 
structurally stable over the period. Results for the pre- 
CCC era, defined as 1964(1)-1970(4), are also presented so 
that the two data periods can be compared on an entirely 
consistent basis. Finallyp results for the entire period 
1964-1979, and various sub-periods starting in 1964 and 
terminating at different points in the 1970's, are presented. 
The major objective is to determine whether Competition 
and Credit Control merely temporarily disturbed the demand 
for Ml relationship, or whether it resulted in a permanent 
disturbance. In the latter case it is important to establish 
whether or not the function has become unstable; a structural 
shift may have occurred with the parameters remaining stable 
at their new levels. Although the sample of post-CCC data 
is still relatively small, there are enough observations for 
estimation purposes. 
5.1 Evidence from the post-CCC era 
1. Fixed laq models 
The following autoregressive model is to be tested in which 
the dynamics are assumed to reflect partial adjustment: 
mt =A0+b1yt+b2pt+b3Rt+ 
xm 
t-1 +ut 
ut = PU t-1 +et 
The model is estimated both in untransformed linear and log- 
linear forms. Since Ml is essentially demand-determined the 
single equation specification is likely to be a valid reduced 
form model in which each of the explanatory variables can be 
regarded as exogenous or pre-determined regressors. 
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In the log-linear specification several interest 
rates are tested: the rates on local authority bills, 
certificates of deposit, building society depositso and 
short and lo I ng-term government securities. The results 
are summarised in the tables below. 
TABLE 5.1 
A Summary of Single Equation M1 Results Using Various 
Interest Rates - 1972(1)-1978(4) 
Mi = 0.18 + 0.23 y + 0.21 P -0.04 R LA + C) 75 Ml_, (0.1) (1-0) (2.8) (3.0) (7: 4) 
x2 =20.6 x2 =4.58 p=-0.40 R2=. 995 10 (1.9) 
2. Mi 0.30 + 0.21 Y + 0.20 P -0.04 R CD +0 76 Ml_ 1 (0.2) (0.9) (2.7) (2.9) (7: 4) 
x2 =21.4 x2 =4.86 p=-0.42 R 
2=. 995 
10 1 (2.0) 
3. m1 0.87 + 0.28 Y + 0.32 P -0.08 R BU +0 64 Ml_ 1 (0.5) (1.1) ý(3.1) 
(2.1) (4: 7) 
x2 =18.8 
2 
=5.11 p=-0.45 R2m. 994 10 1 (2.1) 
4. Ml 0.17 + 0.28 Y + 0.27 P -0.07 Rs B + 0.71 Ml_ 1 
(0.1) (1.2) (3.3) (3. C» (6.6) 
x2 =21.7 x2 =3.82 p=-0.37 R2=. 995 10 1 (1.7) 
5. Ml = 1.22 + 0.34 Y + 0.40 P -0.10 RL B + 0.55 
Ml- 1 
(0.7) (1.4) (3.8) (2.9) (4.1) 
x2 =20.6 0 x2 =2.73 1 p=-0.32 
R2=. 995 
1 (1.4) 
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TABLE 5.2 
Ex-Post Forecasting Performance - Percentage Forecast 
Errors for 1979 
Eqn. No. 1 2 3 4 x2 4 
I R LA -0.6 -0.1 -1.4 -2.8 2.32 
2 R 
CD -0.4 -0.1 -1.3 -2.7 2.00 
3 R BU -1.7 - -1.6 -3.7 3.80 
4 Rs B -0.5 1.9 0.3 -1.6 1.43 
5 RL B -0.2 1.9 1.9 0.2 1.50 
It is noticeable from these results that the 
rates on short-term and long-term government securities 
perform best: serial correlation is less of a problem 
in the equations including these rates, which are 
marginally better determined and give better forecasts 
for 1979. Empirically there is little to choose between 
the two bond rates, although a shorter adjustment period 
is suggested when the long-term rate is used. A 
comparison of the speeds of adjustment and elasticities 
is shown in Table 5.3 overleaf. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Elasticities 
yPR Speed of 
Adjustment 
SR LR SR LR SR LR 
1 M1 RS B 0.28 0.97 0.27 0.93 -0.07 -0.24 10-11 
months 
2 M1 RL B 0.34 0.76 0.40 0.89 -0.10 -0.22 6-7 
months 
For the untransformed linear specification of the 
model a similar exercise was carried out and once again the 
government bond rates outperformed the rates of interest on 
short-term, capital-certain financial assets. Since the 
best results were obtained when the short-term bond rate was 
used, this rate was used for the purposes of comparing the 
untransformed linear and log-linear structures. 
The evidence on structural form and model dynamics 
There is a need to test whether the untransformed linear or 
log-linear specification is more appropriate, and if the 
naive dynamics of the partial adjustment hypothesis are 
acceptable. 
To do this the GIVE programme was used, and for each 
of the specifications results for the three representations 
of the model (the SF, URTF and RTF) were noted. The results 
are as follows: 
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1. Untransformed linear results: 1972(l)-1978(4) 
A. Structural Form 
Mi -1692 +0 10 Y+ 32 2P- 103 RS+0 84 Ml_j 
(0.5) (0: 7) t (2: 4) t (2.4) B (8: 4) 
Random correlogram test -x2 19.3 DW 2.19 R ='. 995. 10 
Ex-post forecasts for 1979: percentaqe forecast errors 
234 X2 4 
errors 1.2 2.4 1.1 -0.3 4.82 
Chow test F 4,23 = . 783 
B. Unrestricted transformation function (summar ) 
Random correlogram test -x2= 18.2 DW = 1.88 R2= . 996 10 
Test of significance of additional parameters -F4,19 = 1.38 
Post-sample parameter stability test -x2= 18.26 4 
Chow test -F4,19 = 1.13 
C. Restricted transformation, function 
mi -1780 +0 10 Y+ 30 0P -98 3Rs +0.86 M 
(0.6) (0: 7) t (2: 4) t (2: 5) Bt (9.0) t-1 
p -0.20 x2 test on px2=0.93 
(0.8) 
1 
2 
Test of validity of autoregressive restrictions - X3 = 6.22 
2 
Random correlogram test -4 18.6. 10 
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Ex-post forecasts 1979: percentaqe forecast errors 
12342 X4 
errors 
1 
0.9 2.7 1.5 -0.1 5.71 
1 
Chow test -F4., 22 ý 0.86 
2. Loq-linear results: 1972(l)-1978(4) 
A. Structural Form 
mi = 0.17 +0 28 Y+0 27 P -0 07 Rs+0.71 Ml_ 
(0.1) (1: 2) t (3: 3) t (3: 0) Bt (6.6) 1 
R2= . 995 
2 
Random correlogram test -x 10 = 21.7 
Ex-post forecasts 1979: percentaqe forecast errors 
234x2 4 
errors -P. 5 1.9 0.3 -1.6 1.43 
Chow test -F4,23 = 0.326 
B. URTF (summar ) 
Random correlogram test -x2 16.8 DW = 1.80 R2= . 996 10 = 
Test of significance of additional parameters - F4,, 19 = 2.23 
post-sample parameter stability test -x2=5.72 4 
Chow test -F"0.80 4,19 ": 
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c. RTF 
Mi = -0.09 + 0.27 Y+0 24 P -0 07 Rs+0.74 Ml_ 
(0.1) (1.4) t (3: 5) t (3: 4) Bt (8.3) 
p= -0.37 x2 test on p: x2=3.82 
(1.7) 1 
Test of validity of autoregressive restrictions -x2=6.94 3 
Random correlogram test -x2= 17.2 10 
Ex-post forecasts 1979 : Percentaqe forecast errors 
234x2 4 
errors 
1 
-1.20 2.1 1.1 -1.3 2.04 
Chow test -F'0.47 4,22 'ý 
Examination of these results reveals that: - 
The autoregressive restriction is in order for both 
2 
specifications. Critical x3 for the 5T. significance 
level = 7.81, and the calculated values are both less 
than 7. This means that we can reject the URTF. 
(2) Although an adjustment for 1 st, order serial correl- 
ation is valids we cannot reject the hypothesis, for 
either model, that p is not significantly different 
from zero. Both t-tests and x2 tests show this to be 
the case. Thisp together with the fact that the 
I 
results for the SF and RTF are very similar for both 
the untransformed and log-linear specifications 
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implies that we can accept the SF results. This 
finding is further supported by the F-tests on the 
significance of the additional variables entering 
the URTF: in both cases calculated F is comfortably 
below the critical value (5% significance level) of 
2.90. 
The forecasting performance of the SF is better than 
that of the URTF and the RTF for both model 
specifications. 
(4) The estimated parameters have the correct signs and 
are of plausible magnitude. Only the income 
coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero, at the 5% level. Equilibrium adjustment is 
completed within a year following an initial disturb- 
ance. 
(5) Despite the fact that the SF can be accepted and 
yields plausible parameter estimates, the hypothesis 
of a random correlogram cannot be accepted, at the 
5% level, for either specification of the Structural 
Form. Since calculated x2 remains relatively high 
after adjustment for 1 
st order serial correlation it 
is possible that higher order serial correlation 
exists. Since some of the seasonal variation in the 
data may not have been adequately eliminated by the 
methods of seasonal adjustment used* a simple 4 
th 
order scheme, following Wallis (135)p was tested: 
howevert since P4 was < 0.2 and not significantly 
* See Chapter 3v Section 3.4.1, p. 126. 
181 
. different from zero the hypothesis of simple 
4th order serial correlation was rejected. 
Most, of the evidence points to the Structural Form 
being an appropriate specification and with both the 
untransformed and log-linear SF's passing the post-sample 
parameter stability test and the Chow test for structural 
stability (when the sample is extended to'include 1979 
observations) the suggestion is that the M1 demand function 
has been stable during the post-CCC 1970's. 
It would appear from the results that the log-linear 
model specification is marginally preferable to the 
untransformed linear specification: the parameter es. timates 
are better-determined and the ex-post forecasting performance 
is better. In view of this the log-linear specification of 
the model is accepted as the more appropriate form. This is 
convenient for two reasons: firstly, the problem of hetero- 
scedasticity is minimised when log functions are specified 
and secondly, the parameters asýociated with the income, 
price and interest rate variables can be directly interpreted 
as elasticities. 
so, the preferred demand for M1 model i's a log-linear 
specification in which GDP at constant market prices 
represents the income variable, with the GDP deflator as the 
price variable and the short-bond rate representing the 
interest rate variable. The partial adjustment hypothesis 
can be accepted and OLS estimation is appropriate. For the 
estimation period 1972(l)-1978(4) the estimated long-run 
income elasticity `2 0.97, the long-run price elasticity = 
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0.93, and the long-run interest elasticity = -0.24. 
Full equilibrium adjustment following a disturbance takes 
approximately ten months. The parameters of the model 
remain stable when the data period is extended to cover 
1979. Re-estimation of the model after additionally 
including 1979 observations yields the following results: 
mi t 0.64 + 0.22 Y+0 
26 Pt-0 07 RB+0 72 Ml t-1 (0.4) (1.1) t (3: 8) (3: 0) t (8: 5) 
2 R 996 
While the price and interest rate elasticities, and the 
speed of adjustment remain essentially unchanged, there is 
a small disturbance to the income coefficient and the constant 
term. 
Flexible laq models 
A polynomial distributed lag technique was used to estimate 
the flexible lag models. 
After considerable experimentation with both poly- 
nomial degree, which was varied between 1 and 4, and lag 
lengths on the explanatory variables, which were varied up 
to 21-2 years, a 'best' equation was selected. So, the best 
lag structures were decided empirically, unlike in the studies 
of Dickson and Starleaf (38) and Goldfield (55) where a poly- 
nomial of degree 3 was applied to each variable without 
prior experimentation. Furthermore, these researchers applied 
end-point restrictions to the lag weights despite the 
The long-run price elasticity is not significantly 
different from unity, its theoretically expected value. 
183 
disadvantages of tying the lag structure down in this way. 
No end-point restrictions have been specified in my study. 
The criteria used for selecting 'best' equations 
are as follows: - 
(a) The significance of both the polynomial coefficients 
and the coefficients on each of the explanatory 
variables. 
(b) The size of the coefficient of determination adjusted 
for'loss of degrees of freedom - i. e. size of 
R? 
(c) The plausibility of the lag profiles on each variable. 
(d) The plausibility of the long-run income, interest and 
price elasticities. 
(e) The value of the DW statistic indicating the presence 
or absence of serial correlation. 
(f) Forecasting performance. 
As with the fixed lag models it was found that the short-term 
and long-term bond rates were better than short-term interest 
rates such as the local authority and Treasury bill rates. 
Once again, GDP at market prices explained more 
variation in Ml than TFE. 
The optimum lag path for both income and prices was 
one where the coefficients declined linearly; income 
continuing to influence Ml for up to four quarters after an 
initial disturbance, with price influencing Ml for up to nine 
months. The optimum lag length for the bond rate was 
18 
months and the shape of the lag path best captured 
by a 2nd 
degree polynomial. 
* see Kelejian and Oates (72) p. 176-178; especially p. 178. 
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The best equations for the post-CCC era, 1972(1)- 
1978(4), are shown below for log-linear specifications. 
Ml = -8.162 + 0.66 Y+0 51 Y_l +(0: 37 +0 22 Y (4.4) (5: 5) 7 3) 
Y-2 
(3: 3) _3 
+0.08 Y-4 + 0.82 P+0.42 P+0.01 p 
-2 -0 
39 P_ 3 (0.6) (6.3) (9.2) -1 (0.3) (3: 0) 
-0.06 Rs-0.06 Rs-0.06 Rs-0.05 Rs-0.05 Rs 
(2 g) B (6 0) B-1 (5.7) B-2 (5.0) B-3 C5.2 )B -4 
-0.04 Rs -0.03 Rs 
(3 . 1) 
B 
-5 (1.0) 
B 
-6 
DW = 2.30 R2 = . 9961 
Lonq-run elasticities 
ypR 
1.83 (1.77) 0.86 (0.85) -0.34 (-0.31) 
Chow test for structural stabilit 
Calc. F=1.01, (critical F0 
95 
= 2.87) 4,20 4: 20 
(2) Mi = 1.291 + 0.54 Y+0.36 Y -1 
+ 0.18 y2+0.01 Y- 3 (3.6) (3.5) (2.6) 
-0.18 Y-4 + 0.96 P+0.47 P -1 -0.02 
P2-0 51 P_ 3 (1.5) (6.4) (9.3) (0.3) - (3: 2) 
-0.03 RL _O 07 RL -0.09 RL -0.09 RL -0 07 RL 
(0.9) B (3: 8 ) B-1 (3.8) -B -2 (3.5) 
B 
-3 (3: 5 )B -4 
-0.03 RL+0.03 RL 
(1.1) B_ 5 (0.5 )B -6 
DW = 2.47 R2= . 9961 
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Long-run elasticities 
ypR 
0.91 (0.77) 0.91 (0.91) -0.34 (-0.26) 
Chow test for structural stability 
4,20 ý 3.35 
Notes 
Long-run elasticities coefficients on current and 
lagged terms. 
Figures in brackets refer to the corresponding values 
for the extended data period, 1972(l)-1979(4). 
3. The test for structural stability is over the four 
quarters of 1979. 
While the estimated. long-run price and interest rate 
elasticities are similar when using the alternative bond 
rates, there is a marked difference between the income 
elasticities. Following Baumol's transactions demand for 
money model* economies of scale in money-holding would be 
anticipated so that the expected value for the long-run income 
elasticity is less than unity. This suggests that the 
specification including the long-term bond rate is to be 
preferred v since the long-run income elasticity = 0.91 as 
opposed to the value of 1.83 when the short-term bond rate 
is 
used. However, Baumol's theory need not be accepted and there 
Baumol (17) 
The large value for the income elasticity is matched by a 
sizeable negative constant term in the short-term bond rate 
case. When the long-term bond rate 
is used the constant 
term is relatively small. 
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is no compelling reason to rule out elasticities in excess 
of unity. 
The optimum lag lengths on the explanatory variables 
are the same for both equations, but although the selected 
polynomial degrees for each variable also match-up, the 
Ml adjustment paths with respect to the interest rate changes 
are not the same. The lag profile with respect to the short- 
term bond rate is relatively flat when compared with the 
decidedly humped path associated with the long-term bond 
rate. Despite this difference in shape, both of the lag paths 
are plausible. Eighteen months before adjustment to a change 
in interest rates is completed seems rather a long period of 
time, but can be rationalised on grounds of inertia, habit 
and, where small money-holdings are concernedv brokerage 
costs. The lag lengths associated with ipcome and price 
changes are both reasonably plausible. 
The t-ratios on the lag coefficients are higher for 
both the income and interest rate variables when the short- 
term bond rate is used, and are approximately the same for 
the price variables. This together with the fact that serial 
correlation is less of a nuisance when the short-term bond 
rate is used makes equation (1) the empirically preferred 
specification. 
* Furthermore, equation (1) remains structur- 
ally stable when data from 1979 is taken into consideration; 
calculated F at 1.01 is decidedly lower than the critical F 
value of 2.87. When the long-term bond rate is used we 
cannot accept the hypothesis of structural stabilityp since 
In the case of the short-term bond rate the DW statistic 
of 2.30 reveals that negative serial correlation in the 
residuals is not as high as in the long-term bond rate 
casep where DW = 2.47 
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calcuiated F. = 3.35p exceeds the critical value - i. e. 
there is less than a 5% chance that the 1979 observations 
obey the same structure as that identified for the data 
period 1972(l)-1978(4). 
So, on the basis of criteria (a), (e) and (f) defined 
above, the short-term bond rate is the preferred interest 
rate variable; a finding which is not contradicted by 
the fixed lag model results for Ml. 
Fixed lag and flexible laq model results-compared 
The best equations for the two models contain the same 
explanatory variables - i. e. GDP at constant market pricest 
the GDP deflator and the short-term bond rate. Both sets of 
results seem plausible and the hypothesis of structural 
stability can be accepted in each case. 
It was decided that the partial adjustment hypothesis 
was the appropriate fixed lag specification, which implies 
acceptance of identical lag paths being associated with each 
of the explanatory variables. This rather naive assumption 
concerning the dynamics was accepted after statistical 
testing within the GIVE programmep although in the results 
it was noted that the hypothesis of random residuals could 
not be confidently accepted even after adjusting for lst order 
serial correlation. The flexible lag model with the lag 
lengths and profiles determined by the data itself, offers a 
reasonably rigorous test of the lag structure imposed on the 
relationship in the partial adjustment specification. The 
linear lag profiles associated with the income and price 
variables do not seriously contradict the geometrically 
declining, lag coefficientsimplied by the partial adjustment 
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hypothesis, and the lag lengths on these variables suggested 
by the two models are in broad agreement. The flexible lag 
model suggests a flatter profile on interest'rates and a 
longer period of around 18 months, as opposed to 10-11 months, 
before Ml completely adjusts to a change in the rate of 
interest. 
comparison of the long-run elasticities is shown 
below: 
ypR 
Fixed lag 0.97 0.93 -0.24 
Flexible lag 1.83 0.86 -0.34 
The most serious discrepancy is in the estimated income 
elasticities. 
* This may well be due to the lack of variation 
in real income over the period. The fixed lag estimate seems 
more plausible despite the fact that the income coefficient 
in this model was not significantly different from zero at 
even the l(r/o level (a finding which cannot be attributed to 
multicollinearity problems and probably reflects the above- 
mentioned lack of variation in the income data). 
If the partial adjustment model can be criticised 
because of its strong restrictions on the lag structure, it 
must be remembered that its great virtue is its simplicity. 
providing the estimated long-run elasticities are plausible 
and the model remains stable as the data period changes then 
it will be useful for forecasting purposes. Furthermores 
some testing of the imposed lag structure is available 
in the 
GIVE programme so that it is possible to reject the dynamics 
Although it must be noted that when the long-term bond rate 
was specified in the flexible lag model the estimated long- 
run elasticity was only 0.91. 
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empirically without recourse to polynomial distributed lag 
estimation. 
The flexible lag model is particularly useful for 
determining the underlying dynamics of the modelp but it 
must be remembered that with just three explanatory 
variables there are endless permutations of polynomial 
degrees and lag lengths which can be triedp even if the 
maximum lag is taken as ten quarters and the highest poly- 
nomial degree as three! 
Since demand for money theory is not good enough to 
tie down the lag structure very precisely there is a need 
for much experimentation before settling on an optimum 
flexible lag specification: this, of course, is a very 
time-consuming exercise! 
Some final observations 
Although the results from the fixed and flexible lag models 
do differ to some extent, both sets of equations yield 
plausible parameter estimates, which are highly significant 
in most cases despite the relatively small sample of data 
being used. The forecasting performance of the fixed lag 
model is good and the parameters remained stable when the 
data period was extended to cover 1979. Indeed, we have 
enough evidence from these results to suggest that the demand 
for M1 function has been stable in the post-CCC era. 
one worrying feature is the suggestion in the fixed 
lag model results that higher order serial correlation could 
be a problem. This might be due to several factors which 
include (1) faulty lag structure (2) the influence of CCC 
in the early part of the period which can be regarded as a 
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transitory influence (3) erroneous or incomplete seasonal 
adjustment of data (4) a break in the Ml series occurring 
in June 1975, and (5) the possibility that an important 
explanatory variable, such as inflation expectationso has 
been excluded from the model. 
(1), and (3) have already been dealt with and (5) is 
examined in detail in Chapter 7. Problem (2) can only be 
properly considered by excluding the immediate post-CCC 
period from the sample and without extending the sample of 
data backwards to include the 1960's this would leave us with 
too small a sample. As a result examination of this is 
postponed until a following section in which a relatively 
long data period, 1964(l)-1979(4). o is considered. 
The possibility that the break in the Mi series might 
have disturbed the resultsp causing serially correlated 
residuals, was rejected after running a regression equation 
in which a dummy variable was additionally included. TaXing 
the value 0 before 1975(2) and the value I from this date 
onwards, the variable was found to explain only a negligilDle 
amount of variation in Ml. Both the dummy coefficient and 
the associated t-ratio Vere extremely small and the 
coefficients on the other independent variables were 
essentially the same as before. 
5.2 Evidence from the pre-CCC era 
The aim here is to use both a consistent model and data serjess, 
so that the results for 1972(1)-1978(4), the post-CCC erap 
can be directly compared with the results for 1964(1)-1970('4)' 
which is defined as the pre-CCC era. Since the short-term 
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bond rate was selected as the preferred interest rate 
variable for the post-CCC era, it is also used for the 
pre-CCC era. 
Results 
Mi = 1.61 + 0.26 Y+0.31 P -0 09 Rs+0 58 Ml-i 
(0.6) (1-1) (2.0) (2: 5) B (3: 2) 
Test for random correlogram -x2 18.9 p=0.09 R2= . 964 10 (0.2) 
Post-sample parameter stability test -x2=4.3 4 
Comparing the autoregressive model results for the 
two periods* it can be seen that while the estimated short- 
run elasticities are similar the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium is greater in the pre-CCC era: seven months 
as opposed to ten months. Except for the interest rate, 
the long-run elasticities are lower in the pre-CCC era with 
the price elasticity falling well short of unity - its value 
is approximately 0.75. The pre-CCC structure is more weakly 
determined which is not surprising in view of the lack of 
independent variation in the data; the correlation between 
income and prices = 0.97 as opposed to only 0.74 in the 
post-CCC era. 
The results for the pre-CCC era clearly indicate 
that ist order serial correlation is not a problem, although 
as with the post-CCC sample ax2 test reveals that the hypo- 
thesis of random residuals cannot be accepted at the 5% 
The results for the 1972(l)-1978(4) data period were 
reported in Section 5.1. 
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significance level. 
The post-sample parameter stability test shows that 
the parameters remain stable over the year 1971 which is 
not altogether surprising since competition and Credit 
Control was not introduced until September 1971, and the 
rapid growth in the money stock did not occur until 1972. 
Extending the data period to include 1971 observ- 
ations gives the following results: 
1964(l)-1971(4) 
Ml = 2.57 + 0.17 Y+0.36 P -0.07 RS+0.57 Ml_l 
(1.0) (0.8) (2.3) (2.9) B (3.8) 
Test for random x 
20= 19.9 p 0.10 R2= . 983 correlogram . 1- (0.3) 
Post-sample parameter stability test x2 46.0 4 
Except for the rise in the constant term and the fall in the 
income coefficient, this equation is similar to the previous 
one. However, the post-sample parameter stability test 
J. 
clearly indicates structural break-down when the data period 
is extended to cover 1972. This result strongly suggests that 
the monetary reforms embodied in Competition and Credit 
Control have upset the demand for Ml function. The question 
now arises as to whether the upset is merely temporary or 
whether the structure exhibits a permanent shift. Evidence 
from the post-CCC era suggests that a stable Ml demand 
function can be identifiedp and that although the structure 
is different from that of the pre-CCC period, the difference 
is not too significant. It could easily be the case that 
the inclusion of immediate post-CCC data in the relatively 
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small'sample of post-CCC observations available has biased 
the results. However, rather than relying on evidence from 
even smaller samples of data the procedure which will now 
be adopted is to examine the entire data periodp 1964(l)- 
1979(4) and various sub-periods within this, both including 
and excluding ICCC observations'. 
5.3 Evidence from the pooled sample of pre-CCC 
and post-CCC data: 1964(l)-1979(4). 
Table 5.4 overleaf gives the results for the log-linear 
partial adjustment model: starting with the pre-CCC period, 
1964(1)-1970(4), the sample is progressively extended by one 
year until the entire data period, 1964(1)-1979(4), is 
finally covered. 
The Ml equation is seen to breakdown badly in 1972 
and continues to behave strangely until the end of 1975: 
the coefficients on the-income term are negative and the 
2 
x4 statistic reveals serious parameter instability over the 
years 1972 and 1973, and again in 1975. The breakdown of 
the function coincides with the immediate post-CCC period, 
as expected, with Ml being seriously under-predicted. The 
percentage under-prediction errors for 1972 are as follows: 
1972 
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3.2% 4.5% 4.891o 6.4% 
The errors get progressively worse over the year, this being 
consistent with the relaxation of controls on the banks which 
led to a sharp growth in the money stock. 
TABLE 5.4 
Results for Various Data Periods 
ICT 
0) 
r-i 
Estimation 
Period 
1964(1)- 
1970(4) 
1964(1)- 
1971(4) 
1964(1)- 
1972(4) 
1964(l)- 
1973(4) 
1964(1)- 
1974(4) 
1964(1)- 
1975(4) 
1964(1)- 
1976(4) 
1964(1)- 
1977(4) 
1964(1)- 
1978(4) 
1964(l)- 
1979(4) 
Intercept 
1.61 
(0.6) 
2.57 
(1.0) 
1.56 
(0.6) 
2.04 
(1.0) 
2.79 
(2.2) 
1.06 
(1.4) 
0.56 
(0.7) 
0.41 
(0.6) 
0.35 
(0.5) 
0.42 
(0.6) 
YP 
0.26 0.31 
(1.1) (2.0) 
0.17 0.36 
(0.8) (2.3) 
-0.01 0.22 (0.04) (1.4) 
-0.03 0.26 
(0.2) (2.3) 
-0.06 0.32 
(0.5) (4.2) 
0.10 0.24 
(1.2) (4.1) 
0.18 0.23 
(2.3) (3.9) 
0.19 0.22 
(2.5) (3.9) 
0.17 0.21 
(2.5) (4.1) 
0.19 0.22 
(3.0) (4.7) 
RB Mi-I 
-0.09 0.58 
(2.5) (3.2) 
-0.07 0.57 
(2.9) (3.8) 
-0.05 0.87 
(2.7) (8.7) 
-0.05 0.85 
(2.6) (11.1) 
-0.06 0.80 
(3.4) (11.4) 
-0.06 0.80 
(3.2) (11.4) 
-0.06 0.77 
(3.1) (10.9) 
-0.06 0.78 (3.5) (11.4) 
-0.06 0.80 
(3.5) (13.9) 
-0.06 0.78 
(3.7) (15.3) 
R2 
. 964 
. 983 
. 990 
. 992 
. 993 
. 995 
. 996 
. 997 
, 998 
. 998 
2 
x 10 
18.9 
19.9 
18.6 
21.8 
25.0 
19.5 
16.6 
15.3 
16.6 
17.5 
2 
x4 
4.3 
46.0 
15.7 
6.6 
22.2 
11.8 
2.1 
3.5 
2.9 
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The Ml equation estimated over the data period 
1964(l)-1974(4) badly fails the post-sample parameter 
stability test when observations from 1975 are introduced. 
Howeverp since the estimated relationship is itself 
unstablep it is no bad thing that the hypothesis of stable 
parameters is firmly rejected! The problem in 1975 was one 
of over-prediction and this can probably be accounted for 
by the very sharp rise in inflation, peaking at around 25% 
in the summer, which could be expected to induce a movement 
out of Ml. It is clear, though, that the substitution must 
have mainly been between short-term interest-bearing assets 
and Ml rather than goods and Ml, since the personal savings 
ratio rose quite sharply in the mid-1970's. 
As judged by both the estimated coefficients and the 
post-sample parameter stability tests which show that the 
parameters remain stable over the period 1976(4)-1979(4), 
the Ml demand function appears to settle down in the latter 
half of the 19701s; a result which is confirmed in Coghlan's 
study, 
* in which a flexible lag model is used. The ex-post 
forecasting performance of the Ml equation estimated over 
the data period 1964(l)-1976(4) is good: we can formally 
accept the hypothesis of parameter stability over the years 
1977-1979 inclusive: 
* See coghlan (27). 
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Ex-post Forecasting Performance - 
Percentage Forecast Errors 
1977 1978 1979 
123412341234 
1.3 2.2 -0.3 -1.1 0.4 1.9 -1.0 -2.6 0.9 2.6 1.2 -0.4 
I- 1 -1 1 
Chow test for structural stability -F 12,47 638 
Parameter stability test -x2=8.16 12 
one interesting feature of the results is that for 
the larger samples - i. e. for data periods 1964(l)-1976(4) 
onwards - the hypothesis of random residuals can just be 
accepted at the 5% significance level, but for the smaller 
samples this hypothesis is rejected. Since the early post- 
ccc era saw a rapid increase in the money stock it is clearly 
possible that the behaviour of the data during this period 
has caused the serial correlation problem: during 1972 and 
most of 1973 the residuals were positive and this is likely 
to lead to a serious autocorrelation problem in relatively 
small samples. As the sample size increases then so the 
influence of CCC is diluted and serial correlation becomes 
less of a problem# as the results show. 
The above results suggest that while CCC destabilised 
the demand for Ml over the period 1972-1974, inclusivet the 
function settled down again after 1975. It follows that we 
can certainly 'dilute' the temporary instability caused by 
ccC by considering only large samples of data - e. g. the 
entire data period 1964(l)-1979(4). Howevers 
it is only 
valid to pool the pre-CCC observations with the post-CCC 
observations providing the post-ccc structurep now assumed 
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to be essentially stable in the light of the empirical 
results, is not significantly different from the structural 
relationship identified for the pre-CCC era. Inspection of 
the results for the pre-CCC erao and for the entire data 
period, after excluding ICCC observations', is necessary. 
The pre-CCC period has already been considered, so only the 
latter task remains. 
It is clear from the table of results above that the 
M1 equation estimated for the entire period, 1964(1)-1979(4)0 
is different from the pre-CCC equation: the short-run 
elasticities are uniformly lower for the full sample period 
and the speed of adjustment is slower. While the large 
sample parameter estimates are well-determined with high 
t-ratios, the relatively small sample pre-CCC parameter 
estimates are not so well-determined; in particular, the 
income coefficient is not even significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level! There is also the problem of 
distributed lag bias* which can be serious in small samples, 
especially in the face of non-random residuals which the x2 
test for the pre-CCC results indicates. Because of these 
points we can reasonably conclude that the pre-CCC structure 
is subject to much uncertainty; a conclusion which is 
reinforced by the lack of independent variation in the data 
in the 1960's. Following this line of argument the pooling 
of pre-CCC and post-CCC data becomes a more valid procedure. 
suppose we consider the demand for Ml over the data 
period 1964(1)-1978(4) which leaves 1979 observations for 
structural and parameter stability testing. By running two 
* See Johnston (70) p. 305 and 306. 
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regressions, one in which the full data sample is used, 
and the other in which observations from the ICCC era' are 
excluded, we can determine whether CCC has had a significant 
influence on the demand for Ml. If it has then we need to 
compare the full sample results, after excluding CCC 
observations, with the pre-CCC results. Subject to the 
qualifications made above a discrepancy between the two sets 
of results strongly implies that the structure has changed 
in the 1970's for reasons other than the transitory direct 
influence of Competition and Credit Control. 
An attempt to account for this postulated structural 
change would then be in order: a simple shift of the 
function can be adequately accounted for by the insertion 
of a dummy variable into the equation taking the value zero 
in the pre-CCC era and unity in the post-CCC era. If the 
values of the coefficients and the speed of adjustment change 
then the structural shift cannot simply be captured by the 
inclusion of a dummy shift variable. One factor which might 
be responsible for a complex structural change is inflation: 
during the 1970's inflation has been high and variable 
whereas it was much lower and steadier throughout the 1960's. 
The possible influence of inflation on the demand for money 
is considered in depth in a separate chapter (Chapter 7)p 
where it is suggested that the lagged rate of inflation has 
explained some of the variation in Ml during the 1970's. For 
present purposes an Ml equation which includes the lagged 
inflation rate is estimated for the period of interest, 
1964(1)-1978(4). 
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TABLE 5.7 
Ex-post Forecasts - 1979: Percentage Forecast Errors 
All Observations 
2 3 4 2 X4 
RB 1.1 2.7 1.2 -0.3 2.9 
2. RB Dl -0.2 1.5 0.3 -1.5 1.6 
3. RB P-1 - 1.8 0.4 -1.1 1.5 
4. RB Dl ý_ 1 0.1 1.6 0.8 -1.9 2.4 
(2) Excluding CCC Observations 
1 2 3 4 2 x4 
1. RB 1.0 2.5 1.2 -0.2 3.0 
2. RB Dl -0.2 1.8 0.2 -1.8 2.3 
3. RB P-1 0.2 2.0 0.5 -1.1 1.9 
4. RB D1 -0.3 1.6 0.3 -3.2 4.8 
202 
TABLE 5.8 
Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables: 
1964(l)-1978(4): All Observations 
All Observations 
y pRB Ll M-1 
y 1.0 
p 0.91 1.0 
R B 
0.82 0.78 1.0 
L 0.80 0.80 0.72 1.0 
l 
Ml 0.92 0. ýq 0.78 0.77 1.0 
-l 
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The results reported in Tables 5.5-5.7, above, show 
that equations including all observations yield similar 
results to those which exciude ICCC observations' 
* for each 
of the corresponding specifications. 
The x2 statistic reveals that the hypothesis of 10 
random residuals can be strongly accepted for those equations 
which exclude CCC observationso but has to be rejected when 
all sample observations are included. This confirms that 
the serial correlation problem is specifically due to the 
inclusion of observations from the immediate post-CCC era 
when the relaxation of controls on bank lending caused the 
money stock to increase sharply. 
The results in Table 5.6, for data samples excluding 
CCC observations, can now be carefully considered. 
Equation 2 indicates that the post-CCC dummy shift 
variable, Dl, enters significantly at the 5% level with the 
expected positive sign. 
The inclusion of inflation, alone, as an additional 
variable in equation 3 did not change the results: the 
estimated parameters were very similar to those of equation 1 
and inflation entered with a negligible and insignificant 
coefficient. 
In equation 4 both the post-CCC dummy shift variable 
and inflation were additionally included. Their inclusion 
changed the parameter estimates: although the long-run 
elasticities, except for income which is not well-determineds 
are similar, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is now 
The CCC era was defined as 1971(4)-1973(4) inclusive, and 
these observations were excluded from the data sample. 
See Chapter 49 Section 4.2, p. 154. 
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considerably faster at 7-8 months as opposed to over a 
year in equation 1. For Ml this quicker adjustment seems 
more reasonable. It can be seen from the table that for 
each of the equations the estimated long-run price elasticity 
is'always close to unity which is in accordance with 
theoretical expectation. 
Both inflation and the dummy variable entered equation 
4 significantly at the l(r/o level; the latter was also 
significant at the 5% level. The respective coefficients 
each had the expected signs. If we compare equation 4 with 
equation 1, which excludes these variables, we see that the 
interest-rate coefficient is much better-determined in the 
former specification; it has a t-ratio of 3.7 as opposed to 
2.6. 
Despite the fact that the ex-post forecasts. 9 as shown 
in Table 5.7 above, are marginally worse for each correspond- 
ing equation when CCC observations are excluded from the 
sample, the hypothesis of post-sample parameter stability 
can be confidently accepted in every case. The preferred 
equation, 4., does not forecast 1979 as well as the other 
three, although the run of quarters is not really long enough 
for us to read too much into this. The main reason for the 
weaker forecasting performance is the relatively large 
percentage forecast error of -3.2% which occurs in the fourth 
quarter of 1979. 
This coincides with the abolition of all remaining UK 
exchange controls in October 1979. However, since as a 
general rule UK exchange controls applied only to 
resident outflows, their abolition ought to have imparted 
an over-prediction bias! Clearly, then, other factors 
must be responsible for the under-prediction of Ml in the 
fourth quarter of 1979. 
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If we now compare the pre-CCC Ml results for 1964(l)- 
1970(4) (see Section 5.2 above) with equation 4 in Table 
5.6 (excluding CCC observations) we see that except for the 
income' coefficient, which is poorly determinedo the equations 
give similar results. The short-run price and interest rate 
elasticities are similar and so is the speed of adjustment. 
The t-ratio associated with the price variable is surprisingly 
high, at 3.7, in equation 4 in view of the fact that the 
correlation matrix for the full sample period shows that the 
simple correlation between price and the lagged money stock 
is 0.99. Howeverg this high figure is still lower than the 
coefficient of determination, R29 which stands at 0.999, and 
according to Klein (75) multicollinearity is only a severe 
problem if the simple correlation coefficient is greater than 
the multiple correlation coefficients R. 
It would appear, then, that a shift in the Ml function 
occurs following the introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control, and that rapidly rising and variable inflation rates 
influence the structure in the post-CCC era; the inflation 
being largely a consequence of the rapid growth in the money 
stock following the CCC reforms. 
In conclusion, Competition and Credit Control appears 
to have temporarily de-stabilised the Ml demand function. The 
function shifts and inflation becomes an influential variable 
in the post-CCC era. 
The significance of inflation is also suggested by the 
M1 results listed in Table 5.4. 
** The estimated function 
P. 64 and 101. 
Results for the basic specification 
- i. e. Mi f(Y PR Ml_). BT 
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settles down after 1976, with the 1964(l)-1976(4) equation 
forecasting 1977,1978 and 1979 reasonably-well. These 
were years immediately following the Labour government's 
anti-inflation package which included incomes policy, the 
introduction of monetary targets and public expenditure 
cuts. 
5.4 Ml and simultaneit 
At the theoretical level it seems reasonable to assume that 
Ml is essentially demand-determined. Firstly, since the 
public are free to switch their money between interest- 
bearing and non-interest bearing bank accounts as they choose 
it will obviously be difficult for the monetary authorities 
to independently influence the supply of Ml. In practice 
they are able to influence the public's willingness to hold 
ml, via manipulation of short-term interest rates, but the 
extent and predictability of the influence will depend on 
the nature and stability of the Ml demand function. Secondly, 
it is the broad monetary aggregate, EM3, which the authorities 
have attempted to control during the post-CCC era and whereas 
they have announced target rates of growth for this aggregate 
since 1976, there have been no declared targets for Ml growth. 
Manipulation of the reserve assets base (for example by a call 
for, or release of, special deposits) should have a definite 
influence on movements in LM3* since the reserve assets ratio* 
was defined in terms of the banks' total eligible liabilitiest 
The reserve assets ratio has now been abolished. The 
121fl. ratio was in force from September 1971 to January 
1981 when it was replaced by a 100/. ratio. It was 
finally abolished in August 1981. 
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but may not have any systematic influence on Ml. 
* 
Since domestic short-term interest rates have been 
manipulated by the authorities during the post-CCC 1970's 
it would not seem unreasonable to regard the rate of interest 
as an exogenous variable in the Ml demand function. There 
may wellp however, be significant feedback relationships 
between Ml and income, and/or, M1 and prices. To test 
whether there is any important contemporaneous feedback from 
either of these sources a three equation log-linear model was 
specified and estimated. The endogenous variables are Ml, 
Y and P and the instruments are real investment, 1 751 the 
rate of interest$ RB# autonomous spending at current prices, 
A, and the unemployment rate, U. Each of the equations in 
the system are over-identified. They were estimated using 
alternative simultaneous equation estimators (2SLS, 3SLS and 
FIML) for the purpose of establishing the significance of 
the feedback and to see whether the estimated parameters of 
the Mi demand equation are similar to the single equation OLS 
estimates. Since the FIML results were the only ones which 
yielded a reasonable price equation, just these are presented 
here. The model was estimated over the data period 1972(l)- 
1978(4). 
A five equation simultaneous model in which MPI MS0 Yto 
Pt ýnd RBt were the endogenous variables was 
tt 
estimated by 2SLS, allowing for ist order serial 
correlation in the residuals, and it was found that only 
the lagged dependent variables were significant in the 
money supply and interest rate equations thus confirming 
theoretical expectation. 
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Results - 1972(l)-1978(4) 
Ml = -4.93 + 0.82 Y+0.25 P -0.10 RB+0 67 Ml_j (2.5) (4.3) (4.8) (8: 2) 
2. Y 6.21 + 0.14 Ml + 0.03 175 -0.05 U+0.24 Y_j (3.9) (0.3) (2.4) (1.6) 
3. P -0.99 -0.08 Ml + 0.18 A+0.84 P_j 
(1.2) (2.5) (5.8) 
Correlation matrix of residuals 
mi yp 
mi 1.0 
y -0.17 1.0 
p 0.34 -0.57 1.0 
T6st of model stability - 1979 
1234 
x21.35 9.82 13.1 2.16 3 
Forecast errors for quarters 2 and 3 are 
significant. 
Overall test _X2 = 26.4 12 
Since calculated x2> critical table value 
reject hypothesis of model stability. 
Several important points need to be made concerning these 
results: 
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Estimates of the short and long-run price and 
interest'elasticities are similar to the single 
equation estimates. 
2. Although a much higher income elasticity is 
suggested in the above results we have both 
theoretical and empirical reasons for rejecting 
this finding: firstlyp an estimated long-run 
income elasticity of around 2.5 is not all that 
plausible, and secondly, there is evidence from 
the correlation matrix of residuals to suggest 
that across equation autocorrelation between real 
income and prices cannot be ignored. Furthermore, 
the x2 test shows, the model to be unstable; this 
finding stands in complete contrast to the single 
equation model results which indicated that the 
hypothesis of parameter stability over 1979 could 
be confidently accepted. 
3. Even if we accept the results they show that changes 
in the demand for Ml do not have any significant 
influence on prices in the current period; the 
t-statistic of 1.2 on the M1 coefficient shows that 
current period feedback between M1 and prices is 
insignificant. In contrast, a change in Ml does have 
a significant feedback influence on real income as 
equation 2 shows. 
4. Following the popular mark-up theory of pricing, it 
could be argued that equation 3 is wrongly specified 
and that the most important explanatory variable 
ought to be an index of wages and salaries, W. 
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Replacing A with W in the price equation and 
additionally including the unemployment ratet 
U. gives the following set of results. 
* 
1. Ml = -0.82 + 0.38 Y+0.26 P -0 07 RB+0 70 Ml_, - (0.4) (1.3) (3.2) (3: 1) (6: 1) 
pl = -0.36 
Test for random correlogram -x2= 17.7 10 
2. P -2.88 -0.04 Ml + 0.59 W+0.05 U+0.36 P_l 
(2.9) (0.6) (5.4) (2.0) (2.4) 
P2 0.43 
(2.2) 
Test for random correlogram -x2=7.4 10 
3. Y 7.05 + 0.20 Ml + 0.25 1 75 -0.08 U -0.08 Y-1 (1.9) (2.0) (1.4) (1.5) (0.2) 
P3 0.41 
(1.2) 
Test for random correlogram -x2 1208 10 
Although there are still problems with this structure 
- e. g. the coefficient on unemployment in the price equation 
has the wrong sign and the income equation is weakly 
determined - the wage variable proves highly significant in 
the price equation and feedback between M1 and prices is both 
negligible and highly'insignificant. 
The parameters of the M1 equation are very similar to 
the single equation OLS estimates; in fact the short-run and 
Estimated by 2SLS after adjusting for lst order serial 
correlation. 
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long-run elasticities estimated for price and interest 
rates are almost identical. Since the only significant 
source of feedback is running from Ml to real income it 
is not surprising that the estimated income elasticities 
differ: the simultaneous model suggests a long-run income 
elasticity of approximately 1.25 over the period 1972(l)- 
1978(4) whereas the corresponding OLS estimate is unity. 
It appears from the above results that there is 
some simultaneous feedback between Ml and Y. but that since 
the variation in real income over the data period is not 
particularly significant this does not invalidate the OLS 
results. Howeverp since it has proved difficult to specify 
satisfactory equations for both price and real income, we 
cannot be too confident about these results; in particular, 
we cannot be sure that the separate influences of Ml on 
price and on real income have been correctly picked-up. 
Because of this, plus the fact that the single equation OLS 
estimates suggested that the price and income elasticities 
were the same, a2 equation model with Ml and nominal income, 
Y, as the endogenous variables will now be investigated. 
Results for the 2 equation model 
The following log-linear model was specified: 
(1) Ml =a0+b1Y+b2vB+ 
Xmi-i +ut 
(2) Y=a1+c1 Ml + C2 A+9 Y_j + Vt 
of course we cannot even be sure that we have picked-up 
the separate influences of real income and price on Mi 
correctly. 
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Since both of the equations are identified, consistent 
estimates of the structural parameters can be obtained. 
The model is estimated over the data period 1972(l)- 
1978(4) using three alternative estimators: 2SLS, 3SLS 
and FIML. The results for the reduced form equations are 
also shown. Finally, a parameter stability tests over the 
quarters of 1979, is conducted in the case of the FIML 
estimator. 
1.2SLS Results 
Mi 0.29 + 0.26 Y -0.07 RB+0 72 Ml_j 
(3.4) (3.4) (7: 8) 
(2) 0.19. + 0.35 Ml + 0.38 A +(0: 28 
(2.2) (4.5) 1 3) 
Correlation matrix of residuals 
mi 
mi 1.0 
y 0.27 1.0 
No significant across equation correlation of residuals. 
Restricted reduced form 
RB A Mi-i Y-1 
Ml = 0.37 -0.08 + o. 11 + 0.79 + 0.08 
(1.9) (3.4) (2.7) (10.0) (1.8) 
Y=0.32 -0.03 + 0.42 + 0.28 + 0.31 
(1.9) (2.2) (5.4) (3.0) (2.1) 
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3SLS Results 
Ml = 0.32 + 0.28 Y -0.08 RB+0 70 Ml_ (3.8) (4.0) (7: 8) 
(2) Y=0.21 + 0.26 Ml + 0.32 A+0 42 Y_ 
(1.7) (4.0) (2: 1) 
Correlation matrix of residuals 
ml y 
ml 1.0 
y 0.19 1.0 
No significant across equation correlation of residuals 
Restricted reduced form 
RBA Mi-i Y-1 
Mi = 0.41 -0.09 + 0.09 + 0.75 + 0.13 
(2.1) (3.8) (2.7) (9.4) (2.4) 
y 0.32 -0.02 + 0.34 + 0.19 + 0.46 
(1.9) (1.8) (4.4) (2.1) (3.2) 
FIML Results 
Ml 0.33 + 0.28 Y -0.08 RB +(0: 69 Ml_j 
(3.7) (3.9) 7 4) 
(2) y 0.20 + 0.28 M1 + 0.33 A+0 40 Y_l 
(2.5) (5.2) (2: 7) 
No significant across equation correlation of residuals 
Restricted reduced form 
The results are almost identical to those for 3SLS. 
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Test of model stabilit 
(1) Each quarter of 1979 
1 
x21.51 2.00 0.45 1.19 2 
None of the individual forecast errors are significant. 
Overall test 
2 
x8=5.15. 
Accept hypothesis of parameter stability for 1979. 
Since across equation autocorrelation is lower than 
0.3 for all three estimates it is not a serious problem and 
can therefore be ignored. Furthermore, since the single 
equation results for Ml did not exhibit any significant 1 st 
order serial correlation over the period 1972(l)-1978(4) it 
seems reasonable to ignore this problem as well. It follows 
from this that the alternative simultaneous estimators, 2SLSP 
3SLS and FIML, will be consistent. 
Despite the fact that the estimators reveal a 
significant feedback relationship between Ml and Y, 
* 
comparison 
of the structural parameters of the Ml equation when alternative 
estimators are used reveals that the OLS estimates are very 
similar. 
The estimated Ml coefficient is in the region of 0.3 and 
is statistically significant at the 5% level for 2SLS and 
FIML, while it just becomes significant at the 10% level 
for 3SLS. 
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TABLE 5.9 
The Sensitivity of Demand for Money 
Parameters to Choice of Estimator 
b 1(y) b2 (R B) 
x(mi-1) 
OLS 0.28 -0.07 0.71 
2SLS 0.26 -0.07 0.72 
3SLS 0.28 -0.08 0.70 
FIML 0.28 -0.08 0.69 
This similarity between the alternative estimates 
which casual inspection of Table 5.9 above, reveals, 
strongly suggests that a single equation model is an 
appropriate reduced form specification of the demand for 
Mi. 
5.5 Concludinq comments on the Ml results 
The log-linear model specification was empirically preferred 
to the untransformed linear specification. This is convenient 
since the former yields estimates of the relevant elasticities 
directly. 
For both the fixed and flexible lag models the best 
explanatory variables representing incomes price and the rate 
of interest# were GDP at 1975 market prices, the GDP deflator 
and the short-term government bond rate, respectively. 
While the dynamics of the partial adjustment model were 
not too seriously contradicted by evidence from the flexible 
lag model results, there were differences in the lag lengths 
associated with the explanatory variables: for examplev three 
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quarters for Y and six quarters for R Be There was also a 
discrepancy between the Ml lag paths associated with the 
bond rate. However, while the flexible model can provide 
useful detail on the underlying lag structure, the partial 
adjustment model is a conveniently simple specification 
which can be useful for forecasting purposes and has been 
commonly applied in empirical studies. 
Evidence from fixed lag models suggests that the Ml 
structure changes after CCC, although the pre-CCC structure 
is not well enough determined for us to be sure of this. 
Inflation appears to have had some influence on the demand 
for Ml in the 1970's and empirical evidence from the pooled 
sample of pre-CCC and post-CCC data suggests that there is 
a shift in the function after the introduction of Competition 
and Credit Control. 
The serial correlation problem suggested in the full 
sample results disappears when the immediate post-CCC 
observations are excluded from the overall data sample. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that the CCC reformsj 
which temporarily disturbed the behaviour of Ml, had caused 
the serial correlation problem. 
The post-CCC equation, 1972(1)-1978(4), is well- 
determined and the estimated parameters certainly seem 
plausible: the long-run income, price and interest elast- 
icities are 0.97,0.93 and -0.24, respectively and equilib- 
rium adjustment following a disturbance is completed within 
a year. The possible role and significance of inflation 
in the Ml function is to be investigated in Chapter 7. 
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The empirical evidence on simultaneity seems to 
support theoretical expectations. The only feedback 
channel -of any significance at all is between income and 
Ml. and despite this single equation OLS estimates of the 
parameters virtually coincide with those yielded by the 
simultaneous estimators. one possible channel of 
simultaneous feedback which is not examined is that between 
inflation expectations and Ml. 
i 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON TIME DEPOSITS AND LM3 
6.0 Introductory remarks 
From a policy point of view ZM3 is the most important 
definition of money, and although Ml accounts for approx- 
imately half of this aggregate, the manipulation of the 
growth of ZM3 by the monetary authorities has typically 
involved the banks' interest-bearing eligible liabilities 
during the 19701s. Since the government has attempted to 
control the growth of M3 in the post-CCC era, this monetary 
aggregate cannot really be regarded as demand-determined. 
Both supply and demand factors will determine the level of 
LM3 and as such simultaneous estimation of the demand 
function parameters will be in order. 
In this chapter both single and simultaneous equation 
models are investigated for ZM3. For time deposits, only 
single equation models are considered. The main justification 
for looking at single equation models is that within the 
context of a quarterly model simultaneity may be weak, so 
that a simple single equation specification becomes adequate. 
In addition to this, since monetary policy focused on 
interest rate controls before Competition and Credit Controlp 
it was possible to regard LM3 as essentially demand-determined 
in the pre-CCC era. It is certainly of interest to see if 
simple single equation models which performed well before the 
1970's can make any sense of the post-CCC experience. We 
now have enough post-CCC observations to test whether a simple 
stable money demand function can be identified and whether 
219 
there has been a structural shift following the CCC reforms. 
However, simultaneity is not the only issue. Before 
CCC the monetary authorities exercised close control over 
interest rates, so that rates on government securities were 
not allowed to vary in accordance with market forces. As 
a result speculation in the bond market was unlikely to have 
had a destabilising influence on the demand for LM3, and a 
single rate of interest could adequately represent the 
opportunity cost of holding money in terms of other financial 
assets. Furthermore, it was only after the introduction of 
CCC that an own-rate on money variable became truly relevant 
since the clearing banks were unable to bid competitively for 
fundsp except on a limited scale through their own merchant 
bank subsidiariest before the banking reforms of 1971. 
International variables such as the exchange rate and 
foreign interest rates become potentially more significant 
explanatory variables with the change from fixed to flexible 
exchange rates in 1972. However, the existence of exchange 
controls until the Autumn of 1979 may well mean that exchange 
rate changes have only had a weak influence over the relevant 
post-CCC sample period. 
The results are presented in two sections. Section 
6.1 deals with the single equation models and the main 
concern here is to establish whether a simple model can 
adequately explain both &M3 and time deposits (TD) or whether 
additional variables taking account of both domestic and 
international speculation need to be introduced. If 
speculation is important then does it de-stabilise these 
demand for money functions? In Section 6.2 the importance 
of simultaneity for the ZM3 definition of money is 
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investigated, under the assumption that a relatively 
simple demand for money function is appropriate. Simple 
LM and IS/LM models are considered. 
6.1 Sinqle equation model results 
The most general model to be tested included variables to 
capture both transactions and speculative demands for money. 
To capture the latter both the expected return on bonds and 
the expected exchange rate were included in the TD and ZM3 
functions. Since both government bond rates and exchange 
rates have exhibited upward and downward trend movements 
during the post-CCC era, the adaptive-expectations model was 
rejected, and expectations were assumed to follow an 
extrapolative/regressive scheme in each case. The only 
other additional variable, compared with the Ml model, is 
the own-rate on money which following Hacche (59) is assumed 
to be adequately represented by the CD rate. 
The model is as follows: 
a+bY+bP+bR+bR+bRE+b EX 
E 
t01t2t3 CD 4S5B6 
Where, 
(1) mt-m t-1 = ý(M*t-m t-1 )+ut Partial adjustment 
RE h(A R) B 
EXE = EX + g( LEX) 
Extrapolative/regressive 
expectations 
Extrapolative/regressive 
expectations 
This gives a final estimating equation as follows 
(overleaf)t 
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Mt= -Xa 0+ 
ýb 
1yt+ 
Xb2pt 
+ Äb 3R CD t+ 
Xb 
4Rst 
+ Xb 5RBt+ 
Xb 
5 h(LR B)t + 
Xb 
6 EX + 
Xb 
6g( A EX) 
+ (1-x )mt-l +Ut 
Variations on the basic model were considered and the 
simplest model entertained merely included the own-rate 
on money as an additional variable. In the context of the 
above model RE and EXE were dropped so that (2) and (3) B 
disappear. such a simple model which excludes speculative 
influences reflects the monetarist belief that the demand 
for money is essentially a stable function of just a few 
explanatory variables. Following this view the main source 
of substitution is likely to be between bank time deposits 
and other capital-certain liquid assets. It is argued that 
substitution between risky and capital-certain assets is 
likely to involve many different liquid assets and not just 
money. So, it is a speculative demand for liquid assets as 
opposed to a speculative demand for money which really needs 
to be investigated. 
As with Ml, alternative interest rates were used to 
represent RS, but only within the context of a simple 
specification which excluded both bond rate and exchange rate 
expectations. For both ZM3 and TD the rate selected was the 
one which yielded the best empirical results. 
6.1.1 Results for the post-CCC era 
Since log-linear demand functions generally yielded better- 
determined relationships than the untransformed linear 
Such an investigation is carried out for the company 
sector; See Chapter 9. 
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functions., onlythe results for the former are presented 
here. 
The first issue investigated concerns the choice of 
an appropriate opportunity cost variable for both the TD 
and ZM3 money definitions. As with M1 the local authority 
rate, the building society deposit rate, the short-term 
government bond rate and the long-term bond rate were all 
tried. In each case the CD rate was used to represent the 
own-rate on money, although Artis and Lewis (11) argued that 
a weighted average of rates on money would be more 
appropriate. 
In common with the findings for Ml the bond rates 
outperformed the short-term interest rates for both TD and 
ýEM3. In each case the short-term bond rate was marginally 
preferred and the results using this particular rate are 
shown in Table 6.1 overleaf. 
Two equations for each definition of money are shown: 
one in which the own-rate on money and the alternative asset 
rate coefficients are freely estimated and the other in 
which the coefficients are constrained to be of equal 
magnitude and opposite sign. So, equations 2 and 4 specify 
RB -R CD as the relevant 
interest rate variable, which should 
be read as Log R -Log R or Log 
LB 
Quite clearly the B CD R CD 
expected sign of the coefficient on this variable is negative 
since when the differential between the bond rate and the CD 
rate grows in favour of the former, then so the opportunity 
cost of holding interest-bearing money increases and 
substitution from money to other liquid assets is likely to 
occur. 
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The results for time deposits indicate that the 
interest rate restriction holds quite precisely. In 
equation 1 where the interest rate coefficients have been 
freely estimated the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
the same to two decimal places, and they each have the 
expected signs. In equation 2 the restriction is applied 
and the equation yields identical coefficient estimates to 
equation 1. As can be seen from the t-ratios on the 
coefficients equation 2 is marginally better-determined 
and this is due to the additional degree of freedom now 
available for estimation. Not surprisingly, the forecasting 
performances of the two equatýions over the year 1979 are 
virtually identical. This result suggests that substitution 
between Ml and time deposits is weak and that if relative 
interest rates - i. e. 
RB 
remain unchanged then only R CD 
changes in income and prices will influence the level of 
time deposits. Weak substitution between Ml and time 
deposits can only be rationalised by suggesting that movements 
out of Ml and into other financial assets typically takes 
place on a broad front with many interest-bearing assets 
being involved. If this was the case then substitution 
between Ml and a particular interest-bearing asset, such as 
interest-bearing bank deposits, would tend to be weak. 
For ZM3 the interest rate restriction does not hold. 
In equation 3 the short-run interest elasticity with respect 
to the bond rate is -0.11 while the own-rate elasticity is 
only +0.06, and both these coefficients are well-determined 
with t-ratios comfortably in excess of 2. This difference 
can be rationalised in the following way. When both rates 
rnove up by equal proportionsp although 
the level of interest- 
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bearing bank deposits will not be seriously disturbed (see 
argument above for TD) there will be a movement out of Ml 
into interest-bearing liquid assets generally. Since most 
of this represents a move out of money the demand for ZM3 
can be expected to fall as the equation suggests. Now if 
both rates move down with relative rates unchanged once 
again the level of time deposits should not change signif- 
icantlyp but there will now be a general move back into Ml 
from a variety of interest-bearing liquid assets, since the 
opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing money has 
fallen. This move back into M1 will swell ZM3 as equation 
3 suggests. 
If we accept that the short-term bond rate does indeed 
represent the alternative asset rate(s) satisfactorily, then 
the question of coefficient equalities centres around (1) 
Just how important relative interest rates are in portfolio 
decisions and (2) whether the variable used to represent the 
own-rate on money is a satisfactory choice. As far as point 
(2) is concerned the CD rate is not entirely appropriate for 
the ZM3 money definition, and this is because well over 80% 
of Ml, which itself represents approximately k of ZM3, is 
non-interest bearing. However, simply taking a weighted 
average of the rates on money, assuming a zero return on 
current account balances, as did Artis and Lewis (11) and 
Grice and Bennett (18)0 is not particularly satisfactory 
either. While the CD rate certainly overstates the own-rate 
on money for ZM3, the rates used by these researchers neglect 
the implicit convenience return on current account deposits, 
and thus tend to understate the own-rate. 
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Despite the fact that the restriction on the interest 
rates did not hold for ZM3v it was still applied in equation 
4. 
The estimated equations for time deposits are certainly 
reasonable with each of the coefficients being of plausible 
magnitude, except for the price elasticity, and having. the 
expected signs. The income and interest rate coefficients 
are particularly well-determined with t-ratios well in excess 
of 3. The p coefficient shows that is 
t 
order serial correl- 
ation is highly insignificant so that the RTF can be rejected. 
Furthermore) the x2 test for random residuals is easily passed 
with the calculated x2 values being less than 10; this gives 
an indication that higher order serial correlation is not a 
problem. Since the URTF could be rejected because the 
additional lagged variables did not add significantly towards 
the explanation of variation in TD, this suggests that the 
SF postulated is an adequate specification. 
The long-run elasticities for TD are given in Table 
6.2 together with the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. 
Certainly, with the exception of pricep the estimated long-run 
elasticities are plausible although the income elasticity at 
3.6 does seem rather high. The speed of adjustment at 18 
months seems reasonable enough. 
The post-sample performance is good insofar as the 
parameter stability test is easily passed, but although the 
individual forecast errors are very small, the equations 
over-predict in each quarter. 
I st order serial correlation is again a trivial problem 
for ZM3 although despite evidence from the random correlogram 
test which suggests that higher order serial correlation is 
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not a-problem, a lagrange-multiplier test (not shown in 
Table 6.1) suggests that it is! Furthermore, an F-test for 
the URTF showed that additional lagged explanatory variables, 
especially the interest rates, made a significant contribution 
to the explanation of variation in ZM3. This evidence was 
reinforced by ax2 test for the validity of the autoregressive 
restriction, which strongly suggested that such a restriction 
was invalid and that the RTF must be rejected in favour of the 
URTF. 
However, despite these important qualifications to the 
structural form results shown in Table 6.1, they do seem 
reasonably plausible, especially equation 4 which placed an 
, empirically invalid' restriction on the interest rate 
coefficients. Indeed, equation 4 yielded a significant price 
coefficientt whereas equation 3 suggested that price was an 
insignificant explanatory variable. 
A speed of adjustment of approximately 17 months is 
suggested by equation 4 whereas equation 3 suggests a less 
plausible speed of over three ytars. Table 6.2 shows the 
equilibrium speeds of adjustment and the long-run elasticities 
for LM30 for both equations. An income elasticity of just 
over 2 is plausible enough for ZM3ý although a price elast- 
icity of 0.5 still seems rather low. Equation 3 where the 
interest rate coefficients are freely determined, suggests 
that the long-run income elasticity is as high as 4, which 
seems an unlikely result. 
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TABLE 6.2 
Long-run Elasticities and the 
Equilibrium Speeds of Adjustment 
Eqn. yPR R D 
Adjustment 
d No. B C Spee 
1. TD 3.6 0.12 -0.71 0.71 18 months 
2. TD 3.6 0.12 -0.71 0.71 18 months 
3. M3 4.0 0.38 -1.37 0.75 3 years, 
1 month 
4. M3 2.2 0.50 -0.22 0.22 17 months 
Restricted coefficients 
The post-sample performances of the ZM3 equations 
are reasonably good. Table 6.1 shows that both equations 
comfortably pass the post-sample parameter stability test 
and that both over-prediction and under-prediction errors 
occur. Equation 4, in which the interest rate coefficient 
restriction is applied, gives slightly better forecasts: 
for the first three quarters of 1979 the percentage errors 
are smaller and in the last quarter the percentage forecast 
error is marginally worse. Re-estimating equation 4 for 
the entire post-CCC period, 1972(1)-1979(4) gives the 
following results: 
£M3 = -1.98 + 0.39Y + 0.09P -0 039(R B -R CD 
)+0.82£M3_ 1 
(2.0) (3.7) (3.0) (2: 7) (21.9) 
R2 = . 998 x2 6.79 10 
The estimated parameters virtually coincide with those for 
the 1972(l)-1978(4) data period. 
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Despite satisfactory results from this simple model 
there are weaknesses. Firstly, price was not a significant 
explanatory variable in the TD equations, and the estimated 
long-run price elasticity of EM3 was, at 0.5, considerably 
lower than the theoretically expected value of unity. 
Secondly, although the structural form specified for TD 
passed all the specification tests built into the GIVE 
programme, the estimated equation over-predicted the level 
of time deposits in each quarter of 1979. Thirdly, the 
structural form postulated for ZM3 was empirically rejected 
by both x2 and F-tests: in particular, evidence from the 
URTF suggested that lagged interest rates should be included 
amongst the explanatory variables. 
These weaknesses may well be due to the omission of 
potentially important explanatory variables such as the 
expected returns on capital risky assets - e. g. government 
bonds - and exchange rate expectations. Accordingly, such 
variables were added to the basic model to give the general 
specification outlined at the beginning of this section. 
Equations 2 and 3 both impose an extrapolative/regressive 
hypothesis on expectations, which has already been ration- 
alised, and the expected signs on the coefficients h and g 
are - and +, respectively, which meet the extrapolative case. 
The empirical procedure adopted was to estimate this 
general model and then to drop any redundant explanatory 
variables from the structure, amongst the interest rate and 
exchange rate expressions, before re-estimating the model. 
Further variations on the theme were then tried in accordance 
with evidence from the specification tests built 
into the 
GIVE programme: in particular, evidence of significant lagged 
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explanatory variables entering the URTF was checked for. 
The results based on the general model, together 
with the best simple model resultsq are shown in Tables 
6.3 and 6.4, for time depositso and Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
for LM3. 
The TD results in Table 6.3 suggest that while 
domestic speculation in the bond market is of some import- 
ance for interest-bearing money, exchange rate changes are 
not. Equations 1 and 2 assume extrapolative expectations 
for both the domestic bond rate and the exchange rate, and 
while the hypothesis receives some support in the case of 
the former, it receives no support in the case of the 
exchange rate. The exchange rate level has only a negligible 
and highly insignificant influence, and although the 
coefficient on AEX is considerably larger it is not signif- 
icantly different from zero at even the 100/. level. 
Both a comparison of equations 2 and 4 and inspection 
of the correlation matrix (see Table 6.7) reveal that the 
weak performance of the exchange rate cannot be attributed 
to multicollinearity problems. The highest simple correlation 
coefficients involving the exchange rate variables are (1) 
only 0.33 for AEX and (2) 0.96 for EX; although this latter 
correlation coefficient is high it is still lower than the 
multiple correlation coefficient, so that according to Klein 
(75) * multicollinearity is not a severe problem, A comparison 
of the two equations shows that the estimated income and 
interest rate elasticities remain similar when the exchange 
rate variables are droppeds and this reinforces the view that 
See page 64 and page 101. 
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poor results are not due to. multicollinearity. 
Equations 3 and 4 both exclude exchange rate 
variables, so that only the expected return on government 
bonds is additionally included. The negative coefficient 
on the bond rate level and the positive coefficient on 
RL supports the extrapolative expectations hypothesis: B 
howeverp the relatively low t-ratio on the AR 
L 
coefficient B 
means that we cannot be confident about this. Furthermore, 
each of the equations which included both RL andLR 
L 
BB 
indicated a higher order serial correlation problem. 
* A 
comparison between equations 4 and 7 reveals that the 
interest rate elasticities are not seriously disturbed when 
RL is dropped, although the estimated short-run income B 
elasticity increases from 0.28 to 0.41, and becomes 
considerably more significant. Another interesting feature 
associated with the dropping of &R 
L is that the equilibrium B 
speed of adjustment increases from the highly implausible 
figure of five years to three years (which still seems 
unreasonably slow). Associated'with this faster adjustment 
is a noticeable easing of the higher order serial correlation 
problem: some indication of this is given by the sharp fall 
in calculated x2 from 11.4 in equation 4 to 7.5 in equation 8 
7, which excludesA RL B 
One curious result, no-matter how the equation is 
specifieds concerns the price coefficient which is always 
close to zero and highly insignificant. This may well indicate 
the inappropriateness of GDP and GDP prices as explanatory 
variables in the demand for interest-bearing money function. 
1 st order serial correlation was not an important problem 
in any of the estimated equations shown in Table 6.3. 
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However, the absence of any comprehensive information on 
wealth has necessitated the use of an income variable. 
* 
It can be seen from equations 1,3,5 and 6 that 
inflation is not an important determinant of TD demand; 
a result which is confirmed for the simple model in Chapter 
7. 
Equation 8 gives the simple model results, which 
have been considered in detail earlier in the section. It 
is noticeable that although the price coefficient is still 
highly insignificant it does at least enter with the correct 
sign and has the highest t-ratio out of the eight equations. 
Furthermore, this equation has the best-determined income 
coefficient and a highly significant# correctly signed 
interest rate coefficient. It also yields the most plausible 
speed of adjustment of approximately 18 months; this is 
significantly faster than the speeds suggested by the other 
equations. 
Table 6.4 indicates that equation 8 is able to track 
TD holdings in 1979 considerably better than any of the 
other equations, although it must be noted that equation 2p 
which includes both the expected return on bonds and exchange 
rate expectations, still comfortably passes the parameter 
stability test. What is most striking from this table is 
that each of the estimated equations over-predict TD in every 
quarter of 1979. 
Although not shown in the table, the results from 
'permanent income models, were considered and found to 
be poor. Adopting a flexible lag approach to income 
and prices did not improve matters. 
The re-imposition of the corset in the summer of 1978 
might well be responsible for these over-prediction 
errors, especially as the control was in force through- 
out the year 1979. 
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So, despite the fact that Keynesian demand for money 
theory suggests that there should be a significant specul- 
ative component in the demand for interest-bearing money, 
my empirical work does not support this view. Perhaps the 
relevant expectations formation process is too complex to 
capture or perhaps Leijonhufvud's claim that Keynes should 
have been interpreted as meaning the speculative demand for 
all capital-certain short-term financial assets as opposed 
to just 'money's is really in order. 
* 
So, it appears that a simple transactions models 
which includes an own-rate on money variable as the one 
additional explanatory variable compared with the Mi case, 
performs best for time deposits. 
The results for LM3 are shown in Table 6.5. Equation 
1 is the reduced form equation obtained from the model 
outlined at the beginning of the section, in which an extra- 
polative/regressive hypothesis was entertained for both the 
expected return on bonds and exchange rate expectations. 
Each of the relevant estimated coefficients have the correct 
a priori signs for the extrapolative expectations casep 
although it is clear that &EX makes only a negligible 
contribution towards the explanation of variation in the 
demand for ZM3; the coefficient of 0.01 is very small and 
only has a t-ratio of 0.1. The correlation matrix, shown in 
Table 6.7s makes it clear that multicollinearity is not 
responsible for the small and poorly-determined coefficient 
on & EX. The exchange rate level is also a weak explanatory 
variable having a t-ratio less than unity. 
* Leijonhufvud (84). 
* 
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Equation 2 indicates that when the exchange rate 
variables are dropped the coefficients on the other explan- 
atory variables are still very similar to the estimated 
values in equation 1. The current period bond rate enters 
significantly, at the 5% level, and while the coefficient on 
RL is not signif icant at the 10% level it does have a B 
t-ratio comfortably greater than unity and is of significant 
size. Certainly, we cannot reject the extrapolative- 
expectations hypothesis regarding the expected return on 
bonds. 
A comparison of equations 2 and 4 shows that when 
RL is dropped from the models the short-run income B 
elasticity rises sharply from 0.13 to 0.20, and the negative 
intercept increases from -0.61 to -1.09. For the other 
explanatory variables the coefficients reTain much the same 
sizes but now have higher t-ratios indicating that they are 
better-determined. 
Equations 1 -4 , inclusive, each have large coefficients 
on the lagged money term: the smallest value is 0.93 which 
following the partial adjustment hypothesis suggests a lag 
of more than 31-2 years before the demand for ZM3 fully adjusts 
to a change in any of the arguments. This seems unreasonably 
long! 
However, as with equation 10 which represents the 
simple transactions demand model, the structural 
forms 
specified are rejected by the GIVE programme: 
the URTF 
consistently indicated that both lagged 
income and lagged 
rates of interest were significant explanatory variables. 
* Results for this model have been fully discussed above. 
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Attemýts to include lagged income in combination with 
current income indicated that the former variable had 
significantly more explanatory power. Because of this, 
and in order to avoid multicollinearity problems when 
both current and lagged income are included, equations 
5-9, inclusive, included just the lagged income variable. 
As far as lagged interest rates are concerned, the 
lagged CD rate and the lagged bond rate were additionally 
entered, both singly and in combination. The coefficients 
on these rates were both freely-determined and constrained 
to be of equal size and opposite sign. Out of the ten 
equations only equations 7 and 9 pass the specification 
tests in the GIVE programme: for these equations none of 
the additional lagged variables entering the URTF are 
significant and the RTF results indicated that the hypothesis 
of significant 1 st order serial correlation in the residuals 
could be confidently rejected. So, the structural forms 
suggested by equations 7 and 9 are acceptable; a finding 
which is reinforced by the evid6nce of random residuals in 
both cases as indicated by the calculated x2 statistics 
(see Table 6.5). 
A closer inspection of equations 7 and 9 indicates 
that although most of the coefficients are well-determined, 
the estimated price elasticities are weakly determined and 
are implausibly small: equation 9 has the larger estimated 
long-run price elasticity which is only 0.23! Full equil- 
ibrium adjustment following a disturbance takes almost three 
years according to equation 7 and approximately two years 
according to equation 9. While the latter estimate seems 
more plausible, a more reasonable estimate still is provided 
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by equation 109 which is derived from the simple transactions 
demand model. Equation 10 is the only one which suggests 
that price is a significant explanatory variable and although 
the long-run price elasticity of 0.5 seems on the low side it 
is higher than the estimates suggested by the other equations 
with the single exception of equation 1. However,, since the 
short-run price elasticity was rather poorly-determined in 
this particular equation, and the speed of adjustment 
implausibly longp this particular estimate must be discounted. 
Table 6.6 clearly shows that equation 10 forecasts 
1979 much better than the other nine equations and easily 
passes the post-sample parameter stability test. It can be 
seen from the table that several specifications over-predict 
for each quarter of 1979 and fail the parameter stability 
test. Equations 7 and 9, the preferred specifications on 
purely statistical grounds, yielded both under-prediction and 
over-prediction errors, in common with equation 10. Howeverp 
equation 7 just fails the parameter stability test, while 
equation 9 only just passes. 
It appears, then, that none of the estimated single 
equation models for ZM3 are entirely convincing, and that if 
speculative demand influences are important then only a rather 
complicated functional form will be able to capture them 
successfully. Indeedv it is a possibility that both domestic 
and international speculation together with the CCC reforms 
have had a seriously destabilising influence on the demand for 
ZM3. While this may be the case it must be emphasized that 
it has been possible to estimate a sensible, well-determined 
demand relationship for ZM3 in the context of a simple trans- 
actions demand model. Despite some theoretical problems with 
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the interest rate specification and the failure of the 
model to pass certain specification testsit has, 
neverthelesss explained variation in the demand for LM3 
reasonably well in the post-CCC era. In particular, it 
provided easily the best ex-post forecasts for 1979 out 
of the various single equation models tested. 
Table 6.8 shows the post-CCC sample results for 
the best Mlp TD and ýEM3 demand models. Despite the 
difficulty concerning the interest rate specification in 
the LM3 equationp which has already been discussed, these 
equations give reasonably consistent information. The 
estimated short-run income and price elasticities for ZM3 
lie in-between the corresponding estimates for Ml and TD, 
which must be the case given that both M1 and TD respond 
positively to changes in the same income and price 
variables. Furthermore, the estimated long-run price 
elasticity of ZM3, which equals 0.5, is perfectly consistent 
with the information from the M1 and TD equations. Since 
the long-run price elasticity of M1 was close to unity, and 
the corresponding elasticity for TD very close to zero# it 
follows that the price elasticity for LM3 must lie in- 
between these values. in fact, it will be a weighted average 
of the elasticities for M1 and TD, and since these components 
of LM3 have approximately equal weight this suggests that 
the long-run price elasticity of &M3 should indeed be in the 
region of 0.50. 
Despite this consistent information on income and 
prices, many researchers have felt that the theoretical case 
for homogeneity in prices is strong enough to impose a 
unitary price elasticity for LM3 from 
the outset. In Appendix 
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A results are presented for both time deposits and LM3 
models, in which homogeneity in prices is assumed. Since 
no sensible results emerge this suggests that the price 
elasticity is significantly different from unity for both 
TD and LM3, and as such should be freely estimated. 
TABLE 6.8 
Best Results for Ml, TD and ZM3: 1972(l)-1978(4) 
y p RBRB -R CD M-1 R2 
Ml = 0.17 0.28 0.27 -0.07 0.71 . 995 (0.1) (1.2) (3.3) (3.0) (6.6) 
TD =-4.46 0.61 0.024 -0.12 0.83 . 993 (2.5) (3.5) (0.7) (3.7) (26.1) 
S, M3 =-2.14 0.40 0.09 -0.04 0.82 . 997 (2.0) (3.5) (2.4) (1.8) (19.3) 
6.1.2 Results for the pre-CCC era 
Strictly speaking, ZM3 is not the relevant measure of broad 
money before 1976. For the pre-CCC era, defined as 1964(l)- 
1970(4), M3, which additionally includes UK residents, 
holdings of foreign currency, should be used. However, for 
reasons of data consistency only the ZM3 definition is 
considered here. 
The main purpose in considering this period is to see 
if the TD and LM3 demand structures are significantly different 
from those estimated for the post-CCC era. Since a simple 
transactions demand model was empirically preferred to more 
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complex specifications in the post-CCC era, and since it 
performed well in the pre-CCC eras the most likely cause of 
disturbance is the new competitiveness of interest-bearing 
bank deposits after the relaxation of controls on bank 
lending and the abandonment of the clearing banks' interest- 
rate cartel. Thisp of course, should be adequately captured 
by the inclusion of a suitable own-rate on money variable. 
Round-tripping is a complication which cannot be easily 
handled empirically, although this ceased to be important 
after the introduction of the 'corset' in December 1973. 
In view of the low and rather sticky rates on interest- 
bearing bank deposits in the pre-CCC era it was not really 
necessary to include an own-rate on money variable in either 
the TD or ZM3 equations. 
Table 6.9 shows the results for time deposits and ZM3 
with the short-term bond rate and the rate on local authority 
temporary debt used as alternative measures of the rate of 
interest. 
For time deposits the only significant explanatory 
variable is lagged TD, so that no relationship can even be 
identified. The freely estimated price elasticity has the 
wrong a priori sign and is close to zero. Although not 
shown in the table, equations in which the price elasticity 
was restricted to take its theoretically expected value did 
not give very good results either. So, for this particular 
monetary aggregate a simple relationship cannot be established 
for the pre-CCC era. 
Most researchers found that the demand for M3 was a 
stable function of just a few variables in the 1960's. 
The Keynesian belief that speculation destabilised the 
function did not receive empirical support for the UK 
economy. 
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For f. M3 the results are also inconclusive when the 
price-elasticitY is freely-determined. Howeverf equations 
5 and 6, in Table 6.9f show that when long-run homogeneity 
in prices is assumedf a better-determined relationship 
emerges# in which the income elasticity is significant. 
comparing equations 3 and 4 with 5 and 6 shows that the 
estimated interest-elasticities and speeds of adjustment 
are insensitive to the treatment of the price elasticity. 
Essentiallyf it is the lack of independent variation in real 
income and prices during the 1960's which is responsible for 
the weakly-determined coefficients associated with these 
variablesf in the unrestricted cases. Taking either 
equation 3 or 4, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
long-run price elasticity of SM3 is zero; on the other hand, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is unity (at 5To 
significance level): Quite simplyf multicollinearity makes 
it difficult to say anything conclusive about the long-run 
price elasticity of LM3. 
In view of the lack of independent variation in the 
data during the 1960's we cannot be very confident about 
either the TD or &M3 demand structures. For TD we cannot 
even determine a relationship at all! The &M3 equations are 
considerably better and comparison with the simple models 
estimated for the post-CCC periods shows that the short-run 
price and interest rate elasticities are very similarg although 
the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is faster in the post- 
CCC period. The estimated short-run income elasticity is 
considerably higher, 0.40 compared with 0.25, in the post- 
CCC era. Despite these differences we have no firm empirical 
evidence suggesting that the pre-CCC structure is significantly 
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different from the post-CCC structure for either time 
deposits or ZM3 providing an own-rate on money variable 
is included. As such, there can be no strong objection 
to pooling data from the two periods which will give a 
relatively large sample. 
6.1.3 Evidence from the Dooled samni 
da 1964(l) 1514r2 
f 'Pre-CCC and 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 give the results for a variety of 
transactions demand models of LM3 and time deposits. In 
the light of the results for ZM3 and TD in the post-CCC 
era, where the expected return on bonds and exchange rate 
expectations 'were insignificant explanatory variables, 
only these simple models have been considered. 
For the ZM3 resultsp shown in Table 6.100 the best 
equation is number 4, with explanatory variables Y, P and 
R*- Inspection of the table shows that the estimated 
parameters in equations 5,6 and 7 are very similar to 
those in equation 4, and that the additional explanatory 
variables, D1 and ý_lq entered singly and in combination, 
are insignificant. ý_,, the lagged inflation rate, proxies 
for inflation expectations * and Dl is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 0 in the pre-CCC era and 1 from 1972(l) 
onwards. The dummy variable is included in order to pick up 
any simple structural shift of the function which may have 
been caused by the introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control. 
Equations I to 4 in Table 6.10 only differ with 
respect to the interest rate specification. In equations 
* See Chapter 7. 
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1 and 2, the local authority rate and the short-term bond 
rate, respectively, are specified, and an own-rate on 
money variable is not included. As a result of this mis- 
specification each equation suggests an explosive model 
with a significant negative price coefficient! Quite 
clearly, equations 1 and 2 should be rejected. Equatign 3 
specifies a log differential rate between the short-term 
bond and local authority rates, so that an own-rate on money 
variable, proxied by the rate on local authority temporary 
debt, is entered for the entire data period. This result 
should clearly be rejected since the price and interest rate 
coefficients are highly insignificant and the implied speed 
of adjustment is implausibly slow! In equation 4, R* is the 
chosen interest rate variable: for the pre-CCC data period, 
defined as 1964(l)-1971(3) for present purposes, R* = the 
log of the short-term bond rate, and for the post-CCC period, 
1971(4)-1978(4), R* = the differential between the logs of 
the short-term bond-rate and the CD rate - i. e. Log 
R B/RCD* 
This specification suggests that an own-rate on money 
variable only becomes important in the LM3 demand function 
after the introduction of CCC. Furthermore, the parameter 
estimates are certainly plausible and highly significant. 
Table 6.14 shows the estimated long-run elasticities and speed 
of adjustment; it is noticeable that the estimated price 
elasticity of 0.45 is very close to the estimate of 0.5 for 
the post-CCC data period. 
For time deposits a similar procedure was followed 
and from the results listed in Table 6.11 
it can be seen 
that equation 4 is the preferred specification. As with LM3 
the preferred interest rate specification 
is R* which 
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emphasizes the importance of the own-rate on money in the * 
post-CCC period. However, as for the post-CCC sample period, 
the suggestion is that GDP prices are not a significant 
determinant of the level of TD holdings; in fact price 
enters with a small negative coefficient of -0.03 although 
it is not significantly different from zero. Table 6.14 
shows the estimated long-run elasticities and speed of 
adjustment for the preferred TD specification. 
Table 6.12 indicates the forecasting performance of 
each of the estimated ZM3 and TD equations and shows that 
the preferred specifications comfortably pass the post- 
sample parameter stability test. Calculated x2 for the 4 
best LM3 specification (equation 4) is 1.9v while the 
corresponding statistic is 5.9 for the preferred TD specif- 
ication (equation 11). Howeverp while both under and over- 
prediction errors occur in 1979 for LM3, the TD equation 
under-predicts in each quarter of that year. 
* 
Since the immediate post-CCC data period, 1971(4)- 
1973(4), saw rapid growth of th6 money supply# prompted by 
the 1971 banking reforms and aggravated by 'round-tripping', 
it is possible that the inclusion of these observations in 
the overall sample may have distorted the estimated demand 
for money function. To see if this was the case some 
alternative ZM3 specifications were re-estimated after 
excluding these ICCC observations'. The results are shown 
in Table 6.13 and a quick comparison with the original results 
in Table 6.10 shows that the estimated equations are remark- 
ably similar! Sop in the context of a large sample of data 
This under-prediction is evident for each of the TD 
specifications in Table 6.12. 
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TABLE 6.13 
ZM3 Results, 1964(1)-1978(4) Excluding ICCC Observations, 
Dl 
Li 
s-m3 R2 X2 
-1 10 
1. 9, M3 = -2.01 0.40 0.09 -0.029 0.81 . 999 21.5 (3.1) (3.4) (2.6) (3.2) (13.0) 
2. &M3 = -1.94 0.38 0.08 -0.032 -0.012 0.82 . 999 21.4 (2.8) (2.7) (2.2) (2.3) (0.3) (10.0) 
3. &M3 = -1.74 0.34 0.08 -0.032 -0.006 0.84 . 999 23.9 (2.5) (2.7) (2.2) (3.4) (1.0) (12.2) 
Ln CN 4. -EM3 = -1.79 0.37 0.09 -0.025 +0.034 -0.009 0.81 . 999 25.5 (2.5) (2.7) (2.2) (1.6) (0.6) (1.1) (9.9) 
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TABLE 6.14 
Long-run Income, Price and Interest 
Rate Elasticities - 1964(1)-1978(4) 
yP R* Adjustment Speed 
1. SM3--Y P R* 2.0 0.45 -0.17 16-17 months 
+2. &M3-Y P R* 2.1 0.47 -0.15 15-16 months 
3. TD -Y P R* 4.4 -0.21 -0.29 21-22 months 
Notes 
(1) + excludes immediate post-CCC data, 1971(4)- 
1973(4). 
(2) All elasticities, except for the price 
elasticity in the TD equation, have been 
derived from short-run coefficients which 
are significant at the 5% level. 
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the behaviour of the variables in the immediate post-CCC 
data period, 1971(4)-1973(4), does not appear to upset the 
&M3 demand relationship. 
Furthermore, comparing the results for the full 
sample period, 1964(l)-1978(4), with those for the post-CCC 
period, for the preferred ZM3 specification (see Tables 6.5 
and 6.10) it can be seen that the estimated equations are 
very similar. This perhaps is not too surprising in view 
of the poorly-determined results for the pre-CCC period 
which were due to lack of independent variation in the data 
during the 1960's. For time deposits there is also a 
similarity between the two sample periodss although it is 
not so striking as the LM3 case. 
Since there are multicollinearity problems involving 
the price variable (see Table 6.15 which shows that there is 
a simple correlation coefficient of 0.98 between P and 
LM3_1) the best ZM3 and TD equations were re-estimated after 
restricting the long-run price elasticity to take the value 
unity. The results are given in Appendix A which shows, 
without exception, that the equations are more weakly deter- 
mined, since the t-ratios associated with the estimated 
coefficients are smaller, and that the equilibrium speed of 
adjustment is far too slow! In some cases the hypothesis of 
random residuals is decisively rejected. These results 
strongly suggest that homogeneity with respect to GDP prices 
is out of order for both TD and LM3. 
In Table 6.16, below, results covering the entire data 
period are presented for the best ZM3 specification. 
Two 
* See Section 6.1.2 above. 
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TABLE 6.16 
Further Results for LM3 
Full sam2le period, results - 1964(l)-1979(4) 
All observations 
ZM3 = -1.89 + 0.38Y + 0.09P -0.027R* + 0.82LM3 (4.6) (6.7) (3.6) (6.9) (25.4) -1 
R2= . 999 x26.10 10 
(2) Excluding CCC observations (1971(4)-1973(4)) 
S, M3 =-1.89 + 0.39Y + 0.09P -0.028R* + 0.81ZM3- 
(3.1) (3.6) (2.9) (3.4) (14.2) 
R2= . 999 x2= 19.21 10 
2. Results for data period 1964(l)-1976(4) 
(all observations) 
S, M3 = -2.00 + 0.36Y + 0.06P -0.03R* + 0.84ZM3_ (4.7) (6.3) (1.9) (6.8) (24.4) 
R2= . 999 x26.1 10 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors - 1977,1978 and 1979 
1977 1978 1979 2 
123412341234x 
12 
1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -2.5 -2.9 -0.7 -0.4 -2.1 -0.4 -1.0 -1.3 -2.6 21.82 
Chow test F 12,47 961 
258 
sets of results are shown: f irstly using all observations 
and secondly, excluding 'CCC observations'. The equations 
are very similar to one another and to the corresponding 
estimates for the 1964(l)-1978(4) data period. This latter 
finding is entirely consistent with the evidence of parameter 
stability over the year 1979; Table 6.12 shows that 
calculated x2 for the 1964(1)-1978(4) estimated ZM3 equation 4 
is well below the critical value of 9.49 (5% significance 
level) indicating that we can strongly accept the hypothesis 
that the LM3 demand parameters remain stable over 1979. 
Testing for parameter stability over just the four 
quarters of 1979 is not the most stringent test of model 
adequacy. To test both the stability and the forecasting 
performance of the preferred ZM3 model more severely, an 
equation was estimated over the data period 1964(l)-1976(4) 
leaving three years beyond the sample period in which the 
performance of the model could be assessed. It is clear 
from the results shown in Table 6.16 that the estimated 
parameters are similar to those for the 1964(1)-1979(4) 
equation. 
The short-run price elasticity is lower and less 
significant for the shorter data period and the speed of 
adjustment is marginally slower at just over 18 months. 
The x2 test for serially uncorrelated residuals indicates 
that we can confidently accept the hypothesis of random 
residuals. 
The post-sample parameter stability test is marginally 
2 
failed at the 5% significance level with calculated x 12 
21.82 just larger than the critical value of 21.03. The Chow 
test, however, suggests that the hYpOthesis of no structural 
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change over these years can be accepted. 
Since the preferred Ml specification, derived from 
a transactions demand model, comfortably passed the para- 
meter stability test over these three same years, 1977-1979 
inclusive, the clear suggestion is that the behaviour of 
interest-bearing money is causing the problem. Considering 
the individual forecast errors for ZM3, shown in Table 6.16# 
we see that besides 1977(l) when the model over-predicts, 
under-prediction errors occur in each of the remaining 11 
quarters. This contrasts strongly with the Ml results which 
indicated both under-prediction and over-prediction errors 
for the corresponding quarters. 
However, despite this tendency of the ZM3 demand 
model to under-predict there is clearly no trend increase 
in the size of the percentage error. The most serious under- 
prediction errors occur in the 4 
th 
quarter of the year in 
both 1977 and 1979, whereas serious errors occur in both the 
1 st and 4 
th 
quarters of 1978. Further inspection of within 
sample residuals revealed that the relatively large under- 
prediction errors tended to occur in the 4 
th 
quarter, 
suggesting that the seasonal adjustment of the data is not 
adequate. A test for 4 
th 
order serial correlation, together 
with evidence from the residual correlogram, indicated a mild 
4 th order problem; the simple 4 
th 
order serial correlation 
coefficient was 0.37 but had a t-statistic of only 1.6. 
This problem which appears to relate to incomplete or 
unsatisfactory seasonal adjustment of the data is perhaps not 
too surprising given that the method by which the Bank of 
England adjusts the money stock figures is not consistent 
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with the C. S. O. 's adjustment of income data. 
* Furthermore, 
seasonally adjusted money stock and income data is combined 
with seasonally unadjusted interest rate data. 
It is possible that the error pattern has other 
causes. one possibility concerns systematic income distri- 
bution changes between sectors within any given year. For 
example, the tendency of firms to increase wage-rates early 
in the lst quarter of a year so that workers receive a boost 
in their real incomes which then slowly fall as prices move 
upwards during the course of the year. Another example of 
this concerns the timing of company sector tax payments, 
which are typically paid in the ls 
t 
quarter of the year. 
The systematic under-prediction of ZM3 over the years 
1977,1978 and 1979, as suggested by the demand equation 
estimated over the period 1964(l)-1976(4), might be related 
to a change in the distribution of income between the 
personal, company and public sectors following the anti- 
inflation policies introduced by the Labour government in 
1975 and 1976. In particular, the incomes policy improved 
the position of the company sector relative to the personal 
sector, and following the public expenditure cuts in 1976 
the public sector's rising share of national income was 
halt6d. Since the demand for money behaviour of these sectors, 
particularly where interest-bearing deposits are concerned, is 
likely to be quite different it is of considerable interest 
to examine the money-holding behaviour of each sector. In 
Chapters 8 and 9 the demand for M3 by the personal and company 
sectorsp respectively, is examined. Between thems the sectors 
For details on the Bank of England's adjustment of the 
money stock figures see BEQBv June 1981. 
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hold well over 80% of M3. 
However, before investigating the sectoral demand 
for M3 the importance, or otherwise, of simultaneity in 
'broad money' models is examined. 
6.2 Simultaneity and ZM3 
Two basic models were estimated. Model A is a simple 2- 
equation model of the money market, while model B includes 
a third equation which links the money market with the 
goods market. The reduced form of model B is investigated 
in the policy chapter, Chapter 10. However, the immediate 
concern is with the structural equations and to establish 
whether the estimated demand for money parameters in these 
simple simultaneous models differ significantly from the 
single equation estimates outlined in 6.1 above. 
The 3-equation model is similar to the one that 
Frowen and Arestis (4,5) used in their study of the demand 
for and supply of money in W. Germany, which follows the 
approach of Teigen (128). The main difference is that 
whereas the above-mentioned authors specified the money 
stock as the endogenous explanatory variable in the income 
equation, I have used the rate of interest. 
* 
The models used are outlined below. They have been 
estimated in both untransformed linear and log-linear forms" 
and the results are shown in Tables 6.170 6.18 and 6.19. 
This avoids the multicollinearity problem which arises 
when autonomous expenditurev Ap and the money stock, M, 
both enter as regressors in the income equation. 
Furthermore, these variables are not independent of one 
another in cases where an increase in government spending 
is financed by the sale of debt to the banks. 
See footnote on p. 131 (Chapter 3) regarding the validity 
of the log-linear specification. 
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Model A- money marke 
M3 s=A+bH+bR t1t2Bt 
M3 d=B+cY+cR t1t2Bt 
+b MLR +6 M3 s+u 3t t-1 t 
cR+ 
XM3 d_ 
+v 3 CD tt1t 
M3 s= M3 d= M3 ttt 
Model B- money market and goods market 
1 M3S =Af+ bi H+btR+b/ MLR +6/ M3 S- +u t1t2Bt3tt1t 
dtd 2. M3 =B+cy+ c/ R+CR+ 
XM3 
+V t1t2Bt3 CD t t-1 t 
yt=C+d1At+d2RBt+gY t-1 +et 
Notes 
A general partial adjustment hypothesis is assumed 
to adequately describe the dynamics of the system. 
(2) In the light of the single equation results reported 
in Section 6.1 only a relatively simple transactions 
demand model has been specified for the demand for 
money. 
(3) All variables are defined in the general data 
appendix. 
The equations were estimated by 2SLS and casual 
inspection of the results reveals that they are not partic- 
ularly good. 
The money supply equation has several weaknesses. In 
both models Al and B, MLR enters with the wrong sign. In 
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the case of the untransformed linear models the MLR 
coefficients were both positive and significant, while the 
coefficients were small and highly insignificant in the 
log-linear cases. For these same models the bond rate 
enters with a negative rather than a positive coefficient, 
and although the reserve assets base, H, enters with a 
correctly signed coefficient it is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. 
For model A2# Table 6.18, although the coefficient 
on the interest rate variablep RB -R CD , enters with a 
significant negative coefficient in both versions of the 
modelp MLR enters with a significant and correctly signed 
coefficient. Another advantage of model A2 is that the 
reserve assets base enters the equation significantly. 
For all three models the suggested speed of adjustment 
of the money supply to a change in the explanatory variables 
seems far too slow! The coefficient on the lagged money 
stock was greater than 0.90 in each case, suggesting that 
adjustment is not completed inside 2.1-2 years. In practice, 
the money supply ought to adjust reasonably quickly following 
an increase in the level of bank reserves since the banks 
will havea profit incentive to make new advances. Accord- 
inglys money supply equations were estimated for both linear 
and log-linear versions of the three models after dropping 
the lagged money stock from the specifications. This 
resulted in very weakly-determined money supply equations 
Because of the rather uncertain role of MLR as an explan- 
atory variable in the money supply equation over the data 
period in question and its weak empirical performance in 
the log-linear models, it was dropped from the log-linear 
specification. 
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which were decidedly poorer than the results shown in 
Tables Q. 17,6.18 and 6.19. 
Some sense can be made of the negative coefficient 
on the bond rate in the money supply equation. Consider 
the government's anti-inflation policies, particularly 
after 1975. A combination of (1) reduced government 
borrowing from the banks, (2) public expenditure cuts aimed 
at reducing the level of the public sector borrowing require- 
ment and the government's share of national income, and (3) 
an increased sale of government debt to the non-bank private 
sector, would tend to reduce the money supply and raise 
interest rates on government debt. 
Attempts to include the PSBR as an additional variable 
in the money supply equation simply yielded a small and 
weakly-determined coefficient. Howevers since the way in 
which a given PSBR is actually financed will influence the 
money supply directlyp this result is not really too 
surprisingL 
The equation of interests the money demand equation, 
can now be considered. Model Al and Model B results, shown 
in Tables 6.17 and 6.19, respectivelyp suggest an implausibly 
slow speed of adjustment. The coefficient on the lagged 
money stock is in the region of 0.95 for all cases except 
the log-linear version of Model B (see Table 6.19), where 
the speed of adjustment was considerably quicker. Howevers 
since this particular equation suggests that the 
interest 
In this particular modelt the equation was adjusted for 
significant ist order serial correlation and the results 
suggested a speed of adjustment of approximately 6 months 
which seems far more plausible. 
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rates are not significant explanatory variables the results 
are rejected. 
Model A2, shown in Table 6.18, gives reasonable 
results for the money demand equation and there is little 
to choose between the untransformed linear and log-linear 
specifications. The latter equation suggests a long-run 
income elasticity of approximately 0.60 and long-run interest 
elasticities of -0.23 and +0.23 for the government bond rate 
and the CD ratep respectively. 
Table 6.20 gives the OLS results for the alternative 
money demand specifications embodied in models Al and A2. 
The estimated parameters are very close to the 2SLS estimates 
in three out of four cases, which points to simultaneous 
equation bias being negligible in the context of these 
simple quarterly models. For the log-linear version of model 
'A2 the long-run income and interest elasticities are in 
agreement although the OLS results, in Table 6.20, suggest a 
longer adjustment period of approximately 17 months, as 
opposed to just over a year in the case of the 2SLS results. 
The long-run elasticities and speeds of adjustment 
yielded by the two estimators are compared in Table 6.21. 
It is appreciated that the simultaneous models 
specified are highly simplified and that, properly speaking, 
elements of the reserve assets basep Hv should be regarded 
as endogenous. However, in the context of a simple simult- 
aneous model it has been shown that single equation OLS 
estimates of the money demand parameters are as good as the 
2SLS estimates for the post-CCC data period. 
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TABLE 6.17 
Results - Structural Equations (1972(l)-1978(4)) 
Model Al -A Simultaneous Model of the Money Market 
Untransformed linear model - 2SLS 
1. M3 s =2.53 + 0.65 H -0 33 RL+0.16 MLR + 0.94 Ms t (3.1) (1.6) (3: 3 B (2.4) (19.0) t-1 
p=0.09 x2 16.4 
(0.4) 10 
2. M3 d=2.62 + 0.07 Y -0 23 RL+0.13 R+0: 95 M3 
d 
t (3.6) (0.8) (2: 0) B (2.2) CD 8 3) -1 
p=0.11 x2 16.9 
(0.3) 10 
Instrumental variables - H, MLRp Y, R CDO 
Endogenous regressor -RL B* 
Ex-Post Forecastinq Performance of Demand 
Equation: Percentage Forecast Errors for 1979. 
1979 
1234x2 4 
2.2 0.3 1.8 0.7 9.2 
Note - The money supply equation failed the 
post-sample parameter stability test 
over the four quarters of 1979 - 
calculated x2= 14.4. 4 
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TABLE 6.17 (continued) 
Log-linear model - 2SLS 
1. M3 s=0.46 + 0.07 H -0 06 RL+0.92 Ms t (3.8) (1.3) (2: 8) B (16.7) t-1 
p=0.15 x29.6 
(0.7) 10 
2. M3 
d=0.43 
+ 0.02 Y -0 11 RL+0.04 R +(%96 M3 
d 
t (2.1) (0.5) (3: 3) B (2.4) CD 1 . 5) 
p=0.01 x2 21.3 10 
Ex-Post Forecasting Performance of-Money Demand 
Equation: Percentaqe Forecast Errors for 1979. 
1979 
X2 12344 
3.0 1.2 2.9 1.4 11.3 
Note - The money supply equation easily 
passed the post-sample parameter 
stability test - calculated x2 4 
2.3. 
268 
TABLE 6.18 
Model A2 - An Alternative Simultaneous 
Model of the Money Market 
(1) Untransformed linear model - 2SLS 
M3S = 1.41 + 0.89 H -0.22 (R 
L 
-R ) -0.15 MR + 0.93 MY t (2.4) (2.4) (3.9) B CD (2.9) (20.7) -1 
p=0.05 x2 13.2 
(0.2) 10 
2. M3 d=2.22 + 0.12 Y -0.10 (R 
L 
-R )+0.88 M3 
d1 
t (3.8) (2.6) (1.9) B CD (18.4) 
p=0.26 
2 
15.6 
(1.0) 10 
Instrumental variables - H, MLR, Y. 
Endogenous regressor - (R 
L 
-R B CD 
Ex-Post Forecastinq Performance of MoneV Demand 
Equation: Percentaqe Forecast Errors for 1979. 
1979 
1234x2 4 
1.3 -0.2 0.9 - 2.7 
Note - The money supply equation comfortably 
passed the post-sample parameter 
stability test. 
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TABLE 6.18 (continued) 
Log-linear model - 2SLS 
1. M3 s= -0.33 + 0.16 H -0 21 ( 
L_ 
ttRBR CD 
) -0.12 MLR + 0.93 M3_, 
(0.8) (2.5) (2: 4) (2.2) (12.4) 
p=0.31 x2 24.3 
(1.3) 10 
2. M3 d=0.95 + 0.15 Y-0 055 (R L -R )+0 76 M3 
d 
t (2.0) (2.0) t (2: 4) B CD (6: 8) t-1 
p=0.51 x29.2 
(2.1) 10 
Instrumental variables - H, MLR, Y. 
Endogenous regressor - (R 
L 
-R B CD 
Ex-Post Forecastinq Performance of Money Demand 
Equation: Percentaqe Forecast Errors for 1979. 
1979 
234x2 4 
0.1 0.6 -1.0 1.33 
Note - The money supply equation just passed 
the post-sample parameter stability 
test over the four quarters of 1979 - 
calculated x2=9.3. 4 
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TABLE 6.19 
Model B-A Simultaneous Model of the 
Money and Goods Markets 
(1) Untransformed linear model - 2SLS 
M3 s=2.10 + 0.67 H -0.24 RL + 0.12 MLR + 0.94 M3S t (3.0) (1.7) (3.5) .B (2.1) (19.6) 1 
p=0.11 x2 17.2 
(0.5) 10 
dLd 2. M3 = 2.51 + 0.07 Y -0 20 R+0.12 R +(%95 M3 t (4.0) (0.8) (2: 4 B (2.2) CD 1 1) -1 
p=0.16 x2 16.4 
(0.7) 10 
3. y=2.52 + 0.87 A -0 09 RL+0.37 Y_ 
(2.0) (5.5) (1: 3 B (3.2) 1 
p=0.68 x2 23.0 
(3.7) 10 
Ex-Post Forecastinq Performance of Money Demand 
E_quation: Percentaqe Forecast Errors for 1979. 
1979 
2342 X4 
2.0 0.3 1.6 0.6 8.0 
Note - The money supply equation just passed 
the post-sample parameter stability 
testv while the income equation passed 
more comfortably. 
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TABLE 6.19 (continued) 
Log-linear model - 2SLS 
1. M3S = 0.46 + 0.07 H -0 06 RL+0.92 M3S 
(3.8) (1.1) (2: 9) B (16.7) -' 
p=0.14 x29.6 
(0.7) 10 
2. M3 
d=1.99 
+ 0.31 Y -0.26 RL+0.045 R +(0: 51 M3 
d 
(1.5) (2.4) (0.5 B (1.8) CD 2 2) -1 
p 0.70 x2 12.3 
(2.6) 10 
3. Y=1.30 + 0.63 A -0 15 RL+0.31 Y_ 
(4.0) (5.8) (2: 7 B (2.6) 1 
p 0.56 x2 18.0 
(3.1) 10 
Instrumental variables - H, R CD 0A 
Endogenous regressors -RL, Y. B 
Ex-Post Forecastinq Performance of Money Demand 
E-quation: Percentaqe Forecast Errors for 1979. 
1979 
1234x2 4 
0.6 -0.1 0.6 -1.0 0.6 
Note - Both the money supply and income 
equations easily passed the post- 
sample parameter stability test. 
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TABLE 6.20 
OLS Estimates of Structur 
tion - 19 
(1) Model Al 
1. Untransformed linear 
L 
£M3 = 2.51 + 0.07 Y+0 12 R CD -0 
20 RB+0.95 £M3_ 
(4.0) (0.8) (2: 2) (2: 4) (10.1) 
R2= . 997 x2 16.3 p=0.16 10 (0.7) 
Percentage Forecast Errors 1979 
1234 X2 4 
2.0 0.3 1.6 0.6 8.0 
Loq-linear 
9, M3 = 0.48 + 0.03 Y+0 03 R CD -0.09 RL+0.94 &M3- B (2.4) (0.6) (2: 3) (3 .3 (13.9) 
R2= . 997 x2 19.9 p=0.03 ý 10 (0.2) 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors - 1979 
12342 X4 
2.7 0.9 2.5 1.0 8.2 
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TABLE 6.20 (continued) 
Model A2 
Untransformed linear 
EM3 = 2.30 + 0.13 Y -0.139 (R 
L 
-R + 0.87 ZM3 
(4.0) (2.9) (3.0) B CD (18.6) 
R2= . 997 x2 15.9 p=0.22 10 (1.0) 
Percentaqe__Forecast Errors - 1979 
2342 X4 
1.6 0.3 1.4 0.6 5.83 
Loq-linear 
LM3 = 0.78 + 0.11 Y -0.040 (R 
L 
-R )+0.83 LM3 (5.2) (3.0) (2.7) B CD (18.3) -1 
R2= . 997 x2 17.7 p=0.32 10 (1.4) 
Percentage Forecast Errors - 1979 
2342 X4 
1.4 0.1 1.3 0.3 1.73 
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TABLE 6.21 
A Comparison of OLS and 2SLS Parameter 
Estimates for Models Al and A2 
Ib2x 
Al Linear OLS 1.4 -4.0 5 years 
2SLS 1.4 -4.6 5 years 
Log-linear OLS 0.50 -1.5 44 years 
2SLS 0.50 -2.7 64 years 
A2 Linear OLS 1.0 -1.07 2 years 
2SLS 1.0 -0.83 2 years 
Log-linear OLS 0.65 -0.23 -11-2 years 
2SLS 0.62 -0.23 1 year 
b long-run income elasticity 
(coefficient) 
b2 long-run interest elasticity 
(coefficient) 
speed of adjustment 
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6.3 Concludinq comments 
A simple transactions model of money demand yielded the best 
results for both time deposits and &M3. Models which included 
the government bond rate (long-term) and the exchange rate, 
to pick up the possible influence of domestic and international 
speculation, respectively, did not perform particularly well. 
In particular, the exchange rate proved to be a highly 
insignificant explanatory variable. 
The short-term government bond rate proved to be the 
best empirical measure of the alternative asset rate for both 
TD and LM3. Better results were obtained using this measure 
rather than rates on short-term, capital-certain financial 
assets - e. g. the rate on local authority temporary debt. 
Since short-term interest rates have been subject to more 
control than longer-term interest rates this finding is not, 
perhapsp too surprising. Also, since the own-rate on money, 
which was measured by the CD rate, is more highly correlated 
with other short-term rates than it is with government bond 
rates, the empirical superiority of the latter is only to be 
expected. In fact the most plausible results were obtained 
when the differential between the bond rate and the own-rate 
was specified, rather than the two rates separately. For 
time deposits the restriction was empirically validp although 
for LM3 it was not. 
The best TD results for the post-CCC era were reasonable 
except for the weakly-determined price coefficient and the 
suggestion that the long-run price elasticity was only in the 
region of 0.15! 'Both the income and interest elasticities were 
well-determined: the long-run income elasticity was 3.6 and 
the bond rate and CD rate elasticities were approximately 
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-0.70 and +0.70, respectively. 
For ZM3 each of the coefficients were reasonably 
well-determined, although the estimated long-run price 
elasticity of 0.50 seems a bit low. The long-run income 
elasticity was just over 2 and the interest elasticities 
were -0.22 and +0.22 (own-rate elasticity). A speed of 
adjustment of almost 18 months is plausible enough. 
Constraining TD and ZM3 to be homogenous in prices 
only yielded weaker and less plausible results. In view 
of this finding a price elasticity significantly lower than 
unity was accepted as being in order for both money 
definitions in the post-CCC era. 
Lack of independent variation in the data during the 
1960's means that we cannot be confident about either the 
TD or LM3 demand structures in the pre-CCC era. There is 
certainly no firm evidence to suggest that the pre-CCC 
structure is significantly different from the post-Ccc 
structure for either time deposits or ZM3, once the import- 
ance of an own-rate on money variable is formally recognized 
after 1971. 
ZM3 and TD equations estimated over the full data 
period, 1964(i)-1978(4)p were similar to those estimated over 
the post-CCC era and excluding the immediate post-CCC observ- 
ations from the large sample only had a negligible 
influence 
on the results. 
Both the 1972(1)-1978(4) and the 1964(1)-1978(4) 
estimated LM3 relationships passed the post-sample parameter 
stability test over the quarters of 1979. For a more stringent 
test of parameter stability a demand equation was estimated 
over the period 1964(l)-1976(4) so that three post-sample 
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years were available for the test. This test was narrowly 
failed although the equation passed the Chow test for 
structural stability. 
Finally, single equation OLS estimates of the ZM3 
money demand parameters were not subject to any serious 
simultaneous equation bias. OLS estimates of the structural 
parameters of simple 2 and 3 equation simultaneous models 
were very similar to the 2SLS estimates. 
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APPENDIX A 
ZM3 and TD Results where the Long-run Price 
Elasticity is Constrained to Equal Unity 
(1) Post-CCC era - 1972(l)-1978(4) 
1. RM3 = -0.31 + 0.08 Y -0.044 R* + 0.95 
zm3- 1 
(0.2) (0.6) (2.3) (15.0) P 
p=0.52 x24.3 
(3.0) lo 
2. RM3 = 0.95 + 0.01 Y -0.055 R* -0.019 +0 92 
LM3 
-, 
(0.6) (0.1) (2.9) (1.8) (li*5) p 
p=0.40 x2 10.0 
(2.0) 10 
3. RTD = 2.38 -0.10 Y -0.21 R* + 0.87 
TD_ 
(1.3) (0.6) (4.6) (18.9) P 
R2= . 967 x2 29.4 10 
4. RTD = 2.20 -0.12 Y -0.145 R* -0.045 + 0.92 
TD_ 
(1.4) (0.8) (3.3) (3.1) (21.4) p 
R2= . 977 x2 11.1 10 
/... continued. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
In this chapter the direct influence of inflation 
expectations on the demand for both Ml and time deposits 
is examined for the post-CCC 1970's. 
7.1 The theoretical case and the existinq empirical 
evidence 
If money is regarded as a substitute for both other 
financial and real assets in the overall asset portfolio, 
then we must include an explanatory variable which measures 
the opportunity cost of holding money in terms of goods. 
The expected rate of inflation can be used to measure the 
relevant rate of return on goods: if inflation is expected 
to increase sharply then we would expect the public to 
economise on money-holdings, in particular non-interest 
bearing money, since money is a- wasting asset. 
Which rate of inflation should be used? For house- 
holds an aggregate price index covering consumer durables 
seems most appropriate, while for companies an aggregate 
price index covering stocks and capital equipment might be 
best: percentage changes in these indices would then be the 
relevant measures of inflation. 
In my work I have used a measure of inflation based 
on the general retail price index. It is a rate which 
is 
well-publicised by the media and therefore likely to be 
influential in practice. Also, since no split of either Ml 
or time deposit holdings between the personal and company 
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sectors is available from published sources, a single 
rate which is generally heeded seems best. 
* 
Except in conditions of hyperinflation as defined 
by Cagan (25), which are not relevant to UK experiencep 
most of the existing empirical evidence suggests that 
inflation expectations have no significant direct influence 
on the demand for money. However, besides the studies 
of Boughton (20) and Arango and Nadiri (3) which found a 
significant role for inflation expectations for the UK 
economy, Shapiro (120) and Melitz (91) found the variable 
influential for the US and French economies, respectively. 
Shapiro specified and estimated a dynamic model with 
a flexible lag structure (a 2nd degree Almon polynomial was 
applied to each of the explanatory variables). 
The model is as follows: 
n 
Mt a+ bi AYt_i 
i=O 
Where, 
(1) m= Narrow money 
m 
ci Lr+J di 
i=O t-i i=O p t-i 
(2) rA nominal short-term interest rate 
m, < n= Length of lags. 
The coefficient on the inflation term was signific- 
antly negative, as theory suggests it should be. However# 
with time deposits as the dependent variable the-negative 
In fact companies 'would be likely to heed movements in 
wholesale prices. 
See Friedman and Schwartz (54) p. 657 and Rowan and Miller 
(92). 
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coefficient was not obtained and inflation was not a 
significant explanatory variable. The clear suggestion 
is that substitution between money and goods in the asset 
portfolio only involves non-interest bearing money. 
Despite the weight of empirical evidence suggesting 
that expected inflation has not been a significant 
explanatory variable in times of moderate inflation it is 
nevertheless of interest to test this proposition for the 
UK economy in the post-CCC 1970's. Inflation has been both 
high and variable during this period, and in 1975 it reached 
25%! In terms of 20th century experience for the UK the 
inflation of the 1970's has been highly significant. (See 
Table 7.1). 
7.2 Models of inflation expectations 
Two models of inflation expectations are to be tested: the 
adaptive-expectations scheme and the extrapolative/regressive 
hypothesis (see models 1 and 2 below). * 
For the relevant data period 1972(l)-1978(4) the 
latter would seem theoretically sounder assuming a moving 
annual series for inflation is relevant. This series shows 
a clear upward trend over the period 1972(l)-1975(3) followed 
by several quarters in which inflation falls back, before 
levelling-out in 1977 at around 15%. Between 1977 and 1978 
there is a sharp fall in inflation which takes it down to 
single figures (see Table 7.1 overleaf). So, using this 
series for inflation an adaptive-expectations scheme would 
Two other approaches to the modelling of inflation 
expectations were mentioned in Chapter 2(Section 2.2): 
the direct survey approach and rational expectations. 
283 
TABLE 7.1 
Inflation, 1972(l)-1979(4) 
PA PQ ýA PQ 
1972(l) 8.0 1.6 1976(1) 22.5 3.6 
(2) 6.1 1.8 (2) 16.0 3.6 
(3) 6.5 1.7 (3) 13.7 2.3 
(4) 7.7 2.3 (4) 15.0 4.6 
1973(l) 7.9 1.8-- 1977(l) 16.5 5.0 
(2) 
. 
9.4 3.1 (2) 17.4 4.4 
(3) 9.2 1.6 (3) 16.5 1.6 
(4) 10.4 3.4 (4) 13.0 1.5 
1974(l) 12.7 4.0 1978(l) 9.5 1.7 
(2) 15.8 6.0 (2) 7.6 2.8 
(3) 17.0 2.5 (3) 7.9 1.7 
(4) 18.2 4.5 (4) 8.1 1.7 
1975(l) 20.3 6.0 1979(l) 9.8 3.1 
(2) 24.3 9.5 (2) 11.4 3.7 
(3) 26.5 4.3 (3) 16.5 6.7 
(4) 25.3 3.5 (4) 17.2 2.8 
-A P Moving annual percentage changes in 
the R. P. I. 
ýQ Quarterly percentage changes in the 
R. P. I. 
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progressively under-predict inflation over the first half 
of the period, and would be likely to over-predict inflation 
over the second half. In contrast, the extrapolative/ 
regressive expectations hypothesis is suited to situations 
in which there is a trend rise or fall in inflation. The 
following example demonstrates the weakness of the adaptive- 
expectations scheme during a period of time in which there 
is a trend rise in inflation followed by a trend fall: 
Period PE PE PE _P -1 -1 
1 10 10 10 0 
2 11 10 10.50 -1 
3 12 10.50 11.25 -1.5 
4 13 11.25 12.12 -1.75 
5 14 12.12 13.10 -1.88 
6 15 13.10 14.01 -1.90 
7 14 14.10 14.04' 0.10 
8 13 14.04 13.52 1.04 
9 12 13.52 12.76 1.52 
10 11 12.76 11.88 1.76 
11 10 11.88 10.94 1.88 
12 9 10.94 9.97 1.94 
Notes 
1. PE series generated from the adaptive-expectations 
scheme (see model 1 below) under the assumption that 
g= 0*5* 
2. PE represents the inflation expected for the following t 
period - i. e. period t+1. For period 1 it is 
assumed that inflation has been correctly anticipated. 
3. PE figures are shown correct to 2 decimal places. 
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ýE 
1-P represents the error made 
in anticipating 
inflation and this series clearly demonstrates that during 
the first six periods when inflation is rising slowly and 
steadily, it is progressively under-anticipated. During 
the period 1972(l)-1975(3) there was a steep trend rise in 
inflation and following the adaptive-expectations scheme it 
is clear that the errors would not only increase, but also 
reach a significant size; this seems unreasonable. 
From period 7-12 when inflation falls steadily it is 
over-anticipated and as can be seen from the above figures 
the size of the error again increases. 
Sop the adaptive-expectations scheme does not appear 
to be particularly well-suited to our inflation experience 
in the 1970's. 
The above argument only applies if a moving annual. 
series is used for inflation; an alternative measure would 
be a quarter-on-quarter series which shows more up-and-down 
variation and is considerably more volatile. It seems 
unlikely that the public would pay too much attention to a 
single quarter's inflation in forming their views about 
future inflation, but despite this the series is used as 
an alternative measure in the empirical work. 
Despite the suggestion that adaptive-expectations 
are inappropriate, the model is still testedv along with the 
extrapolative/regressive expectations hypothesiss for the 
relevant data period. 
For the extrapolative/regressive model to be supported 
it is necessary that the parameter g in the equation below 
is significantly different from zero: 
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pE =p+g (p ttt t-1 
pE = Inflation anticipated over period t+l. t Expectation formed in period t. 
Properties of the model 
if (1) g=0 then 
(2) g -: C 0 then 
(3) g>0 then 
-E 
E<P 
if 
-E p>ý if 
-E p> if 
.E if P< P- 
If g is small and not significantly different from 
zero, then actual inflation will best reflect inflation 
expectations. If g is significantly less than zero then 
the hypothesis of, extrapolative expectations is contradicted 
since expected inflation will be lower than actual inflation 
during periods when inflation is rising, and higher than 
actual inflation during periods when inflation is failing. 
Such a result is in agreement with the adaptive-expectations 
outcome although it does not necessarily reflect this 
particular scheme. Finally, if g is significantly greater 
than zero then the hypothesis of extrapolative expectations 
is supported. 
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Model 1: Demand for Money Equation combined with an 
Adaptive Expectations Scheme for Inflation 
M* = AY 
blpb2R b3pEb4 M* = Desired money-holdings 
m M* )x M-1 M-1 
PE 
ýE 
Partial adjustment 
Adaptive expectations 
Substituting for M* in (1) we have, 
m (AY 
blpb2R b3pEb4 )X 
M-1 M-1 /1% 
Therefore, 
x Xb4 1A 
m ', ýXyXbjpXb2Rýb3PEý M- 1u 
which can be expressed in log-linear form as follows: 
XA + Xb 1 Y+ 
Xb 
2p + 
ýb 
3R+ 
Xb 
4 
ýE + (, _X 
From the log-linear version of equation (2) above we have, 
pE = gý + (, _g) 
fE , 9ý D= Delay or lag operator 
Therefore P 
Substituting for pE in equation (3 ) above we have, 
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gXb 4a 
M= XA + ýbY + 
Xb2p 
+ 
ýb 
3R+ (1-(1-9)D p 
(1-x) M-1 
(1-(l-g)D) M= gý A+ 
Xb 
1Y -(l-g)X b1 Y-1 + 
Xb2P 
-(1-9)Xb2p-l 
ýb 
3R- (1-9) 
Xb3 R_ 1+ gXb 4+ 
(1-x )M- 
-('-g)('-X )M-2 +u -(l-g)u_l 
Therefore M= gX A+ XbjY -(l-g) 
Xb 
1 Y- 1 +Xb 2p -(l-g)Xb 2P-1 
Xb 
3R -(1-9) 
Xb 
3 R_l + 9X b4ý+B 1-g)+(i- 
XIM- 
1 
-('-g) (1- )M-2 +u -(l-g)u_l 
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Model 2: Demand for Money Equation combined with an 
Extrapolative/regressive Model of Inflation 
Expectations 
blpb2 b3-Eb4 M* AY RP M* = Desired money-holdings 
m M* M-1 M-1 
pE = p( T;, 
p 
1) 
g 
Partial adjustment 
Extrapolative/reqressive 
expectations hypothesis 
Substituting for M* in (1) we have, 
m (AY 
b, 
p 
b2R b3pEb4 ýv 
M-1 M- N 
Thereforep 
M= (AY 
b lp b2R b3pEb4 )Xm 
'-x 
-1 
m AýyXblpXb2RXb3pEXb4M'-X v 
-i 
Substituting for pE in (2) we have, 
m= AýYX"P 
Xb2R Xb3 Fp( 
pP )9 
Xb4 
mv 
Or, 
(3) M A\yXblpXb2R 
Xb3p Xb4(-r Xb 
49Ml-Xv 
P-1 1 
(3) above can be expressed in log-linear form as followsl 
M XA + Xb 1Y + 
Xb 
2P + 
Xb 
3Rt 
Xb 
4 
0 Xb 
4g -rp + (. l-x) M-1 P-1 
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Dividing equation (3) through by price we get# 
m AXYXblpXb2-lRXb3pXb4 (p) 
Xb4g 
MlA T= P-1 -1 
Since P-1 = P-X P(X -1) = P-X P-(l-'X) = 
PA 
P(1-A 
we can express the above equation as follows: 
M AXY 
XblpXb2P-XR Xb3ýXb4 
(P) 
Xb 
49 ( 
M-1 
Y; P-1 p 
Collecting price terms gives, 
m AýyXbjpX(b2-1) 
Xb3ýXb4 
)Xb4g (L-1 
i-X 
TRp)v 
Now if the long-run price elasticity is constrained to 
equal unity then b2 =1 and the price term in the above 
equation disappears leaving, 
(4) A\Y 
Xb 
1R 
Xb3ýXb4('Tt b49 
(Mp 
l-X 
P-1 
(4) above can be expressed in log-linear form as follows, 
ýA +Äb Y+ Äb R+ Xb -1 1 4ý + 
Äb 
4g (, 
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7.3 Results - M1 
As argued above the extrapolative/regressive hypothesis 
of inflation expectations in the 1970's seems theoretically 
sounder than the adaptive expectations scheme. 
The empirical work establishes that the latter model 
should be rejected whereas the former conveniently collapses 
to a case in which just the lagged inflation ratep as 
measured by the retail price index, enters the Ml equation. 
This variable enters with the expected negative sign and 
contributes significantly to the explanation of variation 
in Ml. 
So, although there is doubt at the theoretical level 
as to whether anticipated inflation is an important 
determinant of Mls the empirical work suggests that it is. 
In particular, the inclusion of the lagged inflation rate 
results in a much faster speed of adjustment following an 
initial disturbances while the estimated coefficients are 
quite well-determined and have the appropriate signs and 
magnitudes. 
Another interesting point is that when an inflation 
variable is included in the demand for money function, the 
hypothesis of random residuals can be strongly accepted. 
This finding contrasts strongly with those equations which 
do not include such a variable; in several of these the 
hypothesis of random residuals cannot be accepted and even 
when it can, it can only just be accepted at the 5% signif- 
icance level. It would therefore appear that serial 
correlation which is present in those equations which exclude 
inflation as an explanatory variable, is specifically due to 
the omission of such a variable. 
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Finally, the role of inflation expectations is 
also examined in Ml equations where the long-run price 
elasticity is constrained to its theoretically expected 
value of unity. These equations proved to be inferior 
to those in which the restriction was not applied, which 
is not surprising in view of the consistent results for 
the freely estimated price elasticity which point to its 
value lying between 0.88 and 0.93. 
7.3.1 Results for the adaptive-expectations case 
The equations were estimated over the data period 1972(1)- 
1978(4) and each of the variables are expressed in natural 
logarithms. Just two equations were run using alternative 
interest rates: the short-term bond rate and the rate on 
3-month local authority deposits. 
(1) Mi = -1.29 + 0.05Y + 0.49Y + 0.61P -0 25P_, (0.5) (0.2) (2.0) -' (2.1) (0: 7) 
-0 07R 
s-0 04R s -0.01ý + 0.38M1_ +0 22 Ml_ 
(1: 4) B (0: 7 ) B-1. (0.3) (1.6) 1 (1: 0) 2 
2= 
10.2 x2=2.68 R2=0.9964 10 1 
Ml -0.67 -0.0lY + 0.49Y- + 0.51P -0.17P (0.3) (0.1) (2.1) (1.9) (0.5) 
-0 03RLA -0 04R LA- - 0. Olý + 0.30M1_1 (1: 5) 1 (0.5) (1.3) 
0.28M1 2 (1.3) - 
X2 10.5 x2=1.1 R2=0.9967 110 1 
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The entry of several lagged variables in the equations 
has created multicollinearity difficulties which have 
given rise to some poorly determined coefficients. In 
both equations inflation enters with the expected sign, 
but the size of the coefficient is negligible and the 
standard error considerably larger than the coefficient. 
Quite clearly, it is rather pointless trying to unscramble 
estimates of the structural parameters (see Model 1 above). 
While a first difference transformation of the data 
should considerably ease the multicollinearity problems, 
it is doubtful as to whether this is an appropriate 
procedure in-view of the fact that for both estimated 
equations abovey the hypothesis of random residuals (x 
2 
10 
can be quite confidently accepted. Also, estimates of p 
are reasonably low and insignificant as indicated by x2 1 
tests. For these reasons a first difference model has not 
been estimated. 
Some of the difficulties posed by multicollinearity 
0 
can be overcome by restricting the long-run price elasticity 
to the theoretically plausible value of unity. ' However, 
this is a restriction which should be specifically tested 
before imposition. Results from equations in which 
inflation was not included as an explanatory variable 
suggest that the long-run price elasticity is around 0.90 
for the relevant data period. 
7.3.2 Results for the extrapolative/reqre 
exnectations case 
The complete set of results, in which several different 
interest rates were tried, are listed in Appendix 1A. 
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Four different rates were used -RS, R and R (see B" RLA CD BU 
Appendix 2 for variable definitions). As RS perf ormed best B 
only the equations in which this rate was specified are 
considered in the main text. All variables are expressed 
in natural logarithms, in Table 7.2 (overleaf), and the 
estimation period is 1972(l)-1978(4). 
By examining equations (l)-(3) we can see if (a) 
1ý inflation has any significant explanatory power and (b) 
whether the extrapolative/regressive hypothesis of 
inflation expectations is supported. 
Comparing equations (1) and (2) we see that the 
effect of additionally including the rate of inflation# as 
measured by the moving annual percentage changes in the 
R. P. I., is to substantially alter the estimated equation. 
Firstly, the short-run income and price elasticities 
are larger in equation (2) and the speed of adjustment is 
faster. When inflation is included as an explanatory 
variable adjustment of Mi following an initial disturbance 
takes around six months, whereas equation (1) which excludes 
inflation suggests that the public take considerably longer 
than this to fully adjust; almost a year. There is no real 
reason to suppose a particularly long adjustment lag in 
practice, so an adjustment period of six months or less 
-would seem more plausible. Short adjustment lags are 
suggested in the work of Hamburger (60) and my own results 
I are in broad agreement with his with respect to the dynamics. 
Equation (3) additionally includes a change in inflation 
variable and is the estimating equation derived from the 
partial adjustment model of M1 combined with an extrapolative/ 
regressive hypothesis for 
inflation expectations. 
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Although the Lý variable does enter with a t- 
statistic greater than 1p its entry in the equation does 
not have much influence on the other coefficients, as 
close inspection of equations (2) and (3) reveals. only 
the size of the interest rate coefficient shows any real 
change. Alsop inspection of (3) 
B 
reveals that the estimated 
coefficientsp save for the interest rate variable and L 
itself, are very similart so that whether a quarter-on- 
quarter or moving annual measure of inflation is used makes 
little difference in practice. The fact that Ný does not 
interfere with estimates of other coefficients indicates 
that the series tends to move independently of the other 
explanatory variables, a point which the correlation matrix, 
shown in Table 7.3p makes clear. 
There are some grounds for preferring equation (3) 
A 
to equation (2). The additional inclusion of LpA means 
that we can more strongly reject the hypothesis of lst order 
serial correlation, and accept more positively the hypothesis 
of random residuals; the x2 statistics show this. Further- 
more, since the results for quarter-on-quarter and moving 
annual measures of inflation are quite close, we can focus 
on just the latter measure. In'fact the latter is preferable 
on purely statistical grounds since when using the quarter- 
on-quarter series, which is considerably more volatiles the 
hypothesis of random residuals cannot be confidently accepted. 
Both equations (2) and (3) are preferred to equation 
(1) since the hypothesis of random residuals is rejected for 
(1) and there is evidence that lst order serial correlation 
is a nuisance. Since these problems largely disappear when 
inflation is included as an explanatory variable it could be 
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said that the serial correlation present in (1) was 
specifically due to the omission of an important explan- 
atory variable - i. e. inflation expectations. 
'So, it would appear that the inclusion of an 
inflation variable in the demand for money function is 
preferable to a specification which excludes it on two. 
scores: realistically faster adjustment to equilibrium 
and the absence of any significant serial correlation in 
the residuals. In fact, as the results shown in Appendix 
IA make clear, in every case in which inflation is omitted 
as an explanatory variable, the speed of adjustment is 
slower and serial correlation is something of a problem. 
Those equations in which inflation does enter all indicate 
reasonably quick adjustment and serial correlation in the 
residuals is much less of a problem. 
Equations (4) and (5), above, do not include an 
interest rate variable; in addition to the income and price 
variables only an inflation measure is included. The effect 
of this is to suggest an even faster speed of adjustment 
combined with stronger evidence of no serial correlation in 
the residuals. The coefficients are reasonably well- 
determined, save for the income coefficient, and all are of 
sensible magnitude with the expected signs. 
This is a slightly worrying result since it suggests 
that the inclusion of any interest rate variable in the 
demand for Ml equation results in greater serial correlation 
in the residuals and lengthens the estimated adjustment lag. 
This applies no-matter which interest variable is used as 
the results listed in Appendix 1A make clear. Since many 
interest rates are controlled to some extent it is possible 
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that they do not adequately reflect the opportunity cost 
of holding Ml! If this is the case then unless it is 
possible to find a rate which is freely determined by 
market forcesp (possibly the euro-dollar rate in London) 
inflation may well represent the optimal opportunity cost 
measure. 
Possible grounds for rejecting such an idea are: 
(1) Theory strongly suggests that interest rates are 
important in the demand for money equation whether 
money is narrowly or broadly defined. 
(2) The ex-post forecasting performance of those 
equations which include inflation but exclude 
interest rates is relatively weak as Appendix 1B 
shows. For each quarter of 1979 Ml is under- 
predicted, while those equations which include 
both an inflation variable and the rate on short- 
term government bonds yield + and - errors which 
tend to be smaller. 
The above analysis suggests that specification (3) 
A 
is the preferred cases despite the fact that its ex-post 
forecasting performance for 1979 is marginally inferior to 
that of equation (1) which excludes an inflation variable 
(see Appendix 1B). 
Equation (3) A is derived from a partial adjustment 
model combined with an extrapolative/regressive hypothesis 
concerning inflation expectations (see Model 2 above). 
It is now necessary to consider the parameters of 
this model and the estimated coefficients more closely. 
Since the coefficient on Lý is positive this suggests that 
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for any given current level of inflation, the greater the 
recent increase in inflation then the greater will be the 
holdings of Ml. Now this plainly contradicts the assump- 
tion of extrapolative expectations (the positive coefficient 
supporting regressive expectations) since when inflation 
starts to rise the publicf on average, are assumed to 
anticipate higher rates of inflation in subsequent time 
periods, and vice-versa. So. on grounds of inflation and 
changes in inflation alone, Ml should fall back. (It will, 
of course, rise because of the direct price effect, but on 
the assumption that the price elasticity is unity, real 
money-holdings would fall back). 
Now f rom equation (2) in the model we have, 
pE 
p Extrapolative/regressive 
expectations hypothesis 
Therefore, 
ýE 
b4= 
pb4(-r' )b4g 
P-1 
(Note - 
pEN is the term which enters the 
equation for desired money demand; 
see Model 2) 
In logs, 
bb4ýb4 
Or, 
b4 PE =b4P+b 4g 
" 
Now from equation (3) 
A Xb 
4= -0.031 
Xb 
4g 'ý 0.036 
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Therefore, 
Xb 
4g 
Äb 4 
Therefore: 
0.036 
=_1.16 
-0.031 
= -1.16 
Since g is close to -1.0 and not significantly different 
from this figure accept the restriction. 
Therefore, 
b4 PE =b4P-b4 (P-p- 1) 
b4 pE =b4ý-b4ý+b4 ý-l 
4 
ýE =b41 
Therefore: 
So, the estimated equation for the data period 1972(1)- 
1978(4) suggests that inflation expectations can be captured 
by the lagged inflation rate. Thisp in turns suggests that 
the public only pay attention to recent rates of inflation. 
Furthermore, since the current rate of inflation will only be 
known to the public after a lag, it is to be expected that the 
rate of inflation lagged one quarter will provide a better 
measure of inflation expectations. An important advantage of 
this specification is that it leaves us with an equation which 
is relatively easy to estimate. 
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The revised Ml demand model is as follows: 
Ml =XA + Xb 1Y+ 
Xb 
2P+ 
Xb 
3R+ 
Xb 
4 
ýE +(l_>, ) Ml_l 
= 
Therefore., 
Ml =XA + Xb 1Y+ 
Xb 
2P+ 
Xb 
3R+ 
Xb 
4 
ýA 
1 +(i-X) mi-i 
So, re-estimating equation (3) 
A, Table 7.2, in the above 
form we get a new equation: 
(6) Ml = 1.74 + 0.33Y + 0.46P -0 07RS -0 03ý_, +0 50M1_ 
(0.9) (1.5) (3.3) (2: 7 B (1: 7) (3: 1) 
x2 14.3 x2=1.91 R2=0.99535 10 1 
The equation is virtually identical to (3) 
A 
with 
respect to size of income, price and interest rate coeffic- 
ients and speed of adjustment to equilibrium, which is six 
months. As Appendix 1B shows, the forecasting performances 
of the two equations are virtually identical. This is not 
true when equation (6) is compared with equation (2) in 
Table 7.2 as can be seen again from Appendix 1B. (6) provides 
marginally better forecasts and the coefficients are better 
determined. On specification grounds, (6) is obviously 
preferable to (3) 
A 
since the restriction on g has been shown 
to hold. Alsop 1 degree of freedom is saved since 
P_l has 
replaced 
ý and Lý in the Ml equation. 
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7.3.3 Results - long-run price elasticity constrained to 
take its theoretically expected value of unit 
The final estimating equation is derived from Model 2 (see 
above). once again, all the variables are expressed in 
natural logarithms and the estimation period is 1972(1)- 
1978(4). 
The following five equations are similar to thoýe 
run for the unconstrained price case in which an extra- 
polative/regressive hypothesis was entertained for inflation 
expectations. 
(1) M' = 1.01 + 0.14Y -0 07R 
s+0.77 Ml-1 
p (0.8) (1.2) (2: 9) B (12.6) p 
x2 20.9 x2=3.72 R2=0.897 lo =1 
1 (2) n- = 2.10 + 0.09Y -0 06RS -0.014ý + 0.71 
Ml-' 
p (1.0) (0-7) : 9) B (0.7) - (6.2) 
p 
x2 18.2 x23.22 R2=0.899 10 1 
1 (3) n- = 1.98 + 0.16Y -0 08RS -0.02ý + 0.05 + 0.65 
Ml-' 
p (1.0) (1.1) (2: 4 )B (1.0) (1.4) (5.5) p 
x2 13.8 x2=2.12 R2=0.908 10 1 
(4) Ml = 4.65 -0.06Y -0.04ý + 0.015 Aý + 0.60 
Mi- 1 p (2.5) (0.5) (2.1) (0.5) (4.7) P 
x29.1 X2 = 0.75 R2=0.884 10 1 
(5) ill = 2.74 + 0.11Y -0 06R 
s-0.03ý + 0.63 
Ml-1 
p (1.6) (0.9) '(2: 5 )B (1.4) -1 (5.6) P 
22 
x 10 = 
14.2 x1=2.12 R2=0.9052 
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As has previously been pointed out, estimates of 
the long-run price elasticity range from 0.88-0.93 in a 
wide variety of possible single equation specifications. 
This strongly suggests that while the long-run price 
elasticity may be close to 1, it is less than this value 
for the relevant data period. 
When the long-run price elasticity is constrained 
to unity the income and interest rate coefficients are less 
well-determined; this is indicated by the smaller t-values. 
Equation (4) above) which excludes an interest rate variable, 
actually yields a negative coefficient on the income 
variable! A reduced number of explanatory variables ought 
to reduce problems of multicollinearity and yield more 
significant coefficients if the reduction is empirically 
valid (in this case, if the imposed restriction actually 
holds). Since the individual coefficients are definitely 
less well-determined when the price restriction is imposed 
this suggests that the restriction is indeed invalid! 
Despite the inferiority of these results to those in 
which the price elasticity was freely determined, they are 
similar in some important respects. Serial correlation is 
a serious problem only in equation (1) which excludes any 
measure of inflation and comparing equations (2) and (5) we 
see that lagged inflation has more explanatory power than 
current period inflation. A faster speed of adjustment is 
suggested in those equations including inflation and a 
faster adjustment is associated with lessserial correlation. 
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7.3.4 Results for the pre-CCC era 
The Ml results reported in Appendix 1A show the short-term 
bond rate to be preferable to other interest rates in the 
post-CCC period. In view of this only the results for 
equations including the bond rate are to be considered in 
this section. 
As Table 7.4 overleaf clearly shows, the period 
1964(1)-1970(4) is not characterised by high inflation 
and, furthermore, there is no evidence of either a trend 
rise or fall in the inflation rate. As measured by the 
moving annual percentage changes in the R. P. I. the rate is 
mostly under 5%, and from mid-1968 to the end of 1970 it is 
in the 5-7% range, showing little variation. 
Owing to the low level of inflation and the lack of 
significant variation in the series, it is not expected to 
be an important explanatory variable. Furthermore, since 
the variation in the series is not especially striking the 
adaptive-expectations approach is not adopted. As this 
approach creates quite serious estimation problems, espec- 
ially multicollinearity, with all the lagged explanatory 
variables appearing in the final equations no useful results 
are likely to emerge from it in any case. Instead, note is 
taken of the results for the post-CCC era which established 
that neither an adaptive-expectations nor an extrapolative 
expectations hypothesi! ý was really in order for describing 
anticipated inflation. They showed that the rate of 
inflation lagged one quarter was the appropriate measure. 
Allowing for an information lag before the 'current' rate 
of annual inflation is known to the publicp this seems 
perfectly reasonable; especially so, considering the 
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TABLE 7.4 
Inflation, 1964(l)-1970(4) 
0 pA 
1964(l) 1.5 1968(1) 2.8 
(2) 2.7 (2) 4.5 
(3) 4.5 (3) 5.6 
(4) 4.5 (4) 5.6 
1965(l) 4.4 1969(l) 6.4 
(2) 5.3 (2) 5.4 
(3) 4.8 (3) 5.1 
(4) 4.5 (4) 5.1 
1966(l) 4.5 1970(l) 5.0 
(2) 3.7 (2) 5.8 
(3) 3.7 (3) 6.8 
(4) 3.9 (4) 7.6 
1967(l) 3.6 
(2) 2.7 
(3) 1.5 
(4) 2.2 
pA = Moving annual rate of inflation 
based on the R. P. I. 
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steadiness of the rate in the 1960's. 
Table 7.5 overleaf shows the results for two equa- 
tions: one including and the other excluding an-inflation 
variable. Casual inspection of the results shows that 
inflation has only a negligible and highly insignificant 
influence on Ml. Since the estimated structural parameters 
of the two equations almost coincide and the correlation 
matrix (see Table 7.6) shows that P_l is not highly correl- 
ated with any of the other explanatory variables, 
* it follows 
from the-results that inflation is a redundant variable in 
the demand for M1 function in the pre-CCC era, 1964(l)- 
1970(4). 
Since it has been established that inflation expect- 
ations do influence Ml over the data period 1972(1)-1978(4), 
but have no explanatory power in the pre-CCC era, we should 
expect the results for the entire period, 1964(l)-1978(4), 
to indicate that the variable cannot be ignored! 
** 
7.4 Results - TD 
As the results reported in Chapter 6 indicated that a simple 
transactions demand model performed bestv only this specific- 
ation is considered. An extrapolative/regressive model of 
inflation expectations was tested, and since for Ml the 
lagged rate of inflation was the empirically preferred measure 
of anticipated inflation, it was directly entered in some of 
the equations. The models were tested over the post-CCC data 
S0 
The highest simple correlation is between RB and P-1 at 
0.53. 
Inflation results for the entire period were listed in 
Chapter 5 and showed that providing a dummy shift variable 
was entered for post-CCC quarters, inflation entered 
significantly and with the correct sign. 
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period, 1972(l)-1978(4). The results are presented in 
Table 7.7 overleaf. 
Since the restriction that the own-rate and 
alternative asset rate coefficients are of equal magnitude 
and opposite sign was shown to hold for specifications not 
including an inflation variable, it was initially assumed 
that the restriction would continue to hold after the 
introduction of an inflation expectations variable. This 
assumption was then re-tested and again shown to hold. It 
was therefore accepted as a valid restriction. 
The only equation which suggests that inflation 
expectations have a significant role to play in the demand 
for time deposits equation is equation 3 in which pE was 
assumed to be generated from an extrapolative expectations 
scheme. However, despite the significance of &P which has 
the correct a priori sign suggesting that the demand for 
time deposits falls as the rate of change of inflation 
increases, the equation is generally rather poorly-determined. 
comparing this equation with either equation 1 or 4 it can 
be seen that the latter are well-determined with income 
coefficients which are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
It can be seen from equation 4 that the lagged 
inflation rate has no role to play in the demand for time 
deposits equation: the coefficient on P-1 is of negligible 
size and the parameter estimates virtually coincide with 
those in equation 1 which excludes inflation expectations 
from the specification. 
Finallyo equation 2 which includes the actual current 
rate of inflation is also inferior to equation 1 as only 
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the interest rate term and the lagged money stock enter 
significantly. 
Equation 1 is also preferred to equations 2 and 3 
with respect to lag adjustment. The latter equations 
suggest that adjustment to a disturbance is only fully 
completed after 2-2 yearsp whereas equation 1, which 
excludes an inflation variablep suggests a period of only 
l-'2 years which seems more reasonable. 
7.5 Concluding comments 
Neither the extrapolative nor the adaptive expectations 
models of inflation expectations were empirically supported 
for Ml. However, the former model conveniently collapsed to 
a case where expected inflation could be adequately captured 
by the lagged inflation rate. For time deposits the lagged 
rate had no explanatory power, and although the extrapolative 
expectations hypothesis was empirically supported the equation 
was generally poorly-determined. In contrast, time deposit 
equations which excluded inflation were better-determined 
with more plausible parameter estimates. 
During the entire data period 1964(l)-1978(4), the 
only evidence of a significant role for inflation expect- 
ations was for the Ml money definition in the post-CCC era, 
1972(1)-1978(4). In this particular period the inclusion of 
the lagged inflation rate changed the structure significantly. 
In particular, adjustment lags were shorter and more plausiblev 
and the serial correlation problem disappeared. Furthermore, 
the ex-post forecasting performance for 1979 was good. 
Before the 1970's inflation was relatively low and 
showed little variationo so that the finding of trivial 
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influence on money demand is hardly surprising for the 
pre-CCC period. Howevers the finding of no influence on 
time deposits in the post-CCC era cannot be so readily 
explained. On the basis of the empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter it is necessary to argue that 
while goods may be important substitutes for Ml in the 
overall asset portfolio, they are not important substitutes 
for interest, 7bearing bank deposits. 
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APPENDIX 1B 
Ex-post Forecasting Performance of Ml Equations 
1979-Percentage Forecast Errors 
Equation 2 1 2 3 4 x 4 
1. Y P RS Ml- B1 -0.5 1.9 0.3 -1.6 1.43 
2. y P RLA Ml-l -0.6 -0.1 -1.4 -2.8 2.32 
3. Y P R BU Ml-l -1.7 - -1.2 -3.7 3.80 
4. Y P RS Ml-1 B -1.7 0.8 -1.1 -2.8 2.84 
5. Y P RS Lý Ml-l B 
(a) -0.6 2.0 0.8 -2.4 2.38 
(b) -1.5 -0.4 -2.1 -3.7 5.04 
6. y P RLA Ml-1 (a) -1.4 -0.3 -1.5 -3.7 4.10 
(b) -1.6 -1.4 -2.9 -4.5 8.49 
7. Y P R BU Mi-1 -2.0 - -1.4 -4.1 4.67 
8. Y P R BU Ml-l -2.4 -0.4 -2.2 -3.8 5.23 
9. y P RS Ml- 1B1 -0.7 1.8 0.6 -2.5 2.45 
10. Y P P-1 R LA Ml- 1 -0.8 - -0.9 -3.4 3.12 
11. Y P ý_, R BU Ml- 1 1.8 0.2 -1.0 -4.3 4.77 
12. Y P RB RLA Ml-1 -. 0.6 0.7 -0.7 -2.4 1.54 
. 13. Y P RBR CD Ml- 1 -0.5 1.2 -0.3 -2.1 1.31 
14. Y P Ml-l 0.2 0.8 -0.5 -0.4 0.16 
15. Y P RS Ml 0.7 3.1 2.1 -1.3 3.43 _ B1 
Mi 16. Y RS 
Ml-1 
0.4 2.1 0.8 -1.0 1.46 P B P 
Mi 17. Y RS 
Ml-l 
0.3 1.8 0.5 -1.2 1.13 P B P 
Mi 18. Y 
S R 0 
Ml-1 
P &P - 1.1 2.9 2.3 -1.2 3.78 P B P 
Mi 19 y 
Ml-1 
0.8 1.1 0.4 -0.9 0.55 P . P 
Mi 20 Y RS Ml-l 0.7 2.2 1.3 -1.3 2.15 P . B = 
21. Y P Ml-l -1.9 -0.3 -1.9 -2.9 3.24 
22 Y P &ý Ml -1.8 -0.2 -1.7 -2.8 2.82 . -l 
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APPENDIX 1B (continued) 
1979 - Percentage 
Forecast Errors Equation 2 
4 
Adaptive Expectations pE 
SS 23* YY1PP1RBRBP Mi 1 ml 2 -0.9 1.9 3.1 -1.8 4.29 
0 24. YY1PP1 RLAPIA 
1P 
Ml-l mi 2 -1.9 -0.6 -0.1 -3.8 5.18 
Notes 
Inflation is measured by taking moving annual percentage 
changes in the retail price index unless otherwise 
indicated. Equations listed in the same order as in 
Appendix 1A (Results for all estimated Ml equations). 
(a) - Moving annual series for 
(b) - Quarterly series for 
P 
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APPENDIX 2 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Name 
Ml Narrow money - notes and coin 
in circulation and private 
sector sight deposits. 
TD Private sector time deposits + 
bank deposits held by the public 
sector. 
GDP at 1975 marXet prices. 
P GDP deflator. 
RS Rate of interest on short-term B government bonds. 
R 8 Rate on 
3-month local authority L, , deposits. 
R Rate on 3-month certificates of CD deposit. 
R BU Rate on 
building society deposits 
(pre-tax basis) 
ýA Moving annual percentage changes 
in the R. P. I. 
PQ Quarter-on-quarter percentage 
changes in the R. P. I. 
týO OQ Change in inflation 
Note 
Money stock, income and price data is 
seasonally adjusted. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE PERSONAL SECTOR'S DEMAND FOR MONEY 
8.0 Introductory remarks 
Results are presented for the post-CCC data period only. 
Both fixed and flexible lag models were estimated in un- 
transformed linear and log-linear form, but since the log- 
linear results were better in almost every case only these 
are reported below. 
Personal disposable income is the selected income 
constraint variable. and the PDI deflator represents the 
price variable. While these variables are appropriate for 
households, which hold a large proportion of personal sector 
bank deposits, it is recognized that they are not partic- 
ularly suitable for the unincorporated businesses which are 
included in the definition of the personal sector. Ideally, 
I would have liked to examine just household money demand, 
but a break-down of the personal sector's money-holdings 
into household and business components is not available from 
official sources. 
It is assumed that short-tprm capital-certain 
financial assets are the most important substitutes for 
money, and since building society deposits are clearly the 
most important non-money liquid assets, 
* both in terms of 
size of holdings and variation in holdings, held by the 
personal sector# the building society deposit rate is 
selected as the relevant opportunity cost variable. The 
* See Table 10.3 in 'Financial Statistics, 
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relevant own-rate on money is taken to be the rate on 
'retail* bank deposits - i. e. 7-day deposits with the 
London Clearing Banks. Since this own-rate on money is 
a pre-tax rate whereas the building society deposit rate 
is a post-tax rate, the latter is grossed-up so that both 
rates are expressed on a consistent pre-tax basis. 
In my early work the own-rate on money and the 
building society deposit rate were entered separately in 
the money demand function, but this gave rise to poorly- 
determined coefficients. This was due to the 'stickiness' 
of the rates, particularly the rate on building society 
deposits. It was found that the differential between the 
two rates, which showed more variation over the period, 
gave better results. Since it was possible to accept the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the two rates were of 
equal size and opposite sign in the unconstrained cases, 
this restriction (implicit in specifying the differential 
rate as the relevant argument) was accepted as being valid. 
As such, only the results for 'specifications which include 
the differential rate are reported in this chapter. 
The government bond rate is included in some of the 
equations to pick-up a possible speculative component in 
the personal sector's demand for money. Although most 
households are unlikely to hold capital-risky assets, 
* 
some of the high-income households together with the un- 
incorporated businesses included in the sector may well be 
It is assumed that most households will earn insufficient 
income to make speculation in stocks and shares either 
worthwhile or possible. The brokerage costs are likely 
to be high in relation to the size of the expected capital 
gains in many of the cases where speculation is possible. 
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important holders of medium and long-term government 
securities, as well as other capital-risky financial 
assets. 
It is possible that inflation expectations have 
a significant influence on personal sector money-holdings. 
To test whether this has been the case in the 1970's, 
inflation variables based on both the wholesale and retail 
price indices have been included in some of the equations. 
Indeed, because of the high correlation between the rate 
of inflation and the bond ratep it is possible that the 
latter adequately captures the influence of inflation 
expectations. 
8.1 Fixed laq modelresults 
Tables 8.1 - 8.3, below, show the results for three 
different fixed lag models: partial adjustment, adaptive- 
expectations, and a model which combines these two hypo- 
theses. 
8.1.1 Partial adjustment model results 
These are presented in Table 8.1 with the estimated long-run 
elasticities for each equation shown in Table 8.2. 
Three different treatments of the price elasticity 
are covered in these results. Equations I and 2 give freely 
determined estimates, while short-run homogeneity is imposed 
in 3 and 4, and long-run homogeneity in equations 5 and 6. 
Clearly, the hypothesis of long-run homogeneity in 
prices, in the context of a simple partial adjustment model, 
A full description of these models together with the 
derivation of the final estimating equations was given 
in chapter 3s Section 3.3. 
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MP 
must be rejected as the coefficients on 
>1---'*P' 
exceed unity 
thus causing the model to collapse. 
In the short-run homogeneity case only equation. 4 
which includes the bond rate, gives reasonable results. The 
coefficient on PDI in equation 3 has the wrong sign, although 
it is not significantly different from zero. All the 
coefficients in equation 4 have the correct signs and are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The 
only real weakness lies in the size of the coefficient on 
the lagged money variable; at 0.94 this suggests that adjust- 
ment to a change in one of'the explanatory variables takes 
just over four years which seems an unreasonably long periodl 
From Table 8.2 it can be seen that the implied long-run income 
elasticity is rather high at 4.2 and so too is the bond rate 
elasticity at -2.30. So, in the context of equations 3 and 
4 the assumption of short-run homogeneity in prices must be 
rejected. 
This leaves equations 1 and 2 in which the price 
elasticities are freely estimated. Both equations are 
acceptable although the price elasticities are rather weakly 
determined. Table 8.2 shows that the long-run price elast- 
icity of personal sector money-holdings is only in the region 
of 0.31 As the correlation matrix, Table 8.7v shows that the 
simple correlation between income and prices is only 0.55, 
the poorly determined price coefficients cannot be attributed 
to high correlation between these variables. However# the 
correlation matrix does indicate a correlation of 0.94 
between lagged money-holdings and prices but this figure is 
still decidedly lower than the multiple correlation coeffic- 
ients for equations 1 and 2 in Table 8.1; . 997 and . 998, 
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respectively. In view of this, multicollinearity problems 
cannot be regarded as severe. 
As for the other variables the estimated coefficients 
are certainly plausible and all are significant at the 5% 
level. From Table 8.2 we can see that the estimated long- 
run elasticities are very similar for the two equations with 
the income elasticity being close to 2, suggesting that money 
is a luxury good for the personal sector. The long-run 
elasticity with respect to the bond rate in equation 2 equals 
-0.90; a result which suggests that there is a significant 
speculative component in the personal sector's demand for 
money. The speed of adjustment is approximately two years, 
with a marginally faster adjustment suggested by equation 2 
which additionally includes the bond rate variable. Since 
the interest differential between the short rates is not 
entered in log form the coefficients cannot be interpreted 
as elasticities.. In Appendix A the interest elasticity is 
evaluated at the means of the variables, where it is shown 
that a coefficient of -0.0.014 corresponds to a short-run 
elasticity Of -0.031 and a long-run elasticity of -0.378. 
The results presented in Table 8.1 do not include a 
case in which inflation expectations play a role. However, 
it is clearly possible that the government bond rate, which 
has been included in some of the equations to pick-up a 
possible speculative component in money demand, serves as a 
proxy variable for inflation expectations. Certainly# there 
is a strong, positive correlation between movements in the 
bond rate and the annual rate of inflation as measured by 
changes in the retail price index. It is clear, howdver, 
whatever its role, that the goverment bond rate is a 
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significant explanatory variable in each of the alternative 
price cases - i. e. equations 2,4 and 6 in Table 8.1. 
8.1.2 Adaptive-expectations and combined model results 
Table 8.3 shows the results for conventional adaptive- 
expectations and combined models in which expected rather 
than actual income is the relevant constraint variable. 
It can be seen that with lagged explanatory variables 
entering these models multicollinearity becomes a consid- 
erable problem with several of the coefficients being rather 
poorly-determined and not significantly different from zero. 
Attempts to include the government bond rate as an additional 
explanatory variable only made the multicollinearity problems 
worse. As a result of all this it was not felt to be 
worthwhile to include estimates of the long-run elasticities 
for either model. 
Alternative hypotheses were entertained regarding 
expectations; for example an extrapolative hypothesis was 
applied to the price variable. Howeverg in every case the 
results were poorly-determined and therefore are not reported 
here - 
8.1.3 Some further fixed laq model results 
A variety of results are shown in Table 8.4: equation 1 
includes a proxy variable for inflation expectations*, 
equations 2-4 include lagged interest rate terms, and 
equations 5 and 6 allow the price elasticity of real money 
balances to be freely-determined. Short-run homogeneity in 
The moving annual percentage changes in the wholesale 
prices index (NO. 's the variable used as a proxy for 
inflation expectations. 
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prices is imposed in equations 1-4 inclusive. 
Although kH enters equation 1 significantly and with 
the theoretically correct negatively signed coefficient# the 
equation is generally poor a*nd the suggested speed of adjust- 
ment is implausibly slow (see Table 8.5). 
The lagged interest rate coefficients do not enter 
significantly in equations 3 and 4, and again as Table 8.5 
clearly showso the suggested speed of adjustment is rather 
slow. 
In contrastv equations 5 and 6, in which the price 
elasticity of real money balances is freely determined* give 
highly plausible results. However, it can be seen from 
equation 5 that the bond rate becomes an insignificant 
explanatory variable when the assumption of homogeneity in 
prices is dropped. The higher 
2 
of 0.985 associated with 
equation 6 is another clear sign that the bond rate should 
be excluded from the specification. Focussing on equation 6, 
which can be interpreted as a transactions demand model, it 
can be seen that each of the estimated coefficients are 
certainly plausible and highly significant. Furthermore, 
as shown in Table 8.5, the derived long-run elasticities and 
speed of adjustment seem reasonable. A long-run income 
elasticity Of 1.4 indicates that money should be regarded as 
a luxury goodp While a price elasticity of -0.135 suggests 
that there is a degree of money-illusion with the level of 
real money balances failing back as prices rise. A direct 
estimate of the differential interest rate elasticity 
is not 
7 does not enter in log form. However, given, since RBU-R6R 
This corresponds to a price elasticity of 0.865 for 
nominal money-holdings. 
329 
Ul I-j 
z 
0 
rt 
(D 
1 11 
: 00 1 
F-j FJH Hý-j HH HH HP cc 
;ý ý-- ý) ; 1o 
6 ý., zo ;Q ýn zn 
CTI %-ý %D %-ý C) %-ý Ul %-ý Ln ýj 0) -j -j 0 m W 
0) Lo C) w C: ) t1i 0 tj 0 N) 0 00 
tf ; ;ý; ; ; ý-j Z., ) ;j zo j j j D (D 1,0 00 Ln .. 00) L; l 
EA 
-. 30 N0 
(D ý zn ; 
C) 
Ln ko 
t"I 00 C) N C) 0 00 C H CD -30 0 -., C: ) ý C) ýý I-J ý0 H C) Ul Ul 
I-j 
0 
C: ) 
0 
(D 
10 
rt No c) o Ul 0 
ý) ;ý ýD ý- zo ; 
_- 
LJ %-ý ý-' ý4 ý Li 
Ul OD -j 0) 
N) 0 tj 0 N) 0 N0 
C) CD . L)l . . 00 . 
0 tD 9 kD ko -0 
t-i Li 0) (3) co 4 ko W CC) stl its 00 
zo 
zo zo Zo zo zo 
co CC) co co CC) co Ul ý-j 0 N) I-j 0 
m ýi OD 
tli cn Co Pt-, 
- 
ýd 
to cn 
+ 
0 :: r I'd 
:: 1 0h 
(D F-J P- 
(D 
OJ LO (D 
" En H 
rt pi 
ti El) 
0 ri) 
00 
ýi 
PJ (D 
91 91 
m0 
ft Z 
ft ýI 
0 p- 
ft 
A) 1-< 
ýi (D 
La mi 
(D rn 
0 
10 
fi W 
H- (D 
00 
(D 
C0 
ý31 ýI 
H- (D 
l< 
1 
Jj u 
(7) Ul 4 t-i I-j 
its 
4 
;j zn 
H 
Ul 
ý, 15 
! ýi ,Z' 
- Z., , >> 
kN 
w .4 
&< t1i N) Or 
5 (D 
0 
(D (D (D (D 
0) 4) jai 0 
Ef) W Ea En fn 
lid 
, IV t7l 
td 
t" 
(D t7l 
td El) En CD 
Di El) 
9110 
(D 
El) L 
90 
(D I-h 
:: s 
rt 
(D 
(D 
in 
rt, 
i 
331 
the coefficient of -0.006 corresponds to a long-run interest 
elasticity of approximately -0.10 when evaluated at the 
means of the variables. Finally, a speed of adjustment of 
eleven months is the most plausible of all the estimates. 
Overall, equation 6 gives the best results and 
equation 3 in Table 8.4 is best for thosespecifications 
which impose either short-run or long-run homogeneity in 
prices. It was decided that these two equations should be 
tested for both 1 st and higher order serial correlation in 
view of the fact that they represent the best fixed lag 
model results under different price assumptions. 
A. RMP f PDI, P, R -R 
7, RMP_l Equation 6 Table 8.4 BU OR 
et0 516e t-l (3: 1) Significant lst order 
2et0 604e t-l (3: 1) 
-0 153e t-2 (0: 8) 
serial 
correlation 
but no 
3e=0 674e t (3: 3) t-l 
-0 148e 
(0: 6) t-2 
-0 l0e 
(0: 5) t-3 
evidence of 
higher order 
serial 
4et=0 60et_l : -0 040e t-2 -0 l5e t-3 -0 013e t-4 
correlation 
(2 7) (0: 2) (0: 6) (0: 1) 
After adjusting for 1 st order serial correlation we have 
the following equation: 
RMP' = -0.342 + 0.37PDII -0.005R/- -O'. 146P + 0.71RMP/ (0.7) (4.0) (2.4) (5.2) (12.2) -1 
RMP 
/= 
RMP -0.516RMP_l etc. 
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B. RMP f PDI, R -R (R RRs BU OR' BU- OR B' RMP-1 
Equation 3 Table 8.4 
et =0 362et_l 
(2: 0) 
2et=0 370et_l 
(1: 8) 
3et=0 365e t-1 (1: 8) 
4e =(0: 362e t1 7) t-1 
Significant 
lst order 
-0.020e t-2 (0.1) 
serial 
correlation 
but no 
" 0.029e t-2 (0.1) 
-0 125e t-3 (0: 6) 
evidence of 
higher order 
serial 
" 0.027e t-2 -0 113e -0 028e t-3 t4 
correlation 
(0.1) (0: 1) (0: 5) 
After adjusting for lst order serial correlation 'we have the 
following equation: 
RMP/ -1.125 + 0.29PDI/ -0.012R/ -0.003R 
(1.3) (2.5) (4.7) (1.1) 
-0.140R 
S/ 
+0 93RMP 
/ 
(4.1) B (1;. 7) -1 
RMP/ = RMP -0.362RMP -1 
etc. 
It can be seen in each of the above cases that despite 
transforming the variables to take account of significant 1 
st 
order serial correlation in the residuals, the results are 
still broadly similar to those shown in Table 8.4 where the 
serial correlation problem is ignored. 
8.1.4 Evidence from the GIVE programme 
For more comprehensive evidence as to the appropriate fixed 
lag model and the importance of lagged explanatory variables 
in the function# a general single equation auto-regressive 
model was estimated in which the hypothesis of 1 
st order serial 
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correlation was entertained. 
* 
Now despite the fact that equation 6, in Table 8.4 
above, gave the most plausible set of results there is some 
doubt concerning the assumption of quick adjustment of money 
demand to a change in prices. Certainlys such an assumption 
was not empirically borne out for any of the aggregate money 
definitions - e. g. Ml and JtM3 - although it is possible that 
over-aggregation by type of holder obscures the results here. 
Equations 1 and 2 in Table 8.1 were plausible except 
for the estimated long-run price elasticity, which at approx- 
imately 0.30 might well be viewed as being unreasonably low. 
In these equations nominal money-holdings was the dependent 
variable with money demand adjusting slowly to a change in 
prices. A possible reason for preferring these equations 
to equation 6 in Table 8.4 is that they are both derived from 
simple partial adjustment modelss whereas the latter equation 
cannot be formally derived from any of the standard fixed lag 
models. 
The autoregressive model can be represented in three 
different ways: the Structural Form, the Unrestricted 
Transformation Function, and the Restricted Transformation 
Function. The GIVE programme estimates each of these and on 
the strength of certain test-statistics built into the 
programme allows us to choose the appropriate representation 
of the model. If the basic Structural Form is accepted then 
the partial adjustment hypothesis is in order assuming that 
the Structural Form agrees with either equations 1 or 2 in 
Since tests for the 'best equations' showed that there 
was no evidence of any significant higher order serial 
correlation, the hypothesis of lst order serial correl- 
ation would seem in order. See Section 8.1.3 above. 
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Table 8.1. If the hypothesis of 1 st order serial correlation 
is accepted as a valid autoregressive restriction then the 
RTF can be accepted, in which case it becomes difficult to 
discriminate between the different fixed lag models such as 
partial adjustment and adaptive-expectations. Finally, if 
both the SF and RTF are rejected in favour of the URTF this 
indicates that a higher order lag structure is required and 
that the SF needs revising and re-testing. 
The model postulated is as follows: - 
MP =A+b1 PDI +b2P+b3 (R BU -R OR +c1D1+C2D2 
+C3D3+ 
XMP-l 
+ut 
ut= pUt_l + et 
Ee t0 
Ee 
22 
t aett: 
Ee te t-1 0 
Notes 
Ignoring equation 2 the form of the model agrees 
with equation 1, Table 8.1, which was derived from 
a partial adjustment model. 
2. Only the simplest specification, suitable for a 
model of household money demand, is entertained - 
i. e. only the interest rates on capital-certain 
liquid assets, are allowed to enter the demand 
function# along with the income and price variables. 
335 
3. One weakness of the equations presented in 
previous sections of this chapter is that no 
allowance was made for seasonal variation; 
personal sector money-holding data only being 
available in seasonally unadjusted form. The 
results presented below indicate that thpre 
is a significant positive seasonal influence 
in the third quarter. 
Structural Form - results 
MP -1.49 + 0.28PDI + 0.04P -0.0053(R -R 
7+0.002D1 
(1.3) (2.1) (1.3) (2.4) BU OR (0.3) 
+ 0.004D2 + 0.016D3 + 0.88MP 
(0.5) (1.95) (19.7) -1 
x2= 18.6 R2= . 996 10 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors - 1979 
234x2 4 
0.7 -0.5 -3.1 -1.8 6.2 
Chow test F4,20 ý 1.05 
Restricted Transformation Equation - results 
MP' = -0.96 + 0.22PDI'+ 0.04P' -0.0035(R -R 
7+O. OOlDl 
(1.0) (1.6) (0.6) (1.5) BU OR (0.2) 
+ 0.004D2 + 0.013D3 + 0.88MP 
(0.7) (1.9) (10.7) 
0.46 x2 
(1.7) 10 
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Percentaqe_Forecast Errors - 1979 
x2 4 
-0.8 -1.8 -3.2 -1.3 8.2 
Chow test - F4,19 ý 1.12 
Notes 
since ax2 test showed that the autoregressive 
restriction was valid - calc. x2=3.9 - results 3 
for the Unrestricted Transformation Equation are 
not presented. 
2. All variables except for the interest rate 
differential, R -R 
7, 
are in natural logarithms. BU OR 
TABLE 8.6 
Long-run Elasticities and Speed of Adjustment 
PDI P (R -R 
7 Adjustment 
BU OR Speed 
SF 2.33 0.33 -0.125 
+2 years 
RTE 1.83 0.33 -0.094 
+2 years 
+ Elasticities evaluated at variable means. 
337 
The validity of the autoregressive restriction 
suggests that a higher order lag structure does not exist, 
and that subject to serial correlation the postulated model 
is a suitable description of personal sector money demand. 
The RTF results show that although the absolute size 
of the 1 st order serial correlation coefficient is quite 
large at 0.46, it is not significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. The x2 statistic reveals that the RTE 10 
residuals can be confidently accepted as random and that 
higher order serial correlation is not a problem (this 
finding agrees with the results for 1 st to 4 th order cases 
which were presented in Section 8.1.3). Since p is not 
significantly different from zero the SF results can be 
accepted. Although ax2 of 18.6 indicates that there is 10 
a serial correlation problem the fact that ist order serial 
correlation is not statistically significant at the 5% level 
and that the SF and RTE results are not too different means 
that we can ignore the findings for the SF random correlo- 
gram test. Table 8.6*shows the long-run elasticities for 
the SF and the RTE cases, and it can be seen that the estim- 
ates are in broad agreementp with an income elasticity of 
approximately 2, an interest elasticity of approximately 
-0.10 and a rather low price elasticity of only 0.33. There 
is agreement regarding the speed of adjustment which is just 
over two years. 
Since the SF results can be accepted and p is not 
significantly different from zero, a partial adjustment 
explanation of the dynamics seems to be in order. 
Finallyp the forecasting performance of the model is 
reasonably good over 1979. The worst error occurs in the 
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third quarter with personal sector money-holdings under- 
2 
predicted by 3.1%. Calculated x4 = 6.2 indicating that the 
post-sample parameter stability test is passed when the data 
period is extended to include 1979 observations. The Chow 
test confirms that the model is structurally stable. 
* 
8.2 Flexible laq model results 
Despite experimenting with the shape of the lag path imposed 
on each of the explanatory variables and the length of the 
lag, no really satisfactory results emerged. In fact in 
order to get any reasonable results at all using a polynomial 
distributed lag technique (orthogonal polynomials) the 
intercept has to be suppressed before estimation. Equations 
with a constant term yielded theoretically incorrect lag 
paths - i. e. the influence of both income and prices becoming 
stronger as lag length increased. 
It was felt that a low degree polynomial would be 
suitable for the lag profiles associated with each of the 
explanatory variables. 
" In fact the degree of the poly- 
nomial was varied between 1 and 4 (starting with the high 
figure) and the finite lag lengths were varied up to twelve 
quarters with no end-point restrictions being imposed. 
The best results obtained are shown in Tables 8.8, 
8.9 and 8.10. Tables 8.8 and 8.9 cover money demand equations 
which include inflation as an explanatory variablet alternat- 
ively measured by the moving annual percentage changes in the 
Although the RTE passes the parameter stability test and 
is structurally stable, the hypothesis of structural 
stability can be more comfortably accepted for the SF. 
**A lag path with more than two turning points was consid- 
ered very unlikely for any of the explanatory variables. 
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retail and wholesale (output) price indices. In Table 8.10 
inflation is excluded from the equation. 
In each case the optimum polynomial - degrees were 
indeed low; they were never higher than 2 and for the income 
and price variables there was little to choose between a 
linear or geometrically declining lag path. 
Inspection of Tables 8.8 and 8.9 reveals that the 
R. P. I. measure of inflation has more explanatory power than 
the wholesale price index. The latter measure was psed as 
a proxy for expected inflation since it signals rises in 
inflation, as measured by the R. P. I., one or two quarters 
in advance. Howeverp the R. P. I. based measure is clearly 
empirically preferred. For both estimation periods the 
expected negative elasticity occursp whereas in the case of 
wholesale prices none of the individual coefficients are 
significant and the expected negative elasticity only occurs 
for the 1972(l)-1978(4) estimation period. Comparing the 
results in Table 8.8 with those in Table 8.10p where 
inflation is excluded from the demand for money specification, 
it can be seen that the lag profile for income is much the 
same, a longer lag is associated with the price variable when 
inflation is excluded but the lag profile on interest rates 
is less believable. The long-run income and price elastic- 
ities for these two cases are in close agreement# a finding 
which is not too surprising in view of the relatively small 
size of the long-run inflation elasticity shown in Table 8.8. 
Over the 1972(l)-1978(4) estimation period the g2 statistic 
is the same for the two equations and there is some evidence 
from the size of the D. W. statistics to suggest that serial 
correlation is less of a problem in the specification which 
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excludes inflation. 
From the t-statistics on the lag coefficients in 
Table 8.8 it can be seen that both the income and interest 
rate variables are highly significant. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the lag coefficients on price and inflation 
which are weakly determined; a finding which agrees with 
the fixed lag model results. Againt in Table 8.10, with the 
inflation variable excluded, income and the rate of interest 
are highly significant explanatory variabless whereas the 
price coefficients are poorly determined. 
It is interesting that the empirically preferred lag 
structure for the money demand model in Table 8.10 is in 
broad agreement with the lag structure implied by the fixed 
lag partial adjustment model: the length of lag associated 
with each of the explanatory variables is the same. 
* The 
suggestion is that adjustment to any source of disturbance 
will be completed within a two-year period. 
It is noticeable in each of the tables that the 
estimated equations are sensitive to a change in the data 
period. For examples when the data period is extended to 
include 1979 observations, in Table 8.8, the lag profile on 
PDI changes quite dramatically with the size of the 
coefficients increasing as the lag gets longerl In facts as 
indicated by the Chow test, each of the three equations are 
structurally unstable when the data period is extended to 
cover 1979. Howeverp inspection of the 
1Z2 and D. W. statistics 
in each of the three tables reveals the following: - 
However, the lag profile associated with the interest rate 
variable is extremely flat in Table 8.10 and the high t- 
statistics throughout suggest that adjustment to a change 
in interest rates may not be fully completed within 2 years. 
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1. li2 is lower in every case for the larger sample. 
2. While the D. W. statistic reveals that serial 
correlation is not an important problem for the 
1972(l)-1978(4) data period there is evidence of 
significant serial correlation for the 1972(l)- 
1979(4) period. 
Now in a relatively small sample of data, as we have 
here,, the addition of just four new observations can upset 
the results if they are atypical. While certain events in 
1979, such as the active use of MLR as an instrument of 
monetary control, a tax-switching policy in favour of 
indirect taxes, and the removal of exchange controls,, might 
easily have upset the demand for money equation, the evidence 
from the fixed lag models did not suggest a structural break- 
down. 
one interesting feature of the results is the value 
of the long-run income elasticity, which is always very 
close to unity. However, this result specifically depends 
on the suppression of the constant term; when the equation 
in Table 8.8 was re-estimated after including a constant the 
estimated long-run income elasticity was'approximately 2.3, 
a result which is in broad agreement with the fixed lag model 
results. 
The estimated long-run interest coefficients are 
higher in the flexible lag models than they are in the fixed 
lag models. This, however, is only true for. cases in which 
Neither did the flexible lag models when a constant term 
appeared in the equations. 
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the intercept is suppressed and the long-run income 
elasticity relatively low at around unity. When a constant 
term is included in the equation then the long-run interest 
coefficient is close to the estimate suggested by the best 
fixed lag model results. 
* 
8.3 Concluding comments 
The fixed I ag model results were generally superior to the 
flexible lag model results with the partial adjustment 
hypothesis providing an acceptable explanation of the 
dynamics. 
Equations in which the price elasticity was freely 
determined gave more plausible results than cases in 'which 
either short-run or long-run homogeneity in prices was 
imposed. The best results were obtained when money demand 
was specified in real terms: a simple transactions model 
performed best with no significant explanatory role found 
for inflation expectations or the government bond rate. 
Each of the estimated coefficients were significant, had the 
correct signs and were of plausible magnitude. The long-run 
income and interest elasticities were 1.4 and -0.10* 
respectively, while the price elasticity of real money 
balances was -0.135. 
** The speed of adjustment was approx- 
imately 1 year. The only trouble with this particular 
specification is that it cannot be formally derived from 
any of the conventional fixed lag models. 
Unfortunately the flexible lag model results cannot be 
accepted when a constant term is included. 
Eguivalent to a price elasticity of 0.865 for nominal 
personal sector money balances. 
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For the partial adjustment model applied to nominal 
money balances the long-run income, price and interest rate 
elasticities were 2.33,0.33 and -0.1250 respectively# and 
the speed of adjustment was 2 years. The price elasticity 
seems unreasonably low at 0.33, although the income and 
interest rate elasticities are plausible enough. and well- 
determined. Furthermore, when the data period was extended 
to cover 1979 the model proved structurally stable. The 
hypothesis of parameter stability could be accepted and the 
Chow test for structural stability was passed. 
One result which clearly emerges ior the personal 
sector is that money is a luxury good with the income 
velocity of money falling as income rises (at unchanged 
rates of interest). Another important result is that the 
price elasticity of personal sector nominal money-holdings 
is less than unity, although both its actual value and the 
associated adjustment period are in some doubt. There is 
some evidence from the best single equation results for ZM3 
to suppose that the 2 year adjustment lag, suggested in the 
nominal money equation, is more likely to be correct than the 
1 year lag suggested in the equation for the personal sector's 
demand for real money balances. The suggested adjustment lag 
in the LM3 equation is 17 months, and given that company 
sector money demand adjustments are likely to be completed 
relatively quickly* - i. e. within 6 months - an estimate of 
2 years for the personal sector would seem to be in order. 
For companies the size of returns to be made from port- 
folio adjustments will typically trivialise the brokerage 
costs involved thus encouraging quick adjustment following 
a change in relative interest rates. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Personal Sector's Elasticity of Demand for Bank Deposits 
with respect to the Differential Interest Rate$ RBU -Rý R* 
. 
ions Since the best MP results were obtained from equat 
in which the interest differential entered directly, the 
coefficient on the variable cannot be interpreted as an 
elasticity. The elasticity will in fact vary with the size 
of the interest differential and the level of personal sector 
money-holdings. We can evaluate the value of the elasticity 
at the means of the variables as followst 
Log RMP 
R 9.8309 
R BU -ROR 
2.243 
Now consider the impact of a percentage point increase in 
R BU -R OR working 
from equation 3 in Table 8.4 - i. e. the best 
mp equation in which the price elasticity is restricted to 
unity. Since the estimated coefficient on RBU-R OR =-0.014 
it follows that log RMP will fall by this amount following 
the increase. 
(LM) Actual 
Natural log money-holdings 
9.8309 18600 
0.0140 
9.8169 18340 
260 
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So, following a rise in R BU -R OR from 2.243 to 3.243, 
MP would fall by &260m which is a percentage change of -1.4%. 
A percentage point rise in the interest differential causes 
a fall in personal sector money-holdings of 1.4%o. 
For the interest elasticity we require the percentage 
change in RBU-R OR from 
the mean value. . 
3.243 - 2.243 x 100 = 44.6%. 2.243 
Therefore the differential interest rate elasticity of MP as 
evaluated at the means of the variables is, 
-1 . 40P/o ý -0.031. 44.6% Short-run elasticity 
The lonq-run elasticity = -0.378. (See equation 3, Table 8.4) 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE COMPANY SECTOR'S DEMAND FOR MONEY 
9.0 Introductory remarks 
Although only short adjustment lags were anticipated for 
company money-holdings both fixed and flexible lag models 
were estimated. Since the former confirmed the expectation 
of quick adjustment and the latter failed to yield any 
sensible results for the post-CCC data period, only the 
fixed lag model results are presented in this chapter. In 
fact some of the estimated equations suggest that full 
adjustment to a market disturbance is completed within a 
single quarter. 
In Section 9.1 the money demand behaviour of 'all 
industrial and commercial companies, is investigated. In 
the first instance a simple transactions demand model is 
considered in which no account is taken of possible domestic 
or international speculative influences. Factor cost GDP and 
the index of industrial production were used as alternative 
measures of the constraint variable, 
* * 
with the GDP deflator 
and the wholesale price index for manufactures alternatively 
representing the price variable. For the own-rate of interest 
on money variable the rate on 3-month certificates of deposit 
was useds and the rate on local authority temporary debt was 
In the circumstances the investigation of a monthly model 
would have been an interesting exercise. Unfortunatelyo 
however) neither the Bank of England nor the Department of 
Industry were able to supply a long series of monthly data 
for company sector money-holdings. 
It is recognized that the selected constraint variables 
are not entirely appropriate, but there is no reliable 
information on company sector wealth. 
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the preferred alternative asset rate. The local authority 
rate performed better than government bond rates, and, in 
terms of both volume of and variation in asset-holdings, 
local authority debt has been important in company portfolios 
over the relevant post-CCC data period. 
since other liquid assets are likely to be close 
substitutes for money with portfolio adjustment lags being 
reasonably shorts the estimation of a dis-aggregated liquid 
assets demand model, for all industrial and commercial 
companies, was thought to be a worthwhile exercise. In 
section 9.1.3 a simple empirical model is estimated after 
first considering, in the context of a company sector liquid 
asset portfolio model, some of the theoretical properties of 
asset portfolio models. Before estimation some of the less 
important assets were dropped from the model, and there was 
some aggregation of assets. Multicollinearity problems made 
this aggregation and elimination of assets a necessary task. 
Since money and local authority temporary debt are very close 
substitutes for companies, the holdings of these were 
aggregated and called 'money'. Only two other assets were 
then included in the model, building society deposits and 
tax instruments: variation in asset-holdings was significant 
for each of these variables over at least part, of the post- 
ccC data period. 
Since money dominates the liquid assets portfolio, 
total holdings of selected liquid assetst LAp were not 
specified-as the constraint variable in the model. Sop owing 
to the lack of any reliable data on the total asset-holdings 
it is, in any case, too narrow a measure of company sector 
financial wealth. 
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of companies, an income variable, GDP at current factor 
cost prices, was used. In addition to the relevant liquid 
asset rates of interest, the government long-term bond rate 
(212%*consol rate) was included in the model in order to 
capture any significant speculative component in the company 
sector's demand for liquid assets. 
Results for an aggregate company sector liquid assets 
demand model are reported in section 9.1.4. The constraint 
variable is nominal factor cost GDPp the own-rate of interest 
variable is variously specified, and the long-term government 
bond rate and the exchange rate (in some of the equations) 
are included as additional explanatory variables. 
" 
In section 9.2 the demand for money behaviour of large 
industrial and commercial companies is investigated. Data 
from the Department of Industry's survey of company liquidity 
is used: the survey covers a large# but non-random, sample 
of approximately 220 large companies. The income and price 
variables are represented by real factor cost GDP and the 
GDP deflator, respectively. While it is true that the money- 
holding behaviour of large companies need not be very closely 
associated with changes in domestic output, GDP is used in 
the absence of any comprehensive information on the total 
asset holdings of survey companies. For the own-rate on money 
Three alternative approaches to measuring a composite 
asset rate were discussed in section 3.1 of Chapter 3: 
(1) the best rate in each quarter on the various liquid 
assets held by companies; (2) a weighted average of 
the various relevant liquid asset rates; and (3) the 
rate on the most important asset in the portfolio in 
terms of both size of and variation in asset-holdings. 
These variables should pick-up any significant domestic 
or foreign speculative influences on company sector 
liquid asset demand. 
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variable the CD rate is specifiedv while the rates on local 
authority debt and long-term government bonds are specified 
as alternative measures of the substitute asset yield. The 
exchange ratep as measured by the 'sterling effective exchange 
rate,, is included in some of the equations. 
Equations are estimated for both aggregate survey 
company money-holdings and for holdings dis-aggregated by 
type of holder - i. e. manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
companies. Although it is recognized that the index of 
industrial production and the wholesale price index for 
manufactures. are more appropriate explanatory variables for 
manufacturing companies, for reasons of consistency and ease 
of comparison with other results, factor cost GDP and its 
associated deflator are actually specified. 
9.1 All industrial and commercial companies 
In the first instance a simple transactions model was enter- 
tained with GDP at factor cost and the index of industrial 
production used as alternative income measures. The model 
was estimated in both untransformed linear and log-linear 
form. 
In the work presented in this chapter on company sector 
money-holdings and other liquid assetso none of the equations 
include a variable to account for inflation expectations. 
However, uncertainty regarding (1) the appropriate choice of 
variable to successfully capture its influence, and (2) the 
significance of its rolev provides some justification for 
omitting the variable from the empirical models. A further 
justification might be the suggestion that anticipated 
inflation is not a significant explanatory variable in either 
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the aggregate demand for time deposits or LM3 equations. 
* 
In any case if inflation is important and has a systematic 
influence on company sector money-holdings this would cause 
a serial correlation problem in the context of a simple 
transactions demand model. If the RTE representation of the 
model is valid and yields plausible parameter estimates then 
this suggests that the model is in order and that inflation 
may have its main impact on adjustment speed without being 
of direct significance. 
In an appendix to this chapter some of the ways in 
which anticipated inflation might be expected to influence 
the money-holding behaviour of companies are considered. 
For, the purposes of the empirical work holdings of 
M3 deposits by industrial and commercial companies represent 
company sector money demand. There are at least three - 
reasons for defining the variable in this way: 
This is the closest one can get from published 
sources to a homogeneous group of companies. 
" 
No sectoral split is available from the Bank 
of England with regard to notes and coins in 
circulation; hence only company holdings of 
bank deposits can be considered. 
(3) it has to be M3 deposits as opposed to ZM3 
or M1 deposits because the information is 
unavailable for the latter two series. 
*** 
Although over-aggregation by type of holder and varying 
money demand adjustment speeds by the personal and 
company sectors could have led to this result, 
With the notable exception of DOI survey data on samples 
of (1) manufacturing and (2) non-manufacturing firms. 
Information on company holdings of LM3 deposits is in 
fact available from 1975(2) onwards. 
355 
So,, the definition of company money involves an 
unavoidable degree of aggregation in two dimensions: 
(1) By holder since the aggregate deposits held by 
industrial and commercial companies cannot be 
broken down into (a) industrial and (b) commercial 
company-holdings. 
(2) By type of money deposit held, since the definition 
employed, M3 deposits, comprises sight deposits, 
some of which pay interest$ and time deposits which 
are various and include certificates of deposit. 
* 
Before presenting the results it should be noted that 
over the data period 1972(l)-1979(4) there have been breaks 
in the series for company sector money-holdings. The only 
serious break occurs in 1975(2) when deposits were split into 
sterling and foreign currency deposits, The two estimates 
shown for this quarter differ by over Z300 million with the 
larger figure being the new estimate. Initially a dummy 
variable was specified in the empirical model, taking the 
value 0 before 1975(2) and 1 from this quarter onwards, to 
account for the break in the series. Howeverv since the 
dummy variable proved insignificant it was dropped from the 
empirical model and the break in the series was regarded as 
being of little consequence. 
In factp company holdings of CD's can be separated from 
the other time deposits helds but no attempt is made to 
do this here, since these should be extremely close 
substitutes for most other forms of wholesale bank 
deposits which cannot be easily isolated in the company 
sector's portfolio of liquid assets. 
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9.1.1 Results - 1972(1)-1978(4): A simple transactions 
demand model 
Untransformed linear model 
Structural Form 
MC = -4,888 + 49.0 IND + 41 0P WH + 72 3R CD (2.1) (2: 5) (1: 5) 
-496.3 Dl -800.3 D2 -567.3 D3 + 0.51 MC_j 
(1.7) (3.3) (2.3). (2.7) 
x2 33.7 R2= . 988 DW = 1.43 lo 
(2) MC = -7,634 + 0.33 Y+ 35.8 P+ 793 8R CD -736 9R LA (3.9) (3.7) (3.3) -(2: 6) (2.9) 
+ 0.56 MC_, 
(4.9) 
x25.66 R2 989 DW = 2.08 10 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors - 1979 
2342 X4 
9.8 2.7 13.0 11.0 57.3 
5.6 -2.7 7.3 6.8 24.36 
Both equations failed the Chow test for 
structural stability. - 
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Restricted Transformation Equation 
MC -2774 + 62.6 IND + 71 1 PWH + 125 0R CD (2.4) (2.3) (3: 0) (2. ý) 
-567.3 D1 -743.6 D2 -645.5 D3 + 0.15 MC_1 (1.9) (2.8) (3.0) (0.5) 
x2 29.7 p=0.58 10 (1.4) 
Test of validity of autoregressive restriction 
-x2=5.53 3 
(2) MC -7757 + 0.34 Y+ 34.6 P+ 814.3 RCD -759 8 RIA (3.9) (3.7) (3.0) (2.6) (2.5j 
+ 0.57 MC-1 
(4.7) 
x26.1 p= -0.06 10 (0.2) 
Test of validity of autoregressive restriction 
-x2=8.35 4 
Percentage Forecast Errors - 1979 
2342 X4 
10.1 1.4 11.9 8.1 51.45 
(2) 5.6 -2.6 7.1 7.0 23.1 
Note - since the autoregressive restriction is 
valid the results for the unrestricted 
transformation equation (URTE) are not 
shown. 
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Log-linear model 
Structural Form 
MC = -1.15 + 0.66 IN 
(1.0) (2.2) 
-0.07 Dl -0.12 
. (1.9) (3.6) 
x2 19.2 R2 1 
D+0.34 P WH + 0.08 R CD (2.4) (1.5) 
D2 -0.08 D3 + 0.61 MC-1 
(2.4) (4.3) 
. 985 DW = 1.39 
(2) MC = -6.66 + 1.01 Y+0.29 P+0.90 R CD -0 84 RLA (2.6) (3.6) (2.6) (2.1) (1: 9) 
+ 0.61 MC_, 
(5.8) 
x27.7 R2= . 985 DW = 1.82 10 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors - 1979 
2342 X4 
9.3 4.4 15.4 11.9 22.7 
(2) 5.2 -2.7 9.0 10.5 9.33 
only equation (2) passed the Chow test for 
structural stability. 
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Restricted Transformation Equation 
MC = 0.28 + 0.91 IND + 0.60 PWH +0 12 R CD (0.6) (2.5) (1.3) (2: 5) 
-0.07 Dl -0.10 D2 -0.09 D3 -0.04 MC-1 (1.9) (2.8) (3.5) (0.2) 
x2 17.1 p=0.88 10 (6.6) 
Test of validity of autoregressive restriction 
-x2=2.99 3 
(2) MC = 0.18 + 0.73 Y+0.71 P+0.57 RCD -0 46 RLA (0.3) (2.9) (3.4) (1.6) (1: 3) 
+ 0.07 MC 
(0.4) 
x2 13.3 p=0.79 10 (5.9) 
Test of validity of autoregressive restriction 
-x2=3.1 4 
Percentaqe Forecast Errors - 1979 
2342 X4 
7.1 -1.3 9.7 2.6 7.0 
(2) 1.4 -2.1 8.2 5.4 4.2 
Note - Since the autoregressive restriction is 
valid the results for the URTE are not 
shown. 
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The post-sample parameter stability tests (x 
2 
4 
covering the four quarters of 1979 reveal that the untrans- 
formed linear model is unstable for both representations 
of the model, whereas the parameters of the log-linear 
model are stable for the RTE. 
For the specification in which the index of industrial 
production represents the income variable, instability might 
be due to erroneous seasonal adjustment of the data. In the 
untransformed linear model the seasonal shifts remain constant 
in value regardless of the upward trend in the values of the 
variables. If the adjustment is proportional rather than 
constant then only the dummies in the log-linear model will 
pick-up the seasonal influences correctly. Howeverv when 
factor cost GDP was used to represent the income variable 
the seasonal dummies proved insignificant-and were therefore 
dropped from the model. Despite their exclusion the 
untransformed linear model still clearly failed the post- 
2 
sample parameter stability test: for the SF calculated x4 
24.4 and for the RTE x2= 23.1; values which are well above 4 
the critical x2 value of 9.5 (5% significance level). In 4 
contrasts the log-linear results suggested that the parameters 
of the RTE were comfortably stable, and it was just possible, 
at the 5% significance level to accept the hypothesis of 
parameter stability for the SF. 
It would appearv thenp that the parameter instability 
suggested by the untransformed linear results 
is not caused 
by incorrectly specified seasonal dummiess so that the log- 
linear specifications are to be preferred on stability grounds. 
The method of seasonal adjustment most commonly applied 
is I percentage of Itrend. 
I 
361 
. Both. classes of linear model yield sensible results 
with most of the estimated coefficients significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. The adjustment speeds 
suggested by both representations of the model are quite 
rapid;. in the case of the RTE, adjustment is particularly 
quick and is virtually completed within a single quarter. 
The SF and RTE results for the untransformed linear model 
suggest that GDP is the appropriate constraint variable. 
The random correlogram test (x 
2) 
shows that the hypothesis 10 
of random residuals is decisively rejected when the index 
of industrial production represents the income variable; 
calculated x2 is in the region of 30 which is substantially 
higher than the critical value of 18.2. In contrasts the 
hypothesis of random residuals can be comfortably accepted 
when GDP represents the constraint variable. For the log- 
linear model the hypothesis of random residuals can once 
again be accepted in the GDP cases but it must be rejected 
for the SF and can only just be accepted for the RTE when 
the index of industrial production is used. 
Since the log-linear models are clearly superior in 
terms of ex-post forecasting performance and post-sample 
parameter stability I will focus on just these. 
Both the SF results are subject to significant 
positive 1 
st order serial correlation and the RTE results 
indicate that p is very high; 0.88 and 0.79 for the index 
of industrial production and GDP casess respectively. 
* Since 
Significant 1 st order serial correlation in the residuals 
is not inconsistent with the random residuals suggested 
by the x2 test in the 'GDP equations' since the random 
correlogram test only indicates that high order serial 
correlation is not a problem. 
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ax2 test showed the autoregressive restriction to be valid, 
adjusting for lst order serial correlation is seen to be an 
empirically correct procedure, and as such the RrE is the 
appropriate representation of the model. In both the RTE 
equations the hypothesis of random residuals can be accepted 
according to the random correlogram test (x 
2 
Tests were 10 
conducted for higher order serial correlation up to the 4th 
orderv but none of the pi were significantly different from 
zero. 
Despite the size and significance of the lst order 
serial correlation coefficiento and the validity of the non- 
linear parameter restrictions, it is Still of interest to 
compare the long-run elasticities derived from the SF and 
RTE equations. The estimates are presented in Table 9.1 below 
together with the implied equilibrium adjustment speeds. 
The SF results suggest that money is a luxury good as 
far as the company sector is concerned, with estimated income 
elasticities well in excess of unity. In contrast the income 
elasticities ar e lower than unity in the RTE cases. The SF 
results suggest much higher interest elasticities and a 
slower speed of adjustment; just over two quarters as opposed 
to three months. 
It is of interest to compare these results with those 
of other researchers such as Hacche (59) and Price (112) who 
estimated de7aý#-for money equations for the company sector 
over the pr -CCC period. Their results are shown in Table 9.2. 
Al ough the variables used by the two researchers 
differp nd are different from the explanatory variables in 
my own model.. some interesting comparisons can be made. 
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TABLE 9.1 
Long-run Elasticities and Speeds of Adjustment 
yPRR Adjustment CD LA Speed 
SF (1) INDj, PWH 
RTE (2) IND.. PWH 
SF (3) Y, P 
RTE (4) Yp P 
1.69 0.87 0.21 7.7 months 
0.91 0.60 0.12 - 3 mont hs 
2.59 0.74 2.31 -2.15 7.7 months 
0.73 0.71 0.57 -0.46 3 months 
Note - In both RTE equations, (2) and (4)v the coefficient 
on the lagged money stock was very small -<0.10 - 
and highly insignificant. Therefore adjustment was 
assumed to be completed within a single quarter so 
that the impact elasticities are the equilibrium 
long-run elasticities. 
TABLE 9.2 
Company Sector Results for the Pre-CCC Period - 
Long-run Elasticities and Speeds of Adjustment 
YP RLA RL Adjustment Speed 
1 PRICE 2.77 0.41 -0.36 -Y-2 quarters 
64(1)-70(4) P-1 quarter 
R- Most of 
adjustment in 
1 quarter 
2 HACCHE 0.51 1.0 + -0.07 -0.20 4.8 months 
63(4)-71(3) 
+ Long-run price elasticity constrained to unity. 
Note - Whereas Price used an industrial output series for 
Y and wholesale prices for P,, Hacche used TFE and 
TFE prices. RLA =3 month local authority rate and 
RL = gross redemption yield on 2"2/. consols. Price 
used a flexible lag model whereas Hacche used a 
fixed lag model. 
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Firstly, adjustment speeds are certainly quick in 
both equations with an average adjustment speed of well 
under six months. Now in view of the higher and more 
variable rates of inflation during the 1970's one would 
anticipate even quicker adjustment by companies in the post- 
CCC era, so that the adjustment speeds of 3 months suggested 
by the RTE resultsp in Table 9.1 above$ seem more realistic 
than those suggested by the SF results. 
The issue regarding the size of the income elasticity 
is far from settled: Price's results suggest that money is 
a luxury good whereas Hacche's results su ggest strong 
economies of scale in money-holding. If Hacche can be 
criticised for imposing long-run homogeneity in prices, 
then it must be said that the freely estimated price elast- 
icity doesp at 0.41, seem rather low in Price's equation. 
In view of the fact that the RTE results for the post- 
cCC data period yielded the more realistic estimates for 
adjustment lags and that the empirically valid representation 
of the model was the RTEp the results for this particular 
specification are taken to correctly describe company sector 
money-holding behaviour within the context of a simple 
transactions demand model. 
Another reason for preferring the RTE to the SF log- 
linear results is the superior ex-post forecasting 
performance of the former. Although the RTE results for 
both the index of industrial production and factor cost GDP 
equations are reasonable enough and pass all the relevant 
testsp GDP is the preferred explanatory variable in view of 
(1) the hypothesis of random residuals can be more confidently 
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accepted and (2) a marginally better ex-post forecasting 
performance over 1979. 
So, accepting the log-linear RTE as the appropriate 
representation of the model v with factor cost GDP as the 
constraint variable, the following conclusions can be drawn 
from the empirical results: 
(1) There are economies of scale in company sector 
money-holding. 
(2) Since the long-run price elasticity is only 
0.71 real money-holdings have tended to fall 
with rising prices over the period. 
(3) As expecteds money-holdings are sensitive to 
changes in the own-rate on money, as measured 
by the CD rate, and the rates of interest on 
alternative liquid assets. 
(4) The speed of adjustment is very fast with full 
adjustment to any market disturbances being 
completed within a single quarter. Anticipated 
inflation has probably influenced the speed at 
which companies adjust their asset portfolios. 
In view of the fact that pq the lst order serial 
correlation coefficient, was reasonably close to and not 
significantly different from unity, a first difference model 
was entertained and estimated. As can be seen from Table 
9.3 overleaf the RTE and Ist difference results are similar. 
The weaker performance of the company money demand equations 
in which the index of industrial production is the constraint 
variable might well be due to the fact that an own-rate on 
money variable# RCDP is the only interest rate in the 
equation. Severe multicollinearity problems ruled out the 
inclusion of any alternative rates. 
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TABLE 9.3 
A Comparison of RTE and lst Difference Elasticities 
Income Price Own-rate LA rate 
1 RTE : IND 0.91 0.60 0.12 
2 DIFF : IND 1.00 0.74 0.15 
3 RTE : GDP 0.73 0.71 0.57 -0.46 
4 DIFF: GDP 0.63 0.76 0.61 -0.47 
9.1.2 An asset portfolio model for the cOmPanY sector 
This section focuses on the short-term# capital-certain 
financial assets which are held by companiesp so that wealth 
effects arising on capital risky assetsv when interest rates 
change, are not covered. 
The liquid assets held by industrial and commercial 
companies are shown in Table 9.3 of 'Financial Statistics,: 
if we exclude government securities from the model then we 
are mainly left with capital-certain assets. A set of 
behavioural equations for these liquid assets is set out 
below in loose functional form: 
(1) MC = fl (LA Y RMC RBU ROFI RTB R T, R la, 
R 1a2 
) 
(2) BU f2 (0 #0 tu to 0@ ) 
(3) OFI = f3 (' 0@ to $0 0$ ) 
(4) TB f4 of 0@ , of to 
(5) TI f5 to to 0# ei 
(6) la 1 = f6 
of of of to 
(7) la 2 = f7 0# to tu 0# 
LA = Mc + BU + OFI + TB + TI + la 1+ la 2 
For a discussion of the problems which capital-risky 
assets pose, including measurement of expected asset 
yields, uncertainty and the wealth effect see Goodhart 
(56); in particular p. 59 and p. 60. 
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Variable definitions 
MC = Bank deposits 
BU = Building society 
deposits 
OFI = Deposits with 
other f inancial 
institutions 
TB = Market treasury 
bills 
TI = Tax instruments 
la 1= Local authority temporary debt 
la2 = Local authority 
longer-term debt 
R MC = Own-rate on money 
R BU = Building society deposit rate 
LA = Total holdings of 
selected liquid 
assets excluding 
government bonds 
Y= Total sales receipts 
The explanatory variables include the interest rates 
on each of the liquid assets, a narrow measure of wealth 
covering the liquid assets included in the model and company 
sales receipts. Although wealth effects, arising from 
changing rates of interest, are absent in this dis-aggregated 
liquid assets model, income effects will arise - i. e. both 
income and substitution effects are relevant. In order to 
measure these separate effects total holdings of liquid assets 
can be split up as follows: 
LA t= LA t _ll 
-f- St 
Where St= ALAt = addition to cOmPany sector wealth, held in 
the form of liquid assetss during the current time period. 
A behavioural equation for St can then be added to the model 
as follows: 
sE f (Y.. Rij. R B) 
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Where, 
Y Total sales receipts 
0 Rates of interest on 1 liquid assets 
RE Expected returns on B 
capital risky assets. 
Setting out the model in matrix form we have: 
3 
ýt1 St yt RMC RBU R OF, R TB RT, R la R la 
-1 
L 
mc alL a ls a ly 
BU a 2L a 2S a2Y 
OFI aM a 3S a 3Y 
TB a4L a4S a4Y 
TI a5L a 5s ay 
la 1 a 6L a 6S a 6Y 
la 2 aU a 7S a 7Y 
b 11 b 12 b 13 b 14 b 15 b 16 b 17 (. 0 
b 21 b 22 b 23 b 24 b 25 b 26 b 27 
b 31 b 32 b 33 b 34 b 35 b 36 b 37 
b 41 b 42 b 43 b44 b45 b 46 b47 
b 51 b 52 b 53 b 54 b 55 b 56 b 57 
b 61 b 62 b 63 b 64 b 65 b 66 b 67 
b 71 b 72 b 73 b 74 b 75 b 76 b 77 
Certain restrictions must now be placed on the values of 
the coefficients. i 
Firstlys 
(a) = !ý aiS = 1.0 , 
4-'a iL. 
- 
But (b) a iL aiS 2R aiL / ais 
For simplicity it is assumed in the empirical work that, 
(1) The expected return on capital risky assets is 
adequately represented by the expected return 
on long-term government bonds. 
(2) The expected capital gain on bonds is zero so 
that the current yield on long-term bonds (Vf% 
consols) equals the expected return. 
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Since, 
(1) LA = MC + BU + OFI + TB + TI + la 1+ la 2 
(2) LA = LA t-1 +st 
it follows that restriction (a) must hold. 
Howeverv since there is no particular reason for 
companies to hold newly-acquired wealth in the same way 
as they hold their existing wealtht in terms of portfolio 
balances it follows that a iL need not equal aiS. For 
examples the proportion of existing wealth, LAt-,, held in 
the form of bank deposits could well differ from the 
proportion of company savings, Stv held in this form. 
* 
Now assuming we can successfully isolate the pure 
substitution effects from the income effects so that the 
matrix of bi coefficients measures substitution effects 
alone# we can impose further restrictions as follows: 
(c) =0 
This says that the sum of interest rate coefficients 
along each row of the matrix must total zero. So. if all 
rates were to rise by the same amount and total holdings of 
liquid assets remained unchanged, then since there is no 
change in interest differentials companies would have no 
incentive to adjust their portfolios. Consequentlys if the 
level of each type of liquid asset - e. g. bank deposits - 
is to remain unchanged the sum of the interest coefficients 
This mighto of course# simply be due to portfolio 
adjustment lags although the simple transactions model 
results for company sector money demand suggested 
quick adjustment. 
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across the rows must be zero. 
b 
ji 
This says that the flow of funds into asset i as 
the yield on asset j falls by a given amount should be 
exactly the same as the flow out of asset j as the yield 
on asset i rises by the same given amount, once the adjust- 
ment process is fully completed. For example, if the rate 
on building society deposits falls by 1 percentage point, 
with other rates unchanged, and as a result L50m. of funds 
are lost to the banks, companies will switch precisely the 
same amount of funds from building society deposits to bank 
deposits following a1 percentage point rise in the rate 
offered by banks (other rates unchanged). - In standard price 
theory this is known as the slutsky effect. 
Now with bb and bij =0 it immediately ii ji 
follows that I; bji 0. Sop if the Islutsky effect' holds 
then the-sum of the interest rate coefficients will be zero 
both across rows and down columns. 
The main diagonal of the sub-matrix of interest rate 
coefficients, b 11 -b 7V shows the own-rates on each of the 
assets which companies hold, and these should all be 
positively signed. The off-diagonal parameters are the 
substitute asset rate coefficients which should all be 
negatively signed. 
** From the restrictions outlined above 
* This rather suggests that for given levels of wealth 
companies will only pay attention to relative interest 
yields. Even if this is the case the rates used would 
need to be correctly measured post-tax rates. 
complementary assets are not expected and if such cases 
are found in empirical work it may well indicate 
modelling errors or incorrect data. 
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it must be the case that the sum of positive own-rate 
coefficients along the main diagonal is exactly balanced 
by the sum of negative substitute asset rate coefficients 
in off-diagonal space, when dealing with the pure 
substitution effect. 
A simple example using some figures to represent 
the interest rate coefficients is shown below. 
ExamT)le -a3 asset model 
r1-r2r3 jb 
10 -4 -6 0 
A2 -4 6 -2 0 
A3 -6 -2 80 
000 
Despite the attractions of an asset portfolio approach 
for an empirical study of the simultaneous determination of 
the company sector's demand for liquid assets, there are 
several serious difficulties in employing it. 
Firstly, with all the interest rates and other explan- 
atory variables which must be included the size of the matrix 
will be very large and many degrees of freedom will be lost 
in estimation. 
Secondly, since many of the interest rates on the 
alternative company sector liquid assets move closely 
togetherp multicollinearity problems will make it difficult 
to clearly observe how the system responds to disturbances. 
Perhaps the most serious difficulty concerns the data 
itself. The detailed balance sheet data required is not 
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fully available and some of the data which has been 
constructed is of questionable quality. 
9.1.3 Results - 1972(1)-1978(4): 
A dis-aqqregated liquid assets demand model 
In view of the above-mentioned empirical difficulties 
concerning the application of the asset portfolio model, 
as developed in the previous section, only a verysimple 
empirical model, based on company sector data taken from 
'Financial Statistics's * is considered here. 
The size of the matrix is reduced by (1) omitting 
assets where company holdings have been small and have 
shown little variation over the relevant data period and 
(2) aggregating deposits where they are known to be very 
close substitutes - i. e. where the simple correlation 
between the rates of interest on two assets is close to 
unity. This procedure should help to minimise the multi- 
collinearity problems which arise when all the relevant 
interest rate variables are included in the empirical 
model. 
The basic model is as follows: - 
(1) mC+ =a0+a1 LA t-1 +a2 ALAt + a3yt + b11RCD + b12 RBU 
+b cL1 13RTI + 
X1M + 
(2) BU =a4+a5 LA t-1 + a6 
A LA t+a 7yt +b 21 
R CD +b 22 R BU 
+ b23RTI + X2 BU-1 
The data is taken from Table 9.3: selected liquid assets 
of industrial and commercial companies. 
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(3) TI =a8+a9 LA t-1 + alo 
& LAt + alYt +b 31 R CD 
+b 32 R BU +b 33RTI + 
X3 TI_, 
LA =a+ alýYt +bw+ cR 
E 
12 41ýýA B+ 
X4 h'LA-1 
Identities 
1 LA t= LA t-1 + 
&LA 
t= mc+ + BU + TI 
Parameter restrictions 
1aI+a5+a9 
a2+a6+a 10 
b ij = 0* 
b ij =b ji 
Notes 
(1) All variables are as defined in section 9.1.2 except 
MCý Since the simple correlation between the rates 
of interest on local authority debt and certificates 
of deposit is 0.99 for the data period 1972-1979, 
bank deposits are combinbd with local authority debt 
and called money. 
mc += MC + la 1+ la 2 
(2) Since holdings of market treasury bills, TB# and 
deposits held with non-bank financial institutions 
(excluding building societies), OFI, have not been 
particularly significant in company portfolios, they 
have been dropped from the model. This achieves two 
important advantages: firstly, the size of the data 
matrix is reduced so that more degrees of freedom are 
available for estimation; and secondly, the reduced 
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number of interest rate variables in the model 
will considerably ease multicollinearity problems. 
In fact as the correlation matrix in Table 9.4 
shows, the highest simple correlation between 
interest rates is now only 0.82; this is for the 
building society deposit rate and the government 
bond rate. The correlation between R CD and R BU 
is only 0.64. 
(3) Although not shown in the model specification 
above, allowance was made for serially correlated 
residuals; in particularp lst order serial 
correlation. 
(4) Ideally the lag structure should be empirically 
determined, but the size of the data matrix is 
already large enough. In view of this a naive 
general stock adjustment hypothesis is assumed to 
apply. Since the lags are likely to be short 
with most adjustments completed within a single 
period, the issue of lag structure is not, in any 
case, especially important. 
(5) The model is assumed to be linear either in terms 
of the untransformed datat or after log trans- 
formation. Both versions are to be tested. 
In fact, in view of the number of simplifications 
which have had to be made and the very narrow measure of 
wealth being considered, further changes were made before 
estimating the above model. Since money-holdings, Mc, 
represent a large percentage of the total selected liquid 
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assets held, a highly significant relationship between the 
two variables is inevitable, and as such the wealth measure 
was dropped in favour of an income measure. Furthermoret 
although the sales and investment receipts of industrial 
and commercial companies clearly represent the most approp- 
riate income measure for empirical work, no such series can 
be obtained from published sources. As a resultp nominal 
factor cost GDP was selected. 
Dropping LA from the model means that RE the expected B9 
rate of return on bondsp must now be additionally included 
in equations (l)-(3) above. In the above model RE represented B 
the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets (equation (4)). 
Finally, equations for both Y 
CU 
and RE are added to the model B 
giving the following set of equations: 
(1) Mc+ = A, + alY 
cu + 
- 
bR 11 CD +bR+ 12 BU bR +c RL+ 
Ximc+ 
13 TI 1B -1 
(2) BU =A 2 + a2Y 
cu + bR 21 CD +bR+ 22 BU bRL Bu 23RTI +C2 B+ 
X2 
-1 
(3) TI =A 3 + aýY 
cu + bR 31 CD +bR+ 32 BU bRL Tl_j 33RTI+ C3 B+ 
X3 
(4) Y cu =A 4 +dA+dRL+ 12B 
X ycu 4 -1 
(5) L RB =A5 
cu +e1y+ 
w 
e2 RýA 
L + 
X5 
RB 
_j 
Definitions of new variables 
L1 RB= Redemption yield on 2ýflo consols. It is assumed 
here that this yield reflects the expected return 
on bonds. 
Y CU = GDp at current factor cost prices. 
A Autonomous expenditure at current prices: 
investment +' government consumption + exports. 
RWA weighted average of the short-term rates of LA interest on company sector liquid assets. 
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Notes 
1. The parameter restrictions on the ai coefficients 
in the previous model are now irrelevant. 
2. The theoretical restrictions placed on the interest 
rate coefficients are not imposed. Because of (1) 
aggregation and omission of variables and (2) the 
use of single asset interest rates to represent the 
returns on composite assets, it is rather unlikely 
that the theoretical restrictions would in fact hold. 
In view of this the parameters are freely estimated. 
3. Simply using the redemption yield on consols to 
represent the expected return on bonds is only likely 
to be reasonable in the face of considerable uncert- 
ainty regarding future rates. Account should be taken 
of this risk or uncertainty but there is no really 
satisfactory way of doing this. 
* 
The log-linear model specification yielded the most 
plausible set of results. As there was evidence of significant 
ist order serial correlation in the residuals the SF results 
were rejected. x2 tests based on a comparison of the sums of 
squared residuals from the URTF and the RTF clearly indicated 
that the latter representation of the model was valid in each 
case. As such, only the RTF results are presented below. 
Although the model includes equations for both Y 
CU 
and RL B 
these variables are 'redundant' as endogenous regressors in 
the equations of interest, (l)-(3). 
** It can readily be seen 
Some possible measures of the riskiness of bonds together 
with criticisms of these were discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2 
Although this is true of the model as it stands it would 
not be the case in a fully specified portfolio model. 
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that while simultaneity is important in equations (4) and 
(5), there is no simultaneous feedback postulated between 
any of the liquid assets and either income or the long-term 
bond rate. Sot as the model standss it is quite legitimate 
to use single equation methods to estimate each of the 
liquid asset demand equations. The RTF is estimated by ALS 
and the results are as follows: 
(1) MC t=0.461 + 0.52Y cu + 0.18R -0 lOR -0 02R (1.5) (3.1) (4.0) CD (1 : 1) BU (0: 8) TI 
-0.30R 
L+0.09mc+ 
(2.4) B (0.6) -' 
p=0.88 x27.82 
2=7.44 
F 20 = 1.32 1 (15.3) 10 
x4 4 
(2) BU 0.337 + 0.13YCU -0.25R CD +0 03R BU +0 02RT, (0.6) (1.1) (2.6) (0: 8) (0: 5) 
+ 0.08R 
L+0.70BU_ 
(l. 0) B (l. 9) 1 
P=0.49 x28.22 
2=0.16 
F 2 (1.7) 10 
x4 4,20 : -- 0.05 
(3) TI = -4.39 + 6.26YCU -1.64R -0.71R -0 05RT (2.2) (1.9) (2.3) CD (1.1) BU (0: 6) 1 
+ 2.22R L+0.34TI_ 
(1.6) B (2.0) 1 
P=0.93 x2= 17.39 
2=2.77 F 0.55 3 (13.0) 10 
x4 420 
(4) YCU 0.812 + 0.90A -0.15R 
L+0.02Y cu 
(3.1) (4.9) (1.7 )B (0.1) -1 
P=0.42 x2= 35.2 x2=1.79 F 0.42 4 (1.7) 10 4 4,23 
RL=0.39 -0.035YCU + 0.24R 76R 
L 0 
B LA +, B- (1.7) (1.5) (4.8) (1E5) 1 
-0.39 x25.02 x2= 18.41 F 2.06 p5 (2.0) 10 4 4,23 
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Notes 
Pi lst order serial correlation coefficients. 
MC = MC - P, MC-i etc. 
x2= Random correlogram test 10 
2= 
Post-sample parameter stability test X4 
F 4,20'= Chow test for structural stability 
Since equations (4) and (5) are subject to simultaneous 
feedback relationships they were estimated by 2SLS allowing 
for lst order serial correlation in the residuals. 
For equation (1) above, the money demand equation, the ex- 
post forecast errors for 1979 are as follows: 
1979 - Percentaqe Forecast Errjors 
1234 
6.5 -0.6 6.8 0.8 
Despite the fact that the correlation between interest 
rates, as shown in Table 9.40 is not particularly high for 
any pair of interest variabless most of the interest coeffic- 
ients are not significantly different from zero with some 
having t-statistics of less than unity. 
Only the CD and government bond rates are significant 
in equation (1). For the building society deposits and tax 
instruments equations only the CD rate is significant, The 
relevant matrix of interest rate coefficients is shown 
overleaft 
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R CD R BU RT, RL B 
MC 0.18 -0.10 -0.02 
+ 
-0.30 
BU -0.25 0.03 
+ 0.02 + +0.08 
TI -1.64 -0.71 -0.05 
+ +2.22 
+ Coefficients with t-statistics <1.0 
The main diagonal relating to the three types of 
liquid assets held shows the own-rate interest elasticities 
while the off-diagonal elements show the cross-interest 
elasticities. The theoretical expectation is that the own- 
rate elasticities should be positives while the cross-rate 
elasticities, including those associated with the bond rates 
should all be negative. Ignoring the question of statistical 
significance it can be seen that each of the interest 
elasticities have the correct signs in the money demand 
equation. For building society deposits the CD rate enters 
with the expected negative sign and the own-rate coefficient 
although small and insignificant has the expected positive 
sign. The coefficient associated with the rate on tax 
instruments is negligible, which suggests that the two assets 
are not regarded as substitutes by companies. Finally# a 
positive elasticity of some significance is associated with 
the government bond rate and this contradicts theoretical 
expectation. Howeverv since building societies are important 
purchasers of government debt, increased borrowing by the 
government from the non-bank private sector will raise the 
interest rates on government securities and attract funds from 
the building societies. The building societies, in turnp must 
bid for new funds to make these profitable loans and offer 
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higher interest rates to investors. In this situation an 
increase in the government bond rate is associated with an 
increase in the rate of interest on building society deposits. 
The correlation matrix in Table 9.4 confirms the strong 
positive correlation between the two rates; R=0.82, which, 
as indicated above, is the highest correlation between the 
alternative pairs of interest rate variables. In view of all 
this it is hardly surprising that an increase in company 
holdings of building society deposits is associated with an 
increase in the government bond rate. Indeed, the results 
suggest that the bond rate would serve as a better own-rate 
measure than the building society deposit rate, itself! 
In the tax instruments equation only the CD and the 
building society deposit rate coefficients have the expected 
signs. The interest elasticities are relatively large 
compared with those for money and building society deposits. 
This is probably due to incorrect specification of the 
equation: during the last 18 months of the data period 
company holdings of tax instruments grew very sharply and a 
dummy plus time trend variable should have been included to 
take account of this sudden dramatic growth in asset holdings. 
Focusing on the money demand equation it can be seen 
that if the rates of interest on each of the liquid assets 
were to rise by 10/11. while the bond rate remained unchanged, 
then the predicted response of company money-holdings is an 
increase of approximately 0.6% - i. e.! 
E short-rate elasticities 
x 10. Furthermores in view of the small and insignificant 
coefficient on lagged money-holdings which suggests quick 
adjustments the increase of 0.6% represents the full response. 
Since each of the liquid assets held by companies have become 
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more attractive relative to government bonds this result is 
to be expected with companies shifting out of bonds and into 
a variety of capital-certain assets including money. If the 
CD rate rose by 10%, with all other rates remaining unchanged, 
then the equation suggests that company money-holdings would 
rise by 1.8%. 
In contrast, if the government bond rate rose by 100% 
then company money-holdings are predicted to fall by -30/o,, 
which is clearly a more dramatic response than is predicted 
for equivalent rises on either building society deposits or 
tax instruments. This result clearly points to the 
importance of a speculative demand for money by companies. 
Equation (5) suggests that following a 10% increase 
in short-term interest rates thelong-term government bond 
rate will rise by 2.4%. in the first quarter and will not 
finish adjusting until a year after the original change in 
short rates. After the adjustment is completed the bond rate 
also rises by 10%. According to this result a general rise 
in short rates indicates that capital losses can be expected 
on government bonds if companies intend to hold them for 
relatively short periods - i. e. less than a year. 
In view of the fact that a broad measure of company 
sector wealth was not available from official sources an 
income variablep nominal factor cost GDP, was used to 
represent the constraint variable. For building society 
deposits held by companies the short-run income elasticity 
was 0.13 and the long-run elasticity was 0.43; full adjust- 
ment being completed after 10 months. 
* In view of the fact 
The estimated short-run elasticity was not, however, 
significantly different from zero at the 5% or 10% levels. 
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that the tax instrument equation requires the addition of 
dummy and trend variables to capture the rapid growth 
towards the end of the data period, it is hardly surprising 
that the estimated income elasticity of 6 is unrealistically 
high! Finallyp the income elasticity of company sector money- 
holdings was well-determined with a t-statistic of 3.1. The 
estimated elasticity was 0.52 with full adjustment to a 
change in income virtually completed after one quarter. This 
result is in agreement with the theoretically expected value 
in Baumol's inventory-theoretic' model. 
* It suggests 
important scale economies in money-hýoldings. 
Since GDP is not really an appropriate constraint 
variable for company holdings of liquid assets it follows 
that the estimated interest elasticities must be treated with 
caution. Some explanation of the variation in company sector 
demand for liquid assets is perhaps being incorrectly 
attributed to the interest rate variables. As the empirical 
model stands it is not possible to impose theoretical restrict- 
ions on the interest rate coefficients and all that can really 
be done is to check that the own-rate and cross-rate 
coefficients are plausible - i. e. they have the expected 
signs and are of sensible size. 
Equations (4) and (5) indicate that there is some 
simultaneous feedback between the income and government bond 
rate variables. Equation (4) suggests that a 10% rise in the 
government bond rate - e. g. a rise from 10 to 11% - will 
result in a 1.5% fall in GDP for a given level of autonomous 
expenditure. This fall in GDP feeds into the bond rate 
* 13aumol (17) p. 550 and 551. 
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equation causing a small rise in the bond rate which feeds 
back into the income equation. So the feedback process 
continues becoming progressively weaker before eventually 
dying out. The importance of this feedback ist howeverv in 
some doubt since neither the interest coefficient in equation 
(4) nor the income coefficient in equation (5)' are sigpific- 
antly different from zero at the 5% significance level. 
Since the ist order serial correlation coefficients 
are not significantly different from unity in either the 
money or the tax instrument demand equations a lst difference 
model would be empirically valid. However, in the case of 
building society deposits the Ist order serial correlation 
coefficient is only 0.49 and since the t-statistic associated 
with the coefficient is only 1.7 one could accept either the 
hypothesis that p=0 or the hypothesis that p=1, at the 
5% significance level. 
2 The hypothesis of random residuals (xlO) can be 
accepted for all equations except the income equation. only 
the bond rate equation fails the post-sample parameter 
stability test (x 
2) 
and all equations pass the Chow test for 4 
structural stability (F4,, 20)' 
The forecast errors shown for the most important liquid 
asset held, money, were very small in the 2nd and 4th quarters 
of 1979 - i. e. < 1% - whereas relatively large over-prediction 
errors of over 6% occurred in the Ist and 3rd quarters of that 
year. Since seasonally unadjusted data was used and no 
seasonal dummies specified it is possible that seasonal 
factors might account for the large percentage errors in the 
'Money' = Bank deposits + local authority debt. 
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lst aýd 3rd quarters of 1979. For the lst quarter over- 
prediction might well be expected since companies will 
typically'be re-stockings awarding pay increases to labour 
and paying taxes. Howevers 'seasonal influences' cannot 
explain the large 3rd quarter errors which might be related 
to the late June budget of that year. Furthermore, since 
companies typically build-up money-holdings in the 4th 
quarter in readiness for the payments that must be made in 
the following quarter one might expect a significant under- 
prediction error on seasonal grounds; the forecast error 
for the 4th quarter of 1979 was, at less than 1%, negligible. 
Finally, since seasonal dummies were included in the trans- 
actions demand model and were found to be insignificant when 
GDP was specified as the constraint variables this would 
appear to indicate that either seasonal influences are not 
especially important or that the seasonal pattern has changed 
over the relevant data periods 1972(l)-1979(4). 
* 
9.1.4 Results - 1972(l)-1978(4 : 
An aqqregate liquid assets demand model 
The empirical model entertained is as follows: 
cu wL 
(1) LA =A+ blY +b2 RýA +b3RB+ (b4EX) +b5 LA_l +u 
(2) u=p, u_l +e 
(all variables are expressed in naturallogs. ) 
Evidence from the DOI survey of large industrial and 
commercial companies suggests that seasonal factors 
have been unimportant for manufacturing companies 
while the seasonal pattern has changed over the period 
in the case of non-manufacturing companies, See Section 
9.2 for further details. 
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Notes 
1. The own-rate on company sector liquid assets was 
variously defined: 
(a) The highest rate of interest available on 
the alternative liquid assets which feature 
R LA in company portfoliosp in each quarter over 
the data period. 
(b) A weighted average of the alternative rates 
on the various liquid assets held by 
RW LA companies. The weights used are sizes of 
asset-holdings (in Zmillion) in each quarter. 
(c) Same as (b) except that the own-rate on 
money, as measured by the CD rate, only gets 
W* a reduced (75%w) weighting in recognition R ýA 
of the fact that a certain undisclosed 
proportion of company bank deposits earn 
no interest. 
EX = exchange rate as measured by the 'sterling 
effective exchange rate'. 
3. All other variables are as defined in section 9.1.3 
except that the liquid assets definition has now 
been widened to include all the selected liquid 
assets held by industrial and commercial companies. 
The best results were obtained from the specification 
which included a weighted average own-rate measure, and since 
W W* 
there was little to choose between RýA and R ýA p only the 
results from equations which included the former measure are 
reported here. Results are shown for equations which (a) 
exclude and (b) include an exchange rate variable. Since the 
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RTE was the appropriate representation of the modelt and p 
was close to and not significantly different from 1.0, both 
RTE and ist difference results are presented. 
A Exchanqe rate excluded 
(1) RTE 
LA = 0.503 + 0.47YCU +0 16R 
w 
-0 34R 
L 
-0.03LA_ ýA 
)B1 (2.2) (2.7) (3.3) (2: 6 (0.2) 
LA = LA - PLA-1 etc. 0.91 
(20.0) 
Test of validity of autoregressive restrictions -x2=2.17 3 
Random correlogram test -x2 13.40 10 
Chow test for structural stability -F4,22 ý 1.15 
lst Differences 
cu wäL A, LA = 0.57, &Y + 0.16, &Ra 0.29 RB+0.22ALA_, 
(3.6) (3.0) (2 0) (1.7) 
B Exchanqe rate included 
(1) RTE 
cu wL 
LA = 0.658 + 0.47Y + 0.14RýA -0 33R 0.22EX -0.04LA_ 
(2.2) (2.7) (2.6) (2: 5 )B (0.8) (0.3) 
1 
LA = LA - pLA_l etc. p=0.90 (15.7) 
2 
Test of validity of autoregressive restrictions - x4 = 5.07 
Random correlogram test -x2= 10.96 10 
Chow test for structural stability -F4,21 = 0.87. 
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lst Differences 
ALA = 0.53 bYCU + 0.14 AW -0.28 &R 
L 
-0.30 LEX + 0.18 býLA (3.2) (2.4) 
RiA 
(1.9) B (1.0) (1.3) -1 
cA comparison of the forecastinq performances of 
the restricted transformaTiro-nequations (RTE) 
Percentage Forecast Errors - 1979 
12342 X4 
A- No exchange rate. 3.8 -1.1 7.2 4.0 5.80 
B- Exchangerate 3.1 -2.7 5.5 4.0 4.26 
Since the coefficients on LA_l are small and not 
significantly different from zero in the above equations 
the suggestion is that lag adjustment speeds are fast, with 
full adjustment following a disturbance essentially completed 
within a single qiiarter. This result is to be expected 
because although portfolio shifts between short and long-term 
assets may be subject to some delay, a long delay where large 
asset-holdings are concerned is rather unlikely since 
brokerage costs will tend to be low in relation to the 
returns which can be made from making the adjustment. As 
far as income flowsp in the form of business receipts, are 
concernedv the additional income must# at least initially# be 
placed in the form of bank deposits or other suitable liquid 
assets. What happens after this will depend on transactions 
behaviour. So, quick adjustment of liquid assets, and 
especially money which dominates company portfolioss-seems 
fairly inevitable, although holdings may fall away subsequently 
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as additional wealth held in this f orm might well be re- 
allocated to longer-term assets with a risk element and 
a chance of capital gain. 
* 
The estimated equations for liquid asset demand are 
very similar to the estimated money demand equation in the 
dis-aggregated model (see section 9.1.3 above) which is 
not particularly, surprising in view of the fact that over 
80% of total company sector holdings of selected liquid 
assets are held in the form of money. 
The estimated income elasticity is close to 0.5p the 
own-rate elasticity is around 0.15 and the bond-rate 
elasticity is in the region of -0.30 which suggests a 
significant speculative component in company sector liquid 
asset demand. It is interesting to note that the additional 
inclusion of an exchange rate variable does not significantly 
change the estimated income and interest rate elasticities. 
Inspection of the RTE results reveals that the elasticities 
are very similar and that the addition of the exchange rate 
variable only causes a change in the constant term. Despite 
the fact that the exchange rate elasticity is far from 
negligible at over -0.20, it is not significantly different 
from zero at either the 5% or the 100/6 significance levels. 
However, as the correlation matrix in Table 9.5 reveals# 
multicollinearity appears to be responsible for the weakly- 
determined coefficient: high negative correlation of -0.96 
between the exchange rate and income variables and high 
positive correlation of 0.96 between the exchange rate and 
lagged liquid assets. All other estimated elasticities were 
For moneys in particular, over-adjustment is to be 
expected initially, followed by some running-down of 
money balances to acquire alternative assets. 
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significant at the 5% level. 
2 The hypothesis of random residuals (ýclo) could be 
confidently accepted for both the 'exchange rate included, 
and the 'exchange rate excluded, cases. The percentage 
forecast errors for 1979 showed a similar pattern for the 
two cases with the exchange rate equation yielding margin- 
ally better forecasts. The Chow test for structural 
stability (F 4,21 ) and the post-sample parameter stability 
test (x 
2) 
were passed in both cases. 4 
It would appearp theno that the omission of an 
exchange rate variable from the company sector liquid 
assets demand model is of no particular consequence. 
* 
Since the coefficient on lagged liquid assets was 
small and highly insignificant the above model was re- 
estimated after dropping this variable from the specific- 
ation. The full set of results for each representation of 
the autoregressive model is shown below for both the 
, exchange rate included' and 'exchange rate excluded' cases. 
in theory exchange rate expectations ought to have a 
significant influence on company sector liquid asset 
holdings. Exchange controls operated over the relevant 
data period may be responsible for the weak results 
although no real attempt was made to model exchange 
rate expectations. 
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Ecruilibrium model results 
A Exchanqe rate excluded 
Structural Form (SF) 
LA = -0.681 + 0.98YCU +0 25R 
w 
-0 17R 
L 
(1.7) (21.6) (3: 9) LA (1: 4 )B 
x2 32.9 DW = 0.82 R2= . 963 10 
2 
Post-sample parameter stability test - x4 = 33.1 
Chow test for structural stability -F4,24 ý 3.0 
Unrestricted transformation functiofi (URTF) 
0.453 + 0.5WCU -0.46 
cu 0 15R w -0 llRW -0 36R 
L 
(1.4) (2.8) (2.3)y-' 
+(2: 
6) 
a 
(1: 6) 
a 
(2: 2 )B 
+0.25R 
L+0.92LA_ 
(1.5 ) B_j (6.3) 
x2= 17.34 DW = 1.79 R2 . 990 9 
2 
Post-sample parameter stability test x4 12.0 
Chow test for structural stability -F4,20 0-99 
Test of significance of additional parameters -F 4v2O ý 12.86 
Restricted transformation function (RTF) 
LA = 0.467 + 0.48Y + 0.16R 
w 
-0 34R 
L 
(2.8) (2.8) (3.3) LA (2: 7 )B 
LA = LA - pLA_l etc. p=0.91 x2 14.11 
(19.6) 10 
Validity of autoregressive restrictions -x2=1.44 3 
post-sample parameter stability test -x2=6.29 4 
Chow test for structural stability -F4., 23 = 1.30 
lst Difference 
tý LA = 0.65 äYCU + 
(0: 
16 äRWý -0: 26 ARL 
(4.2) 3 0) LA (1 7) 
B 
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B Exchanqe rate included 
(1) Structural Form (SF) 
LA = 2.41 + 0.81YCU +0 23R 
w 
-0.14R 
L 
-0.34EX 
(0.9) (5.6) (3: 5) LA (1.2) B (1.2) 
x2 33.8 DW = 0.79 R2= . 965 10 
Post-sample parameter stability test -x2= 13.5 4 
Chow test for structural stability -F4,23 ý 0.86 
Unrestricted transformation function (URTF) 
N 
LA = 1.92 0.47Y 
cu 
-0 52 
cu 0 12R w -0 lOR 
w 
(1.0) (2.4) (2: 5)y-' 
+(1: 
8) LA (1: 3) 
a 
-0.35R 
L+0.24R L-0.35EX + 0.19EX 
(2.0) B (1.4) B_l (1.1) (0.5) -1 
x2= 13.04 DW = 2.05 R2= . 991 9 
Post-sample parameter stability test -x2=3.11 4 
Chow test for structural stability -F 4018 = 0.49 
Test of significance of additional parameters -F5,18 ý 9.65 
Restricted transformation function (RTF) 
LA = 0.668 + 0.48Y 
Cu +0 14RW -0 33R 
L 
-0.22EX (2.6) (2.8) (2: 6) 
ýA 
(2: 5 )B (0.8) 
LA = LA - PLA-i etc. p=0.89 x2 11.59 
(14.8) 10 
2 
Validity of autoregressive restrictions - x4 = 3.28 
Post-sample parameter stability test -x2=4.72 4 
Chow test for structural stability -F4,22 ý 1001 
lst Differences 
hjLA = 0.57, &YCU +0 13 ARW- -0.25 j&R 
L 
-0 43AEX 
(3.5) (2: 2) 
ýA 
(1.7) B (1: 4) 
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It is clear from these results that the RTE is 
the valid model representations and that dropping the 
lagged dependent variable from the specification leaves 
the estimated income and interest elasticities unchanged: 
this is true for both cases A and B. The correspondence 
between the two sets of lst difference results is not 
quite so good although the results are still similar. 
Once again the Chow test indicates that the RTE is 
structurally stable and the post-sample parameter stability 
test is comfortably passed. 
The exchange rate is still an insignificant explan- 
atory variable with the associated elasticity having a 
t-statistic of less than 1.0. 
It would certainly appear from these results that 
adjustm ent lags associated with company demand for liquid 
assets are short, with adjustment being essentially completed 
in a single quarter. A monthly model is required to 
adequately capture the speed and nature of this adjustments 
but no comprehensive monthly data on the liquid asset 
holdings of companies is available from official sources. 
9.2 Larqe industrial and commercial companies 
9.2.1 Some details on the Department of Industry's 
Survev of comDanv liauiditv* 
The survey covers only assets that can be realised and 
liabilities that are due to be paid within 12 months. The 
current assets covered by the survey includet 
For full details on the Department of Industry's survey 
of company liquidity see Economic Trends, November 1974 
and May 1977. 
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Deposits with the banking sector (including 
certificates of deposit), 
Deposits with finance houses. 
British government securities. 
(4) Local authority debt. 
(5) other current assets (including treasury 
bills and tax instruments). 
since survey companies have, in many casess been 
unable to provide information on notes and coin very . 
readily, no separate information on these is available. 
Holdings that are reported are small and have been included 
in the category 'other current assets'. 
The number of survey companies vhich actually 
participate varies from year to year, but 'on average, 
approximately 220 large companies are covered. Over the 
relevant data period 1972(l)-1979(4)0 the smallest number 
of survey companies was 210 and-the largest number was 227. 
The survey has been carried out quarterly by the DOI (and 
its predecessors) since the beginning of 1970 and was 
originally intended to cover the 300 industrial and commercial 
companies that were largest in terms of capital employed. 
However, owing to sensitivity concerning the information 
requested, over 50 companies refused to take part and amongst 
these were some of the very largest companies. 
The results of the DOI's survey of company liquidity 
are published quarterly in 'British Business' (formerly 
called ! Trade and Industry'). 
396 
Money-holdings (defined as deposits with the banking 
sector for empirical purposes) constitute a high proportion 
of survey company liquid assets. In 1972(l) money-holdings 
accounted for approximately 65% of total survey company 
current assets; at the end of 1978 they accounted for 70%. 
If deposits with Finance Houses are additionally included in 
the definition of money then the corresponding percentage 
figures are 77% and 74%, respectively. 
The survey data on current assets is disaggregated by 
type of company so that separate information is available 
for the asset holdings of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
companies. Approximately -I-, of the survey companies are non- 
manufacturing and they accounts on average over the data 
period, for just under h of total survey company money- 
holdings so that the average money-holding of non-manufacturing 
companies tends to be higher than that for manufacturing 
companies. 
Since seasonal factors are insignificant for manufact- 
uring companies, holdings of current assets but significant 
for non-manufacturing companies, asset-holdings, the 
seasonally adjusted figures for the total current assets of 
all survey companies are arrived at by adding the seasonally 
adjusted figures for non-manufacturing companies to the actual 
reported figures for manufacturing companies. The seasonal 
factors are shown in Table 9.6 below and they indicate a 
shifting seasonal pattern for non-manufacturing coTpanies 
over the relevant data period. These factors were calculated 
using the IX-111 method of seasonal adjustment, which is 
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a sophisticated version of the 'percentage of trend' 
method. 
TABLE 9.6 
Seasonal Adjustment Factors for Non-Manufacturing 
Survey Companies: 1972(l)-1979(4) 
uarters 
Years 
1 2 3 4 
1972 94.9 95.6 100.0 108.5 
1973 96.2 95.2 101.2 106.2 
1974 97.9 94.7 102.3 103.6 
1975 99.4 95.2 102.7 101.3 
1976 100.3 96.5 102.8 99.5 
1977 100.3 98.4 102.5 98.2 
1978 100.0 99.9 102.4 97.4 
1979 99.8 100.8 102.1 97.1 
Source: DOI 
This method is described in detail in a paper by 
the US Department of Commerce - Bureau of the 
Censusp Technical Paper No. 15p 'The X-11 variant 
of the census method 11 seasonal adjustment 
program - by Shiskin, Young and Musgrave (February 
1967). 
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9.2.2 All survey companies - results (1972(1)-1978(4)) 
A variety of equations were estimated and the results 
are shown in Table 9.7 below. 
Although the CD rate was used as a measure of the 
own-rate of interest on money in all ten equationsp the local 
authority bill rate and the government bond rate were tried 
as alternative measures of the substitute asset yield. 
Equations both including and excluding the exchange rate 
were run, and in equations 9 and 10 nominal factor cost GDP 
replaced real GDP and GDP prices. 9 which were the explanatory 
variables specified in equations 1-8. Both seasonally un- 
adjusted and seasonally adjusted data was used: unadjusted 
data in equations 1-4 inclusive# along with seasonal dummies, 
and adjusted data, using DOI seasonal adjustment factors, in 
equations 5-10. 
2 
The hypothesis of random residuals (xlO) could be 
comfortably accepted in every case after adjusting for 
significant lst order serial correlation. 
* 
p, the lst order 
serial correlation coefficient for the structural form 
residualso was significant in all 10 equations taking values 
ranging between 0.57 and 0.65. The coefficient on lagged 
money-holdings is small and insignificant 
in every equation 
and although seven of the equations yield a negative coeffic- 
iento the hypothesis that the true value of the coefficient 
is zero can be accepted, at even the 30% significance level, 
for all seven equations. This implies that survey companies 
adjust their money-holdings quickly in response to changes in 
For further details on serial correlation and the 
appropriate representation of the autoregressive model 
see notes to Table 9.7 
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the explanatory variables, - i. e. within a period of three 
months -a result which agrees with the findings for the 
money-holding behaviour of all industrial and commercial 
companies. Essentiallyp thenp we have an equilibrium model 
of survey company money demand in which the estimated para- 
meters are the long-run elasticities indicating the full 
responses to any changes in income, price or interest rates. 
A closer inspection of the results shown in Table 
9.7 indicates that the exchange rate, as measured by the 
sterling effective exchange rate, is a highly insignificant 
explanatory variable. In equations 2,4,6 and 8 the t- 
ratios associated with the coefficients are very low and 
comparison with the corresponding equations which exclude 
the variables equations 1,3,5 and 7p respectively, shows 
that the parameter estimates associated with the other 
variables are very similar. In view of this the exchange 
rate should be dropped from the empirical model. It is 
possible that the exchange controls operated over the 
relevant data period, 1972(l)-1978(4), are largely responsible 
for the empirical insignificance of the variable. 
As far as the alternative interest rate variables are 
concerned the local authority rate is always more significant 
than the bond ratep although as can be seen from the relevant 
t-ratios the difference in significance is comparatively 
small when seasonally adjusted as opposed to seasonally 
unadjusted data is used. Another point favouring the local 
authority as opposed to the bond rate is that the demand for 
money results are similar when seasonally adjusted rather 
than unadjusted data is used: in the case of the bond rate 
the parameter estimates are not consistent, 
400 
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Notes on Table 9.7 
1 All variables (except the seasonal dummies) are 
expressed in natural logarithms. 
2 For equations 1-49 inclusive, seasonally unadjusted 
survey company money-holdings were used to represent 
the dependent variable. For equations 5-10 seasonally 
adj usted survey company money-holdings were used: 
the DOI seasonal adjustment factors, shown in Table 
9.6 aboves were applied. Although these factors 
actually relate to total current assets held by survey 
companies, it was considered that since company money- 
holdings form a high proportion of thesep it would be 
reasonable to apply the factors to money-holdings 
alone. 
3 In 8 out of the 10 cases shown x2 tests revealed that 
the RTE representation of theautoregressive model 
was valid. However, for equations 4 and 9 the auto- 
regressive restrictions proved to be -just invalid at 
the 5% significance levelp with calculated x2 just 
above the critical table value. Despite the findings 
for these two equations it was decided that the RTE 
was the valid model specification. Accordingly# all 
of the results shown are for the RTE representation 
of the model. In this specification 
! LC 
= 
! LC 
- PAC-) NNN 
and ditto for the explanatory variablesq with the 
value of p. the lst order serial correlation coeffic- 
ient for the SF residualss shown for each equation. 
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Table 9.8 below gives the estimated income, price 
and interest elasticities for each of the equations which 
exclude the exchange rate as an explanatory variable. The 
results point to money being a luxury good for survey 
companies since the estimated income elasticity comfortably 
exceeds unity in three out of four cases. The only case 
which suggests scale economies in money-holding (equation 7 
in Table 9.7) has a poorly-determined income coefficient 
with a t-ratio of less than unity. In addition the bond rate 
rather than the preferred local authority rate has been used 
as a measure of the substitute asset yield. 
The-estimated price elasticity is close to unity in 
every case and is highly significant. Equations 1-8 in 
Table 9.7 yield estimates in the range 0.99-1.14: each of 
the estimated price elasticities are significantly different 
from zero at the 1% significance levels and none are signif- 
icantly different from unity at even the 200% significance 
level. Indeed, this conclusive finding of homogeneity in 
prices is the most striking single feature of the results for 
survey company money demand. 
The estimated income and price elasticities of survey 
company money-holdings stand in quite marked contrast to 
the results for all industrial and commercial companieso 
In the latter case the estimated income and price elasticities 
were both in the region of 0.70 and the t-ratios indicated 
that they were well-determined. These results suggested 
economies of scale in company money-holdings and that real 
See section 9.1.1 where the 'equivalent model' results are 
presented and the same explanatory variables used. 
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money-holdings fall back when the price level rises. Taking 
these results at face value suggests that while the larger 
companies regard money as a luxury good, many of the smaller 
companies must regard it as a necessity! Perhaps this could 
be explained by the fact that more attractive rates of 
interest are offered by the banks for large,, wholesale money 
deposits. Another reason for the difference could be that 
while the number of survey companies was taken into account 
in the empirical workp no account was taken of the changing 
number of 'all industrial and commercial companies', and that 
if a consistent treatment had been possible then the elastic- 
ities may well have been similar. 
of course, it could be that despite the empirical 
significance of GDP and GDP prices as explanatory variables, 
they are not entirely appropriate for explaining the money 
demand behaviour of companies. If this is the case then none 
of the estimates can be trusted. Howevero since no compre- 
hensive measures of company wealth are available and because 
GDP was a better explanatory variable than the index of 
industrial production# we must make do with this income 
measure. One point in its favour concerns the overwhelming 
evidence from the survey company results that company money 
demand is homogenous of degree one in prices; a result which 
squares with theoretical expectation. 
Table 9.8 indicates that survey company money-holdings 
are highly sensitive to interest rate changes. When the CD 
rate represents the own-rate on money and the local authority 
rate represents the alternative asset yield, then the own-rate 
elasticity just exceeds unity while the cross-rate elasticity 
is in the region of -1.0. The high correlation between these 
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two rates has caused a multicollinearity problem which leads 
to relatively large standard errors on the interest coeffic- 
ients. Despite this problem the interest rate coefficients 
are significant at the 10% significance level and so it is 
not severe enough to throw the results out too badly. 
When the bond rate is used to represent the substitute 
asset yield, the measured interest elasticities are much 
smaller. This is understandable since local authority debt 
is a closer substitute for interest-bearing company money- 
holdings than government bonds. The much lower own-rate 
elasticity can be readily-explained since typically rates 
on certificates of deposit and local authority debt move 
closely together. With the latter rate now excluded from 
the equation it follows that increases in money-holdings 
following a rise in the own-rate on money involves switching 
away from weaker substitutes such as government bonds. When 
the local authority rate represents the alternative asset 
yield then any change in the own-rate on money not quickly 
matched by the former can be expected to lead to significant 
portfolio adjustments. 
Since most of the variation in nominal GDP over the 
relevant data period has been due to price changes# with 
real income showing little variation, it was decided that 
equations should be run in which nominal GDP is specified. 
The estimated coefficient on this variable should largely 
reflect the influence of just price. In fact equations 9 and 
10 in Table 9.7 show this to be the case with nominal income 
coefficients which-are very close to unity and not signific- 
antly different from this figure. 
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Finallyp the ex-post forecasting performance of all 
ten estimated equations was rather poor and both the post- 
sample parameter stability test and the Chow test for 
structural stability were clearly failed (the results for 
these tests are not shown, but they were failed in every 
single case). Once again this finding stands in contrýLst 
to that-for 'all industrial and commercial companies', where 
both the post-sample parameter stability test and the Chow 
test for structural stability are clearly passed. The poor 
post-sample performance of the survey company equations might 
well be associated with the change in the number and compo- 
sition of companies participating in the survey of company 
liquidity. A sharp increase in the number of survey 
companies from 210 in 1977 to 226 in 1978 was followed by 
a fall in number to 222 in 1979. Before. 1979 a fall or rise 
in the number of companies participating in the survey 
involved a fall, or rise, in the numbers of both manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing companies. However, in 1979 while an 
additional non-manufacturing company. participated, five 
manufacturing companies dropped out of the sample. 
Another possible reason for the poor ex-post forecast- 
ing performance of the survey company equations is that large 
companies have made significant purchases of tax instruments 
since the middle of 1978, with a particularly large increasep 
of over L300 millions occurring between the last quarter of 
1978 and the first quarter of 1979. 
* Now while this must be 
the case for 'all industrial and commercial companies, as 
* See 'Financial Statistics', Table 9.5. 
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well, the effect on the survey companies is much more 
dramatic in relative terms since (a) they hold a large 
proportion of the total tax instruments held by companies 
and (b) their total money-holdings amount to only approx- 
imately 20% of total company money-holdings. 
This large increase in the holdings of tax instruments 
would be expected to cause over-prediction errors over the 
ex-post forecast year 1979 since actual money-holdings 
should fall back following the sudden increased demand for 
tax instruments. In fact over-prediction errors occurred in 
every quarter of 1979 as well as the last two quarters of 
1978. Since it was immediately after the 2nd quarter of 1978 
when company holdings of tax instruments started to rise 
sharply, this particular explanation of the over-prediction 
errors and the post-sample parameter instability seems quite 
plausible. 
9.2.3 Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Survey Companies - 
Results - (1972(1)-1978(4)) 
Since it is clearly possible that the money-holding behaviour 
of manufacturing companies differs from that of non-manufact- 
uring companies, it is of interest to investigate the 
possibility. Separate data on the money-holdings of the two 
types of company was kindly provided for this purpose by the 
DOI. 
The results for manufacturing companies are shown in 
Table 9.9 overleaf and the results for non-manufacturing 
companies in Table 9.10. 
The most striking differences between the two sets of 
results concern the speed of adjustment and the significance 
of serial correlation. The evidence for manufacturing 
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companies suggests that lst order serial correlation in 
the residuals is highly insignificant andv following a 
market disturbance, money demand adjustment takes about a 
year to complete. In contrastv the 'preferred' results 
for non-manufacturing companies suggest that serial 
correlation is highly significant and that full money- 
holding adjustment is completed within three months. So, 
there appears to be an important difference between the 
two types of company with respect to the speed of adjustment 
of money demand. 
The results for manufacturing companies, shown in 
Table 9.99 indicate that the bond rate is clearly empirically 
preferable to the local authority rate. This suggests that 
manufacturing survey companies are important holders of 
government securities, and that local authority debt is not 
held in any significant quantity. 
* Comparing either 
equations 1 and 2,. or 3 and 4, in Table 9.9.. it can be seen 
from the R2 statistic that the 'bond rate' equations (2 and 
4) explain around 96% of the variation in money-holdings 
while thd local authority rate' equations (1 and 3) only 
explain just over 94%. Furthermore# the t-ratios show that 
the parameters are much better-determined in the 'bond rate' 
equations. For examples comparing equations 1 and 20 it 
can be seen that while the bond rate coefficient is signific- 
ant with a t-ratio of 3.19 the local authority rate coefficient 
is highly insignificant with a t-ratio of only 0.51 
Information provided by the DOI confirms this suggestion 
for the end of the data period (1978 and 1979) and for 
the years 1980 and 1981. See Appendix B to this chapter. 
(Unfortunately no information was provided for earlier 
years). 
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For non-manufacturing survey companies the only 
sensible equations are those in which the local authority 
rate is specified as the relevant substitute asset yield. 
Equations 1 and 3 in Table 9.10 include the local authority 
rate and although some of the individual coefficients are 
not very well-determined they each have the correct sign 
and are of plausible magnitude. In the case of the bond 
rate equations (2 and 4) the individual coefficients are 
insignificant and the CD and bond rates enter with the 
wrong signs. In addition, the income coefficient in equation 
2 also has the wrong sign. 
In Table 9.11 overleaf the estimated long-run money 
demand elasticities are shown for both types of company: 
only the best equations from Tables 9.9 and 9.10 were 
considered. 
Despite the marked contrast in the values of the real 
income elasticities both results were based on highly 
insignificant income coefficients. * Furthermore, most of 
the variation in nominal factor cost GDP has been due to 
rising prices over the relevant data period (1972-1979)p so 
that more attention should be directed towards the values 
of the price elasticities. The aggregate survey company 
results strongly suggested that company money demand was 
linearly homogeneous in prices, a result which is not 
seriously contradicted by the evidence from non-manufacturing 
companies: Table 9.11 shows that the estimated price 
elasticity is in the region of 0.9. 
Results which suggest that survey company money-holdings 
are not importantly related to variations in real national 
income. Howeverp no better empirical income or wealth 
measures could be found. 
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However, for manufacturing companies the' estimated 
long-run price elasticity is approximately 1.7; an estimate 
which is well-determined but nevertheless unreasonably high! 
The nominal income elasticities for manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing companies were 2.0 and 0.83, respectively. 
Since price changes dominate the variation in nominal income 
the estimate for manufacturing companies is rather high, 
while the estimate for non-manufacturing companies seems 
reasonable enough. The high estimate for the former might 
well be due to the naive assumptions about lag structure 
which are embodied in the model. If the lag adjustment 
periods associated with the individual explanatory variables 
differ then it is clearly possible that the adjustment period 
associated with a change in prices is significantly shorter 
than a yeart so that the long-run price elasticity of money 
demand for manufacturing companies is much closer to the 
theoretically expected value of unity. 
As far as the own-rate of interest elasticity is 
concerned there is broad agreement between the results shown, 
in Table 9.11 abovep for the different companies: the 
estimates lie in the range 1.3-1.6 indicating that survey 
company money demand is interest-elastic. 
As far as the cross-rate interest elasticity is 
concerned values of -3.1 for manufacturing companies and 
-1.47 for non-manufacturing companies 
(the cross-rate 
elasticities are similar when nominal income is specified) 
indicate that survey company money demand is very sensitive 
It is interesting to note that if RLA replaces RB in the 
manufacturing survey company equations then the estimated 
price elasticity is much closer to unity. However# as 
stated above, the bond rate equation is decidedly better- 
determined. 
414 
to changes in rates of interest on alternative financial 
assets. While local authority debt appears to be the 
most important money substitute for non-manufacturing 
survey companies, capital risky assets such as government 
bonds (and probably company shares) appear to be more 
important substitutes for manufacturing 
Indeed, the importance of the bond rate 
rate elasticity suggest that there is a 
speculative component in the demand for 
manufacturing companies. 
Although not shown in the above 
survey companies. 
and the high cross- 
significant 
money by large 
resultst the ex-post 
forecasts for 1979 were not particularly good for either 
manufacturing or non-manufacturing companies. Howevers the 
forecasts were considerably better than was the case for 
aggregate survey company money demand. For non-manufacturing 
survey companies both over-prediction and under-prediction 
errors occurred, and both the Chow test for structural 
stability and the post-sample parameter stability test were 
just passed. For manufacturing survey companies money 
demand was over-predicted in each quarter of 1979 and the 
above-mentioned stability tests were clearly failed. 
Howeverp if the local authority rate is specified in place 
of the bond ratep then despite the comparatively poorly- 
determined equation, the forecasting performance is improved 
with over- and under-prediction errors occurring. in 
additionp the stability tests are just passed. 
Appendix B shows that government securities were certainly 
more significant than local authority debt in the asset 
portfolio of manufacturing companies at the end of the 
1970's. For non-manufacturing companies holdings of la 
debt were marginally greater than holdings of government 
securities. 
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This considerable improvement in ex-post forecasting 
performancep with the dis-aggregation of survey company 
money demand by type of holder, is not perhaps surprising 
in view of the fact that the money-holding behaviour of 
large manufacturing companies was found to be quite different 
from that of large non-manufacturing companies; especially 
with regard to speed of adjustment. This difference in 
money-holding behaviour means that any change in the 
composition of the aggregate sample of survey companies, 
such as occurred in 1979# may well be enough to suggest 
that the demand for money function for large companies is 
unstable, when in fact it is not. 
* 
Certainlys the dis-aggregated results suggest that 
the rapid growth in tax instrument holdings was not respon- 
sible for the over-prediction forecast errors in the case of 
the aggregate survey company money demand results. 
9.3 Concluding comments 
A summary of the best results for (1) all industrial and 
commercial companies and (2) large 
industrial and commercial 
companies is given in Table 9.12 below. 
The results f or all companies, in section 1 of the 
tables suggest that there are economies of scale in money- 
holdings and that the demand for real money balances falls 
bacIc following rises in the domestic price level which are 
unaccompanied by changes 
in real income or interest rates. 
Essentially# thenp the two separate demand functions for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing survey companies 
could both be stable while the over-aggregated function 
suggests instability simply because of a change in 
sample composition. 
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Equation 1 (1) shows that company money demand is 
quite sensitive to changes in short-term interest rates, 
with an own-rate elasticity of 0.57 and a cross-rate 
interest elasticity of -0.46. When money is re-defined 
to include a close money-substitute, local authority 
temporary debt# then the own-rate elasticity falls sharply 
and the most relevant substitute asset is long-term govern- 
ment bonds; changes in the bond rate have a significant 
negative influence on money demand. This sharp fall in the 
own-rate elasticity for re-defined money indicates that 
local authority debt is clearly the most important 
substitute for company M3 deposits amongst the various 
selected liquid assets held. 
Equation 1 (3) covers the aggregate liquid assets 
demand of companies and,, as Table 9.12 clearly shows, the 
results are very similar to those for money demand; a 
result which is hardly surprising in view of the fact that 
money (MC + la) represents a very large proportion of the 
total selected liquid assets held. 
The significance of the bond rate for these wider 
definitions of money' employed, suggests that there is an 
important speculative component in the company sector's 
demand for short-term# capital-certain financial assets. 
In the case of large industrial and commercial 
companiesp results for which are shown in section 2 of 
Table 9.12, the suggestion is that money is a luxury good 
with an income elasticity clearly in excess of unity. 
Equation 2 (1) yields a price elasticity of demand of 1.02 
-which means that the nominal money demand of all survey 
companies' is linearly homogeneous in prices; a result 
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which agrees with theoretical expectation. Howevers when 
survey company money demand is disaggregated by type of 
holder it can be seen that for large non-manufacturing 
survey companies there are economies of scale in money- 
holding and the long-run price elasticity. is lower than 
unity: results which are in broad agreement with those 
for all industrial and commercial companies. For large 
manufacturing companies the size of the income elasticity 
suggests that money is very definitely a luxury good# 
although the short-run elasticity upon which the estimate 
of 4.2 is based, is very poorly-determined. Furthermores 
the estimated long-run price elasticity of 1.71, although 
well-determineds is implausibly high which suggests, at 
the very leasts that the lag structure has not been 
correctly captured. Since this was the only case in which 
adjustment was not completed in a single quarter, the 
result must surely be in doubt, especially as a period of 
almost a year is suggested. However, as the results stand, 
the suggestion is that while large manufacturing companies 
are slow to adjust their money-holdingst large non- 
manufacturing companies adjust them rapidly. 
As expected, survey company money. demand is very 
sensitive to interest rate. changes with both the own-rate 
and cross-rate interest elasticities in excess of unity. 
These higher, interest-elasticities for the large companies, 
compared with those for all industrial and commercial 
companies, are to be expected since even small changes in 
relative interest-yields should induce portfolio changes 
when the volume of funds concerned is particularly large. 
A failure to switch funds would mean sacrificing large 
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absoliite interest returnst while the cost involved in 
switching f unds is likely to be small in comparison and 
similar to that for the smaller companies. 
An interesting feature of the dis-aggregated survey 
company results is the suggestion that government bonds 
are an important substitute for money as far as manufact- 
uring companies are concerned, while local authority debt 
is an important substitute in the case of non-manufacturing 
companies. Indeeds the large and significant negative 
elasticity associated with the government bond rate, in 
equation 2 (2) of Table 9.12, suggests that there is a very 
important speculative component in large manufacturing 
companies' demand for money. 
The forecasting performances of the demand equations 
for all industrial and commercial companies are reasonable. 
The ex-post forecast errors p although not especially small, 
are both positive and negative over the four quarters of 
1979 and both the Chow test for structural stability and the 
post-sample parameter stabilitj test are passed in each case. 
In contrastp the forecasting performance of the 
equation for all survey companies (equation 2 (1) in Table 
9.12) is extremely poor, with growing over-prediction errors 
occurring in the forecast year. Both the stability tests are 
clearly failed. It is possible that a change in the compo- 
sition of the survey sample, with the number of manufacturing 
companies falling and non-manufacturing companies rising, 
has contributed to the poor ex-post forecasting performance 
over 1979; especially as the dis-aggregated money 
demand 
results show that the demand behaviour of the two types 
is 
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quite different. In any event,, the forecasting performances 
of the dis-aggregated money demand equations (2 (2) and 2 (3) 
in Table 9.12) are considerably betterp especially in the 
case of non-manufacturing survey companies where both over- 
and under-prediction forecast errors occur and the post- 
sample stability tests are passed. 
The differences between the results for all industrial 
and commercial companies and the large survey companies, in 
pa rticular with respect to the income and price elasticities, 
might, simply indicate that the money-holding behaviour of the 
largest companies is not typical of companies in general. 
Howeverp other factors which could-be influential include 
(1) the different methods of data collection involved, (2) 
the fact that we only have data from a sample of the largest 
companies, which fails to include some of the very largest 
companies', and (3) both the size and the composition of the 
survey sample change over the relevant data period. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND THE COMPANY 
SECTOR'S DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Inflation expectations might be expected to influence the 
money-holding behaviour of companies for transactions, 
precautionary and speculative reasons. 
Transactions motives for holding money or near- 
money cover purchases of variable inputsp repaying interest 
on loans and meeting depreciation and other fixed costs such 
as rent and rates. Where companies are able to borrow large 
amounts of money to finance transactions then they will 
typically hold only small amounts for transactions purposes 
in the form of liquid assets. Howevers if inflation is 
currently high but expected to falls as was certainly the 
case after 1975% then long-term borrowing at fixed rates 
of interest becomes unattractive. This is so because a 
trend fall in the rate of inflation would leave companies 
paying progressively higher real rates of interest over the 
terms of the loans. Indeed, the collapse of the company 
debenture market was largely due to the general fears of a 
trend fall in the rate of inflation from a high level. 
Soo inflation expectations in the mid-1970's made 
long-term borrowing unattractive and consequently funds 
required for investment were increasingly drawn from retained 
profits and raised from shorter term loans - e. g. bank 
In the summer of 1975 the Labour government introduced 
an incomes policy, and further anti-inflation measures 
followed in 1976 in the shape of public expenditure 
cuts and monetary targets. 
/ 
/ 
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advances. The greater reliance on retained profits to 
finance investment means that savings which would otherwise 
have been channelled into liquid assets9 the holdings of 
which are dominated by money, are diverted towards the 
purchase of plant and machinery. 
* 
A transactions demand for money to cover payments for 
the variable inputs will be important. 
In the case of labour fighting for wage increases 
based on expected inflation then to the extent which this 
may squeeze profit margins, firms will cut back investment 
plans and lay-off workers. Wage-bill savings will mean a 
reduced demand for money,, although some of the funds ear- 
marked for investment will now be diverted into liquid 
assets. 
Company purchases of stocks may be importantly 
influenced by anticipated changes in stock prices. If the 
wholesale price index (industrial inputs) is expected to 
rise sharply then firms may be tempted to stockpile in order 
to beat inflation. Providing the costs of holding additional 
stocks are reasonably low then firms will wish to run down 
money balances in order to finance the extra purchases. 
However, money balances will build-up in subsequent periods 
when running down the stocks. 
Inflation expectations may influence company money- 
holding behaviour on precautionary grounds. For examplev if 
inflation is expected to become both higher and more variable 
Although on this argument there would be a fall in company 
demand for liquid assets, reduced borrowing would soon 
mean reduced interest costs and wider profit margins. 
This factor combined with an attempt to retain a higher 
proportion of profits would boost funds. 
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this may generate much uncertainty regarding future profits. 
As a cushion against future hardship firms may wish to keep 
a greater proportion of their assets in a liquid form 
seeking out the highest return short-term financial assets. 
In addition, if inflation is expected. to fall back from a 
high level because of government anti-inflation measures# 
companies will anticipate borrowing difficulties and attempt 
to save more in the form of retained profits. They will 
wish to keep most of these extra savings in a liquid form. 
Uncertainty over future inflation and future profits 
is likely to have been largely responsible for the sharp 
rise in company sector liquid asset holdings which occurred 
in the mid-1970's and continued through subsequent years. 
In 1975 and 1976 companies, liquid asset holdings increased 
by 21% and 16% respectively. In contrast, they fell back by 
over 20% in 1974. 
The asset motive is another important consideration. 
Despite the fact that interest rates have failed to keep 
pace with inflation they have reached high nominal levels 
in the 1970's. Now rising inflation increases the opportunity 
cost of holding non-interest bearing moneyt which has a 
convenience value onlyp so that companies will typically 
wish to hold a smaller proportion of liquid assets in this 
form when the rate of inflation is expected to rise. 
The most important influence of inflation expectations 
with respect to this motive concerns transactions in capital 
risky assets such as government securities. In times of 
rising inflation and rising interest rates bond prices will 
be failing. If companies expect this trend to continue they 
will move out of bonds and into capital-certain liquid assets. 
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In times of falling inflation the opposite happens and 
companies will wish to hold more bonds in their asset 
portfolios. Now with the annual rate of inflation 
running at 25% in the Summer of 1975 and the government's 
introduction of anti-inflation measures, expectations of 
falling inflation must have been strong. Companies were 
therefore anticipating an increase in government bond 
prices and as Table 9.13 clearly indicates company sector 
holdings of government securities showed a strong trend 
rise between 1975 and 1979. The percentage share of 
government securities in companies, total holdings of 
liquid assets rose from approximately 1% at the end of 
1974 to just under 3"2/o in the 4th quarter of 1979. 
Although the public expenditure cuts in 1976 reduced 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement it can clearly be 
seen from Table 9.14 that, owing to the large reduction in 
borrowing from the banks, the amount borrowed from the non- 
bank private sector increased sharply. A reduction in 
government borrowing from this sector would have prompted 
stronger speculative buying since the price of debt would 
have risen further. As it was, the increased sale of debt 
must have dampened the force of speculative buying to some 
extent by limiting the rise in bond prices and therefore the 
sizes of the capital gains to be made. 
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CHAPTER 10 
REDUCED-FORM MODELS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
10.0 Introductory remarks 
In the context of an IS/LM model the successo or otherwise, 
of monetaryýpolicy in achieving its stated policy objectives 
will depend on the stability of both the IS and LM functions. 
For monetarism to be a successful method of controlling 
the level of aggregate demand, in particular the rate of 
inflationp in the medium term (3-5 years), then the following 
necessary conditions must be satisfied: 
A stable demand for money function exists; 
one which can be correctly identified. 
A stable aggregate expenditure function exists 
and can be correctly identified. 
3. The money supply is capable of being closely 
controlled by the monetary authorities. 
My work has been concerned with the first of these 
conditions, but it should be stressed that in the face of 
serious violation of either conditions 2 or 3, or both, the 
stability or otherwise of the demand for money function is 
no longer of any real policy significance. If for example, 
the money supply cannot be kept within the target growth 
range, which was 7-11% per annum for ZM3 at the end of the 
1970's. then unless there is a compensating change in the 
income velocity of circulation of money, monetarism will fail 
to realize its policy targets. 
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In the following section a simple IS/LM model is 
outlined and the reduced-form equations for the endogenous 
variables are formally derived from the structural model. 
In order to bring out the importance of the above-mentioned 
necessary conditions for the success of monetary policyp 
lag structure is initially ignored and an equilibrium model 
is advanced. Following consideration of the theoretical 
properties of the reserve base and money multipliers, the 
reduced-form results are presented for the dynamic IS/LM 
model specified in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2). These give the 
impact multipliers for a quarterly model directly. The 
larger dynamic multipliers are also shown. 
This dynamic IS/LM model is essentially the same as 
the equilibrium model, save for the incorporation of a 
generalised partial adjustment lag structure. 
After a brief consideration of the plausibility and 
-significance 
of the various structural parameters and the 
implications for monetary and fiscal policy which can be 
drawn from the reduced-form resultsl full attention is devoted 
to the money-demand relationship. In Section 10.2 a summary 
of the best post-CCC results is presenteds for various 
definitions of money, and ex-post forecasting performance 
for 1980 and the first quarter of 1981 is considered. In 
the light of (1) a change in the techniques of monetary 
control and (2) abandonment of exchange controlst this 
represents a stringent test of model stability; especially 
for broad definitions of money. 
Finallyl the policy implications of the major findings 
are carefully considered. In this context it is not just a 
question of whether the money demand function is stable or 
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unstablet but whether the money supply can be adequately 
controlled. Even if it can be successfully controlled it 
may be that exchange rate targeting is a better method of 
achieving the government's inflation objectives in which 
case money demand stability is not a crucial policy issue. 
10.1 The reduced-form model of an IS/LM structure 
10.1.1 The derivation of the reduced-form from the 
structural model 
(1) The structural model 
1c b(Y-T) 
t0+ ty 
mo + MY 
Consumption function 
Tax function 
Imports function Goods 
market 
4 1 10+ eR Investment function 
5 Y C+ I+G+ X- M National income 
identity 
--- --- --- 
Go 
-- 
X exogenous 
----------- - 
6 MD = AO + B1Y+ B2R 
------- 
Money demand equation 
7 MS= A+ 1 CH+ 1 CR 2 Money supply equation 
Mone 
market 
8 MS= MD = M Identity 
H exogenous 
From equations 1-5 the IS expression is derived. Substit- 
-uting equations 1-4 into the national income identity and 
solving for Y gives: 
is y- 
co-bt 0 +1 O-M 0+ G+X 
-+eR (1-b)+bt+m (1-b)+bt+m (1-b)+bt+m 
The a priori signs of all parameters in the IS 
equation are positive with the exception of the 
interest rate coefficient (e) in the investment 
equation which is negative. 
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Similarly, the LM equation can be derived from equations 
6-8: 
LM Y=+ 
! 
-' H+R BB1 
The a priori sign associated with coefficients 
B1C1 and C2 is positive while for B2 it is 
negative. 
The economy will be in equilibrium when both the 
'goods market, and the 'money market' are in equilibrium 
- i. e. when IS = LM. So. setting IS = LM and solving for 
R will give the rate of interest which simultaneously 
clears both the money and goods markets for a particular 
level of income. The resulting reduced-form expression 
for the rate of interest is as follows: 
R=1 B1e- (C2-B2) 
[Al-AO] 
+ Ble - (C2-B2) 
ZZ 
Z(C2 B2) -I Co-bt 0 +1 O-m 0 +G+X 
Be 
where Z= (1-b) + bt +m 
By substituting this reduced-form expression for R into 
either the IS or LM equations we obtain a reduced-form 
expression for national income: 
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Y=1 
B 1-z(c 2 -B2) 
e 
Be 
(-C2-B 2) 
A -A +c1H 
11 
01 B 1-z(c 2 -B 2) 
[Co-bt 
0 +1 O-m 0 +G+X 
similarly, a reduced form equation for the money stock can 
be obtained by substituting the reduced-form expression 
for R into the money supply equation. This gives: 
M+ 
C2 
Ac2A B1 e-(C 2 -B 2) 1B1 e-(C 2 -B 2) 0 
zz 
c+2H+2 4-bt +I -mo+G+X B1 e-(C 2 -B 2) Z(C 2 -B 2) 000 
C 
zB1 
For known values of the exogenous variables in the structural 
model the reduced-form equations can tell us the values of 
M, Y and R which are consistent with full equilibrium in the 
system - i. e. equilibrium in both the money and goods markets# 
simultaneously achieved. 
* 
The IS/LM framework has several important weaknesses 
despite its usefulness in highlighting the major policy 
issues in the management of aggregate demand. The 
various weaknesses were mentioned in Chapter 1. p. 22 and 
23. An additional weaknessp not mentioned there, concerns 
the interdependence of fiscal and monetary policy via 
, inflationary financing' of the PSBR. The simple model 
advanced above does not formally recognize the possibility 
of such interdependence. 
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10.1.2 An examination of thepolicy-relevant reduced- 
will start by assuming that the monetary authorities 
have been able to exercise a reasonable degree of control 
over the volume of reserve assets held by banks in the 
post-CCC 1970's. If this assumption is accepted then 
providing the reserve base multiplier in the reduced form 
money stock equation is both currently known and remains 
stable over time, then it follows that the monetary 
authorities will have the ability to control the growth 
of the money stock reasonably closely via manipulation of 
the reserve base. The relevant multiplier is as follows: 
m 
C2 
TH B1e_ (C -B 2 2) z 
It can be seen from (1) above that the size of the multiplier 
depends on the values of both the IS and LM structural para- 
meters. Under ceteris paribus assumptions the reserve-base 
multiplier will be higher: - 
Controlling the volume of reserve assets in the context 
of a multiple assets base will be more difficult than 
is the case with a simple monetary base. See Dennis (36) 
p. 194 and 195 for a discussion of the controllability of 
the post-CCC reserve assets base. 
Since the introduction of monetary targets in 1976 the 
growth of LM3 has, on occasionsm during the late 1970'st 
been above the top end of the target range (see Chapter 1 
p. 36). In 1980 the growth of LM3 was, at nearly 20%. 
well in excess of the top end of the 7-11% target range. 
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The greater is Cl, the reserve base coefficient 
in the money supply equation. 
(2) The smaller is C 2' the sensitivity of the money 
supply to a change in the rate of interest. 
(3) The greater is B2. the interest sensitivity of 
money demand. 
(4) The greater is Blp the sensitivity of money 
demand to a change in income. 
(5) The greater is e, the sensitivity of investment 
to a change in the rate of interest. 
(6) The smaller is Z, the leakage or withdrawal 
propensity from the flow of income. 
As long as the value of the multiplier is correctly 
known by the authorities then they will be able to control 
the growth of the money stock. Thisp in turnp means that 
the structural parameters in the IS/LM model must be accur- 
ately known and must remain stalble over time. 
Given that a reasonable degree of control over the 
growth of the money stock is possible we can now examine 
the money multiplier in the reduced-form income equation. 
The relevant multiplier is as follows: - 
(2) 
i-Y c1 
aH B 1-z(c 2-B2) 
e 
Under ceteris paribus assumptions the money multiplier will 
be higher: - 
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(1) The greater is Clo which measures the sensitivity 
of the money supply to changes in the level of 
reserve assets. 
(2) The smaller is Blp-which measures the sensitivity 
of the demand for money to changes in income. 
(3) The smaller the interest coefficients in the 
money supply and money demand equations C2 and B 2,1 
respectively. 
(4) The greater-the sensitivity of investment to a 
change in the rate of interesto lel. 
(5) The smaller is Z. the marginal leakage or with- 
drawal propensity from the flow of income. 
A money multiplier relating to the actual money 
stocks, LM3# rather than the reserve assets base, Hp can 
be derived by simply dividing multiplier (2) above by 
multiplier (1) as follows: 
(3) 
'1 y ly . 
91 
1 
MB -Z (C -B C2 12 2) 
.41[ He+ 71 e- (C 2 -B 2) 
zI 
C1 cancels of course since a stable money multiplier based 
on LM3 does not depend on the value of the reserve-base 
coefficient in the money supply equation. Providing the 
monetary authorities could exercise reasonably tight 
control over the growth of LM3v either by manipulation of 
the volume of reserve assets directly or by some other 
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means, 
* then we have a policy-relevant multiplier. 
It iss of course, the stability of the money multi- 
plier combined with an accurate knowledge of its size, 
rather than the size of the multiplier per se, which is 
so crucial to the achievement of monetary policy target 
objectives. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1 if the 
size of the multiplier is low rather than higN this will 
simply involve a bigger initial change in the money supply 
in order to hit the target for aggregate nominal demand. 
The autonomous expenditure multiplier in the reduced- 
form income equation is as shown below: - 
Be 
(C 
2 -B 2) 
Where A Autonomous expenditure 
G+X 
Although instability in the demand for money income 
and interest rate parameterst B1 and B2, respectively# will 
certainly influence the size of this multipliers it will 
not de-stabilise the multiplier as much as would be the case 
with monetary policy* This is because B1 and B2 have a 
smaller influence compared with the money multiplier case. 
Indeed, under the extreme Keynesian assumption of zero 
interest-elasticity of the IS functiont the coefficient e 
For example via the 'corset' which was an important 
instrument of monetary control in the post-CCC 1970's 
or via a change in MLRt which became an important 
monetary instrumentt for a brief period# at the end of 
the 1970's. 
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would be zero and the value of the multiplier would simply 
be 1/Z., so that there is no dependence at all on either the 
demand for money or the supply of money structural parameters. 
Since Keynesians: believe that investment is not especially 
sensitive to changes in the rate of interest - i. e. e is 
low - it follows that stable income and interest rate para- 
meters in the demand for money function will not be so 
crucial for fiscal policy as they are for monetary policy 
if one is a Keynesian. The stability of the autonomous 
expenditure multiplier will therefore depend importantly on 
the stability of Z, the marginal withdrawal propensity from 
the flow of income. 
It has not been the intention, here# to examine the 
relative power of fiscal and money multipliers$ but merely 
to establish their nature in terms of the structural para- 
meters of the IS/LM models and to see how changes in the 
values of these parameters can influence the sizes of the 
respective multipliers. 
* The question of particular interest 
which will be pursued empirically, is whether or not a stable 
money multiplier exists, and if not how far this is due to 
instability in the demand for money function? 
For a close consideration of the long-run effects of 
fiscal and monetary policy on aggregate demand see Tobin 
and Buiter (24) and the monetarist comments on this 
paper by Friedman and Cagan (24). The paper is of special 
theoretical interest since it seeks to establish whether 
pure fiscal policy (for example, an increase in government 
spending which is financed by an open market sale of debt 
thus leaving the money supply unchanged) can boost aggreg- 
ate demand (nominal or real) in the long-run - i. e. is 
the long-run LM curve vertical? 
For a consideration of the ' relative power of 
fiscal and 
monetary policy in a dynamic context see Arestisp Frowen 
and Karakitsos (6). 
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However# before considering the reduced-form model 
results for the post-CCC era it is important to stress the 
importance of the stability of each of the functions in the 
structural modelp since it is possible for the functions to 
shift with the slope parameters remaining essentially stable. 
Any shifting of a function which takes the government by 
surprise will mean that even if the policy instrument 
variables are capable of being closely controlled and stable 
fiscal and money multipliers can be identifieds it is still 
quite possible that the target growth for aggregate nominal 
demand will not be achieved. 
The introduction of Competition and Credit Control 
in September 1971 led to shifts in the money supply and money 
demand functions with A0 and Alp the intercepts in the 
structural money equations, changing. 
In the case of the IS equation there was certainly a 
downward shift in the consumption function which took the 
government by surprise in the mid-1970's. 
The simple imports function in this model shifted 
upwards significantly at the end of the 1970's. This 
increased import penetration of UK markets was prompted by 
a combination of relatively high domestic inflation and a 
sharply rising exchange rate. Although North Sea Oil 
developments and the rise in oil prices were obviously 
important factorsp tight monetary policy certainly contrib- 
uted to the upward trend in the exchange rate. 
The extent to which these deflationary shifts in the 
consumption and import functions were not anticipated by the 
Sharp increases in MLR which pushed up domestic interest 
rates. 
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government will have meant excessive restriction of the 
growth of aggregate demand: 1975 and 1980 were years of 
sharp recession. 
To see the potentially de-stabilising influences 
of these shifting functions on aggregate demand it is 
necessary to consider the relevant terms in the reduced- 
form money income equation. 
The relevant term which captures the influence of 
shifting money supply and demand functions on national 
income is as follows: - 
Y=1AA B Z(C 2 -Bý-) 1- 0] 
e 
Where A1= Intercept in money supply equation 
A0= Intercept in money demz; nd equation 
Under ceteris paribus assumptions the disturbance to Y will 
be larger following a given change in A1 or A01 
(1) The less sensitive is the demand for money to 
income changes - i. e. the smaller the value of B,, 
(2) The larger the value of the income-expenditure 
multiplier and the greater the interest sensitivity 
of investment - i. e. the lower the value of 
z /e. 
(3) The less sensitive that money supply and money 
demand are to interest rate changes - i. e. the smaller 
are the values of C2 and B 2* 
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So, týe steeper the LM curve, for a given income sensitivity 
of money demand, and the flatter the IS curve,. the greater 
the disturbance to national income resulting from a given 
shift in the money supply or money demand functions. 
The relevant term which captures the influence of 
shifting expenditure functions on national income is as 
f ollows: 
Z-, 
1B1e 
(E2 -B2) 
co-bt 0 +1 0 -M 01 090000000*000 
Under ceteris paribus assumptions the disturbance to Y 
will be greater following a given change in one of the 
expenditure functions: 
(1) The smaller is Zv the withdrawal or leakage 
propensity from the flow of income. 
(2) The smaller is Blp the income sensitivity 
of money demand. 
(3) The smaller is e. the interest sensitivity 
of investment. 
(4) The larger are C2 and B2. the money supply 
and money demand interest coefficients# 
respectively. 
So., the steeper the IS curve# for a given value of 
the income-expenditure multiplier (1/Z), and the flatter the 
LM curve, the greater the disturbance to national income 
resulting from a given shift in one of the expenditure 
functions. 
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Even if both the LM and IS functions are essentially 
stablep subject only to relatively minor stochastic shocks, 
so that aggregate nominal demand can be successfully managed 
by either fiscal or monetary policyp it does not follow that 
the rate of inflation can be closely controlled (certainly 
in the short-run). This is because prices may continue to 
rise significantly while output falls back. In this case a 
target for aggregate nominal demand is achieved through 
falling output and rising unemployment rather than the 
intended fall in inflation. * 
10.1.3 Reduced-form model results for the Post-CCC era, 
1972(l)-1978(4) 
The relevant reduced-form model is based on the following 
dynamic IS/LM structure. 
" 
(1) 
- 
IP = XA 0+ 
XBY + XB 2RB+ 
XB 
3R CD 
Ms ý= GA 1+ ec 1H+ eC 2RB+ 
ec 3 MLR + (1-E)) MS 
(3) MS = IP = Mt 
IS (4) Y Z -bt +I 
[CO 
0 + -m 0J g Z 
[G+X] 
+ 
9-e R Z B+ 
(1-*0)Y-l 
From the money market equations', (l)-(3) above, the following 
LM equation is derived: 
Since 1979 the government has relied almost exclusively 
on monetary growth targets to achieve the low inflation 
objective. Howeverp by the end of 1981 inflation was 
still comfortably in double figures while real output 
had fallen back and unemployment had risen to the three 
million mark. 
Results for the structural equations of this model were 
presented in Section 6.2 of Chapter 6. 
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9 GC2-XB 2 'BC3 
LM Y=A 
LO) 
+ 
OC' 
H+R+ KB- MLR (TB-l 1-B1 TB XB, B 
B3 
R+m Fl- CD B1 -1 
Endogenous variables - M, Y and RB" 
Notes 
1. The residual terms are omitted from the equations 
for convenience. 
2. A general partial adjustment lag structure has 
been imposed with X, 9 and 0 being the relevant 
lag parameters. * The remaining parameters are as 
defined for the equilibrium model which was described 
in 10.1.1 above. 
3. RCD and MLR are additional variables entering the 
money demand and money supply equations# respectively. 
Both are treated as exogenous. 
The reduced-form equations are as follows: - 
(1) Interest rate 
RB XB 
1 
oe 
1 
GA, - 
XA + 
ec 1-H 
-(GC 2-XB2) 
1 
01 ÄBi oe - (GC 2- 
AB2) 
Z 
+ 
6C3 
XB 
MLR 'FB, Oe - (@C2- 2) 
z 
XB 
3 RCD 
hB 
1 
Oe - (C)C2- NB 2) 
z 
M-1 
Z (GC2- AB 2) -e- 
ÄB 10e- (GC 2- ÄB2) 
_ONB 
1Z 
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XB 
1(1-0) 
XBjOe - (eC2- XB 2) 
z 
Money stock 
M1+ 
OC2 
GA 
E)C2 
XB 
1 
Oe - (eCýý2) 1 TBjOe - (E)C 2- XB 2) 0 
zz 
" E)c 1+ 
GC2 
1 XBjOe 
z 
" E)c + 
E)C2 
3 XBjOe 
z 
9C2 
Z(ec 2- XB 2) - 
0 XB 
I 
MLR -- 
XB 
3eC2 R XBjOe - (OC2- XB2) CD 
z 
XB 
2-('- )E)C2 + 
(1-E)) XB 
1 
Oe 
XBlOe (E)C 2- 
ýB 
2) 
z M-1 
z 
ec 2 
**A B 1(1-0) 
ýB 
10e- 
(eC 
2- 
XBý-) 
z 
National income 
1 
TB-j - Z(eC2- AB2) 
Oe 
ec 3 
XB- z(eC2- XB 2) 
Oe 
Y-1 
ec 1 1 
01 ÄB 1- Z(OC2- 
XB2) 
Oe 
MLR 
XB3 
RCD 
Z(@C2- XB2) 
Oe 
A* + 
(I-G) - (1-ý ) 
XB e XB (E)C 2- XB 2) z 
(E)C 2- 
XB 
2) 
Oe 
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(1-0) (eC2- XB2) 
Y- XB 
1 
Oe - (, eC2- XB 27 1 
z 
A* = co-bt 0+10-rno+G+X 
Untransformed linear model* 
RB=5.82 + 0.19H + 0.62A* -0.48RCD + 0.72MLR 
(3.3) (0.2) (1.8) (1.9) (2.5) 
+ 0.48M3_1 -0 95Y_, 
(3.0) (4: 4) 
R2= . 846 x28.5 x2= 36.2 10 4 
(2) M3 = 0.16 + 0.76H -0.19A* +0 31R CD - 0.26MLR (0.2) (1.8) (1.1) (2: 4) (1.8) 
+ 0.8OM3_1 +(0: 28Y 
-1 (9.5) 2 6) 
222 
R . 997 x 10 = 13.9 x4 = 5.3 
(3) Y=0.83 + 0.05H + 0.31A* -0 24R CD + 0.19MLR (1.1) (0.2) (2.2) (2: 3) (1.6) 
+ 0.07M3_1 +0 71Y 
(1.0) (8: 0) -1 
222 R . 998 x 10 = 21.5 x4 = 32.8 
Loq-linear model 
(1.1) (0.2) (2.2) (2.3) (1.6) 
+ 0.07M3_1 +0 71Y 
(1.0) (8: 0) -1 
222 R . 998 x 10 = 21.5 x4 = 32.8 
RB=3.46 -0.31H + 0.07A* +0 19R CD +0 15M3_1 -0.08Y-1 (0.5) (1.2) (0.2) (3: 0) (0: 2) (0.2) 
p=0.89 x29.1 x2=3.9 
(7.6) 10 4 
The relationship between the structural parameters in 
the reduced-form equations described above$ is only 
applicable to the untransformed linear model. 
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(2) M3 = 2.14 + 0.131 
(1.9) (2.1) 
p=0.73 
(4.4) 
(3) Y 0.91 -0.03H 
(0.8) (0.3) 
R+0.07A* +0 042R CD +(0: 
43M3_1 +0 20Y_l 
(1.0) (3: 2) 2 4) (1: 9) 
x2 28.2 
2=3.0 
10 X4 
+ 0.58A* -0.015R CD + 0.04M3_1 +0 33Y 1 (5.2) (0.7) (0.2) (2: 4) - 
22 
p=0.78 x 10 = 20.5 x4=2.0 (4.5) 
Inspection of the theoretical properties of the reduced-form 
model indicates the following a priori signs for the impact 
and dynamic multipliers in the interest rate, money stock and 
national income equations: 
H A* R CD MLR M3_1 Y-1 
R++++ B 
X- 
M3 +++++ 
Y+++ 
Note - The signs of the coefficients associated with 
the lagged money stock in the interest rate 
and income equations will depend on the relative 
sizes of the lag adjustment-parameters in the 
moneK supply and money demand equations. If 
E) > then the coefficient on M3-1 will be 
positive in the interest rate equation and 
negative in the income equation. The reverse 
is true if X> &. 
The empirical results for the untransformed linear case 
reveal that several of the impact multipliers have theoretic- 
allY incorrect signs: 
In the reduced-form interest rate equation H9 RCD and 
Y-1 all have incorrectly signed coefficients# and in 
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the case of the latter two variables the coefficients 
are significant at the 10% significance level. 
In the reduced-form money stock equation only auto- 
nomous expenditure enters with an incorrect sign. 
However, the coefficient is insignificant at the 10% 
level. 
(3) The coefficients associated with both MLR and M3_1 have 
theoretically incorrect signs in the income equation, 
although neither are significant at the 10% level. 
The empirical results for the log-linear case* stand 
in quite marked contrast: 
(1) In the interest rate equation only the coefficient 
associated with lagged income, Y_10 has an incorrect 
sign, and this coefficient is highly insignificant. 
(2) All coefficients have theoretically correct signs in 
the money stock equation. 
(3) only the reserve assets base, Hp enters with a 
theoretically incorrect negative sign in the income 
equation. The highly insignificant and negligible 
coefficient suggests that manipulation of the reserve 
assets base by the monetary authorities has virtually 
no impact on national income within a single quarter. 
A more general inspection of the reduced-form results 
reveals that several of the impact multipliers are highly 
insignificant and that both the untransformed linear and the 
See footnote on p. 131, Chapter 3, regarding the validity 
of the log-linear model specification. 
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log-linear national income equations fail the random 
correlogram test (x 
2> 18.2). While each of the log- 10 
linear equations clearly pass the post-sample parameter 
2 
stability test (x4) both the income and interest rate 
equations in the untransformed linear model emphatically 
fail this test. Finally, while the residuals in each of 
the log-linear reduced-form equations were subject to 
significant serial correlation, this problem was absent 
in the untransformed linear model. 
I will now focus on the reduced-form equations of 
special policy interest which are the untransformed linear 
and log-linear national income equations. Tables 10.1 and 
10.2 below show the relevant impact and dynamic multipliers 
associated with the policy instruments - H, MLR, R CD, A. 
The relevant short-run and long-run structural parameter 
estimates are also shown. These structural parameters of 
the dynamic IS/LM model were estimated by 2SLS (see Chapter 
6, Section 6.2, Table 6.19). 
Both the untransformed linear and the log-linear model 
results suggest that monetary policy via manipulation of the 
reserve assets base has a very weak impact influence on 
aggregate demand. However, the full long-run response of 
demand is quite strong with adjustment occurring gradually 
over a long period. The untransformed linear model results, 
shown in Table 10.1, suggest an impact multiplier of only 
0.05p but a much larger dynamic multiplier of 7.98. Since 
the reserve assets base coefficient in the log-linear case 
has a theoretically incorrect negative sign this result is 
rejected. 
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In contrast fiscal policy, via an increase in 
government spending, appears to have a much stronger impact 
influence although with full adjustment completed relatively 
quickly the dynamic multiplier is considerably smaller than 
is the case for monetary policy: a multiplier of 1.4 
compared with 8.0 (Table 10.1). The fiscal multipliers seem 
plausible enough providing changes in government spending do 
not involve changes in the money supply. 
As for the other instruments of monetary policy, MLR 
only really became important at the end of the 1970's and 
the influence of the 'corset' cannot be successfully picked- 
up by the model as it stands. In fact the structural 
parameterv GC3 , associated with MLR had a theoretically 
incorrect positive sign in the money supply equation of the 
untransformed linear modelp while it was small and highly 
insignificant in the log-linear model. 
on purely statistical grounds these reduced-form 
results must be treated with caution since multicollinearity 
problems involving the reserve assets base, H, and autonomous 
expenditure, At may well have upset the estimated coefficients: 
the simple correlation between H and A is 0.96. 
close inspection of the structural parameters# shown 
in Tables 10.1 and 10.2, reveals that it is the coefficients 
in the money supply equation which are causing the problem and 
that this particular equation needs revising. In both the 
untransformed linear and log-linear cases the interest rate 
coefficient is significantly negative when 
in theory it should 
be positive. No doubt the failure to formally consider the 
financing of the PSBR has caused problems here, since a 
greater tendency to borrow from the non-bank private sector 
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will help to restrict money supply increases while at the 
same time higher rates of interest will have to be offered 
on governrnent bonds. 
In contrast,, each-of the structural parameters in the 
money demand and aggregate expenditure equations have the 
theoretically correct signs. Howevert in the untransformed 
linear case (Table 10.1) the income coefficient in the demand 
for money equation is weakly-determined and the implied speed 
of adjustment is implausibly slow at 5 years! In the log- 
linear model (Table 10.2) the income elasticity of money 
demand is both well-determined and plausible taking the value 
0.63. Furthermores adjustment is completed after 6 months 
which seems reasonablei The only weakness concerns the bond 
rate which enters the demand for money equation with a small 
and weakly-determined coefficient, although it does have the 
correct sign. 
So it appears from the above results that the money 
supply equation is causing most of the problems and that it 
needs to be revised to'take specific account of the influence 
of the 'corset' as well as the interaction between fiscal and 
I 
monetary policy via 'inflationary financing' of the PSBR. 
other problems may well include (1) the failure to 
include a variable to account for inflation expectations in 
the IS and LM equationst (2) the omission of the labour market 
from the model and (3) erroneous lag structure. 
Remedying the above-mentioned problems would involve 
the construction of a considerably more complex model; 
* 
a task 
which is outside the scope of research focussed on UK demand 
Such a task is currently being undertaken and I hope to 
report my empirical findings in the near future. 
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for mýney functions. A major concern of this particular 
thesis has been to establish whether or not just one of 
the necessary conditions for successful aggregate demand 
management via monetary policy has been met in the post- 
CCC 1970's - i. e. whether a stable and policy-relevant 
demand for money function can be identified. So,, further 
examination of policy issues will now be based entirely on 
the empirical evidence concerning the stabilityl or other- 
wise, of-the post-CCC demand for money functions. 
All that remains to be said here is that despite the 
various weaknesses of the IS/LM structure, which are 
outlined above, the framework has been useful for highlighting 
the policy issues, with the empirical results suggesting that 
the most serious problems for monetary policy may well be 
related to the control of the money supply. 
10.2 A verdict on stability based on the best demand for 
money results for the various definitions of monev 
The best results are shown in Tables 10.3 and 10.4 below, 
and full details on the equations shown were given in Chapters 
5-9 inclusive. Relatively simple models proved best with 
fixed partial adjustment lag structures. Simultaneity was 
not found to be important in the context of a quarterly model 
for either Ml or ZM3 so that single equation estimation 
techniques were valid. 
For both broad and narrow definitions of money there 
was no evid6nce of any. important speculative influences on 
money demand and international variables such as the exchange 
rate were not found to be significant. This latter finding 
is not perhaps too surprising in view of the exchange controls 
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which were in force over the post-CCC sample period. 
Inflation expectations* as proxied by the lagged 
moving annual percentage changes in the R. P. I. # were only 
important for Ml, although the direct influence of the 
variable in this equation was not especially strong. 
A particularly important feature of the results is 
clearly brought out by Table 10.4. With the exception of 
M1 and company sector money demand there is a significant 
discrepancy between the values of the estimated price and 
income elasticities. For &M3 the income and price elast- 
icities are 2.2 and 0.5, respectively, so that simply 
specifying nominal income as the constraint variable# as 
was done'in the IS/LM model considered in the previous 
section, is not really empirically valid. It appears from 
the results shown in Table 10.3 that personal sector money 
demand behaviour accounts for the discrepancy between the 
income and price elasticities since the long-run income 
elasticity of MP is over 2 while the price elasticity is 
only in the region of 0.31 
Equations 5 and 6 vhich cover personal and company 
sector money demand, respectivelyp show that the money- 
holding behaviour of the two sectors is quite different. 
As expected company money demand is much more sensitive to 
interest rate changes and adjustment lags are very short 
compared with the personal sector. A shift in the balance 
Since the estimated price and income elasticities are 
in broad agreement for Mlp while there is a major 
discrepancy in the case of time deposits (TD), it must 
be the personal sector's demand for interest-bearing 
money which is mainly responsible for the discrepancy. 
// / 
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of M3 holdings between the two sectors might easily be 
responsible for upsetting the policy-relevant LM3 demand 
function. 
The major concern is to assess the stability of 
these various empirical demand functions; especially LM3 
which has been the policy-relevant definition of money in 
the post-CCC 1970's. The stability criteria employed are 
as follows: 
(1) The significance and plausibility of the estimated 
parameters. 
The ability of the estimated relationships to 
explain a high, percentage of variation in money 
2 demand - i. e. high values for R 
(3) Random residuals. 
(4) Parameter constancy when the sample data period 
changes. 
(5) Post-sample stability of the structure. 
(6) Ex-post forecasting performance. 
criteria (l)-(3) are concerned with 'within sample' 
performance while (4)-(6) are concerned with post-sample 
performance2 in particular the predictive powers of the 
estimated relationships. 
Taking each money definition in turn criteria (l)-(3) 
can now be considered. Only the weaknesses will be mentioned 
so that if there are no weaknesses then the estimated relation- 
ships can be taken as stable as far as these particular 
criteria are concerned. 
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Ml 
Inspection of the results inTables 10.3 and 10.4 reveals 
that when inflation expectations are not included as an 
explanatory variable (equation (1)) the estimated income 
elasticity is insignificant and the hypothesis of random 
residuals cannot be accepted. However., when inflation 
expectations are included (equation (2)) the serial correl- 
ation problem disappears and the significance of the income 
elasticity is improved, although with a t-value of only 1.5 
it is still not significant at the 10% significance level. 
Table 10.4 shows that the inclusion of inflation expectations 
leaves the estimated long-run price elasticity virtually 
unchanged, and close to unity the theoretically expected 
value, but shortens the lag adjustment period from over 10 
months to 6 months. In all other respects the results are 
well-determined and plausible. 
Time deposits (TD) 
The major weakness concerns the very low and insignificant 
price elasticity. Table 10.4 shows that the estimated long- 
run price elasticity is only 0.12, a result which suggests 
that the public's holdings of interest-bearing bank deposits 
are not importantly related to movements in GDP prices. in 
all other-respects the sample results are well-determined 
and plausible. 
IN3 
The results shown in Table 10.3 are well-determined and 
plausible and equation 4 comes very close to satisfying the 
stability criteria. The only possible weakness concerns the 
relatively low value of the long-run price elasticity: 
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Table 10.4 shows that the elasticity is only 0.50 so that 
the theoretical expectation of linear homogeneity does not 
receive empirical support. However# it can readily be seen 
from Table 10.4 that this elasticity of 0.50 is consistent 
with the separate price elasticity results for Ml and TD - 
i. e. it is approximately equal to the weighted average of 
the long-run price elasticities for Ml and TD. 
MP 
While most of the short-run elasticities are well-determined 
the price elasticity is not, and as Table 10.4 showsp the 
estimated long-run price elasticity certainly seems to be 
rather low at only 0.33! 
MC 
Since lst order serial correlation was highly signif icant, 
adjustment was made for this: ax2 test based on the URTF 
and RTF results showed the transformation to be empirically 
valid. After making the adjustment the hypothesis of random 
residuals could be comfortably accepted and the results shown 
in Table 10.3 suggest that full adjustment of money demando 
following a disturbance is completed within a single quarter. 
only the interest rate elasticities are insignificant at the 
5% levelp although very high correlation between the CD and 
LA rates accounts for the relatively high standard errors 
associated with the coefficients. 
Although not shown in Table 10.3 the results for 
survey companies (see Chapter 90 Section 9.2) stand in 
contrast to those for all industrial and commercial companies. 
Whereas the latter suggest economies of scale in company 
money-holdingsv the aggregate survey company results suggest 
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TABLE 10.3 
The Best Estimated Demand for Money Equations for the 
Alternative Definitions of Money in the Post-CCC Era 
(1972(1)-1978(4)). 
mi A=0.166 + 0.283Y + 0.267P -0.074R 
s+0.708M1_1 
(0.1) (1.2) (3.0) (3.3 )B (6.6) 
x2= 21.7 R2= . 995 S. E. = . 021453 10 
j2) M, B = 1.745 + 0.335Y + 0.461P -0.066RS -0.033ý +0.498Ml_l 
(0.9) (1.5) (3.3) (2.7 )B (1.7) -1 (3.1) 
x2= 14.3 R2= . 996 S. E. = . 020610 10 
(3) TD = -4.462 + 0.606Y + 0.024P -0.124 
RS 
+ 0.830TD_l 
(2.5) (3.5) (0.7) (3.7) RCD (26.1) 
x2=9.9 R2= . 993 S. E. = . 0226019 10 
(4) &M3 = -2.144 + 0.402Y + 0.086P -0.037 
RS 
+ 0.81UM3_ 
(2.0) (3.5) (2.4) (1.8) RCD (19.3) 1 
x2=8.4 R2= . 997 S. E. =.. 013597 10 
(5) MP -1.495 + 0.276PDI + 0.039P -0.0053 (R -R 
7) 
(1.3) (2.1) (1.3) (2.4) BU 
6R 
+ 0.016D 3+0 879MP_l (2.0) (1;. 7) 
2 18.6 R2= . 996 lo ý S. E. = . 014764 
(6) MC 0.178 + 0.733Y + 0.716P/-0.46ORLA + 0.575R CD (0.3) (2.9) (3.4) (1.3) (1.6) 
+ 0.074MC 
(0.4) 
A12A 
mc MC -p MC-1 etc X 10 = 12.6 p=0.795 S. E. = . 047964 (5.9) 
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms 
except 'ý. 
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that large companies regard money as a luxury good. The 
disaggregated survey company results, although not partic- 
ularly well-determinedi suggest that money is only a luxury 
good for manufacturing companies. 
Although it is clearly possible that the money- 
holding behaviour of large companies is essentially different 
from that of smaller companies, the different empirical 
results might be accounted for by either, or both, of the 
following: 
The survey covers only a non-random sample of large 
companies; a sample which has varied in both size 
and composition. 
Data for all industrial and commercial companies is 
obtained from a different source. 
In connection with the stability criteria (4)-(6) 
different sample data periods were only considered for the 
aggregate demand for money equations; Ml. TD and ZM3. For 
sectoral money demand (MP and MC) only evidence on post- 
sample structural and parameter stability, along with ex-post 
forecasting performance, is considered. 
The parameter constancy criterion can now be considered 
for each of the aggregate money definitions in turn. The 
supporting empirical evidence for Ml was reported in Chapter 
5 while the evidence for TD and ZM3 was reported in Chapter 6. 
MI 
The suggestion is that the Ml structure changes after the 
introduction of Competition and Credit Control, although the 
pre-CCC structure is not sufficiently well-determined for us 
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to be sure of this. Empirical evidence from the pooled 
sample of pre-CCC and post-CCC data suggests that there 
is a shift in the function after 1971 and that inflation 
becomes influential in the post-CCC period. The Ml function 
settles down after 1976 with an equation estimated over the 
period 1964(l)-1976(4) forecasting money demand over the 
years 1977-1979, inclusive, reasonably well. In fact the 
estimated parameters almost coincide with those for the full 
sample period, 1964(l)-1979(4)o 
An interesting feature of the results for the entire 
sample of data# 1964(l)-1979(4), is that when the ICCC 
observations, (1971(4)-1973(4)) were excluded from the sample 
the serial correlation problemp suggested in the full sample 
results, disappeared. It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that the CCC reformst which temporarily disturbed the 
behaviour of Ml, had caused the serial correlation problem. 
TD and ZM3 
Lack of independent variation in the data during the 1960's 
means that we cannot be confident about either the TD or LM3 
demand structures in the pre-CCC era. There is certainly no 
firm evidence to suggest that the pre-CCC structure is 
significantly different from the post-CCC structure for either 
time deposits or LM3 once the importance of an own-rate on 
money variable is formally recognized after 1971. 
The equations estimated over the full data period, 
1964(l)-1978(4), were similar to those estimated over the 
post-CCC era. 9 and excluding the 'CCC observationst (1971(4)- 
1973(4)) from the full sample only had a trivial influence on 
the results. 
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Criteria (5) and (6) can be considered jointly f or 
each of the relevant money definitions* Table 10.5 below 
shows the ex-post forecasting performance over 1979 of the 
best demand for money equationst which are listed in Table 
10.3 above. It also shows the x2 test statistic for post- 
sample parameter stability over the four quarters (x 
2 
4 
It can be seen that the post-sample parameter stability test 
is comfortably passed in every case# and although not shown 
in the table so is the Chow test for structural stability. 
As for the forecast errors they are reasonably small in 
percentage terms except for company sector money demand. 
The relatively large percentage errors for MC occur because 
seasonally unadjusted data was used and no seasonal dummies 
were specified. 
For Mlp TD and tM3 none of the individual forecast 
errors were significant at the 5% level and only in the case 
of TD did the errors not show changes of sign with small over- 
prediction errors occurring in each quarter. 
For the personal sectors despite changes of error sign 
showing that both under and over-prediction errors occur, the 
under-prediction error of 3.1% in 1979(3) was significant at 
the 596 level. 
For the company sectors despite the relatively large 
over-prediction errors which occur in the third and fourth 
quarters$ none of the forecast errors are significant at the 
5% level. 
Information provided by the Department of Industry 
clearly indicated a shifting seasonal pattern for 
company sector money demand over the post-CCC data 
period. 
462 
TABLE 10.5 
Ex-Post Forecasting Performance of the Best Demand for 
money Equations in 1979: Percentage Forecast Errors 
1 2 
1979 
3 4 2 X4 
1. mi A -o. 5 1.9 0.3 --ýl. 6 1.43 
2. Ml B -0.7 1.8 0.6 -2.5 2.45 
3. TD 0.8 1.1 1.9 0.03 1.1 
4. &M3 0.6 0.5 0.2 -1.1 1.0 
5. mp 0.7 -0.5 -3.1 -1.8' 6.2 
6. MC 1.4 -2.1 8.2 5.4 4.2 
A= Inflation expectations excluded 
B= Inflation expectations included 
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More stringent tests of ex-post forecasting 
perf ormance were conducted for M1 and &M3. In each case 
equations estimated over the period 1964(l)-1976(4) were 
used to forecast the remaining years in the samples 1977- 
1979, inclusive. The Ml equation performed well and only 
small under-prediction and over-prediction errors occurred, 
none of which were significant at the 5% level. Both the 
x2 test for post-sample parameter stability and the Chow 
test for structural stability were easily passed. The LM3 
equation just failed the post-sample parameter stability 
test although the Chow test for structural stability was 
passed. Small under-prediction errors were recorded for 
every quarter except 1977(l) when a small over-prediction 
error occurred. The largest under-prediction error was just 
under _30% and this was the only significant forecast error 
(5%. level). There was no evidence of any trend growth of 
error size. 
A more rigorous test of ex-post forecasting performance 
can be conducted by considering the performance of the post- 
CCC (1972(l)-1978(4)) estimated demand for money equations 
in the early 1980, s. Table 10.6 below shows forecasts for 
M19 TD and &M3 over the period 1980(l)-lg8l(l), inclusive. 
Since all remaining exchange controls were removed in October 
1979 and since MLR became an important instrument of monetary 
controlp 
* 
with the 'corset' finally being abolished in June 
1980, this represents a fairly severe test of post-sample 
performance for the 11970's estimated' demand for money 
equations. 
MLR is no longer an important instrument of monetary control 
and ceased to be continuously posted in August 1981. 
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It can be seen from Table 10.6 that over-prediction 
errors occur in each quarter in the case of Ml whereas for 
TD under-prediction errors occur. On balances the Ml 
equation which excludes inflation expectations, as measured 
by the lagged moving annual inflation rates performs better 
than the equation which includes the variable: although the 
error pattern is similar for the two equations the errors 
tend to be larger when ý_l is included, with two of the 
forecast errors proving significant as opposed to just one 
when P_l is excluded. These results suggest that the lagged 
inflation rate fails to pick-up the influence of inflation 
expectations over the early 1980's. In the case of TD three 
of the forecast errors were significant with the largest 
under-prediction error being well over 6%o! 
Table 10.6 reveals that as the Ml over-prediction 
errors increase so do the under-prediction errors f or time 
deposits and vice-versa. This indicates that over the period 
1980(1)-1981(2) movements of deposits between non-interest 
bearing and interest-bearing bank accounts were not being 
properly picked-up. 
The results for ZM3, shown in Table 10.6, confirm that 
to some extent movements between Ml and time deposits which 
are not being picked-up by the estimated equations are causing 
the problem. The sizes of the forecast errors are uniformly 
smaller with a largest error of 3.5%0 which is only just 
significant. Howevert with the exception of 1980(l) they are 
all under-prediction errors which indicates that in addition 
to movements between Ml and TD which simply change the 
composition of &M3, there must have been a net movement of 
funds from alternative financial assets into interest-bearing 
465 
money. The most significant under-prediction error of 3.5% 
occurred in the last quarter of 1980 and can be accounted 
for by the re-intermediation of funds following the termin- 
ation of the 'corset' in the middle of that year. 
on balances the various stability criteria considered 
above suggest that the post-CCC estimated M1 and LM3 demand 
functions are relatively stable. The major weakness in the 
case of the M1 function was the relatively weakly-determined 
income elasticity and although the tracking performance of 
the equation over the period 1980(l)-1981(2) was rather poors 
this can probably be put down to a change in interest rate 
behaviour following the active use of MLR as a technique of 
monetary control. In the case of LM3 the only real weakness 
concerns the low long-run price elasticity of 0.5, although 
this equation, was considerably more plausible than the one 
in which linear homogeneity was imposed from the outset (see 
LM3 results reported in Chapter 6). The structure for time 
deposits is not so well-determined. In particulars the price 
elasticity is low and insignificant. 
It appears from the sectoral demand for money equations 
that the above-mentioned weakness for time deposits is largely 
accounted 
for by the money-holding behaviour of the personal 
sector, since the price elasticity of MP is both low and 
insignificant while the price elasticity of MC is well- 
determined and much closer to unity. The company sector 
demand for money equation was reasonably well-determined and 
despite some relatively large ex-post forecast errorst which 
* See footnote on p. 463 concerning MLR. 
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TABLE 10.6 
EX-Post Forecasts for Ml. TD and &M3: 
1§80(1)-lg8l(l) 
1980 1981 
1234 
(1) Ml (excludinq pE) 
LB. Actual 29.4 30.0 29.8 30.7 31.9 
Forecast 30.5 30.8 31.6 31.7 32.6 
Forecast-actual 1.1 0.8 1.8 1.0 0.7 
Percentage 3.7 2.7 6.0 + 3.2 2.2 
forecast error 
(2) Mi (incl 
LB. Actual 29.4 30.0 29.8 30.7 31.9 
Forecast 30.4 30.9 31.7 32.2 33.1 
Forecast-actual 1.0 0.9 1.9 1.5 1.2 
% Percentage 3.4 3.0 6.4'ý 4.0* 3.8 
forecast error 
(3) TD 
LB. Actual 30.2 32.9 36.0 38.4 38.4 
Forecast 30.1 31.3 33.6 35.9 37.1 
Forecast-actual -0.1 -1.6 -2.4 -2.5 -1.3 
% Percentage - -4.9*ý -6.7* -6.5* -3.4 forecast error 
(4) fM3 
LB. Actual 59.6 62.9 65.8 69.1 70.3 
Forecast 60.3 61.3 64.3 66.7 69.0 
Forecast-actual 0.7 -1.6 -1.5 -2.4 -1.3 
% Percentage 1.2 -2.5 -2.3 -1.8 
forecast error 
+ denotes significant forecast errors: Y-Y >2 standard 
errors. 
Note - Since expenditure-based estimates of the GDP 
are not available for 1981(2) and 1981(3) o wing to 
the absence of overseas trade statistics th e 
forecast period is terminated at the end of 1981(j). 
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were mainly due to a shifting seasonal pattern in MC, 
it passed the post-sample stability tests. 
10.3 Policy im2lications and conclusions 
From my empirical work a qualified picture of stability 
has emerged f or the demand f or money function in the 
post-CCC 1970's. While other researchers have claimed 
that the demand f or broad money (&M3) has been unstable in 
this period" it must be remembered that conclusions were 
mostly based on data periods combining pre-ccC data with 
only a small sample of post-CCC observations. Furthermore, 
short-run or long-run homogeneity in prices was often 
imposed f rom the outset without any attempt to test the 
empirical validity of such assumptions. In my own work the 
price elasticity was f reely-determined and while f or the 
Ml definition of money it was close to unity, as expected, 
for zM3 it was only 0.5. Attempts to impose either short- 
run or long-run homogeneity in prices suggested that the 
demand for broad money function was unstablep while the 
freely estimated equation suggested stability. Although the 
estimated price elasticity does seem rather low the result 
for LM3 was entirely consistent with the results for Ml and 
time deposits on the one hand and personal and company sector 
money-holdings on the other. Consideration of these results 
revealed that while the price-elasticity of demand for non- 
This shifting seasonal pattern is possibly associated 
with both the timing of tax payments and the intro- 
duction of new taxes. 
See Chapter 4 for details. 
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interýst bearing money was indeed close to unityp the 
personal sector's demand for interest-bearing bank deposits 
was not significantly related to movements in either GDP 
or consumer prices. The tracking performance, of the freely- 
estimated 9M3 demand equation (1972(1)-1978(4)) was - 
reasonable over the period 1980(1)-1981(1), inclusive, 
despite (1) the removal of exchange controls in October 1979 
and (2) the abolition of the 'corset' in June 1980. 
However, despite the fact that the empirical work 
reported in this thesis appears to suggest that at least 
one of the necessary conditions for the success of monetarism 
is satisfied, it needs to be stressed that the authorities 
have. 4 on occasions, certainly experienced difficulties in 
controlling the money supply. 
* Failure to achieve the 
desired control certainly discredits monetarism to some 
extent and this, in turnp means that the stability of the 
demand for money function will no longer be such a crucial 
policy issue. 
Despite the temporary distortions to LM3 caused by 
the reintermediation of funds following the termination of 
the IcorsetIv the authorities, under normal circumstances. 9 
still regard this definition as the best choice for an inter- 
mediate target variable. So, the question naturally arises 
For example, during the financial year 1977/78 the growth 
of ZM3 was, at 16ý46, over 3 percentage points above the 
top end of the 9-13% target range. Againg in the first 
year of the MTFS, 1980/81s the growth of LM3# at 7 percent- 
age points above the top end of the 7-11% target range, 
was clearly excessive. However, in this latter case the 
excessive growth was largely due to the reintermediation 
of funds following the termination of the corset and 
greater attention was paid to other monetary indicators 
which suggested much tighter monetary conditions. 
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as to whetherg in the absence of the 'corset' (which was 
moderately successful in controlling the growth of the 
money supply), a sufficient degree of control over money 
supply movements is possible? The 'corset' achieved control 
at the expense of a disintermediation of funds prompted by 
a change in relative interest rates. This weakens the 
policy significance of ZM3 since offsetting increases in 
velocity mean that the ultimate policy target variables 
cannot be reliably influenced by monetary restraint. 
Ironically# then2 it may be possible to identify a stable 
demand for broad money function (one including a suitable 
own-rate on money variable) and achieve an adequate control 
of the money supply but because of changing interest 
differentials and the consequent shifting of fundso this 
may have little ultimate policy significance for the control 
of inflation. 
Now because of the financial market distortions 
following the termination of the 'corset, the issue of 
adequate money supply control cannot be fairly judged in the 
context of the early 1980's experience. The present 
instruments of money supply control are interest rates and 
fiscal policy, and following the abolition of the-multiple 
reserve assets ratio in August 1981v the UK monetary 
authorities appear to be moving closer to a system of 
monetary base control. It remains to be seen# thent whether 
(1) a reasonable degree of control over the money supply 
can be achieved and (2) if it can, whether the change in the 
techniques of monetary control employed undermines the 
stability of the demand for money function# or causes 
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distortions in'financial markets which render the policy 
instruments useless for achieving the ultimate goal of 
low and steady inflation. 
The case for exchange rate as opposed to monetary 
targeting has recently been considered by Artis and Currie 
(9). * They were, however, unable to come to any firm 
conclusion regarding the optimal choice of intermediate 
target variable since this would depend on the nature of 
the shock to the system, the, type of pricing behaviour which 
firms adopt and on the factors which specifically influence 
the formation of inflation expectations. The choice between 
the two regimes has important implications for the policy 
significance of a stable demand for money function. In the 
case of money supply targeting the identification of a 
stable demand function is one of the critical factors 
governing the success of the policy in achieving medium-term 
control over the rate of inflation. With an exchange rate 
target, demand for money shocks would be accommodated by 
corresponding changes in the money supply so that stability 
of the demand function would no longer be a crucial policy 
issue. In fact if the demand for broad money function was 
unstable then an exchange rate target would be preferred to 
a money supply target providing the balance of the argument 
concerning other factors does not come down strongly in favour 
of the latter. So, to some extent at least# the optimal 
choice of regime may well depend on the stabilityl or 
otherwisep of the UK ZM3 demand function. 
See Chapter 2, p. 67 (footnote), for the basis of the case 
for an exchange rate target. 
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Since my empirical work suggests that the ZM3 
demand function has been reasonably stable in the post-CCC 
period this at least implies that monetary targeting need 
not be inferior to exchange rate targeting. However, it 
must be remembered that the absence of exchange controls in 
the 1980's may well mean that the exchange rate becomes a 
significant explanatory variable in the demand for broad 
money function. The empirical results for the post-CCC 
1970's suggested that the exchange rate had only a negligible 
influence on money demand but exchange controls were in 
force throughout this period until October 1979. Although 
the tracking performance of the preferred LM3 equation was 
reasonable over the first five quarters of. the post-exchange 
controls periodo 1980(l)-1981(1)0 until more data from the 
1980's becomes available we are not in a good position to 
judge whether exchange rate behaviour is more than just a 
potentially destabilising influence on the demand for money. 
Money supply and exchange rate targeting could be 
formally assessed in the context of Policy simulation 
exercises. based on comprehensive structural macroeconomic 
models representing alternative schools of thought regarding 
the workings of the economy and the relevant transmission 
mechanisms. Within such models one could then test whether 
a policy of monetary targeting was capable of achieving a 
closer control over inflation than exchange rate targeting 
(given certain policy constraints relating to the balance of 
payments and unemployment$ for example). Assuming that a 
policy of monetary targeting, with fiscal policy and. interest 
rate manipulation as the main instruments of monetary control, 
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could be shown to be optimal under thfý extreme assumption 
of perfect stability of the demand for broad money function, 
one could then test how sensitive the findings were to 
varying degrees of imposed instability in the demand 
function. This could be achieved by forcing the money demand 
parameters to change over the relevant policy period by 
varying amounts. In this way one could assess (1) how 
unstable this function can be before exchange rate targeting 
becomes preferable, and (2) how sensitive the policy target 
variable# the rate of inflation, is to both the nature and 
the degree of instability introduced. It would also be 
possible to assess the relative speeds with which the 
alternative policy instruments can actually influence the 
rate of inflation. 
It may# of course, be necessary to disaggregate ZM3 
by type of money deposit, or by type of holder before coming 
to any conclusions concerning the stability of the demand 
function in the first place. The empirical work presented 
in this thesis suggests that the money-demand behaviour of 
the company and personal sectors, for example# is decidedly 
different, especially with regard to adjustment speed and 
respons&s to interest rate changes. This, in turns suggests 
that a re-distribution of income between the sectorsp or the 
introduction of a new technique of monetary control which 
has a more dramatic impact on one of the sectors, might 
I leave this as an exercise for researchers with access 
to powerful macroeconomic models which spell out the 
relevant transmission mechanisms and the lag structures 
in detail. The IS/LM model considered earlier in the 
chapter is too small and simple to be useful in this 
context. 
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easily upset the aggregate broad money demand function 
while the disaggregated functions actually remain stable. 
In a comprehensive structural macroeconomic model, 
disaggregation of &M3 demand by at least type of holder 
would be advisablep in view of the fact that companies and 
households respond to different variables at different. 
speeds. 
If a picture of instability in the demand for broad 
money function(s) was to emerge in the 1980's, then 
providing the success of money supply targeting was seen 
to critically depend on stability, a strong case could be 
made for the UK to adopt a policy of exchange rate targeting, 
thus following the examples of Austrias Belgium and Sweden. 
However, the empirical evidence from the post-CCC 19701s 
certainly suggests that monetarists have no cause for alarm 
as far as the demand for money is concerned. Achieving 
adequate control of the money supply without causing 
distortions to financial markets appears to be the major 
problem. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Money stock variables 
Ml = Notes and coin in circulation 
+ private sector sterling sight 
deposits 
LM3 = Ml + private sector time deposits 
(sterling) + public sector 
deposits (sterling) 
TD = ZM3-Ml 
Mp = Personal sector holdings of M3 
deposits 
MC 1= Company sector holdings of M3 
deposits 
Income and price variables 
A Aqqregate money definitions 
M1 p TD, SM3 
y= GDP at current market prices 
y= GDP at 1975 market prices 
P= GDP deflator 
B P-ersonal sector - MP 
PDI = Personal disposable income at 
1975 market prices 
P= PDI deflator 
C C-ompany sector - MC 
IND index of industrial production 
PWH Wholesale price index (output) 
YCU GDP at current factor cost 
prices 
y GDP at 1975 factor cost prices 
P GDP deflator 
Data source 
Financial 
statistics 
Economic trends 
annual supplement 
Economic trends 
annual supplement 
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Interest rate variables 
(1) Short-term interest rates 
" BU = Building society deposit rate expressed on a pre-tax basis 
" CD = 
Rate on 3-month certificates 
of deposit 
" EU = Euro-dollar rate 
" LA = Rate on 
3-month local authority 
debt 
R7 Rate paid on ordinary interest- OR bearing bank deposit accounts 
(2) Lonqer-term interest rates 
RS Redemption yield on 5-year B 
government bonds: short-term 
bond rate 
RL Yield on V-2% consols: long-term B bond rate 
6R 
Bý Change 
in bond rate 
Other variables 
-A P Inflation as measured by the 
moving annual percentage 
changes in the RPI 
PQ Inflation as measured by 
quarterly percentage changes 
in the RPI 
Inflation as measured by the 
moving annual percentage changes 
in the wholesale price index 
(output) 
EX = Sterling effective exchange rate 
, &EX = Change 
in exchange rate 
N Number of companies participating 
in the Department of Industry's 
survey of company liquidity 
Nl = Number of manufacturing companies 
participating in the survey 
N2 = Number of non-manufacturing 
companies participating in the 
survey 
DI, D2, D3 = Seasonal dummies 
Data source 
Financial 
Statistics 
Economic trends 
annual supplement 
Financial 
statistics 
British business 
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Data source 
Variables included in simultaneous2 
equation models - Ml, ZM3 
A= Autonomous expenditure (G+X) 
U= Unemployment rate Economic trends 
1 75 = Gross 
domestic fixed capital annual supplement 
formation at 1975 market 
prices 
W= Wages and salaries index 
H= Reserve assets base 
MLR = Minimum lending rate 
Financial 
statistics 
PSBR = Public sector borrowing 
requirement 
Notes 
1. For survey company models (DOI survey of company 
liquidity): 
MC = Holdings of M3 deposits by all survey- companies. 
MC1 = Manufacturing survey company holdings of M3 
deposits. 
MC2 = Non-manufacturing survey company holdings of M3 
deposits. 
2. For the simultaneous equation models only the variables 
for the money supply and goods market equations are 
defined. The money demand variables have already been 
defined. 
For the company sectorp only variables entering the 
demand for money equation have been defined in this Appendix. 
For definitions of each of the variables included in the 
dis-aggregated liquid assets demand model see Chapter 9. 
sections 9.1.2 and 9.1.3. 
All aggregate money stock, income and price data is 
seasonally adjusted, whereas the corresponding sectoral data 
is seasonally unadjusted unless stated otherwise in the 
reported results. 
All income and money stock data is in Lmillions unless 
stated otherwise in the reported results. 
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